In 2023, Tunisia imported nearly half of its natural gas needs, leaving it highly exposed to price volatility and energy insecurity. At the same time, the country is being promoted as a future hub for renewable energy, with ambitious promises to supply Europe with clean power.

Yet, with renewable energy contributing only 3% to Tunisia’s energy mix, a key question emerges: Is Tunisia’s energy transition truly about national sustainability, or is it paving the way for a new era of dependency?

The government has set a target of 35% renewables by 2030, but this goal remains more aspirational than achievable given the country’s deep reliance on fossil fuel imports and its governance challenges. Without addressing these structural issues, Tunisia risks falling into a form of green colonialism, where it produces clean energy for export while its citizens continue to face shortages and rising costs.

The urgency of Tunisia’s energy transition goes beyond technological and economic factors. It is deeply intertwined with governance deficits, equity concerns, and the need for meaningful civil society participation. A just transition requires more than infrastructure and foreign investment, it demands adherence to Just Transition Principles that ensure transparency, inclusivity, and good governance.

An October 2024 roundtable discussion, “Unpacking Just Transition: Conception, Civil Society, and Governance in Tunisia’s Energy Pathway”, shed light on these pressing issues. It offered crucial insights into how Tunisia and other countries in the West Asia and North Africa (WANA) region can navigate the complexities of energy sovereignty and sustainable development without sacrificing social justice.

1. The Just Transition Challenges in Tunisia

1.1 Historical Inequalities, Colonial Legacies, and External Dependencies

Tunisia’s energy sector has long been shaped by external exploitation, limiting the country’s control over its own resources. As Yasmina El Amine highlighted during the roundtable, Tunisia’s energy infrastructure was historically designed to serve foreign investment interests rather than local development needs. Under colonial rule, resource extraction was structured to benefit European hegemonies, prioritizing exports over domestic energy security. This legacy has not only persisted but has evolved into new forms of dependency under the pretext of renewable energy transition.

Even after independence, Tunisia struggled to assert full sovereignty over its energy sector. Foreign-led initiatives and international “financial assistance” often came with conditionalities that prioritized external markets. Today, this dynamic is re-emerging in Tunisia’s renewable energy transition, where large-scale green energy projects are increasingly designed for export, particularly to Europe. While framed as a step toward sustainability, these projects proved to risk replicating past patterns, where energy production is shaped by external interests rather than domestic needs.

Without a shift in governance and policy priorities, Tunisia’s renewable transition may become another chapter in a long history of resource extraction that benefits others while leaving local communities with little to no control over their own energy future.

Therefore, it is becoming increasingly clear that a just transition in Tunisia requires more than foreign investments and bilateral cooperation. It demands a decisive break from historical patterns of exploitation and dependency.

Today, Tunisia’s energy sector remains shaped by a combination of state control, private sector involvement, and international financial institutions. The Tunisian Electricity and Gas Company (STEG), a state-owned entity, plays a dominant role in electricity generation and distribution, yet it operates within a framework increasingly influenced by external financial actors.

International institutions, including the European Union (EU), the World Bank, and the African Development Bank, have introduced financial mechanisms such as green cooperation frameworks, EU-backed energy investments, and private-public partnerships to accelerate Tunisia’s renewable energy transition. While these instruments are framed as opportunities for sustainable development, they risk reproducing historical patterns of economic dependency.

Conditionalities tied to international financing, such as structural reforms promoting privatization could further reduce Tunisia’s sovereignty over its energy sector.

This raises the alarm about green structural adjustment, where loans and investments meant to support clean energy development come with policy conditions that prioritize foreign markets and investors over local needs. The European Green Deal and the EU’s Global Gateway strategy, for example, have already set the stage for increased European involvement in North Africa’s energy infrastructure, potentially turning Tunisia into an exporter of renewable energy while domestic energy security remains fragile.

Without addressing these deeply embedded disparities, Tunisia risks repeating the same dependency dynamics, this time under the guise of green energy transition, but possibly at a higher cost to national sovereignty and social equity.

 

1.2 The Risks of Tunisia’s Energy Megaprojects

Tunisia is being promoted as “the most attractive for investment in energy transition”, after raking 30th among emerging markets and 7th in Africa in Climatescope 2024. Many foreign investors are paying attention to the country's energy sector, bringing several renewable energy deals that, while they seem ambitious, also carry significant risks undermining Tunisia’s energy sovereignty and exacerbating existing inequalities.

Green Hydrogen Valley: Water Scarcity and Neo-Extractivism

The Green Hydrogen Valley project positions Tunisia as a key exporter of green hydrogen, but at what cost? The project’s reliance on desalinating vast amounts of seawater for electrolysis raises urgent concerns in a country where 27% of the population lacks reliable access to clean water. Tunisia is already known to be one of the most water-stressed countries in the world, with renewable freshwater resources dropping below 400 cubic meters per capita annually, far below the 1,000 cubic meter threshold for water scarcity.

Preliminary estimates suggest that large-scale green hydrogen production could consume up to 9 liters of water per kilogram of hydrogen produced, real-world production demands significantly more, with estimates ranging from 20 to 30 liters per kilogram when factoring in purification and cooling processes, adding enormous pressure to Tunisia’s already overstretched water reserves.

Civil society organizations, including Tunisia’s Observatory of Water and the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights (FTDES), have raised concerns that local water resources could be diverted from agricultural and domestic use to serve European energy needs.

Despite these risks, Tunisian officials, including representatives from the Ministry of Industry, Mines, and Energy, have continuously framed the project as an economic opportunity, introducing it as a potential foreign investment and job creation opportunity.

However, critics argue that without robust regulations and local benefit-sharing mechanisms, Tunisia risks falling into a neo-extractive model, where resources are extracted, the environmental burden falls on local communities, and profits flow abroad.

ELMED Connector, MEDGRID, RePowerEU: Energy for Europe, Costs for Tunisia?

These initiatives aim to integrate Tunisia into Europe’s renewable energy supply chain through large-scale electricity export infrastructure. While such projects are presented as a win-win for both regions, the economic terms suggest an imbalance that could deepen Tunisia’s dependency.

One major concern is the financial burden on Tunisia’s national electricity provider, STEG. Under new regulations, STEG is legally required to purchase electricity from private investors at inflated prices in foreign currency, effectively subsidizing foreign energy interests at the expense of domestic affordability. This dynamic has already led to rising local electricity costs, while Tunisia’s energy access remains precarious.

Furthermore, critics argue that these projects reinforce a "green paradox”, where Tunisia produces renewable energy only to export it to Europe while struggling with its domestic energy security. The Tunisian General Labor Union and environmental groups have voiced concerns over a lack of transparency in these agreements, questioning whether they serve national interests or primarily benefit European markets.

Protests and critiques have emerged in this response, particularly regarding the secrecy surrounding the terms of the ELMED project’s contract, as well as fears that Tunisia will remain locked in an energy-export model without guaranteeing meaningful long-term benefits.

Without governance reforms ensuring local energy sovereignty, Tunisia risks becoming an energy-export corridor where foreign companies profit, while local communities bear the social and economic costs.

1.3 Tunisia in the Broader Context: Reflecting a WANA-Wide Governance Dilemma

Tunisia’s challenge of balancing international partnerships with domestic development priorities mirrors a broader governance dilemma across the WANA region. Many countries are navigating the complex transition to renewables while struggling to avoid new forms of external dependency and deepening social inequalities.

A key reference is Morocco’s solar energy expansion, particularly the Noor Ouarzazate project, which positioned the country as a renewable energy leader. However, the project has faced significant land rights disputes and community displacement concerns, as many local populations were not adequately consulted, and compensation mechanisms were insufficient.

Tunisia can learn from Morocco’s experience by prioritizing community engagement, ensuring transparent land acquisition processes, and guaranteeing local benefit-sharing mechanisms. Establishing legal safeguards that prevent forced land transfers and offering equity stakes or revenue-sharing schemes to affected communities could also mitigate similar risks.

Similarly, Egypt’s Benban Solar Park, one of the largest solar farms in the world, successfully attracted international investment but revealed challenges in ensuring local job creation and equitable distribution of energy benefits. Tunisia should take note of the importance of strong labor policies in renewables, ensuring that investments translate into long-term employment opportunities for local communities, rather than relying on temporary or foreign labor forces.

In Jordan, the rapid expansion of private-sector-led renewable energy projects has led to rising electricity prices, as contracts with foreign investors included expensive buyback agreements. The latter reference can remind us of Tunisia’s ongoing energy privatization, particularly in the context of projects like ELMED, which should be carefully assessed to avoid similar pitfalls. Implementing pricing regulations, public ownership stakes, and local reinvestment requirements can ensure that renewable energy development does not disproportionately burden Tunisian consumers.

Hence, Tunisia’s experience can potentially offer a relevant case study for other WANA countries. Unless governance is strengthened, the just transition risks replicating past inequalities, where resource wealth benefits external stakeholders more than local populations.

2. Governance Deficits

2.1 Persistent Challenges in Tunisia’s Energy Sector

Tunisia’s energy sector has long suffered from opaque governance, a pattern that persists even as the country shifts toward renewables. As Charefeddine Yaakoubi notes, governance failures in the hydrocarbon sector, such as non-transparent contracts with foreign oil companies and the exclusion of local communities from decision-making, were never fully addressed. This lack of transparency has historically eroded public trust and fueled social unrest, particularly in resource-rich regions like Kebili and Tataouine, where protests over energy exploitation without local benefits have become recurrent.

Unfortunately, the same governance challenges are now resurfacing in Tunisia’s renewable energy transition. One striking example is the 2022 solar energy contract awarded to a foreign consortium led by AMEA Power and China's TBEA Xinjiang New Energy Co. The agreement, finalized in March 2022, involves the construction of a 100 MW solar power plant in Kairouan. However,  key terms, including pricing agreements and land acquisition details, were not publicly disclosed, raising concerns about transparency and potential prioritization of export-driven energy policies over domestic energy security and affordability.

The secrecy surrounding such deals raises concerns that Tunisia might once again prioritize export-driven energy policies at the expense of domestic affordability and local development.

Furthermore, civil society organizations such as the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights (FTDES) and I Watch have repeatedly called for greater transparency in energy agreements. However, their demands often go unheeded, as major energy contracts are negotiated behind closed doors, bypassing public scrutiny and democratic oversight.

This pattern risks trapping Tunisia in a cycle of energy dependency, exporting renewable energy while local communities struggle with rising electricity costs and limited access to affordable power. Without adopting structural governance reforms, the shift to renewables could reinforce the very neo-extractive dynamics Tunisia is seeking to escape.

2.2 Governance Reforms: Breaking the Cycle

To ensure a just and sovereign energy transition, Tunisia urgently needs an independent regulatory body to oversee renewable energy contracts and ensure public accountability. Currently, no such autonomous authority exists, leaving energy governance vulnerable to opaque deals and external influence. Therefore, establishing a regulatory entity with the power to review contracts, enforce public disclosure laws, and safeguard energy revenues for essential public services, such as healthcare and education, is critical to ensuring a just and transparent energy transition.

Moreover, transparency in energy contracts must be reinforced. Tunisia’s existing Renewable Energy Law (Law No. 2015-12) does not mandate public participation for large-scale energy projects, allowing deals to be concluded without community input. To address this, amendments should introduce compulsory consultation with local communities, public disclosure of contract terms, and clear mechanisms for raising objections before agreements are finalized.

Equitable benefit-sharing should also be a cornerstone of Tunisia’s energy strategy. Renewable energy agreements must include binding social clauses that ensure local job creation quotas, reducing dependence on foreign labor and expertise. Additionally, revenue-sharing mechanisms should be established so that a portion of the profits generated from renewable projects is reinvested into affected communities. Crucially, protections for water and land use must be enforced to prevent displacement and resource exploitation, mitigating the risks of environmental and social harm.

Civil society oversight must also be strengthened to hold both the government and private investors accountable. Tunisia has several active civil society organizations monitoring energy governance, including I Watch, which focuses on anti-corruption; FTDES, which advocates for economic and environmental justice; and the Observatoire Tunisien de l'Économie, which tracks energy finance and policy. These organizations should be granted legal standing to challenge opaque deals in court and demand accountability from policymakers, ensuring that Tunisia’s energy transition does not replicate past patterns of exploitation and exclusion.

Without these reforms, Tunisia risks repeating again historical patterns of energy dependency, where foreign investors take the benefits while local communities bear the environmental and economic costs of transition. A just transition is only possible if governance structures are reformed to serve public, not private, interests.

2.3 Reflections on the Regional Context: A Shared Governance Challenge

Tunisia’s governance deficits in the energy sector are not unique; they reflect a broader regional pattern across WANA. Countries such as Algeria, Egypt, and Morocco face similar challenges, where centralized, non-transparent decision-making in the energy sector has often prioritized foreign investments over local development and democratic governance.

In Algeria, the state maintains strict control over its energy sector, but bureaucratic opacity and resistance to regulatory reform have hindered efforts to transition toward renewables. Egypt’s solar and wind expansion, particularly through Benban Solar Park, has drawn criticism for favoring private investors while failing to distribute benefits equitably. Meanwhile, Morocco’s Noor Ouarzazate solar complex has been hailed as a success but has also been mired in land rights disputes and limited local participation.

A truly just energy transition in Tunisia and across the region requires more than just expanding renewables; it demands deep governance reforms to ensure transparency, inclusivity, and national sovereignty over energy policies. One way forward is through regional cooperation on governance reforms, where WANA countries can exchange best practices in contract transparency, community engagement, and equitable energy distribution.

By learning from regional experiences and pushing for collective governance standards, Tunisia and its neighbors can prevent history from repeating itself – ensuring that the shift to renewables does not become yet another mechanism of external control and inequality.

3. Civil Society: A Key Actor for Accountability

3.1 Role of CSOs

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) play a pivotal role in advocating for energy justice in Tunisia, ensuring that marginalized communities have a platform to voice their concerns, and holding decision-makers accountable in the renewable energy transition. As Mohamed Ismail Sabry noted, CSOs are vital in advocating for transparency, social justice, and community involvement in energy initiatives. Their work is central to ensuring that the transition to renewables does not ignore local needs or environmental resources.

One of the most notable recent examples of grassroots CSO activism is the "Save the Water" movement, which emerged in response to the growing water scarcity exacerbated by large-scale energy projects, particularly those related to the Green Hydrogen Valley initiative. This movement, spearheaded by local environmental NGOs, community groups, and activists, draws attention to the risks of over-extracting Tunisia’s already limited water resources for renewable energy production, especially through desalination processes for hydrogen production.

In 2022, the Green Hydrogen Valley project, aimed at producing hydrogen to export to Europe, accelerated efforts to desalinate seawater in regions already suffering from water shortages. Local communities, supported by organizations such as the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights (FTDES), rallied against the project’s potential to exacerbate water scarcity. They argued that energy projects should not come at the expense of local water resources. Through public protests, advocacy campaigns, and engaging international forums like UN Water and regional climate discussions, the movement successfully pressured the government to reconsider the environmental and social costs of such projects. Although the Green Hydrogen Valley project proceeded, it was forced to address water management concerns, demonstrating the effectiveness of grassroots advocacy in shaping policy.

Despite these successes, Tunisia’s authoritarian political climate remains a significant barrier to the effectiveness of CSOs. Restrictions on assembly, funding, and freedom of expression limit their ability to operate independently, challenge government and corporate decisions, or advocate for marginalized communities. State control over NGO financing further weakens their autonomy, preventing them from acting as effective watchdogs over energy projects, including those in the renewable energy sector.

 

3.2 Constraints and Challenges

The roundtable discussions highlighted several pressing concerns regarding democratic deficits and the lack of political will to enact governance reforms. Specifically, the non-enforcement of laws like Tunisia’s Social Corporate Responsibility (CSR) law – designed to ensure that companies contribute to local development – remains a major issue. The failure to enforce this law means that companies involved in renewable energy projects do not adequately contribute to community development or mitigate the social and environmental risks associated with energy projects.

These constraints severely hinder CSOs’ ability to create meaningful change in energy policy. In the absence of a robust legal framework and political commitment, CSOs are often left with few tools to hold the government or corporations accountable for the socioeconomic and environmental implications of energy projects. This is compounded by the centralized decision-making that excludes local communities and undermines public participation in the energy sector.

Tunisia’s authoritarian political climate further exacerbates these challenges. The centralization of power restricts the ability of CSOs to influence policy-making or demand accountability from the government and private investors. Activists are often targeted for their advocacy, facing intimidation or restrictions on their freedom of expression.

3.3 Key Recommendations

Based on insights from the roundtable discussions, several key recommendations have emerged to foster greater regional collaboration among CSOs and strengthen their role in energy governance:

CSOs across the WANA region should establish regional networks to amplify their voices on energy and environmental justice. By adopting a collaborative approach, these networks can build on successful initiatives such as the COP27 Indigenous rights movement, where grassroots organizations in the Global South united to advocate for their rights on a global stage. Through coordinated efforts, regional CSOs can share best practices for engaging local communities and governments in energy policy discussions, ensuring that transitions to renewable energy are both just and inclusive.

To counteract funding restrictions often imposed in authoritarian settings, CSOs must develop alternative financing mechanisms that reduce reliance on national sources. International foundations, philanthropic organizations, and crowdfunding initiatives can offer strategic financial support, allowing CSOs to operate independently and advocate more effectively for community-driven energy policies. Diversifying funding sources is essential to ensuring that CSOs remain resilient against political pressures and continue to hold decision-makers accountable.

Strengthening policy dialogues through South-South cooperation can also play a crucial role in advancing energy justice. By fostering knowledge exchange on grassroots mobilization, advocacy strategies, and alternative funding models, CSOs can build stronger networks and increase their capacity to influence policy. Platforms such as knowledge-sharing workshops will be critical in facilitating these exchanges, allowing activists and organizations across the region to learn from one another’s successes and challenges.

Establishing partnerships with regional development banks and international foundations is another key strategy for securing funding that aligns with community priorities. By leveraging these partnerships, CSOs can ensure that financial resources are directed toward local development rather than external agendas that fail to address the needs of affected communities.

Finally, facilitating peer-learning platforms across WANA countries will further enhance CSOs' organizational capacity and advocacy skills. By creating spaces where organizations can share experiences, discuss policy influence strategies, and strengthen their networks, CSOs will be better equipped to push for fairer and more transparent energy transitions that prioritize social and environmental justice.

4. Rethinking International Cooperation for Energy Sovereignty

International cooperation in Tunisia’s energy transition must be restructured to serve national interests rather than reinforce patterns of dependency. The current EU-driven frameworks, such as RePowerEU, the ELMED Connector, and MEDGRID, largely prioritize Europe’s energy demands, often sidelining Tunisia’s development needs and deepening resource pressures, particularly in water and land allocation. These projects, while marketed as opportunities for economic growth, risk turning Tunisia into a mere energy-export corridor while rural communities continue to struggle with electricity access. If left unchallenged, this model will replicate the same historical patterns of resource extraction, where external actors dictate Tunisia’s energy trajectory at the expense of local sovereignty.

To counter this, Tunisia must proactively diversify its partnerships beyond the EU, exploring investment opportunities with African and Asian partners, such as China, which may offer financial models with fewer conditionalities. Strengthening ties within Africa and the broader WANA region could enable energy strategies that align more closely with domestic socioeconomic realities rather than external profit-driven imperatives. However, merely shifting reliance from one foreign actor to another will not be enough. Tunisia must invest in local ownership structures, moving away from top-down, investor-driven models to community-led renewable projects that ensure energy benefits are equitably distributed. Countries like Denmark have successfully implemented cooperative-based energy models, where local communities collectively own and profit from wind and solar farms. This approach, if adapted to Tunisia’s context, could provide a viable path toward energy sovereignty, reducing reliance on external funding and ensuring that renewables serve local needs first.

Moreover, alternative financing structures are essential to break away from the loan-based, conditional investment models that have historically constrained Tunisia’s policy flexibility. Cooperative-based energy funding, public energy trusts, and decentralized financing mechanisms could empower local communities to co-own and manage renewable energy projects, mitigating the risks of corporate monopolization.

Without a radical departure from the current trajectory, Tunisia’s renewable energy transition will remain a neo-extractivist process, one where foreign entities profit while Tunisia bears the costs. A just transition demands more than technical fixes or increased foreign investment; it requires a fundamental restructuring of governance, ownership, and financing models to ensure that the country’s energy future is shaped by and for its people.

 

5. Conclusion

Tunisia stands at a critical crossroads. Without urgent governance reforms, its energy transition risks reinforcing the very dependencies it seeks to break, turning the country into a mere energy-exporting corridor for foreign markets while its citizens continue to struggle with rising costs and resource scarcity. If these challenges are not addressed, Tunisia’s energy sovereignty will erode further, deepening socioeconomic inequalities and fueling public discontent, all while multinational corporations and foreign states reap the benefits of its renewable resources.

To avoid this outcome, Tunisian policymakers must take the lead by ensuring transparent governance, enforcing accountability in energy contracts, and prioritizing local energy security over external demands. CSOs must intensify their advocacy efforts, pressuring both the government and international investors to uphold principles of justice and equity in energy policies. Meanwhile, international partners must rethink their role, shifting away from exploitative investment models and instead supporting locally-driven, community-led energy initiatives that strengthen Tunisia’s self-sufficiency rather than perpetuating dependence.

Tunisia’s energy transition is not just a technical or economic shift; it is a fight for sovereignty, justice, and long-term sustainability. If approached with bold reforms and a commitment to energy democracy, Tunisia can set a precedent for the WANA region – a model where renewables serve the people first, not just the global market. However, without immediate action, the country risks repeating the past: trading one form of dependency for another, while its energy future remains controlled by external forces. The time to act is now.