As 2026 begins, the Arab region stands at a critical juncture, shaped by the cumulative weight of unresolved conflicts, economic strain, environmental stress, and shifting regional and international alignments. Yet moments of uncertainty are also moments of possibility. Across the region, societies continue to adapt, organize, and articulate demands for dignity, justice, and accountable governance, albeit in constrained and uneven ways. At the Arab Reform Initiative, we will be closely tracking the following ten developments, drawing on insights from ARI’s subject matter experts; extended reflections on each issue are available on our website.
1. Syria’s transition pathways, particularly whether emerging domestic initiatives, local governance efforts, and societal pressures can create openings for meaningful political change, or whether internal dynamics remain constrained by a security-dominated framework reinforced by regional and international normalization.
“A central dynamic to watch in 2026 is whether Syria’s transitional authorities can move from managing fragmentation to addressing it. While military and security-first approaches may appear to offer quick solutions, they risk destabilising the transition and undermining Syria’s future. A more sustainable path lies in political inclusion by reconciling deep domestic divisions, particularly with Kurdish, Druze, and Alawite communities, through meaningful power sharing, expanded participation, and institutional reform that strengthens accountability and transparency. This is closely linked to transitional justice. Without credible processes to address past and recent violations, the risk of indiscriminate sectarian attacks, vigilante killings, and collective punishment will continue to rise, preventing communities from healing and entrenching narratives of collective guilt. The economic test is equally decisive. As living costs outpace wages, the failure to narrow the gap between incomes and household survival expenses risks eroding social trust, amplifying grievances, opening space for corruption, and further straining governing capacity. Finally, the trajectory of the transition will depend on whether the authorities can curb Israeli military operations and limit external intervention, both of which undermine sovereignty and complicate stabilisation.” Dr.Haid Haid, Non-resident Senior Fellow
2. Gaza and the broader quest for Palestinian political representation and self-determination, including governance scenarios for Gaza, the ongoing settlement expansions in the West Bank, and regional diplomatic arrangements.
“The US Administration is adamant about launching the so-called “Board of Peace” in early 2026 - a foreign-imposed entity and governing mechanism to control Gaza and sustain and entrench, instead of dismantle, Israel’s settler colonial domination over Palestinians. Like most “Gaza Day After” plans, it seeks to confine broader Palestinian action, fragment the comprehensive Palestinian identity, and strip the Palestinians from their political agency. In response, in 2026, Palestinians must actively engage in a counter-process to what is being imposed upon them, and must not go along with or submit to new colonial conditions, even if they appear, on the surface, less brutal, or if galvanised with a UN Resolution that aim to repackage colonial rule.
The reconstruction of Gaza and planning its future represent a necessary “opportunity” for political reconstruction of Palestinian politics and governance. This process cannot be confined to Gaza alone. It necessarily extends beyond it and requires the formulation of a collective roadmap for the nature of the Palestinian political system, its representative institutions, its leadership, and its vision. Political reconstruction constitutes another pre-emptive condition that cannot be postponed or denied if the goal is freedom and liberation. And the time for that is now.” Dr. Alaa Tartir, ARI Board Member - Senior Researcher and Director of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
3. The trajectory of Tunisia’s political system, especially whether continued institutional hollowing-out and outright repression gives way to renewed social contestation, elite realignment, or deeper authoritarian consolidation.
“The year 2025 has been an eventful year. New arrests and convictions have decimated the ranks of the opposition. However, the regime does not necessarily come out of the year strengthened. It has had to face an unprecedented increase in social protests, to which his policy responses remain rather limited, centred about gaining time.
What we will be observing in 2026: the opposition's ability to converge struggles. The first rapprochements between different parts of the opposition have been observed since the second half of the year, but the question that persists is whether these rapprochements can be formalised by a common platform. But it will also be necessary to observe the opposition's ability to align itself with the socio-economic agenda of the protests rather than remain on a simple political and institutional reading of the crisis that the country is going through. On the regime's side, if repression has become the norm, we will have to observe its ability to deploy social policies within a framework of austerity to maintain social peace. It will also be necessary to observe the relations between the executive and an increasingly vocal parliament” Malek Lakhal, Research Fellow - Tunis.
4. The future of reformist political forces in Lebanon, particularly in light of the parliamentary elections scheduled for May 2026, the continued Israeli attacks, and ongoing debates over accountability, economic recovery, and state capture.
“Three dynamics will be central to Lebanon’s trajectory in 2026. The first is a race against time between Lebanese-led efforts to disarm Hezbollah and find a new political arrangement and an increasingly belligerent and impatient Israel that keeps threatening more war. The second is the trajectory of attempts to adopt key domestic economic reforms and start the process of rebuilding the destroyed parts of the country and the economy. With parliamentary elections scheduled for May, the traditional political class’ instinct will be to procrastinate, but Salam’s government will try to push certain reforms with the support of regional and international backers. In that regard, the fate of the law on financial losses will be a key indicator of reform seriousness. And finally, if war is averted, then Lebanon’s long-standing and unresolved challenges will return to the forefront – from the collapse of state and municipal services to the rampant impunity. The question will then be whether reform-minded political actors and movements can move beyond ad hoc crisis management toward meaningful institutional recovery.” - Nadim Houri, Executive Director
5. Yemen’s evolving political trajectory, particularly how the divergence between Saudi and Emirati priorities continues to reshape political and territorial dynamics in the south, the future of relations between the internationally recognized government and the Southern Transitional Council, and whether these fractures entrench de facto partition amid ongoing economic collapse and humanitarian crisis.
“The recent rift between Saudi Arabia and the UAE over Yemen is likely to have profound and costly consequences for the country. Already facing what the UN has described as the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, Yemen now confronts renewed instability as competition between two former allies against the Houthis deepens existing political and territorial fragmentation. This rivalry risks undermining the fragile truce, diverting attention from urgently needed stabilisation efforts, and, most dangerously, opening a new chapter of proxy conflict on Yemeni soil.
While Yemen is unlikely to experience a formal partition, it will continue to bear the heavy price of tensions between two powerful, wealthy, and largely unaccountable regional actors. Although the UAE has formally scaled back its military presence, it remains a deeply influential and potentially disruptive actor, given the extensive financial, political, and military networks it has built in Yemen over the past decade.
One of the enduring lessons of modern conflict is that proxy wars are often more reckless, destructive, and prolonged than direct confrontations. For a country already shattered by years of conflict, economic collapse, and humanitarian suffering, this is an especially dangerous trajectory.” - Farea Al-Muslimi, ARI Board Member and research fellow at chatham house focusing on Yemen and gulf
6. Economic reform and social stability in Egypt, where inflation, debt servicing, and IMF-linked reforms will continue to place sustained pressure on households, and whether growing social discontent can generate new forms of negotiation between the state and society.
“As 2025 came to an end, Egypt updated its National Economic Development Narrative, announcing its plan to focus on structural reforms that aim at macroeconomic stability through tamed inflation, renewed growth, job creation, and “resilience.” The government is presenting this strategic framework as one that is built on Vision 2030 goals for a “sustainable and inclusive economy.” While reforms such as supporting productive sectors for an export-led growth, developing the infrastructure, and integrating performance-based budgeting for efficient implementation sound promising, reliance on private investments – including from the Gulf, State-owned enterprises run by the army, and further IMF disbursements as main reform channels raise critical questions: How would such a plan address stubborn poverty and rising inequalities? How would private sector empowerment ensure that growth stakes are evenly distributed to reduce income gaps? How would prospective IMF disbursements counter the heavy debt-burden born by the poorest, while Egypt remains the second biggest IMF-debtor in the world? The proof of success will be one of truly inclusive economic restructuring.” Farah Al Shami, Senior Fellow and Social Protection Program Director.
7. Climate governance in water-stressed countries across the region, where drought, agricultural decline, and energy transitions are increasingly political issues, not just environmental ones.
“In 2026, climate governance in the Middle East and North Africa will be shaped less by formal commitments than by how climate action is negotiated amid war, sanctions, and geopolitical uncertainty. Ongoing conflicts, from Gaza to Syria and Yemen, have exposed how deeply climate vulnerability is linked with displacement, food systems collapse, and infrastructure destruction, yet these crises are also forcing new forms of solidarity.
Humanitarian actors, municipalities, and regional research networks are increasingly integrating climate adaptation into emergency response, agriculture, and water governance, often outside traditional climate institutions. At the global level, strategic competition and energy insecurity continue to distort climate priorities, but they also open space for South–South cooperation and locally anchored adaptation finance. The opportunity in 2026 is to move beyond viewing the MENA as a zone of climate vulnerability and risk, and instead to recognize it as a testing ground for conflict-aware climate governance capable of shaping global debates through locally driven responses and alternative policy pathways.”- Sarine Karajerjian, , Environmental Politics Program Director.
8. The shrinking — and adapting — space for civil society and independent research across the region, including how activists, researchers, and organizations navigate legal, financial, and security constraints.
“Over the past year, many of us have been engaged in ongoing conversations attempting to answer a critical and urgent question: how do we, as civil society organizations, independent researchers, and activists in the region, adapt to a changing funding landscape, one further exacerbated by mounting security and legal constraints across many contexts? In reality, this is a question that will continue to haunt us for years to come. Addressing it has always been a political necessity; today, it has become an existential one.
While multiple avenues present themselves, much work remains to translate these ideas into realistic, actionable pathways. Turning inward to reimagine our institutional and organizational structures; investing in grassroots organizing and resourcing; and exploring South–South partnerships are all part of this ongoing reflection. What our collective efforts, and individual organizational models, will look like in the phase ahead lies at the heart of nearly every activity and conversation we are having this year.” Diala Ahwach, Program Coordinator on Human Rights and Social Justice- Arab Reform Initiative Team
9. Expanding digital infrastructures and the deployment by governments of artificial intelligence and surveillance technologies in the name of efficiency and security, and how citizens, activists, and workers adapt—using technology both as a space for expression and a terrain of contestation over rights, labor, and accountability.
Throughout the MENA region, States and private entities have embedded technology into security and governance systems for use in mass surveillance, disinformation campaigns, and repression of dissent – often while promoting these same technologies as vehicles for accountability and progress. At the same time, local and diaspora populations have used tech to dissent and mobilize, pushing for political change.
This contested terrain, at the heart of tech-centered discourse both regionally and globally, will be a core focus of our work in 2026. We will examine how physical infrastructure and governance frameworks produce environmental, economic, social, and political consequences for people's lived experiences.
A key risk to be aware of moving forward, and one that policymakers, researchers, and civil society must take seriously, is the persistence of optimistic and solutionist discourse that normalizes harmful systems while shielding technological development from legitimate concerns relating to privacy, safety, accountability, and justice.’’ Andrew Findell-Aghnatios, Senior Programme Coordinator
10. Gulf political and diplomatic repositioning, including how Gulf states are redefining their regional leadership roles, balancing economic statecraft with political mediation, managing relations with conflict-affected Arab countries and among themselves.
“A central question for 2026 is what role the Gulf states will play in shaping the regional order. Will they be able to leverage their economic weight and mediation capacities, as well as the predominance of transactional diplomacy, to contribute to conflict stabilization, support institutional recovery, and articulate a more coherent vision for regional order rather than fragmented, case-by-case interventions? Or will unresolved tensions and differing strategic priorities between key Gulf actors - notably Saudi Arabia and the UAE - constrain collective action and dilute regional influence, or even lead to further fragmentation and instability? This dynamic will have direct impact on Yemen and Sudan but will also directly affect the emerging security order in the Levant where Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq look to new alliances to replace the weakening of Iran’s axis and contain a belligerent Israel.’’ Sarah Anne Rennick, Deputy Director
In 2026, ARI will continue to follow these developments through grounded research, regional convenings, and engagement with actors working at the intersection of policy, knowledge production, and social justice — always centering the lived realities and political agency of people(s) across the Arab region. The task is daunting. This is why we need you – our partners, friends, and allies – more than ever.
Over the year, we will seek additional ways to engage with you as part of our commitment to anchor ourselves even more in our communities.
