On November 5th 1989, at Taef, a “National Reconciliation Accord” was signed with the goal of the civil war that Lebanon had been experiencing for fifteen years. The members of the 1972 parliament approved the text that took force of constitutional law in 1990, being cited in the preamble to the constitution and introducing amendments to the text. The Second Lebanese Republic came into being in this context and with it the project of reconstructing the country and reforming its political system. However, the “Taef Regime,” born from this document, proved itself to be particularly non-reformist to the point of being anti-reformist in many respects. Twenty years after the official end of the civil war, the reasons for disillusion concerning the capability of the Lebanese political system to truly transform itself in order to foster the civil peace, supported by a social and political pact and with the agreement of Lebanon’s foreign sponsors, are legion.
The views represented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Arab Reform Initiative, its staff, or its board.