Summary

The Libyan government established a "morality police" force in July 2024, likely as a distraction from economic and political crises. This move is part of a broader pattern of using social control and moral policing to divert attention from governance failure. The new "Public Morality Protection Agency" has extensive powers, including surveillance, detention, and control over civil society activities. The Special Deterrence Force (SDF), known for its role in human rights violations, has jurisdiction over this agency. Morality policing in Libya disproportionately affects women and girls, reinforcing gender-based restrictions and control.

Among significant economic and political challenges, the establishment of the morality police emerged as a deliberate distraction technique. This strategic move by the interim government aimed to consolidate power and control, marking the continuation of historical patterns of governance through diversion and control. The policy is positioned within the broader context of anti-women's rights measures, often justified using the language of morality and traditional values.

Introduction

In July 2024, the Libyan Presidential Council issued Decree No. 14, establishing what translates directly as the “Public Morality Protection Agency”, an independent legal and financial entity. While essentially conceived to act as a new “morality police” force, understanding the logic behind this decision requires an acknowledgment of the current state of the profound economic and financial crisis, an understanding of how the incorporation of non-state armed forces as an extension of the security apparatus is utilized to bolster support to a government in trouble, and a deeper contextualization of how various forms of social and moral control in Libya exist and intertwine with political power and religious interpretation. Indeed, I argue that this new morality police serves to build alliances with conservative and ultra-conservative elements of the population, thereby extending the bases of support to the government, and is a calculated attempt to divert attention from the pressing economic and political crises facing the country. More precisely, the Government of National Unity (GNU) has a legitimacy crisis amid economic challenges, since it has failed to accomplish its mandate for organizing elections. In this context, the formation of the morality police is a move to distract from these developments and to ally with factions within the capital that would be able to protect their position and interest to remain in power while eliminating dissent.

Extending Control in Times of Economic and Political Crisis

Understanding the decision to establish the morality police must first be contextualized in the broader economic and political crisis facing the government of Libya and the tradition of scapegoating and deployment of control mechanisms to deflect threats to legitimacy. Historically, the Gaddafi regime used similar tools to maintain control, including the establishment of Revolutionary Committees that claimed the authority to monitor and enforce public morality, tightening the grip of control during a time of sanctions and economic hardship. The current government’s approach seems to be a continuation of this control strategy to shape a narrative around more precarious developments in the country.

At the outset of 2024, the Tripoli-based GNU sought to strengthen its grip on power, extend its influence in Zawia, and attempt to seize control of the Ras Ejdir border crossing with Tunisia through the Interior Minister. These political and economic maneuvers culminated in the Central Bank Crisis of late August. The crisis unfolded when an armed faction stormed the Central Bank and demanded the governor's resignation. This incident followed public demonstrations and the kidnapping of the IT director after the bank's reunification. The governor's subsequent flight from the country was interpreted as a forceful bid to take over Libya's Central Bank, prompting the Government of National Stability in the East to announce the closure of oil fields in protest. The United Nations Special Mission in Libya intervened to mediate between the two governments. This resulted in a compromise between the newly appointed governor and the bank board in late September. In early October, Libya's National Oil Corporation announced the resumption of full oil production following a two-month shutdown of two major oil fields due to political turmoil surrounding the Central Bank.

While the government in Tripoli and the House of Representatives in the East seem to accept the result, the new governor and board will face more challenges regarding the budget allocation and the bank’s role as a broker between the governments in the East and West of Libya. The current configuration of the alliance between the presidential council (an executive head of the state body) and the government of the National Unity means further interference and disruption due to persistent corruption issues. October and November 2024 were difficult for citizens who were unable to withdraw funds due to liquidity issues amidst floods that reached the western region, further deteriorating depleted and neglected infrastructure, and worsening living conditions for thousands of people. These developments have raised concerns over the legitimacy and durability of the status quo in Tripoli, both locally and internationally.

These developments have pushed international and regional calls for a return to dialogue to the forefront. In early December, the EU delegation in Tripoli hosted the Berlin Process Economic Working Group Co-Chairs to work on a unified budget to mitigate financial and economic risks.  This occurred against the backdrop of the United Nations Special Mission envoy, which held meetings with numerous ambassadors, a Wilton Park conference in the UK, and meetings with Libyan stakeholders, including Khalifa Haftar, to push for another round of dialogue. On 16 December, in her briefing of the Security Council, Stephanie Khoury announced the UNSMIL plan to address the political deadlock in the country by forming a technical committee of Libyan experts to form a consensus government.

However, as this political and economic crisis continues, the interim government has doubled its spending on armed groups to control the population and territory while weakening institutions and fracturing the social fabric of the country. Indeed, transitional governments in Libya have a track record of granting powers to armed groups in the hope that they would protect them when their position is in serious jeopardy or establish new security apparatuses that can serve a similar purpose. By shifting the focus to a morality-policing campaign, the government can distract from these larger economic and political failings while also further extending control mechanisms.

Why a Morality Police?

The choice of morality is a low-hanging fruit in countries like Libya. While morality is subjective at the individual and societal levels, in Libyan society, it is a highly politicized and contentious issue. It is closely connected to reputation, honor, and social status, making it a powerful political tool for control and pressure. It is also a gendered tool of social control. Women and girls tend to bear the brunt of morality policing, as they are often perceived as custodians of cultural and social norms. The imposition of strict dress codes, restrictions on movement and public presence, and arbitrary detention and "rehabilitation" of women and girls accused of moral transgressions are common tactics employed by groups enforcing such codes. Men and boys are also not spared, facing harassment, detention, and punishment for behaviors deemed immoral, which is open to interpretation depending on the force that detains them. This is a common phenomenon in which certain masculinities become hegemonic as they monopolize power¹Connell, R. W., & Messerschmidt, J. W. (2005). Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept. Gender & Society, 19(6), 829-859. https://doi.org/10.1177/0891243205278639 (Original work published 2005 , while some men become less valued. Moreover, arguments against morality policing can be difficult to make, as they place people in danger of character assassination.

The current effort to institutionalize a morality police force builds on a pre-existing tradition. Before 2011, the state detained women and girls under the guise of 'social rehabilitation.' Although not explicitly called “morality policing”, this practice clearly demonstrated the state's control over individuals' behavior, with initiatives that were often met with resistance from civil society and women's rights organizations. In the post-revolution era, Libya has been characterized by the fragmentation of political power, the rise of various armed groups, and control of illicit trade networks. In this context, various armed groups and militias have emerged, exerting control over different territories and often imposing their interpretations of social and moral codes. While not a centralized "morality police”, these groups functioned similarly, enforcing their own versions of morality within their areas of control. To this point, as early as 2012, factions allied with Dar Al-Iftaa²General Authority of Endowments and Religious Affairs is an official governmental organization responsible for overseeing religious endowments, managing religious affairs, regulation of religious institutions, and providing guidance on religious matters. through the Ministry of Culture attempted to establish some form of moral police.

More recently, the General Authority of Endowments and Religious Affairs/ Dar Al-Iftaa announced in May 2023 decision No. 436/2023, establishing the "Guardians of Virtue" force under their authority and granting extensive social control powers, including mass surveillance, detention powers, and power to police personal and social behavior, as well as the right to interfere with and change the educational curriculum. The decision was criticized by the Libyan Scholars Association, who called it a power grab. However, the mechanism of this force remains unclear.

The July 2024 decree goes even further, creating an independent legal and financial agency with far-reaching prerogatives. The powers vested in the new authority can be grouped into four key themes:

• Moral-Religious Dimension: Prerogatives within this dimension focus on implementing measures that involve close collaboration with educational institutions and religious leaders to develop and implement moral education programs. This dimension seeks to build and promote the ideological aspects of whoever is in power by integrating moral education into the curriculum and leveraging religious leaders’ influence.
• Government Accountability Dimension: This aspect emphasizes the crucial role of the government in monitoring and reporting behavioral deviations within society. This involves implementing specific regulations designed to address violations of public morality. The government is expected to play an active role in identifying and addressing issues that may compromise public morality, which are open to interpretation and abuse by the government.
• Social Control Dimension: This involves careful monitoring of various social activities to ensure they align with societal values and cultural norms, although it is not clear from the articles whose values and norms they refer to. These prerogatives include oversight of cultural events and other public gatherings that may influence social behavior. Additionally, prerogatives include mechanisms for addressing citizen complaints related to moral issues, ensuring that the public plays a role in reporting them.
• Political Control Dimension: This dimension focuses on monitoring social media and online platforms for content that may violate public morality standards. However, this has not yet been defined or described. The prerogatives involved identifying and addressing behavioral deviations in the online space, given the Libyan government’s track record in policing online spaces. This could mean further cracking down on freedom of expression and silencing any critique or opposition to its performance.

The approach is extensive, and unlike how the announcement was made, it is clear that the jurisdiction and powers of this agency go beyond just "morality policing" into broader surveillance, social control, and crackdown on civil society and political opposition under the guise of "public morality" protection. When Minister of Interior Emad Al Tarabelis made a video announcement on this, he justified it as a response to a moral decline in Libyan society and an increase in behaviors "against Libyan values." The jurisdiction of the agency has been given to Special Deterrence Force (SDF), or Rad’aa as it is also known, a notorious armed group in eastern Tripoli known for its human rights violations and its own brand of "morality policing." The SDF has affiliations and connections with Dar Al-Iftaa, as well as the jurisdictions granted in 2018 to conduct mass online surveillance under counterterrorism measures. The SDF Detention Centre in Mitiga has been documented to hold thousands of people, often without cases or trials. Civil society organizations documented SDF detention practices in pursuit of accountability at the International Criminal Court and outlined extensive physical and psychological torture, degraded treatment, sexual assault, and killings.

Although civil society and activists both inside and outside the country strongly opposed the decision to form the new agency, it did not gain much public traction. This is due to years of targeted campaigns against civil society organizations and activists, especially those advocating women’s rights.

Broader Anti-Women’s Rights Context

The strategy of diverting attention from political and economic issues by focusing on social and moral concerns is a multifaceted approach employed by the interim Libyan governments. This tactic serves not only to control the narrative and misdirect public sentiment but also to align with a broader pattern of anti-women's rights policies. Transitional governments have consistently leveraged the language of morality and traditional values to justify measures that curtail women's rights and freedom. This approach is bolstered by the influence of institutions such as the General Authority of Endowments and Islamic Affairs, which wields significant power in shaping Tripoli’s social and security policies.

Since the 2011 uprising, Libya has witnessed a recurring pattern of repressive measures against women's rights, with various armed groups and governments attempting to impose their vision of social order. This has manifested in numerous ways, including restrictions on women's movements, dress codes, and participation in public life. The justification for these measures often stems from a narrow interpretation of religious and cultural norms, which are presented as immutable and essential to the Libyan identity.

The concepts of honor, morality, and tradition, along with their gendered familial connections, are deeply ingrained in Libyan society and codified in the penal code. These concepts are frequently invoked to justify discriminatory practices and laws that disproportionately affect women. For instance, laws regarding personal status, inheritance, and sexual violence often reflect patriarchal interpretations of morality and family honor, placing women at a significant disadvantage in legal and social contexts.

By framing restrictive policies in terms of "Libyan traditions" and "moral values”, the government can present itself as a neutral arbiter, upholding societal norms rather than an oppressive force. This approach allows for a more manageable form of manipulation, as it avoids explicitly naming these measures as anti-women's rights or limitations on general freedoms, thus making them more palatable to the public and potentially reducing resistance to such policies.

This moral-framing strategy extends beyond gender issues and is often used to address a range of social concerns. By emphasizing moral and social issues, the government can create a sense of urgency regarding these topics, effectively diverting attention from the pressing political and economic challenges. This diversion tactic is particularly effective during political instability or economic hardship, as it provides a seemingly unifying cause that can temporarily bridge the political divide.

Conclusion

The establishment of a morality police force in Libya, ostensibly to address perceived moral decline, appears to be a multifaceted strategy employed by the government to achieve various political objectives. By focusing on morality and traditional values, the government can effectively deflect scrutiny from its shortcomings in economic management and political governance. This tactic allows the ruling elite to shift the blame for societal problems to perceived moral transgressions rather than acknowledging systemic failures. Furthermore, the creation of such a force provides the government with an additional mechanism to exert control over the population, potentially suppressing dissent and limiting personal freedom under the pretext of moral guardianship of the people.

The implementation of a moral police force raises profound questions regarding the future direction of Libyan society and governance. This signals a potential regression in terms of individual rights and freedoms, particularly for women, who often bear the brunt of such morality-based restrictions. This move could lead to increased gender inequality, limited participation of women in public life, and erosion of civil liberties. Moreover, it may exacerbate existing social tensions and divisions within the country, potentially undermining efforts towards national reconciliation and democratic progress. Everyone should view these developments with concern, as they represent a significant departure from the principles that guided many social groups to revolt in 2011.