Introduction
On 2 July 2024, the presidency of the Republic of Tunisia issued a press release announcing that presidential elections will be held on 6 October 2024. Against the backdrop of Tunisia’s multi-year political crisis, Kais Saied has, since his coup d'état on 25 July 2021, been working to establish an authoritarian regime following the failure of the democratic transition initiated in 2011. While a large part of the opposition had hoped to use the presidential election as an opportunity to turn the page on Kais Saied’s rule, the regime seems determined to ensure that Saied wins at all costs, even if this means organizing a sham election and barring candidates from running.
Political context
On 25 July 2021, while Tunisia was going through a serious economic and public health crisis caused by the COVID-19 epidemic, Tunisian President Kais Saied, democratically elected in 2019, activated Article 80 of the Constitution, which allows the President certain exceptional powers "in the event of imminent peril" to grant himself all powers. He froze parliament, then dissolved it a few months later. He suspended the Constitution and had a new one adopted by referendum on 25 July 2022. He set up an ultra-presidential, authoritarian regime in which opposition voices are muzzled. Several political opponents have been arrested. One of the best-known trials is that of conspiracy against state security, for which several opponents have been in preventive detention since February 2023 and risk sentences ranging up to the death penalty. Other opponents and journalists are being prosecuted under Decree 54, the theoretical aim of which is to combat false information and cybercrime, but which is effectively used as a tool by the authorities to silence any dissenting voice.
In the three years since the coup d'état in 2021, Kais Saied has set up a new political system with legislative and local elections, which were largely boycotted by the opposition and saw record abstention rates approaching 90%. Although the President enjoyed a certain popularity among the population following the coup d'état, these abstention rates show a certain fragility in the popular support on which he relied to push through his reforms. Measuring his true popularity today is difficult especially since polls are banned during election periods.
In this context, the October 2024 presidential election is thus the first full-scale opportunity to test Tunisians’ adhesion to the president and his project. However, the regime does not seem prepared to risk defeat and has done everything in its power to place the incumbent in a position where victory is almost certain.
Successful candidates
Although some of the opposition, such as Hamma Hammami's Workers' Party, had decided early on to boycott the elections, several candidates announced their intention to run in the elections, and 17 of them officially submitted their candidacy files before the 6 August deadline. Only three of these were accepted by the Independent Superior Electoral Body (ISIE):
Ayachi Zammel: Businessman and former MP elected in 2019 on the lists of the Tahya Tounes party formed by former head of government Youssef Chahed. On 27 June 2022, he set up his political party, "Azimoun". Little known to the public, his discourse focuses on economic and social issues. Liberal in outlook, he presents himself as a convinced democrat. He announced his support for all political prisoners and prisoners of conscience and affirmed his commitment to freedom of expression and the press, as well as to the separation of powers. His campaign slogan is "Turning the page". Although he has not attacked the President of the Republic head-on and has taken rather timid and not always audible positions on restrictions on freedoms and political arrests, he is seen as an opposition candidate capable of forging alliances with the various opposition forces. ,
Zouhair Maghzaoui: Secretary General of the Arab nationalist "People's Movement" party, he was one of those who supported the 25 July coup d'état and the entire process of setting up the new political regime. In particular, he called for a "yes" vote in the referendum for the new constitution in 2022. However, since 2023, he has begun to distance himself from the regime, particularly after the low turnout in the legislative elections. His party refused to take part in the local elections of December 2023. In his campaign speeches, he insisted on the need to protect freedom of expression, notably with the repeal of Decree 54, and criticized the regime on many points, including the lack of transparency in its agreements with Meloni's Italy on migration issues. As soon as the presidential candidates were announced, he decided to attack Kais Saied head-on, thus making a 180° turn, but his initial positions of support for the Coup d’état mean that it will be very difficult for him to forge alliances with the opposition. ,
Kais Saied: The incumbent president. After his election in 2019 in the second round against Nabil Karoui, where he won over 70% of the vote thanks to his anti-corruption stance, he staged a coup d'état in 2021 to take over all powers and set up a new political regime. A populist candidate, he built his discourse around a divide between the old political class, which had occupied the stage during the decade of democratic transition, and the people, whom he wished to represent. His mandate was marked by restrictions on freedoms and a return to a form of authoritarianism. His economic and social record is fairly weak, as the situation continued to deteriorate during his term. Nevertheless, his populist rhetoric and accusations of conspiracy and betrayal against his opponents ensure that he still enjoys substantial popular support. He constantly repeats in his speeches that Tunisia is in the midst of a "war of national liberation".
An undemocratic electoral process
A repressive and anti-democratic political context
The presence of only three candidates in the presidential election - and the rejection of a number of credible candidates - calls into question the legitimacy of the electoral process. The entire opposition, from the Islamists to the left and the Destour family, has denounced the anti-democratic context in which these elections are taking place. The President appointed the members of the Independent Supreme Electoral Body (Instance Supérieure Indépendante pour les Elections - ISIE) himself, which calls into question its de facto independence from the executive. This was one of the main arguments that prompted traditional opposition parties to boycott previous elections held under the presidency of Kais Saied.
On top of this, most of the leading political leaders of the main opposition parties are in prison. These include Rached Ghannouchi, leader of the Islamist Ennahdha party, arrested since April 2023; Abir Moussi, president of the Parti Destourien Libre, in prison since October 2023; and Ghazi Chaouachi, former secretary-general of the Courant Démocratique, and Issam Chebbi, president of the Al Joumhouri party, both social-democrats in persuasion, who are in custody since February 2023.
Pressure on the media has also increased. In May 2024, lawyer and TV columnist Sonia Dahmani was arrested for saying on TV that Tunisia was not a good place to live. Two other journalists, Mourad Zeghidi and Borhene Bsaies, were arrested the same week for comments made on air. One of the most popular political programs, "90 Minutes", which used to invite members of the opposition onto its airwaves, was deprogrammed by IFM radio, just after presenter Khouloud Mabrouk was the subject of a judicial investigation. This suggests probable pressure from the executive to force the radio station to cancel its program, which was apparently bothering those in power.
A presidential race fraught with pitfalls
Long before the date of the presidential election was announced, several candidates announced their intention to run. This was the case of Lotfi Mraihi, leader of the Union Populaire Républicaine party, who came seventh in the 2019 election with 6.56% of the vote and opposed Kais Saied since the coup d'état of 25 July 2021. He announced his candidacy in April 2024 but was arrested in July and sentenced to eight months in prison and life ineligibility. The same is true of Safi Saïd, a journalist and writer in the Arab nationalist movement, who also ran in 2019 and won 7.4% of the vote, and who was also opposed to the President of the Republic. In June 2024, he received a four-month prison sentence in absentia, before attempting to flee to Algeria in August, only to be arrested at the border and given a three-month suspended prison sentence.
These two cases, among others, testify to a political climate in which the current regime wishes to dissuade candidates from running. However, several candidates decided to enter the race as soon as the election date was announced though most were not able to overcome the hurdles placed to get their name on the ballot. The electoral law lays down eligibility conditions, some difficult to meet, which made it difficult for candidates to complete their candidacy file. Among these conditions, two received a great deal of media coverage: the need to obtain a Bulletin n°3 (extract from the criminal record), and the need to collect sponsorships: either from 10 deputies of the Assembly of People's Representatives or the National Council of Regions and Districts, or from 40 presidents of local authorities, or from 10,000 voters registered on the electoral roll in at least 10 constituencies with at least 500 voters.
The first condition was heavily criticized, as several candidates applied to the Ministry of the Interior to obtain the ballot, but received either negative responses, like the rapper Karim Gharbi, better known as K2Rhym, who dropped out of the race, or no response at all, like retired admiral Kamel Akrout, who also decided to abandon the race, or Mondher Zenaidi, a former Ben Ali minister who chose to submit his application with the missing document.
As for the second condition, it has been criticized for the complexity of gathering sponsorships: given that the Assembly of People's Representatives and the National Council of Regions and Districts, as well as local authorities, are essentially made up of elected representatives close to the regime, the only option left for candidates is that of popular sponsorship. However, the new electoral boundaries, which have created 161 constituencies, many of them very small, make this a very difficult task for candidates. The files of candidates such as Dhaker Lahidheb (ex-leader of the Courant Démocrate, a social-democrat party), Neji Jalloul (ex-minister of Nidaa Tounes) and Mondher Zenaidi, for example, were refused by the ISIE because the sponsorships were missing, although in the cases of Lahidheb and Zenaidi, the number of sponsorships submitted in the file exceeded 10,000, but the Instance judged that some sponsorships did not comply with the conditions set.
Administrative court action and legal deadlock
Several of the candidates whose applications were rejected by the ISIE appealed to the Administrative Court, renowned for its independence from the executive. In a decision that came as a general surprise and generated a breath of hope that the elections might be competitive after all, the Administrative Court accepted the appeals of 3 candidates on 27, 29, and 30 August and in the process invalidated the ISIE's decision to exclude them and, de facto, put them back in the presidential race:
Abdellatif Mekki: Former leader of the Islamist party Ennahdha, he was Minister of Health during the Troika period, between 2011 and 2014, then under the Fakhfakh government in 2020. He gained prominence during the Fakhfakh government for his handling of the first wave of the COVID-19 epidemic, which was deemed a success, earning Mekki a rise in popularity in opinion polls. A former political prisoner under Ben Ali, he was part of the moderate wing of the Islamist party, before leaving it in September 2021 to launch his own "Work and Realization" party in June 2022. After announcing his candidacy on 26 June 2024, he appeared before the examining magistrate for a case dating back to 2014 and was issued a travel and media ban.
Mondher Zenaidi: A former member of the Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique (RCD), he held several ministerial posts under Ben Ali: Transport, Commerce, Tourism, and Health. Although he participated in Ben Ali's dictatorial regime, he was one of the so-called "technocrat" ministers, chosen for their competence. After the 2011 Revolution, he chose to move to France. In 2014, he stood as an independent candidate in the presidential elections but only managed to secure 0.74% of the vote. As the 2024 elections approached, he declared himself a candidate, and his candidacy was increasingly cited as a real challenge to President Kais Saied.
Imed Daimi: Former Secretary General of the Congrès Pour la République (CPR) party, he was appointed Director of Moncef Marzouki's presidential cabinet when the latter was elected President of the Republic by the National Constituent Assembly in 2011. In 2013, he left the cabinet to become Secretary General of the CPR, then in 2015, he followed Moncef Marzouki into his new party Harak Tounes Al Irada, becoming its Vice-President. Renowned for his conservative stance and commitment to fighting corruption, he founded in 2019 the NGO Marsad Raqabah, which aims to promote transparency and citizen control of institutions.
Nevertheless, 3 days after the administrative court's decisions, on 2 September, ISIE Chairman Farouk Bouasker, in a statement broadcast on national television without any journalists present, announced the final list of successful candidates. Going against the principles of Tunisian law, he refused to apply the decisions of the administrative court, thus leaving in the race only the three candidates initially retained: Kais Saied, Zouhair Maghzaoui, and Ayachi Zammel.
This announcement represents a real political and legal earthquake, as the president of the ISIE, with this decision, clearly violates the electoral law which states that the ISIE is obliged to apply the decisions of the administrative court. Bouasker, in his announcement, justified this by the fact that the electoral body had not received the decisions on time, which was denied by the administrative court via a statement on its Facebook page. This decision provoked stupefaction and anger among many legal experts, such as the Tunisian Association of Constitutional Law, which issued a statement on 3 September, denouncing the ISIE's transgression of the law and warning of the risks it poses to the principles of the Republic. This sets a unique and extremely dangerous precedent for Tunisia, as it violates the principles of the rule of law and opens the door to illegitimate elections. After the official announcement of the election results, the candidates excluded by the ISIE have the possibility of appealing to the administrative court, which can annul the election results, which would place Tunisia in a historic legal impasse.
Finally, on the very day the list was announced, Ayachi Zammel, one of the three shortlisted candidates, was arrested on suspicion of falsifying sponsorships. Two days later, an arrest warrant was issued against him, which will likely prevent him from carrying out his election campaign.
Conclusion
Since the coup d'état of 25 July 2021, Kais Saied has set up a new ultra-presidential and authoritarian political regime. For three years, he meticulously deconstructed the architecture of the democratic regime installed after the 2011 revolution. The presidential election, which could have been the first full-scale test to validate his choices with citizens, will be a sham election, like those organized by the toughest dictatorships and authoritarian regimes. Indeed, for three years, he has created a climate of terror in the country, imprisoning his opponents and hanging a sword of Damocles over the heads of journalists. Today, as the presidential election approaches, his regime has stepped up its repressive measures, arresting or disqualifying candidates and even going as far as denying basic principles of the rule of law to cling on to power. The President's probable victory on 6 October will enable him to remain at the helm of the country, but his legitimacy will remain fragile. Unfortunately, Tunisia's democratic parenthesis seems increasingly closed, barring an unexpected popular surge.
The views represented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Arab Reform Initiative, its staff, or its board.
