Executive Summary

Lebanon's municipalities stand at a critical crossroads in 2025. After years of marginalization, financial strangulation, and delayed local elections, municipal elections were finally held in May 2025. The elections – the first in nearly a decade – revealed both the potential and the pitfalls of local governance in Lebanon. According to official figures released by the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (MOIM, 2025), voter turnout was low in key urban areas (only about 21% in Beirut and 27% in Tripoli), hinting at citizens’ disengagement and raising concerns about the legitimacy of elected councils. In contrast, other regions saw higher participation rates (around 47% in Akkar and 48.6% in Baalbek districts), albeit still lower than in previous elections. The elections had been repeatedly postponed since 2022, leaving over half of municipal councils either dissolved or inactive by early 2025. When voting finally took place, it was marred in some areas by logistical chaos, political meddling, and allegations of irregularities – for example, Tripoli’s vote count was disrupted by violence and fraud claims, leading election observers (El Jammal, 2025) to demand an annulment and rerun of the vote.

Beyond the challenge of holding local elections, Lebanon’s municipal system suffers from deep structural problems that require meaningful reforms if municipalities are to fulfill their role and potential. An outdated legal framework (notably the 1977 Municipal Act) keeps local governments under tight central control and pervasive oversight by the Ministry of Interior. Financially, municipalities are crippled by reliance on an unreliable central Independent Municipal Fund and a narrow local revenue base. Central authorities often delay or politicize fund transfers, even diverting municipal revenues to cover state expenses, leaving municipalities in a perpetual cash-flow crisis. Own-source revenues are limited by outdated tax rates and low collection capacity; many municipalities cannot collect enough to pay even one decent staff salary. Administrative capacity is also weak: most municipalities (especially small ones) lack qualified staff and modern systems. For instance, over 22% of municipal unions lack administrative and financial departments, while 37% operate without an engineering department (DRI, 2017), indicating a severe shortage of technical expertise at the local level. Hiring and retaining skilled personnel is difficult under public-sector wage restrictions and rampant brain drain (many young professionals have emigrated). Political interference further undermines local autonomy – municipalities often function within clientelistic networks of political parties, turning councils into extensions of patronage politics. Central authorities can stall or veto local projects for political reasons, while local officials sometimes prioritize loyalty over merit in hiring. These intertwined structural issues have made municipalities the "weak link" in the service delivery chain.

Lebanon’s ongoing financial and economic crises, which began in 2019, have dramatically exacerbated these challenges. The country’s economic collapse – described by the World Bank as one of the worst in a century – led to the Lebanese pound losing over 98% of its value and driving triple-digit inflation. Municipal budgets shrank to a fraction of their former worth; for example, a town that collected LL 300 million in fees in 2019 (about $200,000 then) found this sum worth only around $5,000 by 2023. Local governments have struggled to fuel garbage trucks, fix streetlights, or pay workers as costs skyrocketed. Many municipal employees now earn the equivalent of less than $50 per month, prompting staff exodus and even strikes across multiple governorates in 2023.

Meanwhile, the central government’s paralysis between October 2022 and January 2025 – a period of over two years with no president and only a dysfunctional caretaker cabinet – meant no relief for municipalities. Budgetary allocations were delayed, and crucial reforms (like an updated decentralization law) stalled in Parliament. The breakdown at the national level trickled down: by mid-2023, the crisis threatened hundreds of municipalities with collapse (International Crisis Group, 2023). The repeated postponement of municipal elections during this period further eroded local governance, leaving many councils in a state of legal limbo and some towns under the control of unelected administrators.

Key Policy Recommendations: This policy paper calls for urgent action by all stakeholders to rescue and empower local governments in Lebanon. It proposes a comprehensive agenda centered on legal reform, fiscal decentralization, and institutional strengthening. In summary, key recommendations include:

• Central Institutions: Enact a long-delayed decentralization law to establish elected regional councils; reform municipal finance laws to expand local revenue sources and restructure the municipal fund for timely, equitable transfers; and relax central controls that stifle local initiatives. These steps would update the legal framework and give municipalities greater authority and resources to serve their communities.
• Municipalities (and Unions of Municipalities): Take initiative in strengthening local governance even under current constraints. This includes improving local revenue collection (through better tax enforcement and community engagement), enhancing transparency and citizen participation in budgeting, pooling resources via unions or partnerships for shared services, and engaging the local private sector and diaspora in development projects. Municipal leaders should also band together to collectively advocate for their rights and necessary reforms at the national level, presenting a united front to demand the support they require.
• International development partners: Align aid with Lebanon’s decentralization goals by channeling more funding directly to local municipalities instead of bypassing them and working with CSOs. Additionally, invest in building municipal capacity via training programs, technical assistance, and city-to-city twinning initiatives. Finally, coordinate donor efforts to avoid duplication and fill urgent service delivery gaps in the interim (such as supporting waste collection or water provision) to prevent humanitarian crises at the local level. External support should empower local institutions rather than substitute for them, serving as a catalyst for sustainable decentralization.

Implementing these recommendations could help relieve the immediate stress on Lebanon’s municipalities while steering the country toward a more decentralized and effective governance system. The central government’s role is pivotal in removing structural barriers and providing an enabling framework. Development partners can offer resources and expertise to bridge gaps and pilot innovative solutions. Meanwhile, municipalities themselves, even under today’s constraints, can improve practices on the ground and prepare to shoulder greater responsibilities. Empowering municipalities is not a luxury or abstract ideal – it is an urgent necessity for Lebanon’s recovery. With genuine legal and fiscal decentralization, municipalities can become engines of development, accountability, and resilience. The reforms outlined in this paper provide a roadmap toward that goal, ensuring that local authorities are equipped to respond to citizens’ needs and help restore faith in governance from the grassroots level.

I. Background: Decentralization with Limited Powers

Lebanon has a three-tier administrative structure with a dual system of governance. Besides the central government, the country has deconcentrated authorities at a regional level represented by eight governorates and 26 districts. Decentralized authorities exist at the local level, represented by municipalities and unions of municipalities.

Local governance in Lebanon has roots extending to the Ottoman era (with early municipal laws in 1864 and 1877) and the French Mandate period (1920–1943). However, the core legal foundation today is Decree-Law 118 of 1977 (the Municipal Act), which continues to define municipal powers despite later amendments. The upheaval of the civil war (1975–1990) severely disrupted municipal institutions – local elections were suspended for over three decades, only resuming in 1998 after the war’s end (Atallah, 2022). From 1998 through 2016, Lebanon managed to hold municipal elections on a regular six-year cycle. This period saw a revival of local democratic practice, albeit within the confines of the existing centralized system. The cycle was broken again when the 2022 elections were postponed.

Today, Lebanon has an exceptionally large number of municipalities relative to its population. There are 1,065 municipalities (MOIM, 2025) across the country – one of the highest per-capita municipal counts in the world for a country of Lebanon’s size. These municipalities range widely in scale and capacity, from the major cities of Beirut and Tripoli (each with 24 council members) to hundreds of tiny rural villages, often governed by councils of just nine members. Over 70% of municipalities serve populations of fewer than 4,000 registered voters, reflecting extreme fragmentation (Zoughaib et al., 2025).

A primary reason for the mushrooming number of municipalities in Lebanon—often created regardless of their long-term sustainability or capacity to deliver on their functions—is Law 665/1997. This law amended several articles of the 1977 Municipal Act, notably changing the conditions for establishing municipalities and making it the prerogative of the Minister of Interior and Municipalities (Hamieh, 2025).

This legislation not only led to an exponential increase in the number of municipalities but also strengthened the dependency of local entities on the central government. This occurred because the establishment of a municipality ceased to be a right and instead became a favor granted by the political elite through the Minister of Interior and Municipalities.

To coordinate and pool resources, Lebanese law allows municipalities to form Unions of Municipalities (UoMs) – voluntary federations of neighboring towns with joint councils. As of 2025, around 60 such unions exist (MOIM, 2025), covering many parts of the country. In principle, unions can undertake regional projects (e.g. shared infrastructure) and provide technical support to their member towns, although their effectiveness varies widely in practice.

Under the 1977 Municipal Act and related laws, municipalities are recognized as autonomous legal entities with elected councils and broad mandates. Every six years, citizens are supposed to elect a municipal council (and a mayor from among the council). The law assigns councils the responsibility for “every work of public character or interest within the municipal area,” encompassing local services and development functions. In theory, municipalities can prepare and approve local budgets and development plans, levy specific local taxes and fees, regulate and maintain public facilities (such as roads, markets, and parks), support local education and healthcare services, manage waste and sanitation, and undertake public works projects. This framework was designed to promote administrative decentralization by allowing locally elected bodies to address community needs directly (El-Helou, 2025).

However, the reality of municipal governance in Lebanon diverges sharply from this theoretical autonomy. Since the post-civil war era, a strong tradition of central tutelage has persisted. Municipalities operate under the close oversight of the central government – primarily the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities – which must approve many local decisions. At the sub-national level, appointed district commissioners (qaimaqams) and governors (mohafez) act as intermediaries of the central authority, reviewing or authorizing a range of municipal actions. Key municipal decisions – such as large expenditures, public works projects, hiring of staff, or contracting debt – often require prior approval from central authorities (IFES, 2025). For example, even if a municipal council allocates funds to build a water reservoir or a new road, the project might be stalled for months awaiting a green light from the Ministry of Interior or additional permits from other line ministries. This pervasive top-down control frequently hinders local initiative due to excessive bureaucracy. Unlike many countries where local government spending is audited after the fact, Lebanon employs pre-approval audits – municipalities must obtain clearance from central authorities before executing many expenditures. As a result, even minor procurements can be delayed, discouraging mayors from attempting innovative solutions if they fear the paperwork will languish on a minister’s desk. As the World Bank (2022) argued, "close administrative and financial oversight by central governments... results in administrative bottlenecks which facilitate political control over resources and impedes municipalities' ability to channel development funds, including international ones, into sustainable services and projects."

Lebanon’s political environment further complicates the role of municipalities. The country’s system is characterized by sectarian power-sharing and patronage networks, which extend to the local level. In practice, many municipalities function as patronage outposts for entrenched sectarian parties or local political bosses (Harb & Atallah, 2020). Local elected officials often owe allegiance to the same traditional leaders that dominate national politics, which affects how resources are allocated and which projects receive support. Rather than operating as independent agents of local development, municipal councils often become arenas for partisan influence and deal-making. For instance, a town aligned with an opposition party might find its funding or project approvals quietly obstructed by a ministry controlled by rival factions. This politicization undermines the spirit of decentralization. Citizens frequently blame municipalities for local problems, but municipal councils themselves may lack both the authority and the resources to act without political backing from Beirut.

Meanwhile, fragmentation – the sheer number of small municipalities – means local administrations are often too geographically and demographically narrow to address broader development needs. Issues that span multiple towns (water resources, major roads, regional landfills, etc.) can fall through the cracks if there is no effective coordination at the district or governorate level. The absence of elected councils above the municipal level (i.e. no elected regional government for governorates or districts) leaves a gap in Lebanon’s governance structure where strategic planning and inter-municipal coordination should occur (Atallah, 2022).

In summary, the backdrop to Lebanon’s municipal crisis is a system where formal decentralization exists on paper, but meaningful power remains concentrated in central authorities. Municipalities are intended to be the cornerstones of local service delivery and democratic representation. Yet legal constraints, financial dependency, limited capacity, and political interference have chronically impaired their performance. The following sections analyze these challenges in depth – including recent developments surrounding the 2025 elections – and propose ways for Lebanon to move toward genuine local empowerment.

II. The 2025 Municipal Elections: Turnout and Legitimacy

Voter Turnout: Regional Disparities, Electoral Rolls and Engagement

Initially due in 2022, Lebanon’s municipal elections were postponed multiple times due to political maneuvering and crises. Parliament delayed the polls first by prioritizing the 2022 parliamentary elections, then again in 2023 citing a lack of funds, and yet again in 2024 amid security concerns linked to the war between Israel and Hezbollah that started in October 2023. After these successive one-year delays, the government finally moved forward with municipal elections in May 2025, conducting them by region in phases over four weekends. These were the first local elections in almost nine years (the last had been in 2016). By the time voting began, the prolonged vacuum had taken a toll: according to Information International (a Beirut-based research firm), more than half of Lebanon’s municipal councils were non-functional ahead of the 2025 elections. At least 125 councils had been officially dissolved (disbanded due to resignations or other failures), several dozen new municipalities formed since 2016 had never held elections, and many others were effectively inactive due to political deadlock or bankruptcy (Information International, 2025). In these areas, local governance was being managed by caretakers (appointed by central authorities, such as district commissioners) in the absence of elected councils. This situation underscored a legitimacy crisis: local democracy had been in abeyance, weakening accountability and citizen engagement at the municipal level.

Voter turnout in 2025 was markedly low across Lebanon, reflecting widespread apathy and disillusionment. Beirut, the capital, recorded a turnout of only 21%, consistent with its historically low participation rates (MOIM, 2025). Tripoli similarly saw roughly 27% turnout (Kayssi, 2025). Conversely, rural regions exhibited relatively higher engagement, with Akkar reporting about 47.3% and Baalbek approximately 48.6% (MOIM, 2025). This stark urban–rural divide highlighted differential levels of political mobilization and voter interest. The prevailing electoral law, which mandates voters to cast ballots in their ancestral hometowns rather than their current residences, significantly contributed to low turnout – notably in large cities where many residents are not eligible to vote – and to weak accountability. Nearly 80% of municipalities faced a mismatch between voter registration and actual residence (Zoughaib et al., 2025). Advocates have consistently urged reforms to allow voter registration based on current residence, which could enhance turnout and ensure councils are genuinely representative (Ray, 2023).

It is also important to note that the 2025 elections were organized on very short notice. The decision to hold the long-overdue polls came only a few weeks before the scheduled dates, after prolonged uncertainty. Until the last couple of weeks before voting began, many Lebanese doubted that the municipal elections would actually be held at all. This last-minute rush meant limited time for campaigns and voter mobilization. For the authorities, simply holding the elections became a goal in itself – a signal of resuming democratic processes and restoring a measure of legitimacy to local governance after years of delay. However, the hurried preparation and low public expectations likely contributed to the tepid voter engagement and poor turnout observed in many areas.

Electoral Integrity and Legitimacy Concerns

Beyond turnout, serious concerns arose about the conduct and integrity of the elections in certain areas, further clouding the legitimacy of the results. The most glaring problems occurred in Tripoli during the second phase of voting (11 May 2025). There, the vote-counting process descended into chaos: blatant violations and security incidents disrupted the tally, and official results were delayed for several days. Independent monitors from the Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections (LADE) documented instances of ballot-box tampering, intimidation of observers, and procedural irregularities. LADE went so far as to demand the annulment of Tripoli’s municipal vote due to these “serious irregularities” (El Jammal, 2025). It took more than two days to finally declare winners in Tripoli, prompting street protests and legal challenges. This turmoil in Lebanon’s second-largest city cast a shadow over the credibility of the elections in the North. While most other districts experienced smoother processes and quick announcements of victors, the Tripoli debacle highlighted the authorities’ weak capacity to manage elections in a tense, resource-poor environment. It also reinforced the sense that, without broader reforms, elections alone might fail to translate into tangible improvements for citizens.

The Governor of the North, Ramzi Nohra, was blamed for fundamentally mismanaging the electoral process, which led to delayed results and widespread accusations of procedural failures. As a direct consequence of the electoral fiasco, the Lebanese Cabinet officially dismissed Governor Nohra from his position on 14 May 2025—just three days after the controversial election took place (Jadah, 2025).

Gender Representation and Participation

Gender inclusion saw incremental improvements in the 2025 municipal elections. Women comprised approximately 12% of all municipal council candidates in 2025, up from about 7% in 2016 (MOIM, 2025). Notably, Beirut featured around 30% female candidates, in stark contrast to rural regions such as Baalbek where women constituted only 7% of candidates (MOIM, 2025). Overall, women secured roughly 10.4% of municipal council seats nationwide – a significant increase from previous elections, though other local positions (such as mukhtar, or village registrar, roles) remained overwhelmingly male-dominated (Hamadi, 2025).

Despite all these challenges, the 2025 elections did produce new municipal leadership across Lebanon. In many areas, traditional political forces (established parties, dominant families) still prevailed, thanks to superior resources and organization. Crucially, however, the impact of these elections will remain limited unless structural issues are addressed. Turnout and public trust are likely to continue lagging as long as citizens perceive municipal councils as powerless or mired in clientelism. The following sections examine those deeper structural challenges in detail.

III. Structural Challenges Facing Lebanese Municipalities

Despite regional variations, Lebanese municipalities share a set of deep-rooted structural challenges that have long limited their effectiveness. These can be grouped into four broad areas: (1) legal and institutional constraints, (2) financial limitations, (3) administrative capacity deficits, and (4) political interference. These factors are interrelated and together create a vicious cycle that undermines local governance. Below, each category is unpacked:

Legal and Institutional Constraints

As noted above, Lebanon’s legal framework for local government is highly centralized, resulting in municipalities having constrained authority and heavy oversight. The principal law, Decree 118/1977 (Municipal Act), formally grants autonomy to elected municipalities; however, in practice it embeds multiple mechanisms of central control (El-Helou, 2025). Under current laws, significant local decisions can be overruled or stalled by higher authorities, reflecting a top-down hierarchy inconsistent with true decentralization. For example, if a municipal council passes a new ordinance or development plan, the Ministry of Interior can invalidate it or simply refuse to approve its implementation. Large development projects often require approvals from central ministries or even Parliament. This means local initiatives can be subject to politicized decisions made far above the local level.

A striking feature is the pre-approval auditing system, in which the central government’s financial controllers must sign off on many municipal expenditures before they are incurred. In most countries, local governments spend within their budgets and are audited afterward; in Lebanon, the anticipation of central approval introduces delays and uncertainty. A municipality may budget for repairing its streets, but every contract and payment might await clearance from a central authority’s representative. This bureaucratic chokepoint not only slows service delivery but also discourages local officials from even proposing projects that they fear will be indefinitely stuck in administrative limbo. As noted earlier, this creates a culture of risk aversion and inertia at the local level.

The lack of intermediate tiers of elected government compounds the issue. Lebanon has no elected regional councils at the governorate (mohafaza) or district (caza) level. All authority above the municipal level is vested in centrally appointed governors and district officers. There is thus no democratic forum for inter-municipal coordination or regional planning. The extreme fragmentation – over 1,000 tiny municipal jurisdictions – is not mitigated by any higher elected body that could pool resources or undertake area-wide projects. The 1977 law did allow Unions of Municipalities, but unions are voluntary and often weak. The absence of a mandated regional tier means that essential functions (like major infrastructure, secondary roads, water resource management, etc.) remain either centralized or neglected. It also means municipalities have limited leverage in dealing with central authorities, since they must bargain individually rather than as a united regional bloc.

Another legal constraint is the outdated delineation of municipal responsibilities relative to other entities. There are overlaps and ambiguities between municipalities and other local actors, such as the mukhtars (village registrars) and deconcentrated central government departments. For instance, municipalities may want to assume local civil registry tasks or certain policing functions, but legal provisions assign these responsibilities to mukhtars or to the Internal Security Forces, limiting a municipality’s ability to expand its role in community affairs. This creates inefficiencies and sometimes conflict or duplication at the local level (El-Helou, 2025). By way of illustration: building a water reservoir for rainwater can be done by a municipal council decision, but creating the same reservoir to tap spring water requires permits and approvals from the Ministry of Energy and the regional water authority.

The draft Administrative Decentralization Law, first introduced in 2014 by the government (following a special commission led by former Interior Minister Ziyad Baroud and launched by President Michel Sleiman), was meant to address many of these structural issues. It proposed establishing elected councils at the caza (district) level with clear developmental mandates, thereby aggregating municipalities under a regional body to overcome fragmentation. It also envisioned a new “Decentralization Fund” to replace the current Independent Municipal Fund with a more equitable and transparent formula for resource distribution. This law, had it passed, would have modernized the legal framework in line with the Taif Accord’s commitments to enhanced decentralization. Unfortunately, the draft stalled in Parliament for years. Reviving and updating this legislation is crucial: by creating an elected intermediate tier and redefining center–local relations, Lebanon can begin to resolve these legal bottlenecks. Without such reform, municipalities will remain at the mercy of central patronage and an antiquated law ill-suited to current needs. In the meantime, even minor legal tweaks – such as streamlining approval processes, raising procurement thresholds for which municipalities need prior authorization, and enforcing the Access to Information Law at the local level – could improve the operating space for municipalities. For instance, switching from a pre-audit to a post-audit system (with strengthened ex-post audits by the Court of Accounts) would speed up local projects while still ensuring accountability. As it stands, however, Lebanon’s municipalities operate in a legal straitjacket where autonomy is more nominal than real.

The law to reform municipalities and introduce meaningful decentralization in Lebanon has remained stalled for decades, as it directly threatens the country’s entrenched sectarian power-sharing system and the centralized nature of its political parties. While the 1989 Taif Agreement called for “expanded administrative decentralization,” its implementation has been paralyzed by a deep-seated fear among major political blocs that granting real financial and administrative autonomy to municipalities could weaken the sectarian political elite. This reluctance is deeply ingrained, as Lebanon’s sectarian political parties are themselves highly centralized organizations; their power would be fundamentally diluted without a top-down state structure that enables their vast patronage networks. The current system—in which the central government controls the purse strings and can veto municipal projects through administrative bottlenecks—is a crucial tool for the elite to maintain influence, reward loyalty, and punish rivals at the local level. Ironically, despite this systemic resistance to reform, virtually every ministerial statement since the Taif Agreement, including that of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s Government, has pledged to strengthen municipalities and improve local governance.

Financial Constraints and Fiscal Centralization

Perhaps the most crippling structural challenge is the financial weakness of municipalities. Local governments in Lebanon have minimal fiscal autonomy and depend heavily on central transfers that are both inadequate and unpredictable. The mainstay of municipal finance is the Independent Municipal Fund (often called the Municipal Fund) – a national pool of revenues (from taxes such as VAT, telecom fees, etc.) intended to be redistributed to municipalities annually. In theory, the Municipal Fund should provide a substantial and regular income stream to complement the revenues municipalities collect directly (see below for more details). In practice, it has been plagued by delays, opaque management, and politicization. Transfers from the Municipal Fund are routinely delayed by the central authorities (particularly the Ministry of Finance), often for years. For example, in August 2023 the central government finally disbursed to municipalities their shares of the 2019–2021 Municipal Fund revenues using the old official exchange rate of LBP 1,500 per USD (ignoring the 98% currency devaluation that had occurred since then). This meant municipalities received paltry lump-sum payments in lira that represented only a tiny fraction of their intended value, essentially negating the purpose of the transfer amidst rampant inflation. Moreover, by June 2025, funds for 2022 and beyond were still unpaid. Most municipalities thus could not count on timely funding; they operate in constant budgetary limbo, awaiting unpredictable lump-sum transfers that, when finally delivered, are severely eroded by inflation.

The formula for distributing the Municipal Fund is also problematic. Currently, 75% of the fund is allocated to municipalities in proportion to their registered population, and 25% in proportion to what each municipality collects in certain local taxes (with a small guaranteed minimum allotment for the tiniest villages). This formula tends to favor larger and wealthier municipalities – which have bigger populations and higher tax revenues – while doing little to address the needs of poorer or smaller municipalities. According to research by Information International, in the latest allocation (for fiscal year 2022), half of all municipalities received less than LBP 250 million from the fund – roughly the equivalent of only $2,800 at the time (Information International, 2025). Such a meager annual sum is insufficient to pay even one full-time staff salary at a living wage, let alone finance any services or investments. Unions of Municipalities receive a small fixed share (historically 12% of the fund), which is also far below what would be needed for them to undertake significant projects. In essence, the current transfer system fails at equalization – it does not adequately boost the capacity of weaker municipalities to deliver a minimum standard of services.

Compounding the issue, there have been instances where the central government unilaterally raided or withheld municipal funds for its own budgetary reasons. For example, the government has at times deducted amounts from Municipal Fund allocations to pay off municipalities’ electricity bills owed to the state utility, without consultation or clear disclosure (Ray, 2023). In periods of fiscal stress, there is always a temptation for the Ministry of Finance to delay releasing municipal funds or to use them to cover central deficits. This breeds mistrust: local authorities feel that the “solidarity” fund is used as a tool of control and a cash cow by central actors rather than as a transparent entitlement. The lack of published data on how Municipal Fund shares are calculated each year has been a long-standing grievance. One advocacy report in 2022 emphasized the need to make the fund’s calculations public and to legally protect municipal revenues from diversion. Indeed, shielding the Municipal Fund in law from being tapped for other uses – and ensuring automatic, timely disbursement – would greatly enhance municipalities’ ability to plan and function (UN-Habitat, 2022).

On the own-source revenue side, municipalities in Lebanon have only a limited set of taxes and fees under their authority, and these are generally archaic in structure. Key local revenues include the property rental value tax (a levy on estimated rental income from properties), local development fees (often tiny fixed amounts), fees on construction permits, business signage fees, and various user charges. The rates for many of these are set by Laws 60/1988 and 665/1997, which have not been significantly updated in decades. Consequently, local levies have not kept pace with inflation – many fees remain fixed in Lebanese lira amounts that are now almost meaningless in value after the currency collapse. Municipalities have no authority to introduce new types of taxes or to adjust rates beyond what is specified by national law. Thus, their revenue base is both narrow and inflexible, relying heavily on three outdated charges (the rental value tax, the pavement & sewerage fee, and construction permit fees), and these bases have eroded dramatically in real terms post-crisis (Zoughaib et al., 2025).

Furthermore, the collection of existing local taxes is quite weak. Many municipalities lack the administrative capacity or political will to collect what they are owed. Tax rolls (like property valuation registers) are outdated and not fully digitized in most towns. As a result, a culture of low compliance prevails – residents often do not pay municipal taxes, either because they see no services in return or due to lax enforcement. One study found that numerous municipalities simply do not aggressively pursue local tax collection, instead waiting for central transfers to fill the gap. This dependency syndrome means that if the transfer falters, the municipality has little recourse. It also weakens accountability, since local officials might treat the bulk of their income as a gift from the central government rather than something extracted from constituents (and thus feel less pressure to be transparent or responsive). Strengthening local revenue requires both legal reform (to update rates, introduce inflation indexing, or convert certain flat fees into percentage-based charges that scale with real values) and administrative improvements (modern billing systems and enforcement mechanisms). For example, one recommendation has been to amend Law 665/1997 to raise the ceilings on major local taxes and convert certain fixed fees into a percentage of real value (so they automatically scale with inflation). Consolidating some trivial fees and eliminating those that cost more to collect than they yield would also improve efficiency.

Additionally, municipalities face borrowing constraints. There is no vibrant municipal credit market or significant central lending mechanism for local governments. Municipalities generally cannot issue bonds, and bank loans are rare (often requiring ministry-level approval and coming with prohibitively high interest). This limits their ability to finance capital investments. Donor grants and NGO-funded projects try to address this gap to some extent, but those are externally driven and episodic.

In summary, Lebanese municipalities are in a fiscal straitjacket: they have a narrow set of local revenue tools that have become almost worthless in real terms, a low capacity for collecting even those revenues, and an overwhelming dependence on an irregular central transfer that has drastically shrunk. The result is chronic underfunding. Many municipalities – especially small ones – can barely cover basic operating costs (if they can pay staff at all). Investment in infrastructure or service improvements is largely out of reach without outside help. As the post-2019 economic crisis proved, when the central state falters (reducing transfers and losing macroeconomic stability), local governments are left nearly bankrupt. Such financial fragility not only hampers service delivery but can even threaten the very existence of local authorities (several municipalities have signaled they might disband due to insolvency). It also increases reliance on foreign aid and NGOs to provide even basic services, which can create parallel systems and undermine the development of sustainable local capacity.

Administrative Capacity Gaps

The third major challenge is the limited administrative and technical capacity within most municipalities. While a few larger cities (like Beirut, which has an established bureaucracy) have relatively more resources, the vast majority of Lebanon’s municipalities operate with a skeleton staff and minimal professional expertise. A significant number of municipalities – particularly in rural areas – have only a handful of employees, often just a secretary and a few laborers. They usually lack specialized departments (engineering, urban planning, financial management, etc.). This applies to municipal unions as well. A 2017 study by DRI found that over 22% of municipal unions lack administrative and financial departments, while 37% operate without an engineering department (DRI, 2017). Since unions tend to be better resourced than individual small municipalities, this suggests that many standalone municipalities are even less equipped. Few municipalities have GIS systems, updated cadastral maps, or computerized accounting software; many still handle bookkeeping and record-keeping manually. Such antiquated administration makes it difficult to plan projects, track revenues and expenditures, or manage assets effectively.

Both hiring rules and financial means constrain human resources. Municipal councils technically have the authority to hire staff, but in practice, public-sector hiring regulations and tight budgets pose barriers. There have been periods of general public-sector hiring freezes (as part of national austerity measures) which also applied to municipalities. Even when hiring is allowed, the public-sector salary scale is low – and it has been further eroded by inflation, making it difficult for municipalities to offer competitive pay and attract qualified personnel. For instance, a civil or electrical engineer would likely find a municipal salary entirely inadequate after 2019’s economic collapse. Consequently, staff retention is poor: skilled employees resign for better opportunities (or emigrate), and those who remain often must juggle multiple jobs to make ends meet. There have even been cases where municipalities rely on volunteers or retirees for expert advice on technical matters because they cannot formally hire the necessary specialists.

Another issue is that political and sectarian considerations often outweigh merit in municipal hiring. Council members may push to hire relatives or supporters into whatever positions exist, resulting in underqualified staff filling critical roles. This patronage hiring further diminishes capacity and harms morale among genuinely competent civil servants. Training and professional development opportunities for municipal staff have been sporadic and project-based. Various donor programs (UNDP, USAID, GIZ, etc.) over the past decade have offered trainings in budgeting, procurement, urban planning, etc., and recently even a Municipal Studies diploma program was launched. However, these efforts, while valuable, often lack continuity. An employee may receive training or new software during a project, but once the project concludes there is usually no follow-up or budget to maintain the system (Zoughaib et al., 2025). For example, a donor might fund the development of a municipal website or an e-procurement portal; however, if the municipality cannot maintain the website after the project is complete, the improvement fades away.

This creates a “capacity trap”: even when funding is available for local projects, municipalities may lack the absorptive capacity to execute them effectively. They struggle with preparing project proposals, supervising contractors, or performing maintenance. Donors and NGOs might step in to implement directly, which solves an immediate problem but doesn’t build the municipality’s own capacity – it can even sideline the municipality or create parallel delivery mechanisms. A cycle emerges in which municipalities become accustomed to relying on external actors for service provision rather than developing their internal systems. For instance, during the crisis years 2019–2021, many municipalities had NGOs handle parts of their solid waste collection or install solar streetlights because the municipalities themselves were incapacitated. While understandable in an emergency, this perpetuates dependency and means local administrations do not gain the experience or institutional knowledge from those projects.

A related concept is that of economies of scale. Many Lebanese municipalities are simply too small to provide services efficiently on their own or to afford specialized staff. A town of 3,000 people cannot realistically afford, for example, a full-time urban planner or a waste management engineer, nor would it need them employed full-time. The idea behind municipal unions was partly to achieve scale by sharing resources. Some unions have indeed hired shared technical staff (e.g. an engineer at the union level who assists all member villages). But not all unions are active or well-funded; some exist only on paper. Encouraging municipalities to pool resources or co-finance positions can be a practical, bottom-up approach to enhancing capacity even before any national reforms. For example, if five adjacent small municipalities pooled their resources, they could collectively hire an engineer or IT specialist based at their union’s office. This kind of inter-municipal cooperation for capacity should be incentivized (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2024).

In summary, the administrative capacity gap means that even if legal and financial reforms are enacted, municipalities will still require significant investment in human capital and systems to utilize their new powers effectively. Conversely, without addressing capacity, simply giving municipalities more funds or autonomy may not translate into better outcomes on the ground. Building capacity is a slow, continuous process – it involves training staff, updating technology, and institutionalizing good practices (like transparent procurement and participatory planning). The recent crises have made this more challenging by draining resources and talent, but also more urgent: as the central state faltered, municipalities became “first responders” by default, and the need for competent local administration became starkly evident.

Political Interference in Local Governance

Political interference is a cross-cutting challenge that exacerbates legal, financial, and administrative problems. In Lebanon’s sectarian consociational system, power is often exercised through informal patronage networks that penetrate all levels of governance. Municipalities rarely enjoy insulation from national politics. On the contrary, many local councils function essentially as extensions of a political party’s or local leader’s influence, which can distort their priorities and decision-making.

One form of interference is through the allocation (or withholding) of resources based on political loyalty. As noted, central authorities can delay municipal fund transfers or project approvals; often, municipalities that “complain too much” or are aligned with opposition figures find themselves at the back of the line for funding. Conversely, politically connected municipalities may receive fast-tracked approvals or extra projects from ministries. This dynamic undermines the fairness and efficiency of service delivery. For example, a waste management project might be approved in a town as a favor to its allied politician, rather than in another town where the need is objectively greater. Political interference thus skews development and can entrench inequalities between communities.

At the local level, elite capture of municipalities is a common phenomenon. Local notable families or party representatives often dominate councils (indeed, many municipal elections are uncontested or decided by familial/clan alliances). Once in office, these local elites might run the municipality for their own benefit – handing out jobs to supporters, granting contracts to cronies, and using municipal resources to solidify their power base. Public funds then may not be used in the public interest but rather to maintain a patronage system. In some cases, this spills over into outright corruption and mismanagement, further tarnishing the reputation of municipalities in the eyes of citizens. It becomes a circular problem: because some municipalities are seen as corrupt or ineffective, central authorities justify keeping a tight leash on all of them (claiming that decentralization could lead to local fiefdoms or misuse of funds). This mutual distrust between central and local actors perpetuates the heavy-handed oversight described earlier.

Political interference has also affected the municipal electoral process itself. The 2022–2025 postponements of municipal elections were fundamentally political decisions – parliamentarians chose to extend the mandates of local councils rather than risk elections at inconvenient times. Indeed, by delaying until 2025, traditional parties gained time to regroup and ensure their candidates would win when elections finally occurred. Even when the elections proceeded, there were accounts of intimidation and vote-buying in various localities. For instance, voters in some villages were allegedly offered cash or services in exchange for their support, and in other places subtle threats were used to discourage independent candidates. Such practices tie municipalities into the national pattern of clientelism, undermining the emergence of truly accountable local leadership.

Another dimension is that municipal boundaries and sectarian considerations can be manipulated for political ends. The creation of new municipalities or the merging of existing ones is a political process in Lebanon. In the past, new municipalities were sometimes established to carve out enclaves for patronage or to reward local allies. This has led to the formation of extremely small and arguably non-viable municipalities (often lacking any economic base) simply to satisfy local identity or deliver political rewards. Conversely, proposals to merge municipalities (to reduce fragmentation and achieve economies of scale) usually face political opposition from those who would lose their mayoral seats or local influence if consolidation occurred.

In short, political interference means that municipal governance cannot be understood in isolation from Lebanon’s broader power structure. Any reforms to empower municipalities may face resistance from politicians who fear losing their grip over local fiefdoms. At the same time, strengthening municipalities – making them more accountable and effective – could help loosen the patronage chains by giving citizens tangible improvements and alternative leadership at the local level. Reducing interference will require legal safeguards (such as more transparent funding formulas, independent oversight bodies for local government, and enforcement of the access to information law at the municipal level) as well as cultural change (encouraging municipal officials to prioritize public service over partisan loyalty). It will also likely require pressure “from below” – i.e. citizens demanding better performance and voting for independent local candidates when given the chance.

In summary, these structural challenges – legal centralization, fiscal weakness, capacity deficits, and political capture – have made many Lebanese local governments essentially “municipalities in name but not in power.” Citizens often blame them for failing to ensure clean streets, water, or basic services, yet they operate with neither the money, workforce, nor freedom to truly meet those needs. Without structural reforms, municipalities risk remaining scapegoats for governance failures, caught between the expectations of their constituents and the constraints imposed from above. The next section examines how the compounded crises since 2019 have worsened these problems, before turning to concrete recommendations to break this vicious cycle.

IV. Impact of Lebanon’s Crises on Municipalities

While Lebanon’s municipalities were already structurally hobbled before 2019, the eruption of financial, economic, and political crises since then pushed many to the brink of collapse. This unprecedented national meltdown stress-tested the local governance system like never before.

Fiscal collapse and inflation: As noted, the Lebanese pound lost over 98% of its value. This hyper-depreciation meant that any municipal revenues or savings held in local currency became almost worthless in real terms. For example, if a municipality had 1 billion LBP in the bank in 2019 (around $660,000 at the time), by 2023 that might equate to less than $10,000 unless it had been converted to hard currency. Local taxes and fees denominated in LBP similarly lost real value. Many municipalities continued to bill residents at outdated nominal rates through 2023–2024; even with perfect collection, the purchasing power of those revenues was negligible. Meanwhile, inflation soared into triple digits, particularly for imported goods such as fuel. Municipal expenditures – fuel for garbage trucks, spare parts for equipment, building materials for maintenance, etc. – all increased drastically in cost. This created a huge mismatch: collapsing revenues versus exploding costs.

The result was that municipal budgets effectively imploded. Councils had to slash any non-essential spending. In many cases, they struggled to cover even the cost of electricity for streetlights or fuel for municipal generators (some towns turned off street lighting to save money, plunging neighborhoods into darkness). Maintenance of infrastructure was deferred, and local roads deteriorated; garbage began piling up in some areas due to fuel shortages that crippled waste collection. The salary issue became especially acute: municipal staff salaries remained in local currency (lira) and were not meaningfully adjusted for inflation, so by 2022–2023 most municipal employees (including local police) were earning the equivalent of only tens of dollars per month. This led to an exodus of skilled employees who could find better pay elsewhere or simply could not afford to continue working for such low wages. Many who stayed on did so out of dedication to their town or because alternative employment opportunities were scarce—but their morale and productivity suffered (it is hard to work diligently if your salary doesn’t even cover the commute). Some municipalities attempted to provide small additional stipends or in-kind payments (such as fuel or food parcels) to staff, but only a few with sufficient resources or diaspora support were able to do so.

Central government paralysis: In parallel with the economic collapse, Lebanon’s central political institutions faltered. Particularly between 2019 and the appointment of President Joseph Aoun in January 2025 (and the subsequent formation of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s government), the country often lacked effective national leadership. The long absence of a president and the presence of only a caretaker cabinet for extended periods had direct knock-on effects on municipalities. Without a fully empowered central government or state budget, no substantial relief measures or policy support were enacted for local authorities. Broader reforms that municipalities desperately needed – such as the Decentralization Law and amendments to municipal finance laws – were shelved while Parliament was consumed by the protracted presidential election and other crises. The national budgets in 2023 and 2024 did not significantly address municipal financing needs. According to one mayor, by 2024 the revenue of many municipalities did not even cover 50% of their annual staff salary costs.

Service and infrastructure deterioration: The crisis period saw a general decline in public services across Lebanon, with municipalities on the front lines of this collapse. With national power outages becoming the norm, municipalities had to try to fill the gap by operating generators for street lighting or essential facilities – tasks that further strained their budgets. Water supply also faltered as central water authorities struggled; in some towns, municipalities stepped in to truck water to residents or support local wells and pumping stations. The solid waste sector, especially in Beirut and Mount Lebanon where it relies on central contracts, fell into disarray when the central government became unable to pay waste contractors; many municipalities were forced to manage trash disposal locally with very limited means. All these extra burdens came at the worst possible time financially.

The central government’s dysfunction often left municipalities to fend for themselves. In areas such as pandemic response or the early phases of the economic collapse, some municipalities stepped up with ad hoc measures – for instance, organizing local food relief drives, setting up community gardens, or managing fuel distribution for residents – even though these tasks traditionally fell under national authorities. Some observers dubbed this phenomenon “municipal entrepreneurship” where proactive local councils improvised solutions in the face of state failure. Although many efforts were constrained by a lack of resources, the municipalities that demonstrated notable resilience did so by activating a few key drivers.

Among the key drivers of municipal resilience, strategic external partnerships and inter-municipal cooperation proved to be critical lifelines, enabling local authorities to function despite the central state's paralysis. These partnerships allowed municipalities to tap into resources and expertise that were otherwise unavailable. Recognizing the government's dysfunction, international agencies and NGOs began routing more aid directly through municipalities for vital projects, such as installing solar-powered water pumps or rehabilitating local clinics. This dynamic also fostered creative initiatives, like community composting programs developed with NGO support. In parallel, municipalities with strong diaspora networks successfully succeeded in raising funds directly from expatriates, using these donations to sustain essential services like purchasing fuel for generators or new waste collection equipment.

Municipalities without funds had to rely on NGOs or private donations for any such initiative. In effect, local governments became implementers of donors. International agencies, recognizing the central state’s paralysis, began routing more aid through municipalities (or directly to communities) for projects such as installing solar-powered water pumps or rehabilitating local clinics. While this helped alleviate suffering on the ground, it sometimes bypassed municipal structures – and in other cases overburdened them with coordination tasks without granting them commensurate authority or capacity.

In summary, the period from 2019 to 2025 severely tested the viability of Lebanon’s municipal system. The financial meltdown dramatically reduced municipal service delivery capacity; the central state’s failure to act left local governments isolated; and democratic lapses – including the postponement of municipal elections – weakened local accountability. However, this crisis also highlighted the indispensable role of municipalities. When trash piled up, when COVID-19 spread, or when disasters struck (for example, many municipalities were key first responders after the 2020 Beirut port explosion, helping affected families even beyond their jurisdictions), it became evident that local governments are the closest authorities to the citizens. Their collapse would directly translate into humanitarian challenges on the ground. This recognition creates an impetus: if Lebanon is to build resilience, it must empower its municipalities. The crisis, as devastating as it has been, presents an opportunity to rethink and reform the state–municipal relationship.

While there are many inspiring innovative coping cases, the analysis presented in this paper warns that, without structural support, these remain merely “isolated success stories.” The crucial challenge is to move beyond ad-hoc coping mechanisms and build a system of institutionalized resilience. This requires a fundamental rethinking of the state–municipal relationship. The final section of the paper outlines a strategic set of policy recommendations aimed at translating these lessons into action, with the goal of placing municipalities on a stronger footing to lead local recovery and development.

V. Policy Recommendations

Achieving meaningful change for Lebanon’s municipalities requires concerted action at multiple levels of government and by various stakeholders. Below, we present targeted policy recommendations for the national government, for municipalities (and their unions), and for international development partners – focusing on legal reform, financial decentralization, and institutional strengthening. These recommendations address immediate needs while also laying the groundwork for longer-term structural transformation.

Central Institutions

• Enact Comprehensive Decentralization Reform: Revive and pass the draft Administrative Decentralization Law (originally introduced in 2014, as per the Taif Accord), incorporating any necessary updates. This law would establish an elected intermediate tier of sub-national government with clear development mandates and create a reformed Decentralization Fund to replace the current Independent Municipal Fund, ensuring a fair and transparent distribution of resources to both municipalities and the new district councils. Enacting this reform would be a game-changer, helping overcome extreme municipal fragmentation by empowering a higher tier to handle area-wide services and strategic planning. It would fulfill a long-delayed promise of the Taif Agreement and provide a modern legal framework for sustainable local governance. Parliament and the Cabinet should prioritize updating this draft and building consensus to pass it in the coming legislative session.
• Reform Municipal Finance Laws: Amend Laws 60/1988 and 665/1997, along with related fiscal legislation, to expand and modernize municipal revenue sources. However, strengthening revenue collection must be accompanied by an urgent and realistic revision of the entire fee structure, as a severe imbalance exists between current revenues and the real value of money today. The adjustments introduced in the 2024 budget—increasing fees by 10 to 20 times—are insufficient, given that operational costs, salaries, and maintenance have risen by approximately 60 times. For instance, a rental value fee that was equivalent to $200 before the 2019 crisis is now worth only $34 after adjustment. This massive discrepancy has left municipalities trapped in a perpetual cycle of deficit. A comprehensive overhaul is therefore necessary to align municipal revenues with today’s operational costs and restore financial viability.
• Restructure the Independent Municipal Fund: Through legislation or a Cabinet decree, overhaul the rules and management of the Municipal Fund to ensure predictable, equitable, and transparent transfers. Institute a fixed disbursement schedule (e.g. quarterly or biannual payments) to eliminate the current arbitrary delays. Revise the allocation formula to better reflect actual needs – for instance, base it on the resident population (not just registered voters) and weight it by development indicators such as poverty levels so that poorer areas receive a larger share. Include an equalization component that guarantees a minimum per-capita amount for small municipalities. At the same time, consider introducing incentives: a portion of the fund could be distributed on a performance basis (rewarding municipalities that demonstrate good governance practices, for example by maintaining audited financials or achieving high local tax collection rates). Enhance transparency by publishing the annual calculations of allocations and the actual transfer amounts for each municipality, and subject the fund to independent oversight. Establishing an independent board or committee to manage the fund – including representatives from municipalities, the Court of Accounts, and civil society – could help depoliticize distribution decisions (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2024). Crucially, the fund must be legally protected from diversion: new provisions should prohibit the central government from seizing or reallocating municipal revenues for other purposes. The law should make clear that municipal funds cannot be used to offset central government deficits or public utility debts (a practice that has happened before). By regularizing payments, revising the formula, and ring-fencing these revenues, the Municipal Fund can be transformed from a source of uncertainty and patronage into a reliable backbone of local finance.
• Institutionalize Timely Local Elections and Electoral Reforms: Amend the municipal electoral law to ensure that municipal elections are held on schedule every six years, without politically motivated postponements. Put in place mechanisms (perhaps constitutional or legal safeguards) that make it difficult for officials to delay local elections arbitrarily. Additionally, pursue electoral reforms to enhance representation and turnout at the local level. For example, consider allowing residents to vote where they live (not only in their ancestral villages) to make councils more representative, and adopt measures to encourage competition (like proportional representation or lower candidacy fees). The authorities should also apply the same best practices used in parliamentary elections to municipal elections: use pre-printed ballots, empower the Supervisory Commission for Elections to oversee local campaigns, enforce spending limits, and ensure media access for municipal candidates (Ray, 2023). Such measures would professionalize and depoliticize local elections, making contests more about local issues than about patronage and clientelism. Restoring the regular rhythm of elections and improving their conduct will help legitimize municipal leadership and renew the social contract at the community level.
• Ease Central Oversight and Strengthen Local Accountability: Reform regulatory frameworks to streamline central oversight and give municipalities greater administrative autonomy to operate efficiently. For example, the Ministry of Interior can raise the threshold for expenses and projects that require prior approval, allowing municipalities to directly procure routine works or emergency repairs up to a higher limit without lengthy sign-offs. Gradually shift from ex-ante controls to ex-post oversight: strengthen the capacity of the Court of Accounts (and its Local Government Audit unit) to audit municipal finances periodically after expenditures are made, instead of burdening municipalities with pre-approvals for every expense. This change would expedite project implementation while still ensuring accountability through regular audits. The central authorities should also actively enforce transparency laws at the local level – for instance, issuing a directive that all municipalities must comply with the Access to Information Law (28/2017) by publishing key documents such as annual financial statements, council meeting minutes, procurement tenders and awards, etc. Boosting transparency in this way can mitigate fears that decentralization will lead to local corruption, and it empowers citizens to hold their local officials accountable.
• Support Municipal Capacity-Building and Professionalization: The national government should facilitate improvements in municipal human resources and capacity. In coordination with the Civil Service Board, exempt critical municipal posts from general public-sector hiring freezes and allow municipalities to recruit essential skilled staff (such as engineers, urban planners, IT specialists, and financial officers) despite broader public hiring restrictions. One idea is to establish a Municipal Capacity Support Fund that co-finances the salaries of these skilled hires in financially weak municipalities, making it more affordable for them to attract talent (donors could be invited to contribute to such a fund). Another recommendation is to establish Regional Technical Support Offices – for example, at each governorate or grouping several unions – staffed with teams of experts (urban planners, procurement specialists, accountants, etc.) who can provide on-call assistance to any municipality in that region (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2024). The central government, possibly in partnership with universities or international programs, could set up these offices to help municipalities design projects, prepare tender documents, and manage complex tasks. This would be especially useful for small municipalities that lack in-house expertise, serving as a shared resource pool. Lastly, encourage the professionalization of municipal administration by standardizing training programs for local staff – for instance, a mandatory orientation or certification course for new municipal treasurers or engineering department heads, provided through the central government’s training institutes or in collaboration with entities like the Lebanese University. In short, investing in people is as essential as investing in infrastructure for the long-run success of decentralization.

Implementing the above reforms will require political will at the central level. The Lebanese government and Parliament should view empowering municipalities not as a threat to the state, but as a necessity to save the state. Strong local governments can enhance overall governance, improve service delivery, and rebuild trust with citizens from the bottom up.

Municipalities and Unions

While many solutions require national reforms, municipalities themselves are not passive victims; they can take proactive steps to improve governance and service delivery even within existing constraints. Local officials – both individually and collectively – should seize opportunities to strengthen their communities and build momentum for broader change. Key recommendations for municipalities (and their unions) include:

• Improve Local Revenue Collection and Financial Management: Municipal councils should focus on extracting the full value of the revenue sources already at their disposal. This means stepping up collection efforts for key local taxes and fees. They can conduct public awareness campaigns about the importance of paying municipal dues, perhaps offering incentives or installment payment plans for citizens in arrears. Councils should also enforce penalties for local tax evasion within the bounds of the law – for example, actually implement the 2018 decree that prohibits awarding public contracts to companies without proof of tax compliance, which would pressure local businesses to pay their municipal fees. Better financial management also involves budgeting conservatively and building small emergency reserves, if possible, to buffer against delayed transfers.
• Enhance Transparency and Citizen Engagement: To strengthen their legitimacy and accountability, municipal councils must proactively embrace transparency and involve citizens in local governance. They should hold regular town hall meetings (at least annually, if not more frequently) to discuss municipal plans and budgets and to hear community concerns. Inviting residents to voice priorities can guide the council on how to allocate scarce resources in line with real needs. Municipalities should also form advisory committees that include civil society members, youth representatives, and local business leaders – for example, a local economic development committee or an environmental committee – to harness community expertise and feedback. Utilizing technology is vital: many municipalities already have Facebook pages or WhatsApp groups; these should be used not only for announcements but also to publish important documents (such as budgets, tender results, and project updates) and to solicit citizen input. In line with the Access to Information Law, councils can post procurement awards or monthly expenditures publicly, demystifying their work and preempting rumors of corruption. Establishing a simple citizen complaint system is another practical step: for instance, a dedicated phone line or WhatsApp number where residents can report issues (garbage not collected, streetlight outages, potholes, etc.) and then receive a follow-up once the problem is addressed. Even if resources are limited, the act of being responsive – acknowledging complaints and trying to resolve them – will build public confidence. In short, municipalities should treat citizens as partners in governance, not just as passive beneficiaries (or worse, nuisances).
• Strengthen and Activate Municipal Unions: For those municipalities that are members of a Union of Municipalities, it is crucial to make that union effective. Mayors and council members within each union should work together to reinvigorate their union’s activities. Collectively, they can formulate union-level development plans that identify projects benefiting the entire region – for example, a regional landfill to serve multiple towns, a joint municipal slaughterhouse, an inter-municipal public park, or a tourism circuit linking attractions across villages. Ultimately, a strong union amplifies the power of its constituent municipalities: it can achieve economies of scale, apply for larger grants, and present a stronger negotiating position when dealing with central authorities or donors. Municipalities in a union should share resources whenever possible (equipment, technical staff) and meet regularly to coordinate efforts.
• Promote Inter-Municipal Cooperation (beyond formal unions): Even municipalities not formally in the same union – or those in different unions – should seek practical partnerships with their neighbors. Many local issues do not stop at administrative borders, including waste management, traffic, and environmental protection. Adjoining municipalities can sign Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) to collaborate on specific services or projects. They could coordinate zoning regulations or building codes for contiguous areas to promote harmonious development. Such voluntary collaborations foster solidarity among local entities and lay the groundwork for any future institutionalized regional structures. By sharing experiences and resources informally, municipalities also strengthen their collective voice and bargaining power.
• Foster Local Economic Development and Resilience: Municipalities should not wait passively for top-down aid; they can be proactive in stimulating their local economies and improving community resilience. Every area has some assets or unique strengths that can be leveraged. Municipal councils, possibly through specialized committees, should identify local economic opportunities – be it in agriculture, agro-food processing, crafts, tourism, or small industry – and develop modest initiatives around them. For example, a village known for a certain crop or product could organize an annual festival or market to attract visitors. Municipalities should also tap into the vast resource of the Lebanese diaspora. Engaging expatriates through “friends of the municipality” groups or diaspora investment forums can generate funds, expertise, and project ideas for local development. Furthermore, municipalities can encourage the formation of cooperatives or support local entrepreneurs by easing permit processes and providing public spaces for them to operate (e.g. designating areas for weekend farmers’ markets or crafts fairs). By catalyzing local economic initiatives, municipalities help create jobs and improve living conditions, which in turn can broaden their revenue base (through increased economic activity) and reduce residents’ dependence on central state services.
• Commit to Good Governance Practices: Municipal officials should lead by example when it comes to ethics and the rule of law. This involves strictly adhering to transparent procurement processes, avoiding conflicts of interest, and refusing to tolerate petty corruption in municipal affairs. Mayors and council members need to build a culture of integrity at City Hall – for instance, by publicly declaring any personal business interests, recusing themselves from decisions where there’s a conflict, and ensuring hiring and contracting are merit-based and competitive. By demonstrating honesty and professionalism, local leaders can slowly change public perceptions and increase citizens’ trust in local government.

By implementing measures like those above, municipalities can gradually build a track record of success even amid crisis conditions. Local authorities should strive to show that, if empowered, they can effectively deliver services to their constituents. Decentralization is as much a bottom-up process as a top-down one: stronger municipalities are part of the solution to Lebanon’s woes, not a risk.

International Development Partners

Lebanon’s international partners – including donor governments, UN agencies, international NGOs, and development finance institutions – have played an increasingly direct role in supporting local service provision during the recent crises. Going forward, their assistance should be aligned to reinforce decentralization and avoid undermining local institutions. The following recommendations aim to focus external support in ways that build municipal capacity and incentivize reform:

• Align Funding with Local Priorities and Plans: Development partners should coordinate closely with any emerging national decentralization strategy (once formulated) to ensure their aid strengthens rather than bypasses municipal institutions. Donors can expand the use of transparent, criteria-based mechanisms – such as municipal block grants or performance-based grants – instead of relying solely on small, ad hoc projects. The key is to utilize aid in a way that empowers local authorities by providing them with resources they control and allocate, rather than consistently circumventing them.
• Invest in Capacity-Building and Twinning Programs: Donors have historically provided training workshops and technical assistance to municipalities; however, these efforts need to be more sustained and scaled up given the severe brain drain and new challenges that have emerged. Development partners should fund long-term capacity-building programs that extend beyond one-off training sessions. This can include continuous on-the-job training for municipal staff in areas like modern financial management, public procurement law, participatory planning, GIS and urban planning, and e-governance systems. Additionally, donors should support municipal twinning and peer-learning initiatives: for instance, pairing Lebanese municipalities with cities abroad (possibly leveraging the Lebanese diaspora’s presence in foreign city councils or professional networks) to exchange expertise and best practices.
• Provide Technical Support for Decentralization Reforms: International partners are well-positioned to assist Lebanon’s national institutions in designing and implementing decentralization reforms when the opportunity arises. Donors can fund pilot projects to test decentralization concepts on a small scale before rolling them out more broadly. For example, a pilot of participatory budgeting in a few municipalities could demonstrate its impact and build the case for wider adoption. Or a digital property tax collection system piloted in one union could, if successful, be scaled nationally (perhaps tied into any e-government initiative the central government pursues). By supporting such pilots and providing technical design input, external partners can mitigate the risks associated with reform and give skeptical policymakers concrete evidence that these ideas work in practice.
• Improve Donor Coordination and Reduce Duplication: With numerous international actors involved in Lebanon’s local development, effective coordination is crucial to maximize impact and ensure balanced support (avoiding over-concentration in some municipalities while neglecting others). Donors should enhance coordination mechanisms specifically focused on municipal support. For example, they could establish a donor working group or platform on decentralization and municipalities – ideally chaired or co-chaired by the Ministry of Interior or another central body – to ensure alignment with national policies and priorities. Regular information-sharing about who is funding what projects in which municipalities can prevent duplication of efforts. Additionally, donor funding criteria could encourage municipalities to partner up – e.g. giving priority to project proposals that involve multiple municipalities or a union – thus naturally reducing fragmentation and promoting local cooperation.
• Fund Critical Service Gaps in the Short Term (with Municipal Involvement): Recognizing that some structural reforms will take years to materialize, donors should in the interim continue to fund essential services and humanitarian needs at the local level to prevent further crises. This includes areas such as solid waste collection, water supply (for example, providing fuel for water pumping stations or community water tanks), and renewable energy solutions (like solar streetlights and solar water pumps for villages). However, even short-term aid should be delivered in a manner that involves and strengthens municipalities rather than sidelining them. Wherever possible, channel funding through municipal accounts, or at least coordinate closely with municipal administrations so that they are part of decision-making and oversight for local projects.

In all these efforts, international partners should adopt a guiding principle of “do no harm” to local governance. This means avoiding any actions that unintentionally undermine local authority or legitimacy. For example, rather than an NGO directly managing a service indefinitely, the goal should be to hand it over to the municipality and build its capacity to run it. The objective is to make municipalities the champions of local development, with donors as supportive, behind-the-scenes facilitators. Over time, this approach will encourage the Lebanese public to trust and rely on their municipalities, knowing that even external aid is reinforcing (not replacing) local institutions.

Conclusion

Lebanon’s municipalities stand at a crossroads in 2025. After years of marginalization and democratic backsliding, they have been pushed to the forefront by the country’s overlapping crises. This policy paper has examined how outdated legal, financial, and administrative constraints have hindered municipalities, and how the national economic collapse since 2019 has significantly exacerbated these issues. The analysis shows that without structural changes, municipalities will remain illusory platforms – blamed for local problems but bereft of the authority or resources to solve them. Conversely, with enhanced powers and funding, local governments can become effective agents of development, accountability, and resilience.

Indeed, throughout the crises, many Lebanese municipalities demonstrated resilience and ingenuity – from organizing community relief during pandemic lockdowns to finding stopgap solutions for electricity and water. These positive efforts, however, have happened in spite of the system rather than because of it. Freeing municipalities from outdated constraints will amplify such local initiatives. It will allow local knowledge and energy to flourish. In a country as diverse as Lebanon, empowering local entities to tailor solutions to their specific contexts is not only efficient but also necessary.

The democratic implications are also profound. Restoring regular, timely local elections will rejuvenate the social contract at the community level. When citizens see tangible improvements in their own neighborhoods, they are more likely to regain trust in governance overall. This grassroots trust-building is essential in Lebanon’s context, where national institutions have largely failed to meet the public’s expectations. Decentralization done right does not weaken the state; it reconstructs the state from the bottom up, making it more responsive and legitimate. It brings government closer to the people in both the figurative and literal sense.

Of course, decentralization is not a panacea. There are risks to manage – such as ensuring uniform standards, preventing local elite capture, and maintaining national unity. However, the answer to these challenges is not to cling to a broken centralized model; it is to reform it and balance decentralization with effective accountability mechanisms. The policy recommendations in this paper aim to do exactly that: grant municipalities more autonomy while simultaneously strengthening oversight (through transparency, audits, and citizen participation) to ensure they remain accountable. International experience shows that building effective local government is a process that requires time and iteration. Lebanon will need to start implementing reforms, learn from early experiences, and adjust course as needed.

The year 2025 can mark a turning point. With municipal elections finally held, new local leadership is in place across Lebanon. Many of these mayors share the common challenge of governing amid economic hardship and institutional paralysis. Their success or failure in the next few years will have a significant impact on citizens’ daily lives and the country’s stability. The Parliament and central government should empower these local leaders to succeed – which means enacting the legal and fiscal reforms outlined here without further delay. Development partners should continue to assist, but that assistance must be aligned with a national vision of decentralization and local empowerment, not run in parallel to it.

In conclusion, empowering Lebanon’s municipalities amid crisis is not just about local governance – it is about national recovery and resilience. It is about restoring people’s trust that government in Lebanon can work. It is about injecting accountability and participation into a system starved of both. The challenges are enormous, but the solutions are within reach if there is political will. The road to a more decentralized, effective governance system will not be easy, but it offers a path out of the current quagmire. As the saying goes, “think globally, act locally” – Lebanon’s revival may well begin in its municipalities.

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