Executive Summary

This paper examines Sudan’s war as a self-sustaining political economy embedded in regional and global supply chains. It argues that the conflict persists as armed actors continue to finance and sustain their operations through the trade of high-value natural resources in exchange for weapons, funding, and external backing.

It analyzes how commodities are traded through regional and Gulf-linked commercial networks, creating a financing cycle that fuels and prolongs the conflict. As such, resource extraction, cross-border trafficking, and logistical support have become core pillars of the political economy sustaining the conflict.

The paper concludes that any durable resolution depends on addressing Sudan’s resource-based political economy, namely by disrupting the trade, trafficking, and market networks that fuel the war.

Introduction

In its fourth year, Sudan’s war has produced the world’s largest humanitarian crisis, displacing an estimated 14 million people and leaving hundreds of thousands dead. According to the United Nations, nearly 34 million people – more than two-thirds of the Sudanese population – will need humanitarian assistance iin 2026. Yet the persistence of the conflict cannot be explained by military dynamics alone. It is also rooted in a war economy that enables armed actors to sustain their operations through resource exploitation, illicit trade, and transnational commercial networks.

The conflict erupted in April 2023 from a power struggle within Sudan’s ruling military junta between General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti).

Ceasefire efforts and attempts at a political settlement have repeatedly failed amid competing interests, weak international pressure, and continued external support to both sides. This paper analyzes the lucrative war economy that is financing arms flows and ongoing fighting, with external actors providing weapons, funding, and commercial networks to both the SAF and RSF.

While triggered by the collapse of a military-led transition to civilian rule and long-standing rivalry between military leaders, the war is fundamentally a struggle for control of the state and its resources, continuing a broader pattern in Sudan of seizing power by force. Both sides continue to profit from Sudan’s resources through regional trade networks, largely involving companies across Gulf and neighboring markets, with little regulatory oversight or international counter-pressure.

Commodities, Profits, and Protracted Conflict

Sudan’s ongoing conflict stems from a long-running struggle between the Sudanese army and the RSF for political and economic dominance, particularly over the country’s ast natural resources. Even before the outbreak of war in 2023, when the two factions were allied in power, they were already competing for control of lucrative sectors, revenue streams, and state assets.

Under long-time autocratic ruler Omar al-Bashir, the RSF was created as a paramilitary force supporting the army in counterinsurgency operations. Both it and the SAF were granted extensive access to key parts of the economy,¹Interview with Suliman Baldo, executive director of the Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker (STPT), 29 May 2026. including banking, telecommunications, trade, and gold mining, as part of a system designed to secure regime survival.

By embedding the two forces in parallel commercial networks across key industries, al-Bashir effectively created the conditions for economic rivalry and, ultimately, political confrontation between them. As one analystdescribes it,²Interview with Kholood Khair, founder and director of Confluence Advisory, a think-and-do-tank in Khartoum, 22 May 2026.  the SAF–RSF confrontation is a “war of succession” over al-Bashir’s militarized state, in which competing “military marketplaces” shape separate economic spheres and incentivize shifting alliances among local armed groups between the two camps. Yet both sides remain locked in the same broader economic ecosystem and reliant on overlapping external actors.

Commodities have therefore played a central role in Sudan’s war from the outset, with both parties building “parallel economic architectures”³Interview with Leena Badri, non-resident fellow at TIMEP, who works on conflict, governance and political economy, with a focus on Sudan, 13 June 2026. around resources that sustain their military operations. A study by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) similarly finds that the conflict is largely driven by escalating SAF–RSF competition over strategic resources.

Both sides rely on revenue-generating commodities such as gold, livestock, gum arabic, and oil, alongside supply chains that finance their war efforts. Over time, they have also developed a web of regional and international alliances that, together with their financial bases, influence Sudan’s political trajectory.

Gold

Gold, accounting for at least 70% of Sudan’s export revenues, is the country’s key strategic asset and primary source of foreign exchange, effectively functioning as a currency of war that enables armed actors to bypass formal banking systems through illicit trade networks.

The RSF controls major mining areas in Darfur and Kordofan, while the SAF oversees much of the extraction in eastern Sudan, with gold from both sides smuggled through regional routes via Chad, Libya, South Sudan, and, in the case of SAF-held territories, Egypt, before reaching the UAE, particularly Dubai, the main trading hub for Sudanese gold.

Once refined, the precious metal is absorbed into global supply chains with its origins obscured. An investigation by the Centre for Environmental and Social Studies (CESS) found⁴Interview with Moneim Adam, a human rights lawyer and advocacy leader of the Centre for Environmental and Social Studies (CESS), 12 June 2026, discussing The Case of Volkswagen. that gold linked to the Sudan Gold Refinery in Khartoum, referenced in Volkswagen’s 2024 Responsible Raw Materials Report, was likely tied to material looted after the RSF seized the facility in 2023. This shadow circuit has provided both the SAF and RSF with liquidity to procure fuel, arms, ammunition, and advanced technologies such as drones.

Gum Arabic

Gum arabic, of which Sudan has historically supplied around 70–80% of global demand, has also become a critical source of conflict financing.

Despite the war, European and other international markets continue to import the product, used in confectionery, beverages, pharmaceuticals, and cosmetics, often through supply chains linked directly or indirectly to Sudan’s conflict actors. With much of the production and trade concentrated in RSF-controlled areas, smuggling networks generate significant revenue for the group’s war effort.

Research by the Dutch peace organization PAX highlights how opaque supply chains have enabled entrenched illicit practices, including RSF control of trafficking routes, informal taxation of traders in areas under its control, and looting for resale in neighboring countries. Gum arabic is frequently smuggled through porous borders into Chad and South Sudan, then re-exported and relabeled for global markets, often without proper certification or traceability.

Livestock

Sudan’s livestock sector, one of its most valuable export industries and a key supplier to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, has also become deeply entangled in the war economy. Livestock moving from Darfur and central Sudan to Port Sudan increasingly passes through informal routes controlled or contested by the SAF and RSF. In RSF-held grazing areas in Darfur and Kordofan, the group imposes illicit taxes and protection fees and conducts seizures of cattle, turning the trade into a major revenue stream.

A report by the Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker (STPT) underlines the sector’s vulnerability to armed extortion, particularly by the RSF, while the sector still continues to sustain both sides of the conflict. Former UN humanitarian adviser Nicholas Stockton has further argued that livestock exports to Gulf markets are a “principal driver” of the war in Sudan.

Oil

Oil remains strategically important, but its role in the war economy differs from that of gold and other readily traded commodities.

Following South Sudan’s independence in 2011, Sudan lost around three-quarters of its oil reserves but retained most of the export infrastructure needed to transport South Sudanese crude.

Oil infrastructure became strategically more valuable than oil fields alone. As a result, since the outbreak of the war, the SAF–RSF rivalry has centered more on controlling strategic energy infrastructure than capturing oil reserves. These assets are valuable not only because they generate transit income but also because they provide access to fuel needed for military operations.

For the RSF, oil infrastructure has served more as a military asset than a source of revenue. Throughout much of the war, it controlled or contested parts of key pipelines, pumping stations and the al-Jaili refinery north of Khartoum (until the SAF recaptured it in 2025). This enabled the group to restrict the SAF’s access to fuel, threaten critical supply routes and gain leverage over  infrastructure vital to Sudan’s fuel supply and South Sudan’s oil exports.

Oil infrastructure has therefore remained strategically important but has not been the main source of wartime finance.

Instead, the conflict has been sustained primarily through control of gold production, taxation of trade flows, patronage networks and foreign backing, with oil assets serving mostly as instruments of military leverage and political bargaining rather than major revenue generators.

Transnational Business Networks: The External Lifelines of War

Regional allies have become key enablers of Sudan’s ongoing war, with both warring parties relying on external actors for direct arms supplies and financing, political backing, commercial ties, and access to international markets.

The SAF and RSF war economies would likely be unsustainable without financial support and market access linked to Gulf states, which continue to facilitate the trade of conflict-linked commodities, providing vital economic lifelines to the belligerents and helping cement a war economy that both profits from and perpetuates violence.

Unlike previous conflicts in Sudan, the current war is marked by a notable symmetry between the SAF and RSF in territorial control and capabilities. The RSF, the most powerful paramilitary force to emerge from the al-Bashir era, operates as a transnational actor and has evolved into a durable economic power capable of accessing financing, weapons, and diplomatic channels abroad in ways rarely seen among non-state armed groups in the region.⁵Interview with Kholood Khair.

Both factions use resource flows to cultivate bilateral relationships with external partners.⁶Interview with Leena Badri. Commodities can be converted into hard currency to purchase fuel, weapons, ammunition and drones, or exchanged more directly for political and military support. Their war economies are thus closely intertwined with the strategic and commercial interests of regional powers. This creates incentives not only for the Sudanese belligerents to continue fighting, but also for external actors to preserve the influence, access and economic opportunities the conflict affords them.

International Backers of the SAF

The SAF relies on a range of external backers, which has strengthened hardline factions within its leadership and reinforced a strategy of continued military confrontation.

Egypt is a primary supporter of al-Burhan’s forces, maintaining close political, military, and economic ties driven by strategic interests, including securing its southern border, safeguarding Red Sea access, managing Nile water security, and containing Ethiopia through alignment with Sudan. It also benefits from Sudanese gold and gum arabic flows into Egyptian markets to bolster depleted reserves, while providing the SAF with a vital financial lifeline. As one expert notes, Egypt has an interest in maintaining Sudan as a resource hinterland.⁷Interview with Moneim Adam.

The Sudanese army is also supported by Iran and Turkey, primarily through reported transfers of drone technology and other military assistance. Turkey’s weapons manufacturer Sarsilmaz supplies the SAF, while Iranian drones have reportedly helped the army shift the balance of the conflict, slowing RSF advances, though Tehran and Khartoum have each officially denied direct military ties.

Saudi Arabia backs the SAF-led internationally recognized government and hosts mediation efforts that have so far failed to end the conflict. Its backing is driven by strategic interests, including food security, Red Sea trade stability, and preventing regional spillover of violence. A Saudi delegation visited Port Sudan in March 2025, pledging support for reconstruction. Discussions focused on supporting the country’s energy, health and water sectors devastated by the war. Saudi Arabia has increased its engagement with Sudan through reconstruction diplomacy, humanitarian assistance and support for essential infrastructure.

Russia has also developed ties with the SAF as it seeks access to a Red Sea port, supplying fuel, weapons, and military equipment. In May 2024, al-Burhan stated that Sudan had reached a deal with Russia allowing it to establish a naval facility on the Red Sea coast in exchange for arms and ammunition, further internationalizing the conflict and reinforcing the SAF’s war effort.

International Backers of the RSF

The UAE is widely considered the RSF’s main backer, with extensive evidence linking it to financial, logistical, and military support despite repeated denials by Abu Dhabi of any involvement in the conflict. UN reports have alleged Emirati provision of weapons and drones, directly or indirectly. A report by The Sentry also found that Khalifa Haftar’s forces in eastern Libya supplied fuel to the RSF in exchange for UAE backing, effectively enabling the war in Darfur.

For the UAE, Sudan sits within a wider strategic landscape shaped by interests in Red Sea access, food security, and control over gold and trade networks. As a gateway between the Red Sea and Africa’s interior, this also reflects Abu Dhabi’s broader effort to expand influence across the Sahel and Horn of Africa, including Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Chad, and the Central African Republic.⁸Interviews with Suliman Baldo and Moneim Adam. The UAE’s regional reach has also shaped alignments, with actors seeking closer ties to Abu Dhabi often leaning toward the RSF, including Chad, Ethiopia, and factions in eastern Libya linked to Khalifa Haftar.

Ethiopia has also been reported to support the RSF. A Yale Humanitarian Research Lab report documented activity at a military site in Asosa in western Ethiopia close to the Sudanese border, including the modification and arming of civilian vehicles for the group. Subsequent reporting by Reuters revealed that Ethiopia has hosted training camps for thousands of RSF fighters.

Chad and Libya function as key transit corridors for RSF-linked supply chains, moving weapons, drones, and other military equipment.

A UN expert report has documented UAE-linked cargo routes through Chad feeding into Sudan, including flows tied to RSF activity in Darfur. South Sudan has similarly emerged as a transit hub for RSF-linked gold smuggling networks, including artisanal production.

Neither war economy is fully centralized. While the SAF and RSF dominate key points in commodity supply chains, multiple militias and aligned actors operate across them,⁹Interview with Leena Badri. controlling resource flows and key economic sectors while relying on patronage from either side to sustain both their positions and the wider war economy.

A Shifting Regional Environment

The escalation of the Iran war is reshaping regional competition over Sudan. According to Armed Conflict Location and Event Data, it could alter the balance of power by limiting the UAE’s ability to continue supporting the RSF, while the SAF is likely to continue receiving backing from Egypt and Turkey even if support from Saudi Arabia and Iran diminishes.

Italian Institute for International Political Studies argues that the war is making the UAE’s support for the RSF increasingly costly and difficult to sustain, while Iran’s expanding military commitments could also reduce its drone support for the SAF. However, the SAF appears better positioned to withstand these shifts, thanks to continued backing from Egypt and Saudi Arabia, driven by their strategic interests in Sudan and the Red Sea.

These assessments remain contingent and dynamic as competition for influence across the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa intensifies. What is clear is that Sudan has become embedded in a wider arena of competition involving Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey and Iran. Changes in one regional theater can therefore affect the resources, priorities and alliances shaping the Sudanese conflict.

Conclusion

The conflict in Sudan has become firmly entrenched through a war economy that is itself sustained by a global network of interests.

As the war continues, supply chains are becoming harder to trace as borders grow more porous and flows of commodities, arms, and finance become increasingly fluid. Smuggled resources are often blended into formal trade channels, obscuring their origins and illicit routes, and complicating efforts to track and hold actors across the chain accountable.

The involvement of multiple states further complicates efforts to bring stakeholders to the negotiating table and create meaningful incentives for de-escalation, as these same actors often control key commodities and trade routes that sustain the conflict economy. By arming, financing, or otherwise supporting Sudan’s warring parties, external actors sustain their capacity to fight and contribute to the destruction of the country’s resources and infrastructure, as well as the resulting humanitarian catastrophe.

Competition over Sudan’s resources has consequently acquired an increasingly pronounced proxy dimension, with the UAE, Egypt, Russia, and Turkey providing weaponry, while neighboring countries serve as key corridors for arms flows and commodity trafficking. As external actors become more involved, the prospects for a nationally driven settlement become more remote.

Diplomatic efforts led by the “Quad” – the US, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt – have stalled as neither warring side has secured a decisive military breakthrough, and both have hardened their positions. Sustained by war-economy revenues that finance weapons and drones, both factions have strong incentives to prolong the conflict rather than compromise.

The weakness of international enforcement compounds the problem. States and companies continue to trade with entities connected to the belligerents with limited to no accountability. International judicial institutions, including the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court, remain constrained by inconsistent enforcement and political contestation. In Sudan, this is compounded by entrenched domestic impunity, leaving little prospect of accountability while the war continues to devastate civilians and divert national resources from livelihoods toward sustained conflict.¹⁰Interview with Moneim Adam.

Addressing the war economy must therefore be central to any credible mediation effort.¹¹Interview with Leena Badri. Diplomatic initiatives focused solely on political power-sharing will fail if the trade, financial and military networks sustaining the conflict remain intact. A more effective approach should combine pressure on the belligerents with coordinated action directed at their external backers and commercial enablers.

The International Crisis Group (ICG) argues that the US and other international actors should use their leverage to bring Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE behind a common framework to end the conflict, recognizing that none can fully achieve its objectives in Sudan alone.

Riyadh and Abu Dhabi should be pressed to reduce the support available to their respective partners, while Egypt and Saudi Arabia should use their influence over the SAF to encourage a military leadership prepared to distance itself from Islamist armed networks and accept an inclusive civilian transition. Coordination with other influential actors, including Qatar and Turkey, will also be necessary.

External political, financial and reconstruction support should be linked to concrete steps toward a ceasefire and political transition. A unified mediation framework involving the United States, African Union, United Nations, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, Gulf actors and Turkey could help reduce proxy competition and create a more coherent negotiating process. International actors, including the G7 and EU, should also move beyond general calls for an arms embargo by disrupting weapons deliveries, tightening enforcement and applying sustained diplomatic pressure on the states that arm and finance the belligerents.

Financial and commercial pressure should be equally targeted. Sanctions should focus on individuals, companies and networks with a direct commercial interest in sustaining the war, including gold-trading entities, transport companies and financial intermediaries. Because both the SAF and RSF have developed mechanisms to circumvent existing sanctions, identifying and closing enforcement loopholes is essential. Companies operating abroad – and states trading with actors implicated in violations – should face greater scrutiny and, where appropriate, public exposure and legal consequences. Robust commodity tracing, due-diligence requirements and customs cooperation are particularly important for gold, gum arabic and livestock.

These measures must support, rather than replace, a Sudanese-led political process. Another power-sharing agreement between the SAF and RSF would reproduce the structures that led to war. A credible process should place civilian actors at its center, including democratic forces, resistance committees, women’s groups, trade unions, professional associations, displaced communities and representatives of Sudan’s diverse regions.

Ultimately, only a viable peace agreement accompanied by accountable civilian institutions can bring revenue streams and smuggling networks under legitimate public control.¹²Interview with Kholood Khair.

Without such a settlement – and sustained efforts to dismantle the networks that make war profitable – these systems will remain dominant channels for Sudan’s exports and continue to reproduce a self-sustaining cycle of conflict.