Introduction

Since 2011, the status of civic action in Morocco has been marked by numerous paradoxes. The new constitution recognizes civil society as a key partner of national and local authorities in formulating and monitoring government policies and programs, and several laws and regulations were enacted to codify mechanisms of participatory democracy, including legislative initiatives, petitions, and advisory opinions. However, activism has continued to decline under the influence of various political and socio-cultural shifts. While the number of associations has reached nearly 280,000, this development is accompanied by a noticeable contraction in civil society’s social base, as evidenced by a decline in the number of members, supporters, and participants in civic activities. This means that the reluctance to participate has shifted from the political sphere to the civic sphere, against a backdrop of deepening crisis in trust and weakened institutional capacities for civil society organizations (CSOs) to mobilize and advocate.

This situation is largely consistent with the current global context, characterized by a widening gap between political systems and societies and declining mediation and advocacy efforts carried out by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). This reality has cast a shadow over civil society’s historical role as a framework for countering authoritarian tendencies and for elevating societal demands to the public agenda. The recent protests by Generation Z youth (GenZ212) best illustrate this impasse. The systematic weakening of channels for civic mediation deepened the divide between society and state, which found itself facing a wave of youth protests that relied on non-traditional mobilization and organization and lacked trust in both formal and informal mediation mechanisms.

This paper seeks to explore the causes and effects of civic disengagement and the associated decline in the appeal of civic action, drawing on participatory observation and critical data analysis of civic movement effectiveness. The paper is structured around three main themes: the first examines the manifestations and roots of civil society’s weakening social ecosystem; the second highlights the organizational, political, and social consequences of civic disengagement in light of the repercussions of the Gen Z movement; and the final section explores the requirements for entrenching social representation within civil society organizations.

CSOs’ Shrinking Social Ecosystem: Manifestations and Roots

The framework for civic action in Morocco has seen a marked improvement since the late 1990s, coinciding with a democratic transition that brought about a broad opening of the public sphere and subsequent growth of popular momentum around issues of civic advocacy. ¹James Nadim Sater, “Civil Society and Political Change in Morocco” (Doctoral thesis), University of Durham, 2003, p. 248, https://etheses.durham.ac.uk/id/eprint/1257/ [Sater, Civil Society and Political Change in Morocco] Furthermore, since 2005, the National Initiative for Human Development (INDH) has enabled the launch of an unprecedented dynamic that has motivated thousands of women and young people to engage in civic activism, ²Yasmine Berriane, “The Micropolitics of Reform: Gender Quotas, Grassroots Associations, and the Renewal of Local Elites in Morocco”, The Journal of North African Studies 20, no. 3 (2015) p. 445, https://hal.science/hal-03125763v1 while improving the equitable geographic distribution of CSOs to extend into urban and rural peripheries, alongside an emerging generation of new non-partisan local associations. ³Janine A. Clark, Local Politics in Jordan and Morocco: Strategies of Centralization and Decentralization, Columbia University Press, 2018, p. 12. This has helped strengthen civil society’s role in fostering local leadership and broadening the social scope of community-based initiatives, thanks to its provisional funding, capacity-building, and support.

As part of Morocco’s response to the challenges of the Arab Spring and the unprecedented blockage in mediation channels that it revealed, the 2011 Constitution granted citizens and civil society actors a prominent role in public governance by enshrining participatory democracy as a fundamental pillar of the political system. This established new mechanisms to promote the co-production of public policies and development programs, such as petitions addressed to the government, parliament, and municipalities; legislative initiatives; and consultative bodies and participatory mechanisms for dialogue and consultation. It also encouraged the establishment of specialized councils to represent civil society actors, such as the Equality Commission and the Advisory Council for Youth and Civil Society.

As part of efforts to activate civil society’s constitutional roles, the government launched a broad dialogue in 2013 with several networks, which resulted in legislative and regulatory draft texts that served as a foundation for establishing a new relationship between state and civil society. Furthermore, creating a ministerial department for government-civil society relations gave a strong boost to the partnership between representative institutions and CSOs, as evidenced by the rise in the number of advocacy campaigns and civic action. However, this momentum would soon fade due to the limited legislative and institutional framework to support these new mechanisms, the continued deterioration of mediation channels, and a growing appeal of unorganized protests as an effective means of articulating and defending demands.

In light of this situation, civil society action has become riddled with countless contradictions: numerically, more than 54% of associations were established after 2011, ⁴National Documentation Center (NDC), National Survey of Nonprofit Organizations – 2019 –Summary of Preliminary Results, High Commission for Planning of Morocco, November 2023, p. 2, https://tinyurl.com/mrx7e4pu [NDC, National Survey of Nonprofit Organizations] yet their membership base has gradually eroded, as reflected in the decline in the number of members and volunteers. While the need for CSOs to advocate for human rights and development issues has grown, the popular base – a necessary support for mobilization – has shrunk. This is evidenced by the declining support base for their initiatives, as reflected in low public turnout at various demonstrations, advocacy events, outreach activities, and a reluctance to sign petitions addressed to representative institutions.

The civic disengagement dilemma is primarily linked to the macro-political context. According to a recent field study by the Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis, 44% of associations view the shrinking of civic space as one of the most significant obstacles hindering their efforts. ⁵Imru Al Qays Talha Jebril and Ayman Taleb, Environmental Advocacy in Morocco: Challenges, Strategies, and Institutional Barriers, Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis, March 2025, p. 8, https://mipa.institute/?p=11625&lang=en In addition, social capital – serving as the moral driving force behind civic action – has eroded amid a continued decline in initiatives, volunteerism, and trust, while tendencies toward individualism and apathy toward public issues have grown, not to mention a weak legislative framework due to obsolete legal provisions that have become incompatible with the requirements of the 2011 Constitution; with the exception of the partial 2002 amendments, associations are still governed by a law enacted in 1958. As a result, challenges related to the freedom of associations have intensified, such as refusals to issue provisional permits promptly and frequent denials of authorization to organize meetings and demonstrations without any legal justification. Furthermore, many associations were denied the opportunity to participate in calls for proposals for projects and refused transparent and equal access to financial support provided by ministerial departments, public institutions, and elected councils. ⁶National Human Rights Council (CNDH), Laying the Foundations for a National System to Protect Economic and Social Rights, February 2024, p. 67, https://tinyurl.com/4xjd9hwv

In this context, the structural impact of insufficient and unsustainable funding sources is evident in the institutional fragility of CSOs and a weakening of their mobilization and management capacities. ⁷Mariam Ibilil, “The Shift Toward Organizational Professionalism in Moroccan Civil Society: A Case Study” (Arabic), in Civil Society in Morocco: Between Achievements and Challenge of Sustainability, Mhamed Elaissaoui and Abderrahim El Allam (eds.), Takamul Center for Studies and Research, 2025, pp. 395–425, https://tinyurl.com/mr3w9dpf Faced with insufficient self-generated resources from membership dues, grants, and donations, a large segment of civil society has fallen into chronic financial dependence on government agencies or international institutions, raising the risk of prioritizing donor agendas over community needs. ⁸Silvia Ma Dorado Nogueras, “Morocco in Transition: Democracy, Civil Society and Human Development”, Revista Castellano-Manchega de Ciencias Sociales, no. 12 (2011), p. 107, https://doi.org/10.20932/barataria.v0i12.141 This situation has led to a systemic shift in CSO position and function, marginalizing work toward social change and allowing professionals and bureaucrats to dominate civil society’s decision-making at the expense of activists and members. This has reinforced their elitist nature and further distanced them from the actual needs of citizens. ⁹Mona Atia and Catherine E. Herrold, “Governing Through Patronage: The Rise of NGOs and the Fall of Civil Society in Palestine and Morocco”, Voluntas 29, no. 5 (2018) pp. 1044–1054, https://doi.org/10.1007/S11266-018-9953-6

In terms of the infrastructure to support civic engagement, there has been a qualitative leap in facilities designed to host citizen initiatives in technically equipped spaces (youth and cultural centers, art palaces, socio-cultural hubs, etc.). However, the procedures for accessing these facilities have been fraught with countless complications, including imposing exorbitant fees for their use, and adopting bureaucratic procedures that often result in cancellations, rescheduling, or relocation to alternative venues that are below the required standards to adequately run training workshops or hold large-scale discussion forums, which run counter to international conventions and constitutional and legal requirements. ¹⁰National Human Rights Council (CNDH), Reordering Priorities to Strengthen Rights Effectiveness (Arabic), October 2022, p. 73, https://tinyurl.com/2wz547nb Furthermore, the fact that more than half of the associations (54.7%) lack their own premises forces them to carry out their activities under inadequate conditions and undermines their ability to implement their programs effectively. ¹¹NDC, National Survey of Nonprofit Organizations, p. 5.

At the same time, internal factors related to fragmentation and polarization undermine the credibility of CSOs and their capacity for social accountability. ¹²Syliva I. Bergh et al., “Powerful Tool or a Passing Trend? Meanings and Practices of Social Accountability in the Arab World, and Why They Matter”, Arab Reform Initiative, 13 May 2023, https://tinyurl.com/m9ysz65f CSOs also suffer from a crisis of internal democracy, which takes on increasingly severe forms, such as a lack of respect for regular convenings of the general assemblies and conferences, as well as limited leadership renewal. The same individuals in executive bodies persist in many associations, undermining their leadership’s dynamic rotation, with serious repercussions, such as the withdrawal of marginalized activists from institutional civil society work and deterring young people from engaging with CSOs. We also note limited compliance with good governance requirements, like irregular meetings and poor financial transparency; official data indicate that the percentage of associations that maintain accounting records in accordance with applicable standards does not exceed 5.3%. ¹³Anas Al-Hasnawi, The Work Environment of Civil Society Organizations in Morocco: Engagement and Contribution to the Development Process, Arab NGO Network for Development, 2018, p. 8, https://tinyurl.com/3vf68shj

The Impacts of Civic Apathy: Organizational and Sociopolitical Dimensions

From an organizational perspective, civic participation has a dialectical relationship with democratic practice. While CSOs’ weak commitment to democratic principles has contributed to fueling civic disengagement, this has, in turn, exacerbated the internal democratic dilemma within most CSOs. Furthermore, the membership’s shrinking base has slowed the turnover of the elites and fostered a tendency to monopolize collective decision-making, which often becomes subservient to ruling minority interests at the expense of the organization’s broader objectives. This has resulted in the infiltration of authoritarian tendencies within most associations and has weakened their credibility and organizational legitimacy – qualities that enable them to challenge abuses of power and defend society’s demands.

Amid this transformation, the appeal of service- and charity-oriented associations has grown due to the availability of funding and institutional support mechanisms; requirements for public benefit status limit most CSOs’ access to regular official funding. Furthermore, support from ministries and public institutions is often granted according to a methodology that prioritizes associations active in the fields of charity and social work. In contrast, the number of associations advocating for rights and causes has declined to no more than 1.4%. ¹⁴NDC, National Survey of Nonprofit Organizations, p. 4. As a result, a large segment of the civil society sector has shifted from holding public authorities accountable to working on their behalf – such as overseeing development plans and the implementation of development projects, particularly those related to restructuring underserved areas and managing social facilities, such as care centers for the elderly and people in vulnerable situations or with disabilities. Under all these agreements, many associations have been turned into functional mechanisms performing administrative roles on behalf of official bodies. ¹⁵Sylvia I. Bergh, “‘Inclusive’ Neoliberalism, Local Governance Reforms, and the Redeployment of State Power: The Case of the National Initiative for Human Development (INDH) in Morocco”, Mediterranean Politics 17, no. 3 (2012) p. 423, https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2012.725304

Table 1

Association Distribution by Field of Activity ¹⁶NDC, National Survey of Nonprofit Organizations.

Percentage (%)	Number	Field of Activity
30.9	58,073	Culture, Sports, and Recreation
14.4	27,080	Education and Scientific Research
3.0	5,661	Health
12.9	24,210	Social Services, Charitable Organizations, and Volunteer Promotion
4.2	7,844	Environment
27.6	51,873	Development and Housing
1.4	2,606	Rights, Advocacy for Citizens and Consumers, and Policy
3.1	5,856	Religion
2.4	4,508	Economic and Professional Associations and Unions
0.1	123	Other Sectors

Table 1 shows that advocacy and defense associations have fallen to the bottom of the list of CSOs in Morocco, while service-oriented associations dominate. This shift has had adverse effects: rather than helping to bridge the gap between authorities and the local population, it has exacerbated tensions between them in the face of a series of regional protests demanding change. ¹⁷Mustafa al-Manasfi, “Civil Society Organizations and Representatives of Public Authorities in Morocco: The Cases of Rabat and Casablanca” (Arabic)”, Arab Council for the Social Sciences, Working Paper Series no. 18, May 2021, p. 14, https://theacss.org/ar/working-papers/15-2/ Rather than strengthening the social legitimacy of civil society actors – given that they provide local services – it has undermined their credibility, as they are now viewed as official partners who share responsibility for shortcomings in services and human rights. In this regard, we note the consequences of delegating early childhood education management to several associations – such as the Moroccan Foundation for Early Childhood Education, the Zagora Foundation, and the Moroccan Federation for Education and Teaching – which resulted in a series of protests by educators regarding their professional rights. ¹⁸Voice of Morocco, “Elementary School Teachers Boycott Administrative Platforms and Programs and Demand a Repeal of the Delegated Measure” (Arabic), 6 March 2026. https://tinyurl.com/ye2y34kk

Politically, narrowing civic action’s societal scope has contributed to a growing sense of underrepresentation, which is no longer limited to public authorities and elected councils but now extends even to opposition parties, labor unions, and CSOs. ¹⁹Jamila Al-Aboudi, “Gen Z Movement in Morocco: An Ongoing Struggle for Freedom, Dignity, and Social Justice” (Arabic), Arab Forum for Alternative Studies, 2 November 2025, p. 6, https://tinyurl.com/ytwb2jde Within this context, there have been signs of a shift away from traditional forms of civil organization toward more flexible models that bypass the formal procedural complexities surrounding these organizations:

Regional Movements

Amid declining confidence in the credibility and competence of CSOs, a new generation of protest movements has emerged, driven by an accumulation of deficiencies in public facilities and infrastructure in certain marginalized regions, and organized by committees that operate outside of civil and political organizations, such as the Popular Movement committees in the Rif in 2016, Jerada in 2018, and Figuig since 2023. Certain “spontaneous” protests have also emerged, in the form of foot marches in marginalized areas, and perhaps most recently exemplified by thousands of residents marching from the Aït Boukmaz region in late July 2025, covering a distance of 80 km toward the Azilal provincial headquarters to demand improvements to infrastructure, health, and educational services. In the past, such demands were typically organized and channeled by local CSOs and networks.

Sectoral Coordinating Committees

In response to the decline in social legitimacy of trade unions, professional bodies, and CSOs, parallel, unlicensed organizations have emerged under the name of “coordinating committees,” serving as flexible frameworks for networking among sectors affected by specific policies and measures. These organizations have gradually come to have more members than recognized organizations, capitalizing on dwindling trust in traditional union work and on their decentralized organizational structure. Examples include the Field Coordination Committee for Unemployed Graduates, the National Coordination Committee for Victims of the Al-Haouz Earthquake, the National Committee for Medical, Pharmacy, and Dental Students, coordination committees for victims of the real estate mafia, and the National Coordination Committee for Teachers Subject to Contractual Employment.

Virtual Organizations

Younger generations are replacing institutional spaces with digital forms of civic engagement. Thanks to this, citizenship is no longer measured in organizational affiliation, but simply by contributing comments, sharing posts, and making suggestions. A wave of social media chat groups has also emerged as “virtual organizations” that coordinate among stakeholders to influence public opinion and decision-making and channel soft forms of protest, such as economic boycott initiatives against certain companies in response to rising prices of basic goods, advocacy campaigns, and online petitions to convey political and social messages.

In this context, the fourth quarter of 2025 saw a surge in protest activity. These emergent, decentralized protests were led by demographic groups that had long been excluded from the dynamics of political change. Following institutional exhaustion faced by civil and labor movements, the Gen Z movement – a generation long viewed as obsessed with video games and deemed incapable of sociopolitical action – emerged and launched a form of protest unprecedented in the country’s modern political history. ²⁰Yasmine Zarhloule, “Understanding Morocco’s Gen Z Uprising” (blog), Diwan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 24 October 2025. https://tinyurl.com/5kjwdw6f The Gen Z movement revealed a sophisticated awareness of public issues among young people that transcends the boundaries of political parties and CSOs. This may inspire other groups to adopt innovative methods and techniques for protesting and demanding rights outside of traditional channels, which are supposedly safer and more predictable for the political authorities, in terms of controlling their pace and how to respond to them, given that these movements stem from groups with organizational structures and leadership figures that facilitate negotiation and compromise. ²¹Mohammed Elmoctar El Khalil, “A Sociological Approach to Understanding the Gen Z Protests in Morocco” (Arabic), Lubab Journal of Strategic Studies, no. 29 (February 2026) pp. 23–24, https://tinyurl.com/2jrna9s3

Gen Z protests demonstrated the inability of traditional mediation mechanisms to withstand shocks coming from the streets, as the movement’s dynamics coalesced and escalated virtually on Discord, completely isolated from various intermediary frameworks. This situation poses serious challenges regarding how to deal with amorphous organizational structures (adhocracy) that have weak ties to political and civil society bodies. ²²Meissa Haouari, “Morocco’s Youth Protests and the Limits of Its Governance Formula” (blog), Afkar, Middle East Council on Global Affairs, 12 October 2025, https://tinyurl.com/pwtykznr The Gen Z movement also highlighted the depth of the generational divide; the disconnect between some CSOs and the younger generations’ concerns, coupled with their limited ability to incorporate these concerns into their structures and programs, has left them lacking the credibility needed to ensure success in mediation efforts. Gen Z youth did not engage with certain CSO initiatives that presented themselves as a bridge to convey young people’s demands to the authorities, ²³Francesco Colin, “Generation Z 212 Earthquake: Youth Shake Up Politics in Morocco”, Arab Reform Initiative, 16 October 2025, https://tinyurl.com/3ppetde3 even though these organizations supported the Gen Z movement through statements of support and contributed to legal representation and judicial assistance, as was the case with the Association of Bar Associations and the Moroccan Association for Human Rights.

Requirements for Deepening Social Representation in CSOs

Given the political environment’s decisive role in curbing civic activism, the effort to restore mediation and advocacy necessarily requires allowing for a natural separation between state functions and political and civil society roles – free from tendencies toward restriction – by ceasing attempts to co-opt associations and turning them into functional tools in the hands of central and local bureaucracies, and promoting positive interaction with civil society’s political role in a democratic sense – as a mechanism in society’s hands to hold political authorities accountable for breaching the social contract and safeguarding human rights in the face of regressive risks toward authoritarianism. ²⁴Francesco Colin, “Articulating Political Spaces: Overcoming the Civic Dimension of Citizenship Performances in Local Morocco”, Democratization 32, no. 6 (2025) p. 1602, https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2025.2478959

Within this framework, the interconnections between civic participation and independent civil action are highlighted; the context of civil society development in Morocco demonstrates that the more independent it is from the state and political parties, the greater the popular momentum it gains in advocating for civil, economic, and social rights. ²⁵Sater, Civil Society and Political Change in Morocco, p. 253. More broadly, civil society remains limited without a civic space that provides an environment conducive to organization, initiative, and dialogue among citizens, and without a clear definition of the nature of the relationship between the state and active CSOs – one that is based on respect for their independence and treats them as genuine partners in public policymaking. ²⁶Francesco Colin, “Red Lines, Where to Find Them and How to Deal with Them: Civil Society, the State, and Political Change in Morocco”, Arab Reform Initiative, 15 November 2024, pp. 28–29, https://tinyurl.com/y4dcc8by

However, any effort to support civil society’s independence remains futile unless it is underpinned by a package of legislative, institutional, and regulatory reforms designed to expand the scope and tools for civic engagement and enhance the level and societal reach of citizen participation:

• Legislative Safeguards for Civil Society Independence: Ensuring laws that govern CSOs align with constitutional requirements and establishing a legal framework that protects CSOs’ rights and freedoms, including streamlining procedures for establishment; holding meetings and organizing demonstrations; scrutinizing procedures for concluding and implementing partnership agreements between associations, public authorities, and elected councils; and establishing clear guidelines for public funding that take into account democratic governance, membership size, and on-the-ground effectiveness, based on terms of reference that consider the specific circumstances of active local associations. The reform must also address legislation that may seem technical but has a significant impact on civic engagement, such as simplifying the conditions for contractual volunteering and facilitating citizen access to public information with the speed and quality required for use in monitoring public policies and programs.
• Governance of Civic Action: Civic participation is linked to the extent to which organizations adhere to standards of good governance, foremost among them is financial transparency through the use of accounting tools, disclosure of funding sources and amounts, and reporting on activity outcomes. In addition, strategic planning involves scheduling communication, organization, and initiative-related activities over the medium term, as well as a focus on continuous training to strengthen capacities in the areas of management, negotiation, and advocacy. ²⁷Economic, Social, and Environmental Council (CESE), The Status and Dynamics of Civil Society, no. 28, 2016, p. 17, https://tinyurl.com/bdzfs2cy Networking within legally regulated coalitions and local and national networks can also be a conducive organizational environment that can help bolster the public support needed to drive the dynamics of change led by civic actors. In addition, social media networks and digital technologies should be leveraged effectively to mobilize support for causes and to broaden alliances. ²⁸Shafiq al-Sawaki, Social Movements and Civil Society in Morocco, Arab NGO Network for Development, 2021, pp. 22–23, https://tinyurl.com/424cdsc7
• Enhancing Civic Engagement Appeal: Given limited media coverage, a significant portion of civil society’s best practices remains overlooked. In light of this, best practices must be highlighted, such as organizing open outreach events to showcase leading associations, leveraging media outlets to promote outstanding activities, and presenting successful on-the-ground models to encourage volunteerism. Sustainable support should also be allocated to the most active associations, and the government must stop downplaying citizens’ initiatives – as was the case with the petition to establish a fund to support cancer patients, which garnered more than 40,000 signatures; although the Prime Minister officially pledged to take practical steps to implement the initiative’s demands, the government failed to follow through. This contributes to growing skepticism regarding effective mechanisms for civic participation. ²⁹Francesco Colin, “Institutional Petitions in Morocco: Opportunities and Challenges of Claiming Rights in Participatory Arenas”, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 50, no. 2 (2023) p. 500, https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2021.1981233
• Strengthening Pathways to Participatory Democracy: To institutionalize the relationship between society and state, a specialized body should be established – potentially in the form of a National Council for Civil Society – based on balanced representation that allows for a democratic selection of representatives from active CSOs. The same applies to local participatory mechanisms: it is essential to mandate the creation of councils parallel to elected bodies, comprising representatives from active associations, while facilitating the use of petitions, proposals, and advisory opinions by removing regulatory restrictions that grant authorities broad discretion in responding.

Conclusion

The quantitative growth of Morocco’s civil society sector has been accompanied by a deterioration in its social depth, as evidenced by declining numbers of members and of participants in activities organized by various forms of civil society work. This situation has cast a shadow over civil society’s historical role as a framework for countering authoritarian tendencies and for advancing societal demands through mediation and advocacy. The recent Gen Z protests have been the most prominent expression of this impasse, driven by a growing sense of marginalization and lack of representation among people from popular backgrounds. The systematic weakening of channels for civic mediation has deepened the divide between society and state, which has found itself unable to accommodate or effectively address young people’s expectations.

To stimulate civic participation, public sphere access must be expanded by efficiently implementing constitutional provisions regarding civil society actor involvement at various stages of public policy formulation, monitoring, and evaluation. Legal and regulatory constraints that stifle civic-life dynamics need to be removed, and robust safeguards need to be established to ensure policymakers engage responsibly with citizen initiatives and CSOs – the latter should be compliant with good governance standards. The more democratic and transparent community-based initiatives are, the greater the popular momentum they will generate. Furthermore, larger social capital investment is needed through coordinated training and communication programs to foster the values of volunteerism, initiative, and trust.