After a nine-year hiatus marked by repeated postponements, Lebanon is poised to hold its municipal elections, but the timeline remains uncertain. Two scenarios are possible: either the elections proceed as scheduled, following the calendar announced by the Minister of Interior and Municipalities on 24 March (with elections spanning 4 to 25 May), or they are postponed at the last minute for “technical” and security reasons, as has often been the case in the past.
If held on the announced schedule, the elections would mark a pseudo-triumph for constitutional adherence and democratic process but would likely create logistical chaos due to insufficient time for preparation. A postponement, while seemingly a setback, could give government institutions breathing space to prepare for the elections more systematically and introduce much-needed reforms.
Despite the assurances of the Minister of Interior and Municipalities, and statements by MPs such as Jihad al-Samad – head of the Parliamentary Committee on Defense, Interior, and Municipalities – that efforts are underway to hold elections on time, practical hurdles remain. With no Supervisory Commission on Elections (SCE) appointed, no budget mobilized, no invitations sent to electoral colleges, no official decrees issued to formalize the process or open nomination offices, and no security guarantees given the renewed Israeli strikes on Beirut and south Lebanon, organizing a vote within the constitutional deadline is a tall order.
Beyond the immediate logistical challenges of holding the elections lies the need to reform a municipal system plagued by structural deficiencies and entrenched socio-political dynamics that hinder genuine local development.
I. Challenges Facing the 2025 Municipal Elections
The Dangerous Normalization of Election Delays
Lebanon’s municipal elections (which are supposed to be held every six years) have been repeatedly delayed – with the current councils elected in May 2016. In 2022, the government cited logistical constraints and the overlap with parliamentary elections to justify the first postponement. In 2023, financial difficulties were used as the argument for yet another delay. In April 2024, Parliament extended the mandates of municipal councils and mukhtars (elected neighborhood- or village-level state representatives) until May 2025, citing security concerns due to the armed conflict between Hezbollah and Israel. While officials now maintain that elections will be held on time, no tangible measures are being taken to ensure this outcome, raising concerns that elections may once again be postponed at the last minute. These repeated extensions have left local governance paralyzed, with many municipalities either ineffective or administered by governors and qaimaqams (district commissioners) in caretaker mode.
These postponements reflect Lebanon’s broader political dysfunction. Historically, both parliamentary and municipal elections have been repeatedly delayed. While parliamentary elections have been postponed multiple times over the past two decades, this marks the first municipal election postponement since 1998. The country’s sectarian-based political system, deeply resistant to reform, has often sought to avoid elections when the results could not be anticipated. The latest postponements fit this pattern, as they have allowed the ruling elite to maintain their grip on power without facing electoral accountability.
Lingering Obstacles Facing the Government’s Ambitions
The election of President Joseph Aoun and the appointment of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, an esteemed judge of international stature, provided a window of optimism that municipal elections could take place as scheduled. Their stated ambition to get the state back on its feet was echoed in the Minister of Interior’s latest announcement. However, despite this rhetoric, many practical hurdles lie ahead.
The SCE, tasked with overseeing the electoral process, has yet to be appointed. The legal framework established under the 2017 electoral law (Law No. 44) mandates the appointment of the SCE members at least six months before any election. Without the SCE in place, proceeding with elections would violate the legal framework and raise concerns about fairness and legitimacy.
Moreover, the necessary administrative procedures to invite electoral colleges and finalize voter lists have not begun. With just weeks left before the May deadline, the lack of preparation makes it virtually impossible to hold elections on time. By law, the government must officially invite the electoral colleges at least 90 days before election day to ensure adequate time for logistical and administrative preparations.
Additionally, although funds have been earmarked for the elections in the recently adopted state budget, the funds have not been mobilized yet. Finally, no official decrees have been issued to formalize the process, and no invitations have been sent to candidates to register, leaving the entire timeline in limbo.
II. What Reforms Are Needed in the Short and Long Terms?
Voting Megacenters: A Low-Hanging Fruit
The scale of the destruction and displacement of populations following the recent war between Hezbollah and Israel, in addition to the ongoing fighting in border towns in Hermel at the Lebanese Syrian border, poses substantial challenges to conducting elections, as many polling stations are no longer operational. Implementing voting megacenters – centralized voting facilities equipped to serve large numbers of voters – has become crucial in this context. These centers would provide accessible and secure locations for citizens to exercise their voting rights, especially for those displaced or residing in areas where infrastructure has been destroyed. Establishing megacenters would not only facilitate the logistical aspects of the electoral process but would also send a strong signal from the Aoun-Salam duo about the resilience of Lebanon’s democratic institutions.
Megacenters could also improve voter turnout, particularly among those who are registered in towns where they no longer reside. Currently, many voters abstain from participating in elections because they are required to travel long distances to cast their ballots. By offering more convenient and centralized voting locations, megacenters could encourage greater participation.
While megacenters require some time to be set up, they remain a relatively low-hanging fruit. The logistical and administrative work is straightforward, and the implementation timeline is far shorter than that of more complex electoral reforms. Moreover, megacenters could significantly reduce election costs by consolidating polling stations and improving efficiency. Their introduction enjoys broad international donor support, as they align with global best practices for ensuring secure and accessible elections, especially in post-conflict environments. Megacenters could, therefore, realistically be established in time for municipal elections if they were delayed until autumn 2025, providing an important step toward restoring electoral integrity.
Structural Reforms Are Needed but Unlikely Given the Current Political Configuration
Some argue that municipal elections should take place after critical governance and financial reforms are enacted, as municipalities currently struggle with inadequate funding and weak institutional structures. There are four structural reforms that would strengthen municipal governance; however, it is unlikely that the current Parliament – dominated by traditional political forces – would enact these changes in its current term which ends in May 2026.
Municipal mergers
One essential yet contentious reform is municipal mergers. Lebanon has a fragmented local governance landscape consisting of 1,062 municipalities – the highest density per square kilometer globally. This extreme territorial segmentation weakens the capacity for comprehensive developmental initiatives and undermines administrative efficiency. Organizations like Democracy Reporting International (DRI) – where I worked until recently – have long advocated for mergers to strengthen municipal capacity, create economies of scale, and improve service delivery. However, these proposals are not welcome by traditionally dominant political players in Lebanon – be it the national-level sectarian parties or their local allies – because reforms that create broader administrative units undermine the familial and clan-based politics that municipal politics depend on.
Boosting municipal revenues
Another key reform is boosting municipal revenues. Most municipalities are underfunded and short-staffed, with 75% considered small, 20% medium-sized, and 5% large. This financial strain stems from three issues. First, municipal tax revenues remain negligible compared to the administrative powers granted to municipal councils. Second, the municipalities’ share of the Autonomous Municipal Fund is allocated based on an inequitable formula and is transferred through unpredictable installments. Third, despite some lawmakers’ support for legal proposals developed by DRI and the Lebanese Foundation for Permanent Civil Peace in 2023 to boost municipal finances, the most influential parliamentary blocs have dismissed these efforts citing “lack of momentum” and other pressing priorities.
Administrative decentralization
At the core of local governance reform lies administrative decentralization, the most fundamental yet elusive change. While political leaders often pay lip service to decentralization, the dominant parties remain hesitant to engage meaningfully in that direction. A decentralized system based on elected regional councils would disrupt the prevailing business-as-usual in Lebanese politics: it would not only redistribute national wealth in a way that makes it harder for a few parties to capture it, as they currently do through their control of ministries, but also open the door for new political actors to emerge. After years of deliberations in the parliamentary sub-committee on decentralization, discussions were indefinitely shelved in October 2019 due to deep political disagreements on four contentious issues: (1) financial and fiscal decentralization, (2) regional police and law enforcement, (3) administrative redistricting, and (4) the governance model for Beirut. A similarly ambitious effort to modernize the 1977 Municipal Law (last amended in 1997) has also stalled due to a lack of political will. The sub-committee, launched to review the law in June 2019, suspended its work in October 2023, with no clear path forward. As an attendee of these discussions, I witnessed first-hand how lawmakers debated in circles, making little progress.
A weak municipal governance system allows politicians to exert greater control over municipal councils, ensuring that they remain dependent on patronage networks and central government approvals. The current fragmented system, therefore, makes it easier for political elites to manipulate local outcomes rather than contend with stronger, more autonomous regional authorities.
This is why a complete overhaul of Lebanon’s local governance system is unrealistic in the short term. Revisiting laws and regulations is a long-term process, and progress will likely be incremental. However, keeping this issue on the political agenda is essential. Reform advocates must recognize that politics is the art of the possible – they must work within existing constraints while setting their sights on the 2026 parliamentary elections as an opportunity to revive the discussion.
The adoption of a gender quota law
Municipal politics, like national politics, remain overwhelmingly monopolized by men. The political sphere is dominated by senior male figures who cling to outdated mentalities and dismiss progressive ideas and individual agency as naïve idealism and lack of experience. This posture of resignation stems from the underlying axiom that “This is Lebanon, and it will never change.” It is deliberately disempowering and aims at discouraging change agents into submission. Such defeatism is not only unfounded but also self-perpetuating.
This patriarchal stranglehold on municipal politics extends beyond gender to shape the very structure of local governance. Clanic and tribal mentalities, deeply rooted in patriarchal thinking, have transformed municipal councils into miniature power-sharing arrangements, where every family must be represented. Rather than fostering genuine competition over programs or visions for development, these councils become arenas for petty representation, social prestige, and status reinforcement. The emphasis is not on governance but on symbolic power – elected positions are treated as markers of familial influence rather than vehicles for public service.
This exclusion likely explains why women and young people remain largely absent from municipal elections. In 2016, women made up just 5.6% of elected councilors, a statistic that highlights entrenched gender biases and a political culture that sidelines large segments of society. This lack of representation not only diminishes the legitimacy of local governance but also deprives municipalities of the diverse perspectives necessary for local development.
A crucial step toward rectifying this under-representation is the adoption of a gender quota. The idea first emerged in 2006 with the Fouad Boutros Commission, which proposed a 30% quota for women on electoral lists. This recommendation influenced subsequent reform efforts, such as Ziyad Baroud’s 2010 municipal elections draft law, which was never adopted. A decade later, in 2021, a renewed push for gender quotas materialized in the form of a draft law backed by a coalition of over 50 organizations, including the National Commission for Lebanese Women. Various MPs have also championed its adoption, notably Inaya Ezzeddine, Bilal Abdallah, Samy Gemayel, Simon Abi Ramia, Nada Boustani, Najat Aoun, Halime Kaakour. Yet, despite mounting advocacy efforts and renewed attempts to fast-track the measure, Lebanon’s political establishment remains unwilling to pass a law that would disrupt the patriarchal order on which it thrives.
III. Potential Opportunities for Reformists
Even if much-needed reforms to unlock the potential of municipal governance in Lebanon are unlikely before the next elections, reform-minded forces can still use the upcoming vote to advance a reformist agenda – provided that they inject programmatic substance into campaigns, adopt inclusive candidate selection processes, mobilize women and young people not just as voters but as candidates to challenge the entrenched patriarchal system, and craft a strategy to secure incremental victories in key municipal battles.
The Stakes of the Next Municipal Elections
The municipal electoral process in Lebanon – with its many small municipalities – typically devolves into a contest of petty familial allegiances, so deeply entrenched that they override any substantive discourse on governance. Most candidates lack even a basic understanding of municipal law and governance, let alone a coherent vision for development. Campaigns are usually devoid of programmatic content, revolving instead around primordial ties and patronage networks. This perpetuates a cycle where elected officials prioritize personal gain over the public good, leading to superficial promises and a chronic absence of tangible progress.
I am witnessing this hollowness first-hand this year. As election day draws nearer, I am inundated with consultation requests from aspiring mayors and council members, most of whom have no vision, no awareness of their constituents’ needs, and no grasp of municipal laws and regulations. Rather than seeking genuine guidance, candidates hunt for ready-made ideas to repackage into hollow campaign pledges, and scramble to fabricate an agenda they neither understand nor intend to implement, perpetuating thus a cycle of empty rhetoric and inertia.
Although family ties and local power dynamics play a bigger role in municipal elections than party affiliation, complex political calculations still loom large. Traditional parties are deploying additional efforts to maintain relevance during this period of diminished influence, due to the stagnant economy, public discontent, and internal divisions.
The outcomes of the municipal elections will therefore serve as a barometer for public sentiment and can influence momentum leading into parliamentary elections. A poor performance by traditional parties at the local level could weaken their negotiating power, favor independent or non-aligned candidates, and potentially signal further losses in national elections. Given these risks, traditional parties are taking the municipal elections seriously.
Strategies for Independent and Reformist Groups
Independent and reformist groups face an uphill battle in challenging this entrenched system. However, the 2022 Lebanese general elections highlighted the potential for independent groups, with coalitions like Shamalouna and Taqaddom, to win parliamentary seats. By adopting inclusive candidate selection processes, independents can replicate this success at the municipal level. To capitalize on this moment, independent actors and political groups should consider tailored strategies for both large and small municipalities.
In major urban centers, independents are unlikely to secure entire municipal councils due to entrenched political interests. However, by forming coalitions with non-partisan or middle-ground individuals, they can increase their representation. Fielding candidates with strong community ties and a commitment to reform – some of whom might be party-affiliated – can resonate with voters seeking alternatives to traditional candidates.
Small municipalities, which may be unattractive to major parties due to the hyperinflation affecting already limited budgets, can present fertile ground for independents, where work is virtually pro bono. By fielding comprehensive or majority lists, independents can achieve significant victories at the local level that, collectively, could alter the political landscape. These wins, though modest individually, hold symbolic importance and can build momentum for broader change at the national level.
In this context, a shared challenge for traditional parties and alternative groups alike is ensuring Christian representation in the municipal councils of Beirut and Tripoli. Unlike parliamentary elections, which adhere to a sectarian quota system, municipal elections allow for panachage, where voters can mix and match candidates from different lists. This dynamic was evident in Tripoli’s 2016 municipal elections, where Christian and Alawite candidates failed to secure seats on the council. The absence of a dominant Sunni political figure in either city to broker alliances that guarantee Christian representation raises the risk of these communities being excluded from municipal governance. For alternative groups, positioning themselves as mediators for inclusive Muslim-Christian partnerships in these cities could strengthen their standing and enable them to navigate the situation to their advantage, and possibly to come out on top in the upcoming elections.
To revitalize Lebanon’s municipal system, a fundamental shift is needed. Encouraging the active participation of women and young people in local elections could inject fresh perspectives and disrupt the entrenched patronage networks that dominate municipal politics.
Independent and non-affiliated political groups should incorporate these reforms into their campaigns, advocating not only for voting megacenters and the adoption of a gender quota law but also for merging smaller municipalities and increasing municipal revenues, as a prelude to administrative decentralization. Without such reforms, the forthcoming elections risk being nothing more than a symbolic exercise, offering the illusion of democracy while perpetuating a deeply flawed system.
The views represented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Arab Reform Initiative, its staff, or its board.
