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Introduction

Lebanon has endured Israeli aggression for decades, most recently during the war that began in October 2023, which has completely destroyed seven towns and entire neighborhoods in at least 37 southern villages.¹L’Orient Today, “Over 40,000 housing units destroyed in 37 devastated southern Lebanese villages”, 5 November 2024. The war has so far claimed over 4,000 lives, displaced approximately 870,000 people to date, and resulted in the destruction of around 361 buildings in Beirut.²Reuters, “Israeli attacks have killed 4,047 people in Lebanon, Lebanese minister says”, 4 December 2024; Beirut Urban Lab, “Damage assessment in Beirut during the 2023–2024 conflict”, Online Platform, 2024. Beyond war casualties, the aggression has had profound implications for Lebanon’s political and institutional landscape. It has not only weakened Hezbollah’s activity across different locations and sectors (primarily in service delivery) but also reshaped the broader political arena.³K. Alexander, “Hezbollah in decline: Between resistance rhetoric and strategic reality”, Manara Magazine, 2 June 2025. Since the ceasefire in October 2024, other major events have also altered the political landscape. A new president, Joseph Aoun, was elected on 9 January 2025, ending a more than two-year presidential vacuum. This was followed by the appointment of the new prime minister, Nawaf Salam, on 13 January 2025, and the formation of the Lebanese cabinet on 8 February 2025. While some view these changes with cautious optimism, others fear uncertainty, especially when it comes to the pace and outcome of reconstruction. The question that will mostly define the success or failure of this government is its ability to end the war and lead a credible reconstruction process.

Reconstruction presents both a critical challenge and a rare opportunity to address Lebanon’s deep-rooted structural inequalities. A primary issue in this context is access to electricity, a basic service that has been unreliable for decades. The energy crisis, already existent, was exacerbated by the recent financial collapse, leaving the formal energy sector unable to provide consistent power to the majority of the Lebanese population.⁴Human Rights Watch, “Lebanon: Electricity crisis exacerbates poverty, inequality”, 9 March 2023. Decades of inadequate infrastructure, political paralysis, and economic instability have forced most people to rely on informal, costly, short-lived, and harmful energy sources, primarily neighborhood diesel generators operated by unofficial local providers.⁵Human Rights Watch, “‘Cut Off from Life Itself’: Lebanon’s failure on the right to electricity”, Report, 9 March 2023.

As stakeholders begin yet another postwar reconstruction process, they will need to address a complex web of governance issues, implement inclusive energy policies, and establish proper financing mechanisms to ensure a just and resilient energy transition. A primary financial enabler in this process is international aid.⁶The World Bank Group (WBG) has already committed US0 million, with expectations that this figure could reach over US billion. While foreign aid and loans offer an opportunity, past experiences have shown that without structural reform, visionary and strategic reconstruction, transparent national oversight, and clear mechanisms of accountability, aid risks reinforcing political clientelism and social inequalities rather than enabling equitable development.⁷M. Fawaz, “Aid, reconstruction, and the persistence of clientelism in Lebanon after the 2006 war”, Middle East Report, Vol. 251, pp. 24-29, 2009. There is a need to challenge this reality by relying on energy-efficient reconstruction processes that integrate renewable energy into urban environments in order to reduce dependence on fossil fuel imports.

This paper explores the challenges and opportunities for energy recovery in Lebanon’s postwar reconstruction by examining three interrelated components: (1) the actors involved in the energy sector and their fragmented strategies that influence energy provision across three timeframes (before the crises, during the current emergency, and in the near future); (2) energy-related planning regulations, with a focus on how existing and proposed laws shape the reconstruction of energy systems and the potential adoption, or hinderance, of sustainable technologies; and (3) the political economy and financial gaps in the current recovery process. It argues that Lebanon’s energy recovery must move beyond short-term fixes and rebuilding as was, and adopt a comprehensive reform agenda that integrates governance, legal, economic, and financial reforms.

To ground the analysis, this paper presents a case study of the southern suburbs of Beirut and municipal Beirut (see Figure 1). The southern suburbs were severely affected by the recent war (at least 417 buildings destroyed), while municipal Beirut, as the adjacent capital, experienced relatively less damage (two compounds of buildings destroyed).⁸The New Arab, “Lebanon ceasefire: What dangers do Dahiyeh’s residents face?”, 2 October 2024. Exploring these two geographies in relation to each other is essential to understanding whether they have coordinated efforts toward improving services for the greater Beirut area (which includes its suburbs). Both regions are characterized by informal energy networks and monopolized diesel generator systems.⁹Ebla Research Collective, “‘I am, as you can see, the local government, the electricity company and much more’: Building committees as space of social organizing in Beirut”, Research report, 2024 (Ebla Research Collective, “‘I am, as you can see’”). This case study highlights the governance, policy, and economic challenges of achieving energy justice amid Lebanon’s volatile political and economic landscape. The purpose of this research is to seize the opportunity presented in reconstruction to establish actionable frameworks that aim to achieve efficient energy recovery nationwide. The research and stakeholder engagement conducted throughout the study further aims to contribute to a more just and inclusive reconstruction of Lebanon’s energy sector: one that ensures marginalized communities are not left behind in the country’s recovery.

Methodology

The research methodology of this paper consisted of: desk reviews of existing reports, news articles, and existing and proposed laws and decrees (e.g., building regulations, reconstruction laws, and proposed legislation); site visits to the southern suburbs of Beirut and municipal Beirut; in-depth interviews with 13 key stakeholders; and conversations with informal actors of the studied area. The interviewed stakeholders were from the public sector, syndicates, think tanks, NGOs, and standard-setting bodies (see Annex for the full list).

The collected data were analyzed thematically using the framework presented below (see Figure 2). In the governance section, associations between different actors involved in the energy sector were derived from the interviews, in which stakeholders described the types of coordination they either had or lacked with one another.

The research findings were validated through a policy dialogue involving the interviewees, members of the Arab Reform Initiative energy sector’s advisory board, and additional stakeholders involved in the sector. This dialogue also served to further develop and refine the recommendations.