Introduction
Extensive research has provided a window into the machinery of authoritarian resilience in relation to repression and coercion measures in the broader Arab world. Likewise, studies investigating the co-optation of business elites and opposition figures have gathered compelling evidence about how regimes bring their potential opponents and allies into the political system to mitigate threats and neutralize rivals. During the Arab uprisings, youth and youth-led social movements have played a crucial role in challenging authoritarian rule in the Arab world. In response, some governments redefined their relationship with revolutionary youth by selectively co-opting movement leaders and other youth groups while repressing those who resisted incorporation, as in the case of the Tamarod movement in Egypt, which facilitated Sisi’s rise to power. Yet, while the literature on authoritarian upgrading is rich, the relationship between youth co-optation and authoritarian renewal remains undertheorized, as does the extent to which co-optation as a strategy has been shaped by processes of authoritarian learning among regime elites and autocrats.
The Sisi regime’s attack on youth mobilization, using co-optation and repression, provides a clear example of how authoritarian renewal is facilitated. While repression remains a significant tool in Sisi’s autocratic toolbox, youth co-optation evolved and gained more momentum post-2013 coup, to ground the regime's legitimacy among youth and incentivize loyalty among those who choose to compromise. Youth co-optation helped steer many young people into organized forms of participation, aligned with the regime’s agenda and its commitment to neoliberal reforms. ) Youth policies have been central to this effort, taking shape through programs and conferences. To a certain extent, similar instruments directed towards youth under Arab dictatorships highlight the continuity of co-optation as a core strategy that has been recycled repeatedly to control young people. Youth policies under Mubarak in pre-revolutionary Egypt and Ben Ali in pre-revolutionary Tunisia, for example, functioned as an articulation of neoliberal governance and authoritarian co-optation. They projected a façade of youth inclusion while advancing neoliberal objectives that encouraged the manufacturing of self-reliant and market-oriented youth.
Yet, in the case of Sisi, his approach is more ambitious and explicit. Drawing on the playbooks of Ben Ali and Mubarak, the paper argues that Sisi used familiar tools of youth co‑optation to sustain his regime. His strategy aims to trap as many young people as possible within the regime’s political project. By focusing on youth co-optation strategies under Mubarak and Ben Ali, the paper highlights the blind spots inherent in these strategies. These are particularly revealing, as both dictatorships’ inability to manage widespread youth mobilization provides an important perspective for assessing the effectiveness of youth co-optation today in Egypt. While Sisi’s approach is more ambitious, it also recycles some patterns from previous regimes, raising the question of how long such approaches can maintain control before reaching a breaking point.
The paper begins by understanding co-optation in general, setting the stage for a closer look at how youth co-optation operates within an authoritarian neoliberal context and which young people it targets. We then turn to a comparison of the blind spots in youth co-optation under Ben Ali and Mubarak, a crucial step for understanding the final section, which analyzes Sisi’s approach to co-opting youth today and evidence of authoritarian learning. The paper concludes with a discussion that reflects on these patterns and considers their potential implications.
Understanding Co-optation: A Zero-Sum Game Between the State and Youth
Co-optation in Arab Dictatorships: Elite Cohesion and the Illusions of Stability
In The Two Logics of Autocratic Rule, Gerschewski defines co-optation as “the capacity to tie strategically relevant actors (or a group of actors) to the regime elite” through formal and informal means. The co-opted actor is “persuaded not to exercise his power to obstruct” and instead to use the resources in line with the ruling elite’s demands. Formal mechanisms include political parties and parliaments, acting as “a transmission belt” that maintains elite cohesion and increases regime credibility in the long term. However, informal mechanisms, including patron–client networks, often act as substitutes for formal institutions.
Relatedly, Josua defines co-optation as “all measures by ruling elites with the aim of strengthening and/or widening the societal base of a regime by giving relevant individuals or societal groups a stake in the status quo.” He identifies four types of co-optations that regimes apply to strengthen and/or widen their societal base: institutional-structural, material, traditional, and identity-based. Institutional-structural co-optation aims at “integrating potential opponents into the formal political arena” using formal institutions such as parliaments, elections, and political parties. Material co-optation involves “the distribution of mostly financial resources to different target groups.” Traditional co-optation relies on historical and long-standing allies, especially in monarchies, while identity-centered co-optation combines nationhood and religion to influence individual identities.
In this way, the recipients of co-optation may be current elite members or newcomers associated with the regime. Regimes can reinforce their existing coalitions or expand their base, provided they do not overlook the elite or sideline the broader social base. Arab autocracies, however, find themselves caught in a conundrum. While expanding their support base is important for achieving overall stability, retaining former supporters is even more challenging, as losing them poses a greater risk than missing out on new supporters. Losing co-opted actors, including business elites, increases the likelihood that they will side with regime rivals. The continuous effort to keep the core base tends to remain a permanent priority in authoritarian politics. Expanding the base of support has been secondary to keeping privileged co-opted actors under control.
For Arab autocrats, the focus has generally been on keeping ruling elites satisfied while keeping the opposition and civil society organizations in check. Most are neo-patrimonial rulers who rely heavily on a small group of loyal elites, and the relationship between them is quite clear. Just as businesses cannot operate without the regime’s consent, the regimes have become dependent on them for their survival and stability. The regimes’ self-assurance and commitment to preserving existing power relations with elites will always “take precedence over making concessions to new challengers.”
Youth Co-optation, Neoliberalism, and the Making of “Good Citizens”
Alongside appeasing business elites and containing opposition, Arab autocrats have instrumentalized neoliberal youth policies as a means to co-opt young people. Youth policies helped steer youth toward controlled avenues of participation. Governments framed youth policies within a political rhetoric grounded in neoliberal imperatives, encouraging youth to be obedient and responsible subjects. The discourse around the figure of “good youth,” or, as Abdelhamid calls it, the “honourable citizen,” was constantly amplified in the media and parroted by Arab regime elites. For instance, the Ben Ali dictatorship relied heavily on a paternalistic discourse towards youth, which was echoed by his ministers and the media, especially during the promotion of his 2009 campaign, “Together, Let Us Rise to the Challenges.” Many of his speeches, regularly broadcast on the national television channel “El Watania,” often framed the state as a guiding authority for young people. This strategy emerged and evolved against the backdrop of the global promotion of youth policies as a central component of neoliberal development, a process spearheaded by the international community.
The adoption of neoliberalism by Arab governments starting in the 1980s had a major impact on societies, including the scaling back of state involvement in key development sectors, such as healthcare, education, and employment. For neoliberal reforms to function without causing social unrest, youth have increasingly been framed as partners in the global development process and governed through policies that promote market-oriented values and forms of subjectivity. As Sukarieh explains, this governance project entails training youth to “act and think as neoliberal, free-market, enterprising subjects,” extending beyond learning skills to encompass behaviors, attitudes, values, and ideologies. The neoliberal framing emphasizes the myth that the free market is equally accessible to all. It presents social mobility as a matter of individual skills and downplays socio-economic inequalities that come into play.
With international community support, neoliberal youth policies enabled Arab autocrats to signal their responsiveness to youth concerns. they drew a variety of youth groups into the regime’s orbit, each engaging with the opportunities provided in different ways. In her study of Egyptian politics, Sika categorizes youth participating in institutionalized spaces based on their relationship to the regime and their strategies for engagement. As red lines keep shifting, the boundaries of participation in authoritarian regimes keep moving as well, so youth who were once compliant and loyal can later be targeted. One group consists of youth who accept the status quo, adopt the discourse of public officials, and contribute to the reproduction of authoritarian political economy. Sukarieh refers to these individuals as the “new global Arab elites.” Many of them continue the practices of the old guard, often their parents and grandparents, but now operate within the framework of a neoliberal state, rather than a welfare one. Some of them represent the young entrepreneurial oligarchy in Arab autocracies, advancing market-oriented reforms while maintaining elite continuity. Another group consists of young people who are interested in advancing social and political reform within the established boundaries, while attempting to bring about gradual change. They become members of civil society organizations, participating in initiatives and programs that are tolerated by the regime. Another group of young people either rejects state policies or remains marginalized within these spaces and is consequently perceived as either vulnerable or a threat to the nation.
To sustain youth co-optation, governments rely on strong political discourse. The discourse around the figure of “good youth” is constantly amplified, as it emphasizes unity and homogeneity as the basis for legitimate political subjectivity and political action. As Fenner reminds us, co-optation’s roots lie in its discursive dimension: “Co-optation does not neutralize opponents through ‘material’ processes of which discourse is straightforwardly reflective or epiphenomenal: the discourse is what is doing the work.” During his 2010 Knowledge Day speech, Ben Ali highlighted the need to “shape generations distinguished by their competence, ambition, and high patriotic spirit,” and only then, “we build the future of our country.” The idea of a “good youth” is clearly defined in his speeches. A “good youth” is loyal to the nation, hard-working, employable, and distinguished by their competence and ambition. Similarly, during the 65th session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Tunisian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kamal Morjane, described young people “as the pillars of the present and the builders of the future,” highlighting all the efforts the country is making to prepare them for this role. He outlined “the organization of periodic and regular youth consultations at the national level to explore the concerns, expectations, and opinions of young people,” which was not the case. However, the discourse sought to present the Tunisian government to the international community as valuing and nurturing its youth. The discourse of youth empowerment sounds encouraging and innocuous. Its underlying message tends to be more exclusionary. It excludes youth who are rebellious, disruptive, or resistant to authority. It frames participation in state-sanctioned spaces as empowerment, portraying participants as innovative problem-solvers and essential to the nation’s future, while justifying the marginalization and repression of those who reject it.
Why Youth Co-optation Failed in the Face of the Arab Uprisings: An Assessment of Tunisia and Egypt
Tunisia and Egypt, described as the “economic tigers” of the rising neoliberal era under Ben Ali and Mubarak, were the first to be swept up by the revolutionary wave. Meanwhile, theDemocratic Constitutional Rally (RCD) in Tunisia and the National Democratic Party (NDP) in Egypt counted on support from their young members, which proved weak during the Arab uprisings. Over the years, Ben Ali and Mubarak relied on co-optation and repression. Yet, they failed to stop youth-led mobilization as young people grew disillusioned with their situation. Youth protested unemployment, socio-economic inequality, and a crumbling education system that undermined the very neoliberal promises the regimes claimed to deliver. Over time, co-optation lost its effectiveness because what appeared to be inclusive youth policies were, in practice, marked by significant shortcomings. The following section examines the reasons behind the flaws of youth co-optation to revolution-proof both regimes. These include a persistent gap between rhetoric and reality, a lack of continuity and coherence in youth policies, and unequal access to opportunities due to patrimonial politics, nepotism, and corruption.
Both dictatorships shared a common flaw: a widening gap between what the regimes promised and what young people actually experienced. Both regimes adopted a paternalistic discourse suggesting that youth should be guided by “wiser heads” to stay on the right path and reach their full potential. Youth were portrayed as either “the hope of the nation” or cast as a “threat” to be managed through protection or repression. Any optimism generated by this rhetoric faded with time. In practice, the language of youth inclusion and empowerment, grounded in promises of political representation and socio-economic advancement, functioned to co-opt youth and project a “youth-friendly” image to the international community. It was also a convenient tool for presenting the issues beyond the government’s reach, thereby placing the burden on the youth.
In Tunisia, Ben Ali proclaimed himself to be the “president of youth,” helping them to take their “rightful place in the country.” His discourse portrayed Tunisian youth as good citizens in the making, expected to contribute to solving the country’s problems. This framing reflected a neoliberal logic, as it shifted responsibility onto young people themselves rather than the state. As Ben Ali asserted in one of his speeches: “The reality is that we must constantly listen to our young people in a constantly changing world, […] preparing them to become mature citizens who are responsible for their countries and their world.” Similarly, in Egypt, Mubarak attributed the creation of a Ministry of Youth to the growing interest in the “future of promising generations” that need support to thrive in the modern world. He promised to get rid of “bureaucratic regulations that stifle talent and undermine honorable ambition” of young people. While this discourse helped bring a large number of young people to the regimes’ side, it also increased the scope of contestations against these same regimes.
Both dictatorships remained stuck in a discursive loop, failing to deliver meaningful change to address youth issues or provide concrete opportunities for social mobility. The planning and implementation of youth policies lacked coherence and a long-term strategic vision. Mubarak introduced his first national youth policy in 2003, aligning with the UNDP’s Millennium Development Goals. The policy focused on employment, political participation, sports, and social activities. The policies targeted unemployed youth, young women, youth with special needs, and rural youth. Although government policies took considerable interest in youth issues, decision-makers failed to make budgetary allocations or introduce executive plans to implement the policy. It was more to showcase their “youth-friendly” track records to the international community. In the case of Tunisia, one of the main shortcomings of Ben Ali’s approach, according to Murphy, was the absence of a coherent or clearly defined youth policy. For instance, programs and trainings tolerated by the regimes focused either on addressing the symptoms of youth issues or on providing short-term fixes to ease the challenges of neoliberal economic integration. For example, the Tunisian government invested efforts to address youth unemployment through Active Labour Market Programs (ALMPs). The ALMPs were government-initiated policies and programs designed to raise the employability of youth through core services like counselling, job search assistance, and matching and placement support. Yet, both awareness and participation in these programs were low among young Tunisians because they were highly centralized and lacked local ownership.
In Tunisia and Egypt, young people came to understand that access to opportunities often depended on personal connections to the ruling party, reflecting the broader influence of patrimonial politics, nepotism, and corruption. Benefits to youth came with strings attached, pushing young people to be members of the ruling parties unwillingly. Even so, belonging to the ruling party did not always secure opportunities and benefits. In Egypt, Wardany explains that although the official discourse called for supporting all young people regardless of their political affiliations, youth understood that their future depended on what kind of connections they had with the government and NDP officials. Many of them joined the NDP or became members of state-led organizations and foundations such as the Generation of the Future Society, chaired by Gamal Mubarak, as a way to be incorporated into policy-making circles or boost their social mobility.
Similarly, in Tunisia, Ben Ali officials understood that expanding their influence over universities was crucial. In the wake of his rise to power, his strategy rested on strengthening the RCD’s infrastructure and co-opting key student activists. Some of them joined the RCD for opportunistic ends, as incentives were attractive to them. These incentives ranged from accessible student accommodation to free vacation trips and other benefits. Another way to attract young graduates to join the RCD ranks was through providing loans. The Tunisian Solidarity Bank, a state development bank created to support youth entrepreneurship and small businesses, quickly became an instrument of political control and co-optation. Credit lines were offered primarily to members of the ruling party (RCD) or to those willing to join it. However, belonging to the RCD did not necessarily mean securing jobs or clients, as was the case for young lawyers. The party hierarchy was selective about which lawyers could benefit from publicly funded work. Young RCD lawyers complained that even among party members, a few had a monopoly on representing the administration and state-owned companies. They had to prove themselves by participating in party-related activities in the hopes of gaining the patronage of a senior party official, or, if lucky, Ben Ali and his family, which was rarely the case. Eventually, these young RCD lawyers grew frustrated and did not resist their colleagues’ strike from December 2010 to January 2011, instead showing indifference rather than support for the party due to weak patronage resources and a lack of benefits.
Youth Co-optation in Egypt: What Has Really Changed Today?
Like his predecessor Mubarak, and other authoritarian leaders, Sisi uses youth co-optation as a tool to stabilize his regime and consolidate his authority. Top-down youth policies provide structured avenues for political participation that align with state priorities. Youth programs, conferences, and state-led organizations are central to this strategy, promoting neoliberal reform. Narratives of entrepreneurship and innovation are omnipresent, portraying youth as proactive problem-solvers who can tackle the nation’s problems. Despite the similarity in discourse, Sisi is more ambitious in his use of co-optation as a systematic effort to confine as many young people as possible within the regime’s political project while continuing to repress those who refuse incorporation. In the following section, I examine how Sisi’s approach to youth co-optation builds on strategies employed by previous regimes while introducing new objectives. He aims to create a new representation of youth that distances them from the “revolutionary youth.” He also leverages youth co-optation to replace the traditional political class with his own army of young politicians.
The Sisi regime relies on a supporting discourse to legitimize its youth policies by promoting a model of “good youth” aligned with its neoliberal agenda. This discourse is not new. Under both Ben Ali and Mubarak, youth were portrayed as “the hope of the nation,” guided toward becoming responsible citizens who are ready to solve their country's challenges. Following the Arab uprisings, Sisi has, however, further adopted the anti-revolutionary youth discourse, enforcing it more rigorously. The anti-revolutionary youth discourse started with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which cautioned the “honorable citizens of Egypt” against internal and external threats. Abdelhamid argues that Egypt was portrayed “under threat” in the state’s official discourses around the Egyptian revolution. This construction also implies that Egypt positions itself as a threat to those who do not and will not identify as normative “honorable citizens,” especially homosexuals and revolutionary youth. Abdelhamid further explains how “this type of governmentality encourages and incites aspirational forms of citizenship that, at their core, work to break the potential for solidarity among disparate actors.” Sisi builds on this already existing discourse. He blames the “chaos” instigated by revolutionary youth for the state of the economy. He emphasizes that “entrepreneurship is the key to the future. We need young people to be creative and to think outside the box. We need them to be innovators and problem-solvers. That is how we will build a better Egypt.” The focus on global discourses of entrepreneurship and innovation places the responsibility for building a greater Egypt onto its responsible youth, regardless of socio-economic barriers, thereby legitimizing the neoliberal reforms that put them in their precarious situation in the first place. The state also recruits influencers to disseminate such discourse, offering honorary titles and financial incentives to cultivate loyalty.
Under the RCD in Tunisia and the NDP in Egypt, the ruling party was the central pillar of the regime. It functioned as the main channel through which young people were co-opted. For instance, the RCD youth wing was the youth branch of Tunisia’s ruling party. It played a central role in political socialization and regime co-optation. The Sisi dictatorship, in contrast, has not relied on a dominant party; instead, youth policies are designed to build what Sallam calls the youth “political apparatus.” Starting in 2014, Sisi launched a series of youth-led initiatives, including leadership programs and youth conferences such as “Innovate! Advance!” and “World Youth Forum,” marketed as spaces for dialogue, communication, and knowledge sharing between youth and public figures. Such initiatives had two main objectives. The first was to create a network of reliable individuals, offering them opportunities for youth participation through state-controlled channels. The second objective was building this qualified youth base to help the regime prevent popular mobilization and, in doing so, reinforce stability.
In line with this strategy, the Mustaqbal Watan Party (MWP), which emerged from Sisi’s electoral campaign in 2013, presented a formal political outlet for these young graduates. The MWP offers insight into Sisi’s ambition to replace the traditional political class with his own army of young politicians, a strategy that has ultimately failed. In 2016, he launched the “Presidential Leadership Program” (PLP), an initiative announced as part of the “Year of Youth.” The program targeted “young future leaders and enable[d] them to acquire the skills they need to learn about governance, administrative and political fields and most importantly to develop their ability to attain critical and analytical thinking.” Following this, in 2018, President Sisi appointed six young PLP alumni as deputy governors. This appointment was part of the national strategy concerned with engaging youth in decision-making. In a similar vein, a new National Training Academy (NTA), inaugurated in 2017, was also a continuation of the PLP, following the French model. Sisi's vision for NTA is to prepare qualified national cadres that will lead to positive change and disseminate the values of leadership and innovation. The academy focuses on offering robust training and preparation programs that align with the state’s priorities and national development plans. With all of this in place, Sisi hoped to create a political arm through the MWP. Yet, it exists primarily as a safety net or political tool for Sisi, rather than as a vehicle for actual governance.
Although Sisi aimed to reach out to all Egyptian youth regardless of background, these efforts failed to materialize in practice. Participation in these programs varied according to social and economic background, with upper-middle-class youth more frequently represented alongside those already engaged in social initiatives or NGOs. Sika observed that most conference participants came from relatively privileged backgrounds, with some who had already engaged in civil society. In comparison, Ramzy explained that these programs had two target audiences. For upper-middle-class youth, these initiatives offered attractive incentives such as networking opportunities, prestigious experience, and the chance to influence national politics. At the same time, for young people from the lower-middle class, these programs provided access to training, practical experience, networking, and potential employment opportunities. More pointedly, by 2021, most of the young members of the MWP had been pushed out of leadership positions, and former NDP members were again dominating the party, with the regime enlisting them to build support for Sisi’s second term in 2018.
The Sisi regime’s attack on youth mobilization provides a clear example of how authoritarianism is renewed. His use of youth co-optation demonstrates how this tool is adapted to new political configurations. While Sisi’s approach appears more explicit, some features remain similar to those of Ben Ali and Mubarak. In particular, Sisi emphasizes a discourse of entrepreneurship and innovation, placing the responsibility for building a greater Egypt on its youth, regardless of socio-economic barriers. This discourse serves to legitimize neoliberal reforms that have, in many cases, created their precarious conditions. By implementing programs like the PLP or the launch of the NTA, the regime encourages the formation of entrepreneurial youth who embrace neoliberal values, including competitiveness, responsibility, and self-empowerment. These programs are viewed by many Egyptian youth as a channel for social mobility, resonating more with upper-middle-class youth or those already engaged in social initiatives or NGOs.
Yet, unlike his predecessors’ tactics, Sisi's co-optation strategy does not revolve around supporting a dominant political party but around creating a regime presence in society. By doing so, the regime extends its influence through programs and initiatives that appear independent, while youth present themselves as distinct from revolutionary youth. They are a new generation of politicized individuals, supportive of the state and aware of their responsibilities. This strategy is one we have not seen used under Ben Ali or Mubarak. The MWP presented a formal political outlet for these young graduates, aligning with the state's vision. Yet, in the end, Sisi sidelined the same young people he mobilized to gain leverage in his 2018 elections.
What has really changed today? Not much. Sisi’s youth co-optation, after all, is not new in many aspects. At its core, the current youth policies are put into place not to improve the living standards of young Egyptians from various socio-economic backgrounds, but mainly to weaponize revolutionary youth and project a youth-friendly image to the international community. Youth, portrayed as “the hope of Egypt,” are only valued as far as they are neoliberal, compliant, and nationalistic subjects. While Sisi has constructed a façade of legitimacy, it is sustained largely through harsh repression at the slightest sign of opposition. As red lines keep shifting, youth who were previously loyal and compliant can later change positions, especially since the regime is not afraid to sacrifice them the moment they no longer serve the agenda, as we have seen with the young members of the MWP.
Conclusion
Co-optation remains an important instrument in the toolbox of Arab dictatorships. Under Ben Ali and Mubarak, youth co-optation succeeded in drawing large numbers of young people into the regimes’ orbits. Yet both countries were among the first to be swept up by the Arab uprisings. The link between the failure of youth co-optation and weak youth policies lies in the gap between what regimes promise and what young people actually experience. Dictators learned how “to talk the talk.” In the media and speeches, youth were portrayed as “the hope of the nation,” who were responsible problem-solvers and symbols of the nation’s future. This was successful in co-opting young people who were interested in advancing social and political reform within the red lines, while attempting to bring about gradual change. Some of them became members of civil society organizations, participating in initiatives and programs that were tolerated by the regime. It was easy to incorporate other privileged youth who accept the status quo, adopt the discourse of public officials, and benefit from the reproduction of the authoritarian political economy.
While this discourse helped bring many young people to the regimes’ institutions, it also increased the scope of contestations against them. Youth policies became mere discursive and operational instruments that national and global power structures relied on to reproduce their own neoliberal ideologies or political dominance. Governments appeared to show considerable interest in youth issues, as seen in Egypt's first national youth policy in 2003, aligned with the UNDP’s Millennium Development Goals, and Tunisia’s employment policy through ALMPs. These policies were often poorly designed, underfunded, and highly centralized projects. When such initiatives did resonate, they tended to appeal primarily to urban upper-middle-class youth.
Young people may initially engage with regime-sponsored programs and training in the hope of social mobility. However, when these incentives prove tokenistic and short-term, they expose the limits of the regime’s commitment to solving youth issues. The case of young RCD lawyers proves relevant. Rather than backing the party, they displayed apathy due to years of discrimination and weak patronage systems, indicating that loyalty can diminish very quickly. This not only undermines the legitimacy of co-optation but can also contribute to youth disillusionment, as unmet expectations make them more likely to disengage from official spaces and seek alternative, often contentious forms of participation, as seen during the Arab uprisings.
The Egyptian regime is constantly micro-managing youth and society without a buffer in the middle. Sisi is ruling without a dominant ruling party, with a severely weakened opposition, marginalized NGOs, and trade unions operating under very strict restrictions. Sisi remains dependent on the use of extreme repression and shutting down all channels of political expression and dissent. Despite his strategy to co-opt youth through conferences and programs, he has yet to build a strong base for his regime outside the security apparatus that protects him. This was clear, given that the regime showed no hesitation in discarding young MWP members once they no longer served its interests. Egypt’s socio-economic situation remains challenging, marked by widespread corruption, nepotism, inequality, and a militarized economy. Since the start of the genocide in Gaza, spontaneous protests have taken place on campuses. These were probably one of the first protests that the campuses have seen in the last couple of years. There were also sporadic protests in mosques and public squares, but the state cracked down and arrested hundreds. The Global March on Gaza failed to take place as many activists were also detained or deported. Although limited, there has nonetheless been a slight revival of protests and activism. While still confined to the margins, even this level of engagement would have been unimaginable a few years ago. The cracks in the regime’s façade offer some room for hope, but it will take time and work to materialize. Although the Arab uprisings were defeated, this time, when we talk about a potential new revolution, there is something concrete we can build on and learn from.
The views represented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Arab Reform Initiative, its staff, or its board.
