“Today was the beginning of the debate and not the end,” declared EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy (HR) Kaja Kallas after the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) meeting on 23 June 2025. During the meeting, Kallas had presented a report on Israel’s (non-)compliance with obligations under the EU-Israel Association Agreement (AA) to the foreign ministers of the 27 EU member states. She had ordered the report on 20 May, after a request from the Netherlands that was backed by 17 member states. The review primarily concerns compliance with Article 2 of the AA, which stipulates that the relationship “shall be based on respect for human rights and democratic principles.”
The report argues that there are “indications that Israel would be in breach of its human rights obligations under Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement” due to its actions in Gaza and the West Bank. This can hardly be new information for European policymakers: A (leaked) internal EU report from November 2024 equally speaks of the “violation of the basic principles of international humanitarian law,” and “the use [of] starvation as a weapon of warfare.” In an advisory opinion from 19 July 2024, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) declared that the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory is illegal under international law. On 21 November 2024, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant, charging them with crimes against humanity. Human rights organizations have documented Israeli human rights violations for decades.
Despite ever-mounting evidence and the current unprecedented violence, the EU has remained inactive. This made some observers argue that the EU is complicit in war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and even genocide. Already in the past, the EU has not done much against the decades-long dehumanization, marginalization, and humiliation of Palestinians, and it has never taken concrete measures to fill the ever-repeated but increasingly hollow mantras of the two-state solution and Palestinians’ right to self-determination with substance. Now, instead of deciding on practical action, Kallas speaks of “the beginning of the debate” and suggests that the FAC could pick the issue up again in the next meeting in July, in case the situation of Palestinians does not improve. This is being said while a new report by an Israeli professor substantiated that the actual number of civilians killed by Israel in the Gaza Strip may significantly surpass the officially reported death toll, as victims who are buried under debris or dismembered are not included in mainstream reports.
Such a passive position stands in clear contrast to how the EU projects itself: as a normative actor in global affairs. While the EU has taken much clearer stances in other cases to uphold its values, seemingly, Palestine is treated differently. Reasons for this include colonial and neocolonial amnesia, European historical guilt for the century-long persecution of Jews and especially the Shoah, and the strong influence of pro-Israel lobby groups in Brussels. EU policies are also heavily impacted by US unconditional (military) support for Israel, as well as by the lack of genuine Arab regimes’ solidarity with Palestine. In effect, this means that the EU’s relations with regional heavyweights, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or the United Arab Emirates, are not disrupted by the Palestinian question. Put together, these factors play a crucial role when trying to understand EU inaction.
In addition, a variety of EU-internal reasons complicate joint action, including the EU’s institutional setting and decision-making mechanism, divisions between EU member states, and differences between key EU officials. Below, we shed nuanced light on these EU-internal issues.
EU Foreign Policy Decision-Making and Institutional Setting
The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 established the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as a framework for coordinating external action among member states. Later, the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) created the position of the HR who serves as Vice President of the Commission and heads the EU’s diplomatic corps, the European External Action Service (EEAS). Hence, the Treaty of Lisbon added crucial elements to the EU’s institutional setting and was an important milestone regarding the implementation of the EU’s CFSP.
When it comes to decision-making, however, foreign policy has remained one of (if not) the least integrated policy area(s). It continues to follow an intergovernmental logic whereby decisions are taken within the EU’s main intergovernmental bodies, namely the FAC (in which foreign ministers come together) and the European Council (which brings together all heads of states and/or heads of governments to make major decisions). Thus, member states – rather than supranational bodies such as the Commission or the EEAS – decide on foreign affairs.
Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) is the most common voting method in the Council of the EU. It follows a double majority logic to neither advantage small nor large member states: for a decision to pass, at least 55% of member states must agree (i.e., 15 out of 27), and these states must represent at least 65% of the total EU population. QMV was introduced to allow for more efficient decision-making within an EU consisting of more and more member states. It is today used in almost all policy areas, and around 85-90% of all decisions are made through QMV.
However, when it comes to issues related to CFSP, the FAC and the European Council adopt the rule of unanimous voting, as stipulated in the Treaty of the EU: All 27 member states must agree, with each one having veto power. This means, for example, that all member states must agree to suspend the AA with Israel. The recognition of Palestine as a state would also require unanimity.
This requirement has hindered coherent EU action in other cases, too. For example, until today, the EU does not recognize Kosovo since five states oppose this (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain). In contrast, in the context of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, unanimous decisions to impose sanctions have been taken on numerous occasions. The freezing of the EU’s AA with Syria in 2011 has equally been decided upon unanimously, just as the cessation of talks about an AA with Libya.
Split Between EU Member States on Their Policies Towards Palestine and Israel
In the case of Palestine, the need for unanimity is a key hurdle for joint EU action, as member states remain deeply divided. This could already be observed during the 2011 UNESCO vote to admit Palestine as a full member, the 2012 UN General Assembly vote to upgrade Palestine’s status to Non-Member Observer State in United Nations, and the 2022 UN General Assembly request for an ICJ advisory opinion regarding the legal consequences arising from Israel's prolonged occupation of Palestinian territory, to name a few examples. In all cases, some states voted yes, some no, and some abstained. Since 7 October 2023, the split has become even more apparent.
EU member states can be categorized into three groups: 1) those who back Israel unconditionally, including its relentless military campaigns (e.g., Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany and Hungary); 2) those who are more critical of Israel and demand more EU action to support the Palestinian struggle for self-determination (e.g., Belgium, Ireland and Spain); and 3) those who are in between and remain rather invisible. Having irreconcilable views, these blocs have often obstructed a unified EU position, resulting in weak statements and inaction.
In late October 2023, Ireland and Spain were the only two member states to push for a ceasefire at a European Council meeting. The Council debated terminology for months thereafter and remained split over whether to demand a humanitarian pause or a ceasefire, until finally, in March 2024, it reached a compromise, calling for “an immediate humanitarian pause leading to a sustainable ceasefire.” When the then-HR Josep Borrell proposed sanctions on violent settlers in December 2023, his suggestion was blocked by Hungary and the Czech Republic. In February 2024, the Irish and Spanish prime ministers circulated an open letter, calling for an urgent review of the EU-Israel AA, which, at the time, was rejected by most member states.
After the ICC issued arrest warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant in November 2024, Borell emphasized that all member states were legally obliged to implement them. While some states declared that they would do so (e.g., Belgium, the Netherlands, and Ireland), others outrightly rejected Borell’s call (e.g., Austria and the Czech Republic). Hence, no initiative was taken to even try to find a common EU position within the FAC on the issue of the ICC warrants – even though the EU has been a key supporter of the court. On the day of his electoral victory, 23 February 2025, the new German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated that he had “promised [Netanyahu] that we will find ways and means for him to visit Germany and also to be able to leave again without being arrested in Germany.” In April 2025, Netanyahu then visited Hungary, which did not lead to any substantial EU reaction. Yet, when Putin had planned to visit South Africa in late 2023, for instance, EU policymakers banged on about his ICC warrant.
Reactions after the FAC on 23 June 2025 were telling of the continued split among member states. While Spain called for an outright suspension of the AA, and lobbied for an EU-wide arms embargo as well as the imposition of sanctions against Israeli cabinet members, others rather vaguely demanded consequences (e.g., Belgium, Ireland, and Sweden). German Foreign Minister Johan Wadephul, in turn, declared that his country would veto a suspension of the AA, and even discouraged “any further formal discussion about this.” Greece and Italy also voiced opposition.
EU Officials Have Differing Stances and Make Conflicting Statements
Divisions are not just between member states. Top EU officials have also taken conflicting stances, quite noticeably since 7 October 2023, which makes joint action even harder. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Parliament President Roberta Metsola have been standing out in continuously emphasizing the EU’s unconditional support for Israel. By being very present, especially in the first weeks and months after 7 October, von der Leyen has thus shaped perceptions of the EU as a firm partner of Israel.
Von der Leyen has been criticized by other EU officials. Some, including the then-European Council President Charles Michel or former HR Borell, pointed out that von der Leyen has clearly overstepped her mandate, which does not include the right to speak on foreign policy issues on behalf of the EU. After all, CFSP remains an intergovernmental policy field, with the FAC and the European Council having decision-making powers, not the Commission.
Others have criticized her one-sidedness and her reluctance to call on Israel to respect international humanitarian law, arguing that this continues to give the Israeli government a carte blanche. In that context, in February 2024, during an interview with El País, Borell argued that “with such an absolutely pro-Israel stance, representing no one but herself on a matter of international policy, [von der Leyen’s statements have] had a high geopolitical cost for Europe.” Overall, Borell was the main EU official to take a consistent, clear, and more critical stance towards Israel and to ask for a suspension of the EU’s political dialogue with Israel early on.
His successor, Kaja Kallas, has been more reserved since taking office in December 2024. Only recently, she became more outspoken, for example during a session at the European Parliament on 18 June: “Israel has the right to self-defense, but what we see in practice from Israel goes beyond self-defense […] blocking food and medicine for Palestinians trapped in Gaza does not protect Israel [but] undermines decades of humanitarian principles.”
The Result: EU Paralysis
The lack of unity has been the prime reason for the EU’s decades-long inaction on Palestine. The 1980 Venice Declaration included the first public European Community’s (the EU’s predecessor organization) acknowledgment of Palestinians’ right to self-determination. Since then, however, the EU has not produced any meaningful (new) positions on Palestine, and its statements have often represented the lowest common denominator. Instead of addressing the reality on the ground, the EU has continued to resort to decades-old hollow mantras, in particular Palestinian state-building and the two-state solution, being unable to adjust its narratives, let alone its practices.
Even in the context of the current unprecedented violence, the used slogans or expressions of concern remain hollow. Almost all EU documents published since 7 October 2023 include a reference to “Israel’s right to defend itself in line with international law”. Yet, EU policymakers have hardly ever openly declared whether Israel is, in fact, violating international law, and have thus continued to avoid explicitly calling out the Israeli government. While EU officials do stress the catastrophic humanitarian situation in Gaza, they hardly mention who is responsible. The manner in which they describe Palestinians’ suffering is more akin to the consequence of a natural disaster, rather than a deliberate and conscious act of a government that continues to breach international law.
When it comes to concrete action, the picture is even bleaker, resulting in what Kristina Kausch, an expert on EU relations with the Middle East at the German Marshall Fund think tank, calls “the EU’s unprincipled paralysis on Gaza.” Instead of imposing sanctions, the EU remains Israel’s largest trading partner, and universities involved in Israel’s military-industrial-security complex are key beneficiaries of EU research funds, such as Horizon Europe. Instead of imposing a full-fledged EU-wide arms embargo, Germany and Italy have provided a third of all Israeli weapon imports in the period 2020-2024. Many EU policymakers are well aware of this paralysis and how it is perceived: Josep Borell, for instance, observed that “Every day we call for a two-state solution, but as the Palestinian representative told me during the UN General Assembly: ‘Apart from calling for it, what are you doing to get it?’”
Any Way Forward? Relying on a Coalition of the Committed
This paralysis has led to a massive reputation and credibility loss for the EU, especially in the Global Majority, where inaction and selective application of international law have not gone unnoticed. The EU’s standing has reached its lowest point ever, especially amongst those forces the EU has proudly called partners, and importantly human rights defenders. The EU has long been perceived as a toothless tiger when it comes to Palestine, but its image is now strikingly one of a villain – a dramatic development for a self-proclaimed normative power.
The question is whether this can be overturned. In theory, some improvements could be made in the EU’s institutional design. Most importantly, the EU could switch to QMV in its CFSP to overcome being paralyzed by the veto of individual member states. This would make it much easier to freeze or suspend the AA, recognize Palestine as a state, or implement an arms embargo or other sanctions, for instance. However, this would necessitate a Treaty change: Somewhat ironically, unanimity is required to get rid of the unanimity requirement. For the time being, this seems highly unlikely.
While far-reaching measures, such as the suspension of the AA, require unanimity, some initiatives falling within the merits of the AA could be taken through QMV, such as the expulsion of Israel from Horizon Europe research funds or the lifting of some trade facilitation measures – tariffs, for instance, are ruled by QMV. Yet, it still remains challenging to overcome the double majority hurdle of QMV, since countries representing 35% of EU citizens can prevent any decision in the QMV system: the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary and Italy alone have a combined 36%, and they have all indicated they will not accept harsh measures.
In conclusion, member states can hardly count on common EU action to support Palestinians’ right to self-determination and not even to truly try to end the ongoing bloodshed. However, they can and should act alone or as a coalition of like-minded and principled agents. Ireland and Spain have already shown the way. In May 2024, they unilaterally announced their recognition of Palestine as a state, and a month later, Slovenia followed suit. Spain has also started withdrawing from several arms deals with Israel, notwithstanding its so-far unsuccessful attempt to lobby for an EU-wide arms embargo. The Netherlands and Belgium at least partly did the same, and France is considering similar action. At the moment, acting alone appears to be the only viable option for member states. The alternative is gridlock and paralysis of the EU, while Palestinians are faced with annihilation.
The views represented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Arab Reform Initiative, its staff, or its board.
