The concept of “civil society” (mujtamaâ madanî) emerged in Tunisia during the associative boom of the 1980s, a period marked by the transition from a political monopoly by the ruling party to a more pluralistic party landscape. This genesis during the political dynamism of the 1980s positioned “civil society” as a symbol of participatory ideals and citizenship. Over time, the term in Tunisia became largely synonymous with the associative sector, overshadowing other forms of autonomous sociability and collective action, such as trade unions, professional organizations, clubs, and leisure-focused organizations. Far from being a neutral concept, “civil society” acquired a political charge, often tied to democratization efforts.
The pre-2011 history of civil society in Tunisia was characterized by a persistent duality, with many associations navigating between authoritarian co-optation and the affirmation of citizenship. ) Created or co-opted by the Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes, many associations served as tools for exerting control over society. Whether initiated from the top by incumbent authorities or fostered and directed by the State, numerous organizations became instruments of patronage and played a crucial role in bolstering and perpetuating authoritarian regimes from 1956 to 2011. In contrast to these were associations operating in domains deemed “politically sensitive,” advocating for public and individual freedoms. These groups championed causes ranging from human rights and women’s rights to the rights of unemployed graduates, political prisoners, children, migrants, and journalists. They stood against torture and violence towards women, reflecting a profound aspiration among individuals and social groups to expand realms of freedom. In their confrontation with the regime, they asserted their determination to transition from the status of subjects (ra'ya) to that of citizens.
These independent groups played a key role in the January 2011 revolution and the subsequent transition. The post-2011 period was marked by a major upheaval in the legislative framework which facilitated the creation of numerous associations active in different fields and across different geographies. Given the active role of Tunisia’s civil society in the post-2011 transition, it is crucial to examine the underlying factors that have facilitated this active engagement. The substantial financial and technical support provided by both institutional and private donors has played a significant role. Nevertheless, this influx of support has also led to the emergence of an associative landscape heavily dependent on foreign funding and shaped by project-based approaches that, in one way or another, align with donor agendas. This approach, coupled with a project-cycle funding model, has left little room for associations to develop their own long-term agendas and strategies, thus weakening their community connections. Furthermore, it has widened the existing gap between well-established civil society associations with strong connections in the capital city of Tunis and smaller, mainly service-oriented organizations, in peripheral and rural regions.
Over more than half a century, the trajectory of civil society in Tunisia has been shaped by professionalization, which stands as the main dividing factor between the pre- and post-2011 eras, between generations of activists, and, to some extent, between Tunis and the rest of the country. While professionalization empowered civic actors after 2011, it also paradoxically contributed to their vulnerability, as they found themselves increasingly targeted and delegitimized by populist discourse, which portrays them as “foreign-funded elites” that are a threat to national sovereignty. However, this fragility is not solely a product of populism. It also stems from the multiple internal cleavages that cut across civil society and from a conception of democracy that ultimately failed to consolidate.
This paper aims to provide insights into Tunisia's civil society landscape, highlighting its strengths and weaknesses. It will underscore its notable achievements, such as active participation over the past decade in the drafting of the 2014 constitution, the transitional justice law, and anti-racism legislation. However, it also examines missed opportunities and obstacles that have contributed to the current situation, including the resurgence of authoritarianism and the repressive measures imposed by President Kais Saied on dissenting voices, including civil society organizations (CSOs).
The views represented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Arab Reform Initiative, its staff, or its board.
