From Tunisia’s independence in 1956 to the departure of ex-president Ben Ali in 2011, right up to the present day, the conditions in which the media operate depend on political upheavals, which themselves fluctuate according to the events shaking the country. Indeed, in a strong State, shaped by Bourguiba from the 1960s onwards, the media could not operate outside a restricted framework imposed by political power. In this context, the exercise of fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of the press and opinion, is reduced to a bare minimum in the name of "the general interest of the country" or "necessary constraint". Nevertheless, in light of the social and political crises affecting the structures of the State, the political field can experience an "authoritarian decompression” characterized by political "openings" that are limited in time. As a consequence, the information and media sectors will be affected by these "openings", experiencing brief moments of “respite”.
The break brought about by the departure of President Ben Ali has paved the way for a new political cycle. From 2011 to 2021, the country experienced a decade marked by abundant political activity. New political parties and associations emerged thanks to several new provisions. Against this backdrop, the media world witnessed a period of exceptional freedom, with the number of newspapers, radio stations, and television channels increasing significantly during that time. This expansion allowed citizens and journalists to stay informed and debate freely, but often without a clear direction. Television studios are sometimes turned into arenas where different players clash.
However, this "embellishment" gradually began to fade from 2021 onwards, and for good reason: the reforms implemented have not had a profound impact on the world of journalism and the media sector. They failed in establishing real safeguards against the risks of the "democratic transition" being hijacked and exploited for politico-personal gains. The role of the State as a promoter of these reforms was somewhat weakened by the proliferation of the interests and practices of private players who were quick to fill these new openings.
Moreover, the internal quarrels that have atomized the political elite that governed the country during the past decade (2011-2021), their successive failures to curb social precariousness, social injustice, and corruption, and their responsibility for derailing the "revolution" weighed heavily on the course and outcome of the 2019 presidential elections.
As a result of the disillusionment of many Tunisians with regard to the "democratic transition" and the frustrations felt in particular by those left behind by the "revolution", a new political figure with populist leanings, Kaïs Saied, easily emerged in the second round of the 2019 presidential elections. He is the antithesis of the traditional elites who have governed the country since 2011.
In July 2021, President Kaïs Saied took the country by surprise by declaring a state of emergency, then seizing all the levers of command, to ultimately act as "sole master on board".
This paper examines the deployment of media during the presidential elections of 2024, in comparison with their role during the 2019 electoral campaign when they were decisive players. It then addresses the situation of the media in 2024 to subsequently question the reasons for the failures or fragility of the gains of the " democratic transition" in terms of press freedom and the return to authoritarian and repressive practices of political power.
Unsurprising elections, disoriented media
Since the start of the political transition on 14 January 2011, electoral confrontations have been characterized by feverish, stimulating exchanges between the candidates. The multiplicity and diversity of candidacies (26 candidates in the 2019 presidential elections) aroused voters' interest, fanned contradictory debates, crystallized oppositions, and propelled the media as well as social networks that relayed and amplified candidates' performances. Polling institutes regularly delivered their results on voting intentions. The suspense remained intact, and the outcome of the elections was never known in advance.
But at the same time, and throughout the 2019 election campaign, the major audiovisual media openly defied the principles governing the election campaign through their biased reporting and their failure to respect neutrality and transparency. These shortcomings exposed the dysfunctions and repeated failures of public policy toward the media. These failures paved the way for a return to authoritarian practices by political power against the media and journalists.
Indeed, with the October 2024 presidential election campaign, the political context has stiffened under the leadership of an omnipotent political power and conditions that no longer guarantee free, fair, and plural competition. The 2024 elections are nothing like the previous ones, at least not those that followed the 2011 revolution. They are a return to the authoritarian practices that prevailed before the outbreak of the "revolution". They pit the incumbent president against a rival in prison and another who has supported him for a very long time. Unsurprisingly, Kaïs Saied won the first round (90.69% of the vote, with a turnout of 28.8%). And with good reason: the credibility of the electoral authority (ISIE) has been tarnished since its members were appointed by the President of the Republic and no longer elected by Parliament. The activities of the audiovisual regulatory authority (HAICA) are frozen because the authorities refused to accept Decree-Law 116 as the legitimate law governing audiovisual communication. The electoral body refuses to implement the decision of the Administrative Court to put back into the race three candidates previously excluded by it (the ISIE). Ten days before the ballot, on 27 September 2024, Parliament approved an "urgent" amendment to Organic Law n°2014-16 of May 26, 2014, which removed the Administrative Court's prerogative to arbitrate electoral disputes and decided to transfer the powers of the administrative and financial jurisdictions to the judiciary. The main NGOs that once monitored the smooth running of elections have not received accreditation from the ISIE, because their funding sources are deemed "suspect". And for the first time since 2011, European Union observers were not allowed to follow the voting process.
Another illustration of the deleterious state of fundamental freedoms can be seen in the conditions under which the media and journalists operated during the 2024 presidential campaign. In the past, they were characterized by great freedom of tone and movement and freely covered election campaigns. Television channels, under the supervision of HAICA, organized debates between opposing candidates, which drew considerable public attention from voters.
For the 2024 elections, national television, which is expected to cover the election campaign, limited itself to broadcasting news relating to the ISIE, brief updates on the candidates' campaigns, reports on voting, and a vox pop entitled "If I were president?". There were no real debates between the candidates and little or no coverage of opposing citizen reactions, except for a few radio broadcasts or newspaper articles that endeavored to amplify dissenting voices. Moreover, the Journalists' Union has denounced the pressure exerted on journalists at the official press agency, Tunis Afrique Presse, by their management since the start of the election campaign.
The reason for the deterioration in journalists' working conditions today can be traced back to 2022, when freedom of expression and information, as well as the right to information, were seriously undermined. Unconstitutional legal provisions have weighed heavily on the work of journalists and the dissemination of opinions on social media, further restricting the space for expression and information.
Variable rights and freedoms
With the introduction of the state of emergency on 25 July 2021, freedom of expression and information, hard-won rights in the aftermath of the "Revolution", have been seriously undermined. Admittedly, the 2022 Constitution enshrines freedom of information and communication and guarantees the right to access information and social networks. However, in an authoritarian, hyper-presidential regime, legal norms essentially depend on how the "zaïm" (leader) interprets and uses them based on the circumstances.
In the absence of a Constitutional Court, a decree-law issued by the President of the Republic, along with administrative orders and judicial decisions, have been sufficient to limit journalists' freedom of maneuver, control broadcasting on social networks, and restrict access to information.
Controlling distribution on social networks, limiting the exercise of journalism
Decree-Law No. 2022-54 of 13 September 2022, on combating offenses relating to information and communication systems is a typical example of a freedom-destroying provision, aimed at controlling and repressing the dissemination on social networks of comments and documents "with the aim of infringing the rights of others...". Article 24 states: that "Anyone who knowingly uses information and communication systems and networks to produce, spread, disseminate, send or write false news, false data, rumors, false or falsified documents or documents falsely attributed to others with the aim of infringing the rights of others or harming public safety or national defense or spreading terror among the population... shall be punished by five years' imprisonment and a fine of 50 thousand dinars...and the penalties are doubled if the person targeted is a public official or similar". The profusion of ambiguous terms contained in this text opens the door to different interpretations on the part of judges, who can initiate proceedings and impose criminal convictions against anyone found guilty under Decree-Law No. 2022-54 "simply for expressing their opinions.
On 15 June 2023, the President of the Assembly of People's Representatives (ARP) announced that journalists would no longer be authorized to cover parliamentary committee meetings, and that information on committee work would only be published in official press releases, accessible via the Parliamentary Assembly's website and its official page on social networks. In the same vein, on 17 June 2023, an examining magistrate from the Judicial Pole for Combating Terrorism issued a court order prohibiting the audiovisual media from reporting on the so-called "plot against State security" case, citing the need to "preserve the smooth running of the investigations". These two cases involve more than 20 opposition leaders, lawyers, and activists, all accused of "plotting against State security."
Shattered gains
In the wake of the major legal reforms introduced by the first post-revolution governments in 2011, new legal provisions were established to regulate the print and broadcast media. Today, however, these provisions no longer appear to be fully operational following the introduction of the state of emergency. This does not mean that they have been formally repealed, but in practice, when legal actions are taken against journalists or citizens for expressing themselves through the press or on social media, judges tend to invoke other legal texts, including recent texts. These include recent legislation such as Decree-Law No. 2022-54 as well as older texts such as the Telecommunications Code, enacted under former President Ben Ali, which contains several provisions that infringe on freedoms. Similarly, the anti-terrorism law adopted by the Assembly of People's Representatives (ARP) in 2015 has been used to incriminate political militants, among others. This law imposes broader restrictions on freedoms and creates opportunities for all sorts of abuses, including branding political opponents as "terrorists."
In addition to the legal framework that tends to restrict freedom of expression and control the work of journalists, the activities of the audiovisual regulatory body, HAICA, are now completely frozen. It is no longer listed as a constitutional body in the 2022 Constitution and now operates under government control. Furthermore, it is no longer required to give its "assent" to appointments of heads of public broadcasting media.
How did we move from a diverse and pluralistic media landscape during the 2011-2021 decade, despite the dysfunctions and blunders, to a context today that is characterized by the shrinking spaces for free expression and the prosecution of journalists?
The reasons are multiple and interconnected. They stem from the long-standing entanglement of the media world with political power since independence as well as the vulnerability and precariousness of the journalistic profession in Tunisia. Today, in their newsrooms, journalists are disoriented by the arrests within their ranks and the legal constraints weighing on many of them. What is more, their material and working conditions are deteriorating. In some companies, journalists' salaries are delayed, and staff cuts are frequent due to falling advertising revenues. To fully understand the causes of this decline, we need to go back to the decade after the "revolution".
An unfinished transition
The 2011-2021 decade raised great hopes among freedom advocates. In the media, in particular, aspirations for freedom of information and communication were reflected in the beginnings of reforms that were undertaken. However, these efforts failed to bring about any profound impact on the world of journalists and the media industry. These reforms have not succeeded in establishing effective safeguards against the risks of democratic transition being hijacked for political and personal gains. Instead, they remain either unfinished or undermined by actors with disparate interests who have used the media, especially audiovisual platforms, to propel themselves into the political arena. This failure can be attributed to the structural reforms because of profound divisions tearing apart the ruling elites and the overwhelming weight of social, economic, and political challenges that burdened the transition.
In this respect, the lack of mutual trust between the various actors in the transition process, on the one hand, and between the rulers and the governed, on the other, coupled with the deterioration of the economic and social situation affecting the most disadvantaged, has flued a strong feeling of resentment among large segments of the population. This resentment reflects the disappointment and disillusionment with the political elite across the spectrum. It was first expressed at the ballot box through the success of independent candidates in the 2018 municipal elections, then through the election of Kaïs Saied, a "fundamentally populist" candidate, in the 2019 presidential elections. He subsequently orchestrated the "coup de force" of 25 July 2021 and declared a state of emergency, marking the end of the political process launched in 2011 and the return to authoritarian and repressive practices.
2011-2021: Media embellishments with no aftermath
In the aftermath of 14 January 2011, Tunisia moved swiftly from five decades of State-controlled media to an unprecedented level of freedom in its contemporary history. For the first time, this situation of freedom and emancipation from political authority has been brought about from below, rather than imposed by a decision emanating from the top of the State. It was driven by a popular will, with no leader and no program, which ultimately undermined the State and public institutions with the fall of former President Ben Ali (1987-2011). However, the departure of Ben Ali and the advent of new ruling elites did not help to break from old practices, nor did it replace old institutions with new structures grounded in a fundamentally reformist vision.
The media reform policy driven by Tunisia’s first transitional governments in 2011 is particularly revealing. It highlights the stark contrast between the legal frameworks that are expected to regulate the media world and their actual application by the various actors in this sector. To understand this dynamic, we must first examine the key provisions introduced since 2011 before analyzing the dysfunctions and deviations they have produced.
Unfinished liberalization
At the outset of the transitional process in 2011, a broad consensus was forged among the new ruling elite that the media should break free from the grips of those that govern and that the audiovisual sector should be regulated by an independent public body.
New legal provisions governing the print media and the audiovisual sector came into force in November 2011:
- Decree-Law No. 115 (Official Journal No. 84, dated 4 November 2011) on the press, printing, and publishing. This law was built around four key areas: the regulation of press companies, the status of professional journalists, the right of rectification and response, and the criminal liability of journalists.
- Decree-Law No. 116 (dated 2 November 2011), on the freedom of audiovisual communication. This law enshrines the freedom of audiovisual communication and, for the first time in Tunisia, establishes a regulatory body for the audiovisual media: the High Independent Authority for Audiovisual Communication (HAICA). Inspired by French and Belgian legislation on the subject, the decree gives the HAICA a civil status and financial autonomy while entrusting it with "guaranteeing the freedom and pluralism of audiovisual communication" ...and "issuing an assent regarding the appointment of CEOs of public audiovisual media".
Furthermore, the Constitution adopted on 26 January 2014 guaranteed the freedoms of opinion, thought, expression, information, and publication, and stated that "no prior control may be exercised over these freedoms" (Art 31). Similarly, the right to information and the right to access information are guaranteed by the State, which is mandated "to guarantee the right of access to communication networks" (Art 32).
The media landscape has since greatly expanded and diversified, with freedom of opinion and expression becoming a tangible reality, constituting the main achievement of the "Revolution". The exercise of this freedom and the adoption of a liberal legal framework have led to the emergence of a wide variety of media. Before the outbreak of the "Revolution", media outlets were few and largely government-controlled.
The Aporias of reform
However, the media advancements of the 2011-2021 decade remained relative and highly vulnerable. On one hand, the development of the legal and institutional framework has not brought about the necessary reforms within newsrooms and the media landscape. Most media outlets were left to their own devices, often succumbing to the lure of ratings through buzz and sensationalism. On the other hand, the temptation of money and the opacity surrounding funding sources in most private media threatened their independence.
In a report on "Owners of Private Audiovisual Media," based on a survey and cross-checking of administrative documents, it emerges that, on one hand, most owners of private audiovisual media do not adhere to the legal principles of ownership transparency that govern the activities of commercial enterprises and are enshrined in HAICA's specifications. On the other hand, the report also highlights the tendency of business circles, religious groups, and wealthy politicians to invest in private audiovisual media, which risks undermining the principles of plurality and diversity in the media landscape.
Furthermore, HAICA was unable to enforce its decisions to close unlicensed channels and stations. It cannot effectively exercise its prerogatives and enforce its decisions without support from government structures. The only time a government intervened to close down a channel of television banned by HAICA, Nessma TV, was taken on the eve of the 2019 presidential elections by the government of the time. The channel's director, Nabil Karoui, was a candidate in these elections, and his main rival was none other than Youssef Chahed, head of that government. Moreover, under political pressure, Nessma TV resumed broadcasting a week after its closure, "while undertaking to regularize its situation". Everything points to the fact that both the decision to close the channel and the decision to reopen it resulted from negotiations between political leaders, with HAICA completely excluded as it "did not give its authorization".
In most media companies, structures designed to promote and protect ethical and professional principles, such as editorial boards, editorial conferences, and editorial charters, are either absent or ineffective. Due to the long-standing dependence on political power from the years of independence until 2011, the journalism sector is far from a homogeneous body. Moreover, journalists continue to face precarious working and material conditions. Finally, journalism curricula and teaching methods, as well as the structures that provide this training, have not undergone substantial change since the era of former President Ben Ali. As a result, in this phase of transition to a democratic State governed by the rule of law, which required the liberalization of media discourse, the media have not been adequately prepared to serve as a watchdog over those in power.
Too much legalism
In 2011, the new legal standard was intended to catalyze subsequent structural reforms in the media, bringing them into line with democratic standards. Along the way, new provisions and concepts were introduced into the legal frameworks, without their implementation was not accompanied by a full adoption and assimilation by all stakeholders, nor did they lead to an irreversible break with the pre-14 January 2011 media system. These innovations include the regulation of the audiovisual sector, self-regulation of the print and electronic media, financial transparency, transformation of government bodies into public service media, separation of administration and editorial staff, and the establishment of an editorial line.
However, this approach involves more than simply transforming these concepts into ready-to-use legal norms, while ignoring the assimilation process , which requires in-depth awareness-raising and pedagogical work if these concepts are to be fully adopted by all stakeholders. Moreover, the lack of a firm political will among the ruling elite to complement legal and institutional changes with substantial reforms – ranging from the training of journalists to the education and socialization of audiences in the democratization process – explains the state of anomie in which the media find themselves.
For instance, it is very telling that the diagnosis drawn up by the National Authority to Reform Information and Communication (INRIC) as well as its recommendations for substantial reforms, outlined in its general report published in November 2012 , failed to spark any national debate or generate the slightest interest on the part of the country's authorities. The lack of cohesion within the government that emerged from the first elections , combined with its unwillingness to undertake the necessary reforms led INRIC members, including the author of this publication, to collectively end the body's activities .
The assessment and the situation are, therefore, bitter. The long-awaited structural reforms in the media sector have either failed to materialize or are struggling to take shape. One reason for this is the tendency in post-14 January Tunisia to prioritize legal norms over a more pragmatic approach, one based on the emergence of a new political will from the State, strong and credible public institutions, and truly professional media organizations independent of political and financial influence.
After this presentation on the politico-historical evolution of the media from independence to the present day, it is clear that any reform must start from the observation that the entanglement of the media with political power is the main barrier to their liberalization and full development. In other words, the issue of media emancipation remains problematic as long as the media are unable to free themselves from the stranglehold of political power, and independent media regulatory and self-regulatory bodies are unable to replace government structures.
To this end, experiences of the role of the media in countries that have undergone "democratic transitions" since the 1970s, should have received sustained attention from Tunisian decision-makers during the transition years. The outcome of these experiences, the methodologies and paradigms that influenced them, and their evolutions in transitional contexts, could have provided valuable insight to better guide and shape the debate on this issue. Indeed, as researcher Olivier Koch rightly pointed out, "the question of the role of the media in the transition from an autocratic system to a democratic State governed by the rule of law is significant in its own right. It requires us to capitalize on what we have learned from studies of different geographical areas and waves of democratization. It also requires us to position ourselves with respect to the paradigms used in studying regime change and to evaluate the methodologies employed to study the media in transitional contexts.”
The views represented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Arab Reform Initiative, its staff, or its board.
