Introduction
Egyptian policy towards the Palestinian issue did not change until the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa flood on 7 October 2023 and the decision to establish the Union of Arab Tribes in May 2024. A set of conflicting readings about the security and economic motives for establishing this union were raised, as well as concerns regarding its risks and potential effects on Egypt's role in mediating between the parties to the conflict. Therefore, the paper will first present the determining factors behind the Egyptian administration's position on the events of the Al-Aqsa Flood; secondly, it will discuss the change in Egyptian policy, i.e. the decision to establish the Union of Arab Tribes, based on the punctuated equilibrium model; thirdly, it will present the security and economic motives for the decision to establish the Union; and fourthly, it will present the dangers of establishing the Union and its effects on Egypt's relationship with the parties to the conflict.
The determinants of the Egyptian position on the Palestinian issue have been characterized by consistency and stability. A set of determinants have shaped its policy over the years, the most important of which are: The historical support of the state for the Palestinian cause alongside popular sympathy in the country, the Egyptian administration's emphasis on the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination, the rejection of repeated Israeli violations, the rejection of forced displacement, the importance of the stability of the region on Egypt's eastern borders in protecting its national security, Egypt's continued mediation and the importance of Egypt as a strategic country in the region, and so on. Based on these factors, the events of the Al-Aqsa flood were addressed in the official narrative of decision-makers, which emphasized that the Israeli response to wage war on Gaza was not commensurate with what happened on 7 October 2023. Egypt mobilized regionally and internationally to deal with the issue, stressing that a policy to collectively punish or exterminate the Palestinian people, as well as the threat posed to regional and Egyptian national security, was unacceptable. The state institutions concerned with the issue (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the General Intelligence Service, etc.) also began to draw up a plan consistent with the determinants of the Egyptian vision of the conflict since the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1979. This plan included conducting intensive contacts with all parties to negotiate a ceasefire, calling for restraint, and organizing an international summit in Cairo on 21 October 2023 to discuss the developments in Gaza. Unfortunately, this summit did not result in a conclusive agreement or a final statement of any kind.
Along with the United States and Qatar, Egypt was a key party in the negotiations between the Palestinian and Israeli sides in the first and second Paris negotiations. On more than one occasion, Egyptian officials involved in these discussions warned of the gravity of the humanitarian situation in Gaza and condemned the targeting of civilians. Despite Israeli accusations that Egypt was behind the delay or failure in bringing aid into Gaza from the outbreak of the war until May 2024, statements by the head of the State Information Service (SIS) (Diaa Rashwan) indicate that Egypt brought in more than 20,000 aid trucks carrying tens of thousands of tons of food, medical supplies and fuel. Egypt’s mediation efforts towards Palestinian national reconciliation must also be noted, with Egyptian intelligence repeatedly inviting the leaders of the various Palestinian factions to discuss contentious issues over a series of meetings. In addition, the leadership has emphasized its rejection of forced and voluntary displacement of Palestinians and the importance of protecting national security and borders in Sinai, reiterating this position consistently throughout its statements (statements by the General Intelligence Service, the armed forces, the Union of Arab Tribes).
Egypt's policy has thus been centered on maintaining its regional and international presence in support of the Palestinian cause and the Camp David Accords, as well as emphasizing the importance of stabilizing the situation in order to avoid any serious political and security repercussions that could increase the chances of a large-scale forced displacement of Palestinians across Egyptian borders. Moreover, in my opinion, the Egyptian official side's reservations about the Islamic orientation of the Palestinian resistance and its previous relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood (Freedom and Justice Party) have played an important ideological role in shaping current Egyptian policy. In other words, the Egyptian government has for a long time relied on its multiple arms (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the General Intelligence Service, the National Security Agency, the media, and other actors) to manage the issue and maintain lines of balance and communication with both the Palestinian and Israeli sides. Despite the heterogeneity of these arms, it was able to strike this balance and maintain stable public policies over a long time, until the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa flood. For some time after these events, the Egyptian government continued making statements, issuing declarations, and holding conferences that did not actually translate into any concrete outcomes or decisions, before realizing that this was untenable and a radical change in its decisions was needed. This is how the Union of Arab Tribes, headed by Ibrahim al-Organi, came to be officially announced in May 2024. In this context, the punctuated equilibrium model would seem appropriate to explain the sudden change in the Egyptian policy-making process towards the war on its eastern borders.
The Punctuated Equilibrium Model and Understanding the Establishment Decision
The Punctuated Equilibrium model, well-known in the public policy literature, posits that the stability of public policies is the norm and that change occurs only in the face of sudden radical changes. ) This is what happened with the events of the Al-Aqsa flood, which represented a sudden and extraordinary event that forced the government to change its previous policies. The government's decision to form the Union of Arab Tribes (military formations outside the framework of the armed forces) to secure its borders and repel any possible attack or forced displacement is a very important one. The decision resulted in the formation of a new actor that included all Sinai Arabs living on the Egyptian-Israeli border, where the political regime had previously assisted in the armed elimination of Islamist groups. The launch of the Union of Arab Tribes was also combined with an announcement of the tribes' alliance with the regime to form an informal armed barrier on the border, beyond the traditional roles played by the foreign and intelligence institutions, the armed forces, or even the Egyptian parliament. Instead of relying on national institutions, this decision of the political leadership thus meant relying on a new entity that was not only non-governmental but parallel to one of its institutional entities, the regular forces. Despite the difficulty of such a decision, the government’s rationale was driven by logistical and economic security goals.
The punctuated equilibrium model differentiates between two main concepts: policy images and policy venues. Policy images refer to the mental images that the public receives about politics, including the way in which public policies are presented to the public and in the media. Thus, policy images can be understood as a set of facts interpreted through the lens of beliefs and values. In this context, the mental image of the Union of Arab Tribes or Ibrahim al-Organi [its president] is a negative one, as social media has been flooded with critical posts and photos raising questions about the sources of his wealth. Moreover, a statement by the “Sheikhs of Arab Tribes in Upper and Western Upper Egypt” rejected the Union of Arab Tribes and even called for its dissolution because of the danger it poses to the unity of Egyptians and the threat of tribal conflict. Moreover, it specifically rejected Organi's leadership and accused him of trading in the suffering of the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. Policy venues, on the other hand, refer to the institutions through which decisions are made on a particular issue. In this case, there was tacit approval from State security services for the establishment of this union, in addition to the participation of a number of civil associations. At its founding, the Union comprised over 25 entities, with approximately 17 registered associations later joining in June 2024 to increase the total to 42. These were then joined in turn by the Union of Sinai Tribes (also headed by Organi), which better knew how to combine security and development aspects than the newly formed Union of Arab Tribes.
The Security and Economic Motivations for Establishing the Union of Arab Tribes: Rationality Driven by Goals
The founding statement of the Union states that its aim is to form a broad organizational framework representing hundreds of tribes to support the nation, especially in light of the dangers that surround Egypt's eastern borders which seek to undermine the country through attempts at spreading chaos. Additionally, it aims to participate in protecting national security and to communicate with all Arab tribes in order to reach shared understandings within the framework of the State to serve common goals. The Union’s stated aims also include supporting the armed forces in countering the displacement plan that aims to liquidate the Palestinian cause at the expense of Egypt. The statement further emphasizes Egypt's firm position in rejecting aggression and its efforts to end the crisis by establishing an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital in accordance with the 1967 borders. At its founding conference, Organi, head of the Union of Sinai Tribes, was chosen to be the president of the Union of Arab Tribes in recognition of his national and social role.
Organi took full advantage of the fact that he is a native of the region and a partner in managing the Rafah crossings. He capitalized on the complexity of the situation and the failure of the various state agencies to achieve significant influence and stalled the negotiations over border crossings following October 2023, benefitting from his previous success with the government in confronting ISIS in Sinai and his current ability to manage the security situation. These factors, combined with his close relationships with government officials, enabled him to influence government policy in his favor and establish the Union under his official presidency to serve as a deterrent on the border against any displacement from Gaza or possible clashes with either the Palestinian or Israeli sides.
When looking into the motives for establishing this union, several questions arise. Is the Union of Arab Tribes a parallel entity to State institutions? Is it a faction affiliated or cooperating with the armed forces? Is it an armed militia supporting the army? Should it be considered an ally and partner of the State in managing the Rafah crossing and official and unofficial trade at the border? Is it a developmental organization, working in partnership with the government in implementing urban and infrastructure projects, bringing the tribes together to support the regime and its security policies? Should it be treated as a civil society organization operating within the framework of the law?
Security Motives
Since the arrival of the new regime in 2014, securing the country’s borders and protecting Egypt's national security has been one of its top priorities, with an estimated 2,000 tunnels between Egypt and Gaza, especially to Palestinian Rafah, destroyed on the Egyptian side as part of this process. The Egyptian city of Rafah was also completely evacuated and the residents of Egyptian Rafah relocated. This means that Hamas can still change the course of these tunnels and make new openings, a situation of which the Egyptian authorities are well aware. The security situation in Sinai has worsened and the armed forces have lost control of a number of areas in Sinai to ISIS and other takfiri groups. The work of the Union of Sinai Tribes in confronting terrorism in Sinai was crucial in helping the regime confront these groups and restore stability and control in the region. Organi has been one of the Union’s most important members since its formation in 2016, eventually becoming its president.
The army has used the Sinai tribes since 2013 in several intelligence operations against “terrorist groups” as part of its efforts to unify tribal efforts and coordinate with the security services to confront terrorist threats and secure the region. The federation has played an important role in gathering information on takfiri groups and their secret locations, as well as participating with the army in anti-terrorist campaigns and monitoring operations that cover border areas and illegal tunnels going across the border. Indeed, it aimed to support the army in the war against takfiri groups by using its modern weapons. The army trained young men from the union in camps affiliated with it on a regular basis, and armed groups were formed from tribal clans with funding from businessmen affiliated with these tribes. These groups were trained in army headquarters in the cities of Al-Arish and Bir al-Abd in North Sinai Governorate, in what was called the “purification battle.” . According to reports by a number of human rights organizations operating in Sinai, children as young as 16 years old participated in confronting takfiri militants in Sinai after the army allowed the allied tribal union militias to do so.
The Union of Sinai Tribes had a unique experience in helping the current regime face security challenges in Sinai due to its knowledge of the geographical nature of the region. This helped to stabilize the security situation in the region by eliminating the influence of takfiri groups, cutting off logistical and strategic support to ISIS, and closing off the tunnels to terrorist elements. The rationale behind the decision to form the Union of Arab Tribes was to capitalize on the success of the Union of Sinai Tribes in controlling the security situation. The timing of this decision is related to Egypt's desire to counter Israeli moves to polarize the Negev Bedouins through attempted alliances with Arab tribes and clans in the Negev Desert, which has contiguous and direct borders with and is a natural extension of Sinai. It was also motivated by the economic alliance and shared economic goals between Organi and State agencies. Organi’s relationship with the security services was visible in the formation of the Union of Arab Tribes. His deputy in the presidency of the “Organi Group” is Major General Luay Zamzam, the former director of military intelligence in North Sinai, and his two deputies in the presidency of the Union are Major General Ahmed Saqr Juhayna, former governor of Gharbia and state security officer, and Ahmed Raslan, former head of the Arab Affairs Committee in the House of Representatives.
Economic Motives
Organi has built a vast network of influence since the Egyptian revolution of 25 January 2011. He owns a group of companies that operate in various fields, including foreign trade and international cooperation, covering a wide range of services inside and outside Sinai, and is one of the most important Egyptian economic groups involved in the Egyptian government's development plan called Vision 2030. These companies played an important role in the reconstruction of Gaza in 2014 and again in 2021. Organi, with his security and economic networks, was able to play a leading role during that time and is expected to continue to do so after the end of the war on Gaza. On more than one occasion, Organi himself has pushed the narrative that terrorism can only be confronted through a two-pronged approach: Firstly, by way of the reconstruction and development projects he leads in Sinai; and secondly, through the security arm which mobilizes the local tribes of the region to help the army eliminate terrorists.
The Organi Group, the holding company that owns a large number of companies in several sectors, operates mainly in the field of contracting. Its subsidiaries have been established in such a way as to make them difficult to track so that neither the group nor its subsidiaries appear in government contracts. For example, one of these companies works in agricultural land reclamation and has agricultural projects in Wadi al-Natrun as part of the military's 1.5-million-acre project. Another works in the field of marketing and organizing entertainment events and professional conferences, having organized the Alamein Festival and the World Youth Conferences, as well as marketing government projects such as the Decent Life initiative. Organi has also established a security services company that provides insurance services for sports and entertainment events. This company provides security to the national football team and Egyptian clubs and even has an insurance contract with Al-Ahly Club. It won these contracts by employing a large number of former security leaders, such as General Tawfiq Badir, former security director of the Zamalek Club, and by managing the security for concerts at Cairo Stadium and Opera House. The Organi Group has also established a ready-mix concrete company that works in State-affiliated projects. This company has seen exponential growth due to the large number of infrastructure projects it handles.
As for Gaza, Organi's tourism company, which also works in the business of security coordination, has earned millions of dollars from controlling the movement of crossings to and from Gaza. Moreover, Organi has also established a contracting company that cooperates with the National Service Projects Organization of the armed forces in all Sinai and Gaza reconstruction projects. Another large-scale presence in the Gaza reconstruction project is a trading and construction company that directly controls the passage of goods and trucks to and from Gaza through the Rafah crossing. It is also active in the field of quarry management in partnership with army companies, where it manages a number of quarries, such as the quarry of Mount Ataqa in the Suez Governorate and the cave in Mount Halal in North Sinai. Organi also helms another exchange company that works in the field of money transfer. Thus, the Organi Group implements more than 450 projects and has many strategic partnerships in the fields of industry, agriculture, and trade within Egypt. In addition, it injects direct foreign investments to achieve the State's development goals and improve infrastructure, most notably in Sisi City in Sinai.
Organi and his companies are also working to secure the borders by completing the infrastructure for the reconstruction of Sinai. This is intended to stop displacement plans in theory by relying on Arab tribes, and in practice by working to establish the Sisi City in Rafah, Egypt, very close to the Palestinian city of Rafah, on an area of about 15km2 . Sisi city is intended to be a fourth-generation city in terms of services, digitization, and progress, as part of a national plan to develop Sinai and link it to the cities on the west bank of the Suez Canal, which separates it from the valley.
Some Western media outlets such as The Times and others have described Organi as an economic tycoon and said that no one or nothing can pass through the Rafah crossing – including Egyptians themselves who hold Egyptian passports – without paying a dollar fee to Hala, a company owned by Organi and which informally coordinates with Egyptian security. A Times report revealed that the company has made more than $100 million in profits by charging Gazans wishing to enter Egypt at an estimated cost of $5,000 per person. There is no doubt that Organi has strong ties to figures with political, security, and economic influence. This is very dangerous because the monopoly of force should ideally reside only with the State and should not be delegated to militia or other entities who could potentially abuse these powers.
The dangers of establishing the Union, and its effects on Egypt's relationship with the parties to the conflict
In my view, the Union of Arab Tribes was a fait accompli in Sinai, possessing remarkable economic, military, and logistical power and influence. The Egyptian government tested it in its war against terrorism and was able to control the situation in cooperation with the security services. The government could then capitalize on the Union’s presence in Sinai as a kind of hidden weapon, allowing it a free hand while also enabling it to complete security and economic control over its actions. The leadership works with the Union in the shadows, mobilizing and directing it unofficially to achieve its interests behind the scenes. This allows the government to circumvent the restrictions imposed on it for several reasons, most notably as a result of the Camp David Accords , and continue to maintain diplomatic relations with Israel and the United States. Thus, the announcement of the formation of the Union was made so that it could intervene in matters of national security if necessary, such as the displacement of Sinai and the Philadelphi Corridor between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, without implicating any of the official state agencies.
In addition, the Union of Arab Tribes acts as a militia to secure Egypt's borders and stop any attempts at forced or voluntary displacement, independently of the armed forces, which are restricted in some parts of Sinai. In the event of any direct confrontation with Israel or Hamas for any reason, the State can distance its forces from this conflict and push the Organi militia to secure the region while preserving its image and position in front of the international community. As a result, if any escalation occurs on the border, the Egyptian armed forces will not be forced to engage with any of the Palestinian factions or elements. This would help avoid a situation where the Egyptian army could be called a partner in the killing of Palestinians in the event of an escalation, a politically and culturally unacceptable outcome in light of the popular support for the rights of the Palestinian people in Egypt. The leadership does not want to risk such an outcome, however unlikely such an outcome may be. More importantly, in my view, the political authority can at any time, if any issues arise or if it receives any accusations or blame from Israel or the United States, easily disavow responsibility.
The dangers of this Union are evident in its founding statement, which did not disclose the tools that will enable it to confront the challenges facing the state in Sinai. Nor did it detail how the Union will contribute to countering the displacement scheme aimed at pushing Palestinians out of Gaza, especially after Donald Trump came to power and explicitly asked the Egyptian government to receive Palestinian refugees on more than one occasion. What is intended to be the main strategy? Using the security arm of the Union, which has already helped a lot in facing terrorism in Sinai, or the economic and developmental arm, which aims to transform the cities of Sinai into fourth-generation cities in terms of developing services and digitization? For all these reasons, there is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the decision to form the Union of Arab Tribes.
Among the most important risks is that this Union is primarily based on an ethnic basis [Sinai tribes], which may negatively impact national security and social cohesion in Egypt by feeding tribalism at the expense of the principles of citizenship and equality. The arming of these tribes and the Union’s reliance on a network of interests that do not necessarily reflect a true representation of these communities are especially concerning. There is also the possibility that other elements may seek to establish their own formations, which may be humanitarian, social, or political. This could pose a serious risk to the cohesion of society, especially since this would contravene the State's refusal to recognize entities that are State-like but are not officially part of government.
The Union of Arab Tribes has also begun to bypass official institutions and address international entities directly, such as the UN Security Council, demanding that it stop the Israeli aggression, and the Arab League, asking it to convene a meeting to discuss the ongoing crisis. This is likely to affect the mediation role that Egypt plays through its official bodies, which may decline in favor of the new entity (the Union). Organi's exceptional power and influence as an individual security, political, and economic actor, as well as the fact that he is a symbol of a number of intersections and interests through his companies and projects, make him a potential threat. For example, Organi was officially welcomed inside al-Joura military base in a tradition only reserved for specific conditions and ranks, such as the arrival of a military attaché of a foreign country. He has also been allowed to land in a civilian plane at a military airport for the first time since 1982.
Another risk is related to conflict of interest. Organi's construction companies are the ones working on the reconstruction and development process in Sinai, and he has a direct relationship with the Egyptian authorities as well as with the governments of Arab countries that have direct interests in the settlement of the issue. It would be dangerous if Organi's militia – with its money and weapons – were to turn against the government and become a threat to the regime's stability and territorial integrity. Indeed, some observers have likened the Union of Arab Tribes to the experience of the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan – headed by Hamedti, who turned against the regime after being its ally. Such comparisons have prompted the Union's spokesperson to issue a denial, stating: “Egypt is too big for militias or parallel entities to appear in it. The Union of Arab Tribes is a national entity that strengthens and supports the state.”
In conclusion, the Egyptian policy of establishing the Union of Arab Tribes [i.e. creating post-military entities parallel to the army] is no different from other countries in the region, in which this trend has been criticized and labeled as an epidemic. As such, Egypt has not been able to immunize itself from this epidemic. A large number of political forces and parties have decried the Union of Arab Tribes as “an ethnic entity and/or contrary to the constitution” and warned that “there is a danger of its expanding influence and armament.” The civil movement announced that it would resort to the judiciary to stop the creation of parallel and alternative entities to the State and has begun a signature campaign. However, the survival of the decision – or its reversal – depends on the security situation in Sinai, the progress made in the negotiations, and the security and humanitarian situation in Gaza. In my view, things have become more complicated with Organi's announcement of a political party led by him called the National Front, and Trump's victory in the US presidential elections. The new US president’s position and statements on the Palestinian issue and Egypt's role in this context will reflect on the role of the Union of Arab Tribes in border management and other matters.
سالى نبيل، "إبراهيم العرجاني: هل بات أقوى رجل في شبه جزيرة سيناء؟"، بي بي سي نيوز، 11 أيار/مايو 2024، تاريخ الزيارة 2 آب/أغسطس 2024، متاح على https://www.bbc.com/arabic/articles/cxr3k00r6k6o.
"مناطق الوجود المصري بسيناء بموجب 'كامب ديفيد'"، الجزيرة نت، تاريخ الزيارة 20 كانون الثاني/يناير 2025، متاح على https://aja.me/tcvp74.
The views represented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Arab Reform Initiative, its staff, or its board.
