Executive Summary

• Education reform in Tunisia has stalled since 2023.
• The impasse reflects deeper legitimacy conflicts between unions and the state.
• Defensive institutional cultures and mistrust prevent meaningful dialogue.
• Without reform, Tunisia risks human capital loss and rising inequality.
• A three-track approach involving unions, MOE, and civil society can reopen reform pathways.

Introduction

Since the 23 May 2023 agreement between the Ministry of Education (MOE) and teacher unions, negotiations over education reform have reached an impasse.¹Although the agreement included phased salary increases of 100 Tunisian dinars annually over three years (starting in 2026), promotion measures with retroactive effect from July 2025, provisions for career progression, and broader commitments to continue sectoral dialogue and address the demands raised by teachers, the unions later accused the government of failing to fully implement its commitments and refusing to engage in dialogue. This crisis is often attributed to the political context of the post-2021 period, marked by the exceptional measures led by President Kais Saied, including suspending and then dissolving the parliament, replacing the 2014 constitution, and limiting the space for dialogue and civic engagement. While this explanation may hold some contextual relevance, the stalemate also reveals deeper structural and historical issues, including protracted contests over legitimacy and mandates, as well as persistent mistrust, that remain unresolved between the government and unions.

This policy brief is informed by consultations during the workshop “Education Reform in Tunisia,” held on 1 February 2026 in Tunis, which convened former MOE advisers, education inspectors, civil society representatives, and development practitioners to discuss the ongoing standoff between the MOE and teacher unions. It also draws on the author’s experience working with civil society actors and donor-funded education reform and youth programs in Tunisia between 2020 and 2024. Based on these insights, the brief analyzes the stakeholder dynamics underlying Tunisia’s education policy impasse, incorporates third-party actors’ perspectives, assesses potential consequences, and proposes a three-track policy framework to advance the reform process.

Understanding Stakeholder Dynamics

This section focuses on the key parties’ positions and their implications for the negotiations and reform process. It also incorporates perspectives from third-party actors, such as CSOs and development practitioners, to unpack the causes underpinning the stalemate in the education reform process.

The Clash over Legitimacy and Mandates: Unions vs. MOE

The standoff between teacher unions and the MOE reflects an enduring contest over legitimacy. Historically, teacher unions, a key constituency of the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT), have seen themselves as pillars of national activism. From the independence struggle and post-1956 statebuilding, to navigating political survival under Ben Ali, participating in the 2011 Revolution, and mediating during the 2013–14 National Dialogue, the unions have consistently shaped Tunisia’s political landscape.²Dina Bishara, “Legacy Trade Unions as Brokers of Democratization? Lessons from Tunisia”, Comparative Politics 52, no. 2 (2020); Ly Netterstrøm, Kasper, “The Tunisian General Labor Union and the Advent of Democracy”, The Middle East Journal 70, no. 3 (2016). “This long history of activism has legitimized the UGTT as a key political actor in Tunisia.”³Author observations during a policy dialogue workshop on education reform in Tunisia, 1 February 2026 These experiences have constructed teacher unions’ self-perception as guardians of the public sector rather than as partners in its transformation. This legacy explains why, since 2011, union leaders have sought to position themselves not only as defenders of teachers’ rights but also as legitimate actors in leading the direction of the education sector. Rather than treating reform as a purely technical domain reserved for the Ministry, unions have actively intervened in debates over the purpose, priorities, and implementation of education policy.

Initiatives such as revising curricula, integrating digital technologies, or modernizing assessment systems were often presented by policymakers or donors as neutral or technical adjustments.⁴Author observation based on professional engagement with education policy stakeholders in Tunisia between 2020–2024.   However, union members interpreted and publicly contested these proposals as part of a broader neoliberal agenda that prioritized efficiency, performance metrics, and standardization over equity and social justice. ⁵Ibid. Through negotiations, public statements, and mobilization, teacher unions sought to redefine these reforms within a broader political debate about the role of public education and the protection of social rights. In this sense, reform was not seen merely as a technical adjustment but as a political and ideological struggle over who has the authority to define the future of the education system and how its institutions should evolve. Yet, today, this historically rooted legitimacy, while a source of strength and mobilization, stands in tension with the MOE—an institution that frames reform around state authority and legitimacy and fiscal rationalization rather than compromise.

In this competing narrative of legitimacy, the MOE has reasserted its mandate to restore “state prestige and authority” and protect public interests. This discourse reflects President Saied’s criticism of post-2011 institutional fragmentation, his push to strengthen executive control, and, most notably, his efforts to curb the influence of unions and other powerful civil society and political actors.⁶Ashley Anderson, Between Resistance and Fragmentation: The UGTT at a Crossroads, December 2025, available at https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/between-resistance-and-fragmentation-the-ugtt-at-a-crossroads/ In practice, it signals a project of recentralizing decision-making power and reinforcing the state’s capacity to implement policy without obstruction. This trend intensified after 2021, when the state began reversing the pattern in which teacher unions had held considerable influence over MOE decisions.⁷Sobhy Hania, “When Do Teachers Strike: Between Strong Unions, Divergent Preferences and Political Opportunity in Tunisia”, Globalisation, Societies and Education 23, no. 1 (2024).

This longstanding tension between unionist and statist approaches to decision-making has shaped the education sector in ways that reflect both institutional conflict and disruption. For instance, as noted by a participant:

After 2011, in the name of democratization, many school directors who were deemed regime loyalists were removed at the unions’ request. This purge disrupted institutional continuity and replaced experienced administrators with pro-union appointees who had little managerial experience. The outcome was not renewal but administrative disarray and loss of institutional memory.⁸Author observations during a policy dialogue workshop on education reform in Tunisia, 1 February 2026.

The post-2011 union dominance has given way to the post-2021 statist approach in which decision-making within the MOE is no longer shaped by unions’ leverage. This statist approach is evident in two areas: the MOE's handling of the 2023 national consultations on education reform, whose findings remain unpublished, and the Higher Council of Education, which, while legally created, is not yet fully operational to deliver the reforms it was intended to oversee.⁹The 2023 national consultations on education reform were launched by the MOE on 15 September 2023 and ran until 15 December 2023, as a public consultation on proposals for reforming Tunisia’s education system. Despite participation from various stakeholders, the official findings remain unpublished as of early 2026. The Higher Council of Education, envisioned in the 2022 Constitution to oversee education policy and reform, was established on paper through a presidential decree on 17 September 2024, with further administrative organization decreed on 9 May 2025. While some symbolic events (ceremonial openings, official visits, and meetings) have taken place, the Council is not yet fully operational and does not yet function as an autonomous policy-making body. In the broader context of return to a centralized governance model, this approach has not translated into rapid or comprehensive policy reform, with key initiatives moving slowly and implementation bottlenecks persisting. This underscores the limitations of the top-down reform strategy, which constrains broader and meaningful societal participation in decision-making.¹⁰Fabrizio Li Vigni, “Online participatory authoritarianism. The case of Tunisia’s E-istichara platform under Kaïs Saïed (2022)”, The Journal of North African Studies (2025). Ultimately, these clashes over legitimacy and competing mandates have prolonged the stalemate, blocking any concrete progress in the reform process.

Implications of Legitimacy Clashes on Negotiations and Reform

At the heart of the contest over legitimacy lies mutual mistrust that influences both parties' behaviors in the negotiation process. This mistrust has transformed negotiations from a tool of progress into what a civil society representative described as: “Arm‑wrestling sessions.”¹¹Ibid. The anecdote of the female teacher who repaired her classroom tables illustrates this behavior: when reprimanded by a union colleague for: “Leaving no bargaining chip for us,”¹²Author observations during a policy dialogue workshop on education reform in Tunisia, 1 February 2026. her initiative was condemned as undermining collective leverage. For unions, control equals survival; for the MOE, concessions signal weakness. This dynamic was also evident in the 2025 decision by the Tunisian government to unilaterally decide wage increases without union consultation—a first since the 1970s. ¹³Majdi Ouerfelli, “UGTT-Kais Saied: 2026, a decisive year?”, Nawaat, 6 January 2026, available at https://nawaat.org/2026/01/06/ugtt-kais-saied-2026-a-decisive-year/#:~:text=The%20question%20of%20wage%20increases,increases%20in%20the%20private%20sector.  This mistrust has set the stage for a negotiation environment defined less by dialogue and shared goals than by caution, calculation, and the protection of individual interest.

These defensive postures have hardened positions on both sides, turning negotiations into transactional exercises rather than collaborative problem-solving. As one former inspector explained: “Negotiations have become purely transactional, derailing reform from its core mission.”¹⁴Author observations during a policy dialogue workshop on education reform in Tunisia, 1 February 2026. Consequently, the agenda of negotiations has become narrowly focused on short-term gains, such as wages and symbolic victories, while neglecting fundamental issues and failing to advance systemic reform. Public perception has also influenced bargaining leverage: repeated strikes during the previous school years exposed teacher unions to parental and societal criticism, weakening their negotiating position. In recent years, reduced societal support has limited unions’ ability to present their demands as nationally representative, making it easier for the government to resist concessions and frame labor activism as obstructionist. ¹⁵Ibid.

The implications for reform are equally pronounced. The legitimacy tensions have altered both the tone and the balance of power in negotiations, constraining the scope of possible agreements. As a result, education reform in Tunisia has gradually shifted from a cohesive national development project to a series of transactional, short‑term initiatives. Unlike the 1958 reform, which supported broader nation‑ and state‑building goals, the post‑2011 and 2021 efforts reveal fragmented agendas lacking a shared vision. In this environment, both unions and the MOE react defensively, producing a patchwork of isolated “mini-reforms” disconnected from long-term developmental purposes. ¹⁶Ibid. These piecemeal measures often reinforce existing inefficiencies, fail to build institutional capacity, and reflect a system trapped in short-term compromises or fixes rather than pursuing coherent, long-term strategies for educational development.¹⁷Haythem Dellai, Behind the Wall Collapse in Mezzouna: Accountability and Reform in Tunisia’s Public Education, July 2025, Available at https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/behind-the-wall-collapse-in-mezzouna-accountability-and-reform-in-tunisias-public-education/?tztc=1

Third-Party Perspectives on Education Reform

Third-party actors¹⁸Third-party actors include development practitioners, donors, and local CSO leaders who contribute to the reform process in various capacities, such as providing trainings, conducting research, engaging in advocacy, and offering other forms of technical or institutional support. describe Tunisia’s education reform context as defensive and exclusionary, shaped by institutional insularity on all sides. As one development practitioner noted:

Policy advancement relies heavily on connections. To start a conversation about reform or even a technical partnership, you must identify your key person in the MOE and build an informal network of supporters within different administrations that will facilitate the acceptance of proposals.¹⁹Author observations during a policy dialogue workshop on education reform in Tunisia, 1 February 2026.   

In other words, third-party actors often depend on intermediaries to shepherd proposals through what participants called the “bureaucratic labyrinth.” This labyrinth, experts explained, has evolved into a defensive system that protects individuals and enforces gatekeeping. The reason is that if a reform proposal is perceived as a threat to an official, it is often blocked through procedural delays or selective interpretation of rules.²⁰Ibid. This informal veto power ensures that projects—such as those proposed by CSOs or donors—are often neutralized long before formal rejection. One participant illustrated this dynamic:

Project proposals to modernize the civic education curriculum in Tunisia languished for years awaiting signatures and approvals. Each time a minister changed, the process had to be redone; even small administrative protocols required personal mediation.²¹Ibid.

Essentially, this means that the absence of consistent gate‑openers within the MOE greatly limits the prospects for progress and undermines any shared sense of ownership. These patterns of governance feed the perception of an insular MOE that operates through caution rather than transparency and collaboration.

Similarly, union culture—once grounded in solidarity and teachers’ dignity—has gradually internalized exclusionary habits.²²Ibid. Some union members, as one participant observed: “Reject views, criticisms, or recommendations from other actors, insisting that they alone are entitled to defend the education sector.”²³Ibid. This view, echoed by several civil society participants, reflects a broader pattern of gatekeeping that alienates potential reform allies in civil society, research institutions, and even among pro‑reform officials. In addition, from a gender perspective, a civil society representative noted persistent male dominance in union leadership and bargaining as a critical blind spot:

Women form the bulk of the education workforce yet hold little voice at the negotiation table, sidelining urgent priorities like safe facilities, harassment protections, student well-being, and occupational health risks.²⁴Ibid.

This representation gap fosters perceptions that the organization’s priorities overlook women educators' realities, fueling demoralization and weakening credibility among diverse members. Without renewal mechanisms such as self-evaluation or leadership rotation to include women’s perspectives and grassroots voices, unions risk distancing themselves from their core base and deepening the system’s trust deficit.²⁵Ibid. In aggregate terms, these observations point to a reform landscape shaped more by protective reflexes than by participatory engagement, with third‑party actors observing institutions guard their boundaries rather than open them to collaboration. This stance has not only limited innovation but also deepened mistrust between state actors and the very partners needed to sustain meaningful education reform.

The Costs of the Stalemate

This section looks at what the deadlock in education reform could mean for the future, examining both its immediate consequences and potential long-term effects.

The Rise of Fear Culture

Fear has become both a management tool and a behavior pattern. Teachers avoid taking personal initiative because action outside officially sanctioned channels can be construed as disloyalty. For instance, education now is described as a sector where: “No one is willing to take initiative or think outside the box, as that may result in disciplinary action.”²⁶Ibid. The consequences for professional identity are profound: teachers, once proud generation makers, have “lost their sense of belonging and symbolic power.”²⁷Ibid. Therefore, instead of serving as catalysts of change, many now feel reduced to wage claimants. This culture discourages teachers and administrators from addressing problems creatively or publicly advocating for improvement, creating classrooms where rote memorization substitutes for critical thinking and where outdated teaching methods persist unchallenged.²⁸Ibid.

The effects of this culture have already been visible in students’ outcomes. Tunisia’s performance in the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 2015 cycle—ranking near the bottom among participating countries (65th out of 70), with scores of 361 in reading, ~367 in mathematics, and 386 in science, more than 115–130 points below the OECD average of ~490–493—highlighted serious learning gaps.²⁹OECD, PISA 2015 Results (Volume I), 2016, available at https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2016/12/pisa-2015-results-volume-i_g1g7397c/9789264266490-en.pdf p. 44. However, instead of addressing these negative outcomes, the Ministry chose not to participate in the 2018 test and subsequent assessment cycles.³⁰Majdi Hassen, Mohamed Ali Marouani, and Emilie Wojcieszynski, Mitigation strategies in response to COVID-19 and inequalities in Tunisia, 2021, Available at https://includeplatform.net/publications/mitigation-strategies-in-response-to-covid-19-and-inequalities-in-tunisia/ p. 13. This retreat reflects an avoidance of external benchmarks that could expose the MOE to criticism and public scrutiny. The result is another generation of students inheriting not just knowledge gaps but also the same risk-averse mindset that perpetuates stagnation across the system.

The Erosion of Civic Engagement

Tunisia’s education sector demonstrates limited openness to civil society, creating barriers to collaborative reform. As highlighted by a civil society representative:

Schools are not open to CSOs; collaboration depends on the profile of the school director. Initiatives that manage to enter are occasional, informal, and based on personal connections.³¹Author observations during a policy dialogue workshop on education reform in Tunisia, 1 February 2026.

This ad hoc, profile-dependent collaboration fosters inconsistency, making CSOs’ initiatives marginal and lacking scalability since programs approved by one director may typically be discontinued by their successor, preventing institutionalization and national replication, thus depriving schools of local and international expertise in pedagogy, teacher training, and curriculum innovation that could complement formal reform efforts.³²Author’s observation based on professional engagement with education policy stakeholders in Tunisia between 2020–2024. In the long term, this atmosphere may extend beyond classrooms: CSOs, parents, and students could withdraw from the public space, as speaking up or organizing around education carries risk.³³Author observations during a policy dialogue workshop on education reform in Tunisia, 1 February 2026. Without sustained third-party actors’ engagement, education reform may lose community buy-in, contributing to broader disengagement from the civic space and societal dialogue. Ultimately, when collaboration shrinks, trust declines, and the sense of collective responsibility diminishes across society.

Human Capital Flight and Intergenerational Consequences

Tunisia’s education system is losing its brightest human capital. Students see limited prospects within the domestic labor market; teachers and young professionals increasingly view migration as the rational escape from unemployment. As one expert summarized: “Education is not producing future officials, leaders, and workforce; it is producing migrants.”³⁴Ibid. This points to an education system that has become a migration pipeline instead of a nation-building engine, where officials, leaders, and workers head abroad due to missing jobs at home. The long-term implications are stark. The decline of public trust in education undermines Tunisia’s capacity to empower its skilled workforce. Deprived of its traditional social mission, schooling can no longer unify communities or attract young talent.

These systemic shortcomings are mirrored in the daily experience of Tunisian students in 2026. Schooling remains largely uninspiring and attendance-driven, with curricula and teaching methods poorly aligned with technological advances. Classrooms rarely leverage digital tools or innovative pedagogies that could enhance engagement. This has created a “two-speed”³⁵Translated originally from French: Une éducation à double vitesse education system: private and international institutions benefit from advanced resources and modern teaching practices, while public schools continue to operate with minimal innovation and limited state support.³⁶Ibid. This gap reinforces educational inequality, creating cohorts of students whose learning opportunities and skill development are fundamentally uneven.³⁷Dellai, “Behind the Wall Collapse”. Intergenerationally, this decline entrenches inequality, hinders social mobility, and extends poverty cycles. In this way, the stalemate may damage the very foundations of social cohesion or as framed by participants: “The collapse of education gradually leads to the collapse of society.”³⁸Author observations during a policy dialogue workshop on education reform in Tunisia, 1 February 2026.

Conclusion & Recommendations

The legitimacy and power struggle between the government and teacher unions continues to influence the trajectory of education reform in Tunisia. While in the post-2011 phase, negotiation between the MOE and unions was the norm and a standard means of resolving conflict and deliberating major decisions, in the post-2021 phase, the space for dialogue and civic engagement has markedly shrunk. Within this context, each party claims to be the “true guardian” of public education and takes unilateral actions, such as strikes by unions and unnegotiated salary increases or cuts by the government. Since 2023, these escalatory behaviors have prevented any meaningful progress in reforming a crumbling education system. Both parties’ ability to overcome differences and build a long-term vision for a robust education system has also been weakened. Meanwhile, the space for civil society actors to act as dialogue brokers and help overcome this deadlock has been limited, leaving no room for third-party mediation and collaborative engagement.

To address this protracted stalemate, three complementary reform tracks can guide progress in Tunisia’s education sector, reflecting the distinct yet interdependent roles of teacher unions, the MOE, and CSOs. Each track emphasizes a different dimension of reform: internal renewal and dialogue within unions, institutional openness and accountability within the MOE, and mediation and participatory engagement through civil society. Together, they outline a negotiated pathway toward education reform grounded in cooperation, transparency, and shared national purpose.

Union Track

• Institutionalize self-assessment and renewal: Establish structured mechanisms for auto-evaluation to reassess union strategies, leadership practices, and engagement approaches in light of evolving education and political challenges.
• Broaden participation in reform discussions: Ensure that education dialogue remains open and pluralistic, preventing monopolization by specific institutions or interest groups.

Ministry of Education (MOE) Track

• Embed reform in a shared national vision: Position education reform as part of a broader national development project rather than a battleground for ideological polarization.
• Reinforce institutional coordination: Activate the Higher Council of Education and publicly release the results of the national education survey to guide dialogue and evidence-based policy-making.
• Adopt an open-governance approach: Foster collaboration with donors, civil society organizations, researchers, and media to increase transparency and public confidence.
• Advance equity in education financing: Ensure transparent and fair resource allocation across governorates and school levels to address regional disparities and reinforce social cohesion.
• Diversify school funding sources: Develop new funding schemes and partnerships to mobilize local resources, particularly for underserved public schools.
• Prioritize implementation planning for reforms: Support all pedagogical reforms with detailed implementation roadmaps, including timelines, performance indicators, and accountability tools.
• Engage with media as a constructive stakeholder: Encourage both national and alternative media to foster informed debate, present balanced narratives, and defend the value of quality public education.

Civil Society Organizations Track

• Forge national advocacy alliances: Partner with other national human rights and civil society organizations and research institutions to advance unified advocacy for systemic education reform.
• Institutionalize inclusive dialogue platforms: Create regional structures/platforms that bring together CSOs and local stakeholders to promote sustained dialogue and action supporting schools.
• Expand CSOs’ mediation role: Strengthen CSOs to connect local communities with state services and articulate citizens’ needs to policymakers.
• Sustain cultural engagement and training programs: Continue implementing community-based cultural activities and capacity-building initiatives that promote civic engagement and collective community actions.