Freedom of expression was one of the significant – and rare – gains of Tunisia’s 2011 revolution. After decades of censorship and restrictions on freedom of expression and opinion, Ben Ali's departure ushered in an unprecedented level of openness. Over the next decade, public debate thrived, particularly in the audiovisual media, supported by a highly liberal legal framework. The press and the media sector became a real counterbalance to power. However, since 25 July 2021, this progress sharply declined. Since assuming full power, President Kaïs Saïed has attacked all checks and balances, using new legal measures and police practices to consolidate his grip. The crackdown intensified in the run-up to the presidential election on 6 October 2024, yet pockets of resistance remain.
Background
Under the reign of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (1987-2011), media freedom was virtually non-existent, except for a brief initial period of relative openness. The RSF index for freedom of expression reflects this reality. When this index was created in 2002, Tunisia ranked 128th but steadily declined to 164th out of a total of 178 by 2010, the year before the fall of Ben Ali. One of the main criticisms of the regime was the high level of web censorship, a practice which earned the Tunisian president the title of “Enemy of the Internet”.
The situation changed radically after the revolution. The transitional authorities embarked on a series of liberal reforms, led by professionals who had endured the heavy-handed rule of Ben Ali. Responsibility for freedom of expression was transferred to the Independent Commission for the Reform of Information and Communication (INRIC), which was tasked with drafting proposals to overturn the repressive laws passed under the dictatorship and align them with international standards.
The government of Béji Caïd Essebsi then enacted highly liberal Decree-Laws 115 and 116, regulating the press and audiovisual media, respectively. Under these laws, prison sentences for press offenses were limited to cases of incitement to hatred, criminal acts, and child pornography, while defamation was punishable by a fine. The legislative framework applied more broadly, extending beyond media professionals to all forms of publications, including social networks, which were rapidly expanding at the time.
To end state control over audiovisual media, Decree-Law 116 established an independent High Authority for Audiovisual Communication (HAICA). This body, independent from executive influence, consists of representatives appointed equally by the President of the Republic and the professional organizations. HAICA is responsible for regulating the audiovisual sector, allocating frequencies to radio and TV stations, and sanctioning any violations.
The Post-Revolutionary Decade: Between Freedom and Instrumentalization
However, this legislative openness faced significant challenges. First, magistrates continued to resort to other, more restrictive provisions of the penal code – such as contempt for a public official or offenses against the Head of State – as well as the communications and the military justice code.
Second, the Troika government took nearly a year and a half to implement the new legislation, which had been enacted after the October 2011 elections but before the new executive took office. Two government coalition partners, Ennahdha and the Congrès pour la République (CPR), sought to curb media outlets they deemed as hostile. Under the guise of “purifying” media outlets tainted by corruption and ties to the old regime, the government engaged in intimidation tactics – either directly or through militias close to it.
Finally, after advocating for the creation of a regulatory authority, some media bosses waged a campaign against HAICA whenever it tried to introduce rules or enforce the existing legislation. The most emblematic figure in this sling is Nabil Karoui, the boss of the private channel Nessma. A businessman adept at navigating different political regimes, Karoui takes a dim view of any authority interfering in his affairs. His first clash with HAICA came when the agency made the maintenance of private channels' licenses conditional on compliance with the newly published regulations designed to align with the updated legislative framework. In response, Nessma aired one-sided TV shows to denounce HAICA's supposed “censorship.” The standoff continued through the 2014 election campaign, ultimately requiring mediation by the Tunisian General Labor Union before Karoui agreed to comply with the new rules. The Islamist channel Zitouna TV similarly resisted HAICA’s authority.
The decree-laws enacted during the initial phase of the democratic transition were meant to be replaced by permanent laws, passed by a sovereign parliament. The 2014 Fundamental Law provides for the creation of an Audiovisual Communication Authority (ICA) to take over from HAICA. To prevent a regulatory gap, HAICA was safeguarded by transitional provisions. While the primary objective of the 2014-2019 parliamentary term was to set up the permanent institutions outlined in the new Constitution, lawmakers failed to install the ICA. Meanwhile, HAICA has been finding it increasingly difficult to enforce its decisions, notably the closure of Nessma, Zitouna TV, and Radio du Saint Coran, all of which remain in breach of current regulations.
This was the backdrop to the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections. Their electoral campaigns were marked by polarization in many major private media, despite legal requirements to observe strict neutrality and equal treatment of candidates. The most blatant example was Nessma TV, which served as a springboard for the career of its boss, Nabil Karoui, helping him advance to the second round in the presidential elections against Kaïs Saïed.
A few months after the Fakhfakh government took office, at the end of the first COVID-19 lockdown in 2020, the parliamentary groups of Ennahda, Al Karama (Islamo-populists), and Qalb Tounes (Nabil Karoui's party) introduced a bill to reform Decree-Law 116. The proposal sought to replace HAICA members with new appointees nominated by magistrates and media professionals but elected by an absolute majority of deputies, rather than the existing two-thirds majority requirement. This change would have weakened the new regulatory body by making it more dependent on the ruling coalition. In addition, Al Karama proposes to simply abolish all prior authorization to establish audiovisual media and align the process with that for the print media, where a simple declaration would suffice. This would have abolished the safeguards in Decree-Law 116 designed to ensure media plurality and prevent monopolization.
Amid the COVID-19 crisis, the Assembly Bureau, dominated by Ennahdha, Qalb Tounes, and the Al Karama coalition, pushed the bill to the Committee on Rights and Freedoms under the accelerated procedure, despite clear conflicts of interest. However, strong opposition from the media and journalists led to its withdrawal. Elyes Fakhfakh then pledged to expedite the creation of the ICA, but his government was forced to resign. His successor, Hichem Mechichi, backed by the Ennahda-Qalb Tounes-Al Karama coalition, removed the ICA bill from the Assembly's agenda.
The Coup and Subsequent Media Control
It was against this backdrop of institutional chaos that the coup d'état of 25 July 2021 took place. By declaring a state of emergency, the President of the Republic significantly increased his powers and systematically attacked all intermediary institutions, including the media.
On 26 July 2021, the police shut down the Tunisian office of Al Jazeera without any judicial order. This action went virtually unchallenged by the political elite, including journalists. It is important to note that this took place after a widely popular coup and that Al Jazeera is seen to be close to Ennahdha, the main political group to lose out in the aftermath.
During the first year following the coup, the media continued to enjoy a relatively wide margin of freedom. The Saïed government repeatedly stated that it had no intention of rolling back the liberal gains of the revolution. Decree 117, issued on 22 September 2021, specifies that exceptional measures should not infringe on rights and freedoms. However, this has not prevented the arrest of several journalists and columnists close to Ennahda, such as Zitouna TV presenter Ameur Ayed. Ayed was arrested for reciting a poem by Ahmed Matar, deemed offensive, during his daily talk show. He was subsequently sentenced to two months in prison by a military court.
In 2022, Tunisia fell back 19 places in the RSF ranking. Despite the occasional slip-up, the situation remains stable, with most media outlets continuing to express dissenting views. During this phase, Saïed moved to undermine institutional checks and balances, including the parliament and judiciary.
Things began to change after 25 July 2022. The new Constitution, adopted by referendum, retains the rights and freedoms outlined in the 2014 Constitution. However, the new Basic Law makes no provision for regulating the audiovisual media, which led to HAICA losing its constitutional immunity.
Kaïs Saïed took advantage of the transitional phase to enact a particularly repressive legal framework. On 16 September 2022, Tunisians read in the official gazette Decree-Law 2022-54, issued on 13 September 2022, concerning the fight against offenses related to information and communication systems. While intended to align Tunisian legislation with international standards for information systems security, the decree quickly became a tool for suppressing freedom of expression.
Article 24 of the Decree-Law is particularly repressive. Titled “Rumors and False News”, it states: “is punishable by five years in prison and a fine of 50,000 dinars (15,650 euros) anyone who knowingly uses information and communication systems and networks to produce, spread, disseminate, send, or write false news, false data, rumors, false or falsified documents or documents falsely attributed to others, with the aim of infringing the rights of others, harming public safety or national defense, or spreading terror among the population. The same penalties shall apply [...] to any person who uses information systems to publish or disseminate false or falsified news or documents, or information containing personal data, or attribution of unfounded data with the aim of defaming others, damaging their reputation, harming them financially or morally, inciting aggression against them or inciting hate speech.
The penalties provided for are doubled if the person targeted is a public official or similar.”
In a single article, Decree-Law 54 reverses many of the major advances achieved by the 2011 revolution. Press offenses will once again be punishable by custodial sentences. What is more, the wording and penalties reflect Kaïs Saïed's conspiracy-driven perspective. It is not so much “false information” that is incriminated but the intent to “harm public safety or national defense, or to spread terror among the population.” Furthermore, Saïed believes that “freedom of expression is only valid if it is preceded by freedom of reflection.” Here, “freedom of reflection” does not refer to freedom of thought, but rather suggests that any criticism of the regime is necessarily the result of a media campaign targeting the president and seeking to undermine his agenda. As a result, the dichotomy of majority/opposition is replaced by that of patriots/traitors.
The authorities quickly seized upon this tool to target critical voices. The first case to be made public concerned journalist Nizar Bahloul, the director of the Business News website. On 15 November 2022, he was summoned by the police following a complaint filed by the Minister of Justice, Leïla Jaffel, under Decree-Law 54. The police questioned him about an editorial titled “ Najla Bouden, la gentille woman ” (Najla Bouden, the Nice Woman), which criticizes the head of the government's record based on factual elements. In a statement to Mosaïque FM Radio, Bahloul clarified that the complaint was not directed to specific passages of the article, but to the entire piece.
In the months that followed, the government increasingly relied on Decree-Law 54 to target dissenting or critical voices. As a result, several opponents from various backgrounds – including Ghazi Chaouachi, Abir Moussi, and Chaïma Aïssa – were summoned to court for “false information,” typically due to comments they made in the audiovisual media. For example, former ministerial advisor-turned-opponent, Jaouhar Ben M'Barek was sentenced to six months in prison following a complaint by the Independent High Authority for the Elections (Instance supérieure indépendante pour les elections, ISIE) accusing him of disparaging the 2022 legislative elections, a sentence that was later reduced to five months on appeal.
Tensions escalated when the authorities targeted Mosaïque FM, the country's most popular radio station. In November 2022, on the sidelines of the Francophonie Summit, Kaïs Saïed expressed his anger to a journalist from the private station: “Every day, on Mosaïque, they talk the way they want. And despite that, they talk about [Tunisia as a] dictatorship. You who work for this station, do you know that no one has ever interfered with your work? So what dictatorship are they talking about?” Three months later, the radio station's director was arrested as part of a broader crackdown on political, judicial, and media figures. He was accused of money laundering, and investigators questioned him about his station's editorial line. “Midi Show,” the country's most popular political program, is overly critical of those in power and was one of the few shows to resist the recruitment of regime propagandists among its columnists. The complaint against Nouredine Boutar came after an anonymous tip-off alleging that the radio station's director was laundering money received to “undermine the symbols of the state.” He was released after three months, following a strong international campaign, but remains under prosecution for plotting against state security.
Pressure Intensified with the Election Year
The crackdown intensified in the run-up to the presidential election. A year before the election, Abir Moussi, leader of the Free Destour Party (neo-Benalist) and a declared candidate, was arrested while protesting against the territorial division planned for local elections. Initially charged with attempting to overthrow the state – a crime punishable by death – she has since been the subject of three detention warrants under Decree-Law 54. Two of these are the result of complaints filed by the ISIE, which is becoming a kind of public prosecutor's office, frantically pursuing critical voices.
It must be noted that the electoral commission's role has expanded over time. Initially, during the election periods, the law required a joint agreement between ISIE and HAICA. HAICA, which was equipped to monitor audiovisual content, played a key role in ensuring the principles of equality between the parties involved in the election. However, taking advantage of a disagreement that arose during the legislative elections, ISIE took over the responsibility of monitoring the audiovisual media. This role was officially assigned to the ISIE by Kaïs Saïed for subsequent elections. In February 2024, the state stopped paying the salaries of HAICA members, a decision that could have led to the demise of the audiovisual regulator. However, HAICA’s board chose to continue its working on a voluntary basis.
From then on, ISIE became a kind of enforcer for the audiovisual media. It increased the number of “warnings” issued to radio stations that failed to respect “neutrality and balance” or criticized its work. Some stations have decided to make the content of these warnings. Mosaïque FM, for example, published the formal notice against Midi Show columnists Kaouther Zantour and Essia Latrous. The two journalists were accused of “violating the rules and standards of the electoral period, notably the duty of neutrality, objectivity and balance in the coverage of the election, as well as the absence of divergent voices.” The letter sent by the electoral commission did not mention any specific incident. The ISIE even interfered in the way interviews were conducted. Journalist Hajer Boujemaa noted that the letters did not bear the name of the journalist in question: “The guest's quote is reproduced in the letter, and the host is criticized for not having objected to it or acquiesced in it.” The presenter, who works on Express FM, describes to the author a heavy atmosphere that encourages self-censorship, adding: “Today, our speech also involves our colleagues and, more generally, the employees of our companies.”
These warnings seem to spare the media that aligned with the government, particularly public broadcasting. Since 25 July 2021, virtually no political parties have been allowed on national television. Over time, all public service channels have closed off to dissident speech, and political broadcasts have been drastically reduced. Those that remain are pro-regime. During the election campaign, national television and radio broadcast “reports” in praise of the “July 25 process”, indirectly supporting the president-candidate's campaign. “The bringing to heel of the public media began as early as 25 July 2021,” says Amira Mohamed, journalist and member of the executive board of the Syndicat national des journalistes tunisiens (SNJT). “In some of his public speeches, the President has indicated how the news should be prioritized, or what public service programs should contain. During the electoral period, we witnessed unprofessional television programs and unbalanced debates aimed at glorifying the choices of those in power and the presidential candidate.”
Judicial pressure on the media intensified, particularly from the spring of 2024 onward. In March, for example, journalist and radio and TV columnist Mohamed Boughalleb, known for his sharp criticism of the government and previously prosecuted several times under Decree-Law 54, was arrested after a media appearance in which he raised a potential case of mismanagement within the Ministry of Religious Affairs. On appeal, his sentence was increased from six to eight months in prison. According to Boughalleb, before his legal troubles, he had been removed from several national media programs due to pressure on his employers. A few weeks later, journalist Khouloud Mabrouk, host of the political program 90 Minutes on IFM, was questioned at length by the judicial police for interviewing a former minister who had fled Tunisia.
May 2023 marked a radical turning point in media life. On 11 May 2023, police broke into the Maison de l'avocat (the Bar Association) in Tunis and arrested lawyer Sonia Dahmani. Dahmani, who is also a columnist, took refuge at the Bar's headquarters to protest against the case against her. Days earlier, on television, the lawyer had sarcastically dismissed the conspiracy theory that sub-Saharan migrants were trying to colonize Tunisia, saying: “This magnificent country that migrants are trying to steal from us!” These words led to her prosecution under Decree-Law 54. When the prosecutor refused to postpone her hearing, she sheltered at the Bar. Her forceful arrest by the police was filmed live by the France 24 camera, putting Tunisia back in the international spotlight. Minutes later, police also arrested journalists Mourad Zeghidi and Borhen Bsaiess, both of whom worked on the same radio morning show as Dahmani. These arrests, which did not require such a large police presence, took place on a Saturday evening, when the security and justice services are only supposed to act in cases of flagrante delicto or imminent danger.
Zeghidi and Bsaiess were quickly sentenced to one year in prison for statements and publications dating back to 2019. Their lawyers argue that they were questioned mainly about their political analyses rather than any act of criminal conduct.
The near simultaneity of the arrests of Dahmani, Bsaiess, and Zeghidi, and the content of the investigation files, send a clear message that the authorities can no longer be challenged. The aim is to intimidate and silence critical voices, no matter how balanced their discourse. The authorities have taken it upon themselves to muzzle dissent. Tried in separate cases, the three journalists received the same sentences: one year in prison at the first instance, later reduced to eight months on appeal.
The impact of these cases was immediate. The morning show “L'émission impossible” (Mission Impossible), hosted by Bsaiess, Zeghidi, and Dahmani, was abruptly canceled. Similarly, “3anna agenda” (we have an agenda), a program known for its intellectual approach to political issues, was also taken off air. On IFM, “90 minutes”, another political program, was canceled just weeks before the summer break, officially due to budgetary reasons. However, it did not return in September. The other two main radio stations – Mosaïque FM and Diwan FM – saw the departure of most of their star political hosts and columnists: Elyes Gharbi, Haythem El Mekki, Zied Krichen, Sami Ben Ghazi, Cheima Bouhlel and Moez Attia.
Summer programming, coinciding with the election period, underwent some significant changes. Mosaïque FM introduced a full-time columnist who defended the regime's positions. At the start of the new school year, the program’s airtime was even cut by 20%. IFM no longer featured any political program, while Diwan FM suspended debates between columnists, only resuming them at the start of the new school year with a significantly reduced number of contributors. Since then, the situation has remained largely unchanged. “The pressure on private media is based on repression. Today, over 40 journalists are being prosecuted for their work, five of whom are in detention. There are also economic pressures, such as the withdrawal of advertising, which affects media companies that are already financially fragile,” observes Amira Mohamed of the SNJT.
Among the major private channels, only Attassia maintains a daily political talk show. Television has drastically reduced pluralism on its platforms, opting instead for differences of nuance among supporters of the presidential camp. For example, during the controversial amendment of the electoral law a week before the presidential election, the channel only invited deputies who supported the amendment. “Attassia's talk show supports the government and attacks opponents, in defiance of ethical principles,” says Amira Mohamed.
Digital Alternatives as Pockets of Resistance
Since 25 July 2021, the number of political broadcasts has been drastically reduced, and plurality of opinion has all but disappeared in some media. These changes, which have accelerated in the 2024 presidential election year, coincide with the state’s decision to “pull the plug” on the audiovisual regulator. This situation aligns with Kaïs Saïed's populist vision, hostile to intermediary bodies and favors direct, unmediated communication with “the people,” notably via social networks.
As the socio-economic situation remains unimproved and the authorities fail to present any gains that would break with the causes of the 2011 revolution, they have opted for repression and intimidation. Arrests and legal actions against journalists have led many media professionals toward self-censorship or complacency with the authorities. The shrinking space for public debate will likely contribute to the growing depoliticization of a large part of the population, as the turnout at recent elections seems to show.
However, this perceptible decline should not overshadow efforts to provide reliable information and maintain a critical eye on the actions of the authorities. In some media, such as Mosaïque FM, Express FM, and Jawhara FM, pockets of resistance remain. In addition, independent web-based platforms like Nawaat, Rachma, Legal Agenda, Al Qatiba, and Inkyfada continue to produce independent material, although their reach remains limited for the time being. These experiments bear similarities to the work of the online newspaper Mada Masr in Sissi's Egypt.
Finally, as is often the case in authoritarian states, some dissent is organized from abroad. During the election campaign, for example, a dissident program, Heyla el bled, was broadcast daily from Paris. Although its impact was limited impact, such resistance initiatives help sustain part of the spirit of the 2011 revolution.
The views represented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Arab Reform Initiative, its staff, or its board.