International Interventions During Wartime: The Case of the Emergency Cash Transfer Program in Yemen

SANAA, YEMEN - MARCH 26: People wait in queues to benefit from the distributed meals amid the ongoing civil war between the Iranian-backed Houthis and government forces during the 9th year of civil war in Yemen.
People wait in queues to benefit from aid distribution amid the ongoing civil war, 26 March 2024 - Sanaa, Yemen. (c) Mohammed Hamoud - anadoluimages

Introduction: The Pressures of Conflict and its Repercussions on the Social Protection System

Conflicts undermine the ability of states to provide social protection and other social services. Yemen is no exception. The war caused a cumulative economic contraction of about 50% over the period 2014-2020 and reduced the annual GDP growth rate to about 0.5% in 2021.1The Arab Investment and Export Credit Guarantee Corporation, Yemen Country Profile: Economic Indicators, Foreign Direct Investment, International Trade, 2020, available at https://www.dhaman.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Yemen-min.pdf. During that year, inflation rose to nearly 30.6%, the unemployment rate reached 13.90%, and the value of the Yemeni rial depreciated to unprecedented levels.2World Bank, Yemen Country Profile, available at https://databank.worldbank.org/views/reports/country=YEM Inflation and currency devaluation have led to a sharp rise in prices, with food prices increasing by 30%. The war has also caused a severe public financial crisis due to a decline in government revenues. The conflict has also destroyed and disrupted a significant portion of critical infrastructure, accelerating the collapse of public systems and reducing people’s access to basic services such as education, health, and water.

The ongoing conflict has increased pressure on public services, with a significant increase in the number of people in need of assistance and protection due to large-scale internal displacement – to date, 4.3 million people have been displaced in Yemen.3World Food Program, Yemen, available at https://ar.wfp.org/countries/yemen-ar Due to the budget deficit, the payment of public sector salaries and pensions has been suspended since September 2016, and the situation remains the same to date in Houthi-controlled areas, where the majority of the population resides.

The conflict has led to the collapse of both pillars of the social protection system. It destroyed the social insurance network, which covers public civilian, military, and security pension funds. It also damaged the network of social safety funds, which consists of eight programs or funds: Social Welfare Fund (SWF), Public Works Project (PWP), Social Fund for Development (SFD), Agriculture, Fisheries, and Aquaculture Support Fund, Small Enterprise Development Fund (SEDF), National Productive Families Program (NPFP), Handicapped Care and Rehabilitation Fund (HCRF), and Supreme Council for Motherhood and Childhood.4International Labor Organization, Social Protection Program in Yemen, available at https://www.ilo.org/beirut/events/WCMS_246618/lang--ar/index.htm

Following the cessation of governmental funds, the Social Welfare Fund was forced to suspend operations, depriving millions of Yemenis of the modest cash subsidies they had been receiving. Similarly, the Public Works Project and the Social Fund for Development also stopped, as donors froze their funding for both entities. On top of that, Public Pension Funds ceased pension payments due to the loss of funds. Additionally, unofficial social protection mechanisms and networks are on the verge of collapse. With around 30 % of Yemenis depending on government salaries and pensions,5Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, “Social Protection in Yemen: Resilience and Coping Approaches: National Social Protection Mechanisms: Status Quo...Programs & Activities", Socio-Economic Update, Issue 48, May 2020, available at https://is.gd/NMfDqK (Ministry of Planning, Social Protection in Yemen the consequences have been catastrophic.  As a result, Yemen is currently experiencing the largest humanitarian crisis globally, as per UN classification.6Global Network Against Food Crises, Global Report on Food Crises 2020, available at https://www.fsinplatform.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/GRFC_2020_ONLINE_200420.pdf , 7OCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan, Yemen: Humanitarian Program Planning Cycle 2023, available at https://is.gd/l28xLT In particular, the national food crisis in Yemen is among the ten worst food crises in the world. The impact of the conflict is exacerbated by climate change, intensifying the need to enhance social protection in the country.

International Interventions in Social Protection

International interventions in social protection in Yemen began in the mid-1990s and continued until the political crisis in 2011. International aid focused on strengthening institutional capacities and funding social safety net projects. For instance, donors contributed to nearly 90% of the Social Fund for Development's programs funding in the form of soft loans and grants. The Public Works Project relied mainly on external funding. The Social Welfare Fund was partly co-funded by the World Bank and the European Union. This international aid ceased with the outbreak of war in 2015 but later re-emerged with a focus on urgent humanitarian needs. Today, a complex network of internationally funded programs and projects has emerged,8Ministry of Planning, Social Protection in Yemen. aiming to maintain social protection systems and activities and contribute to mitigating the impact of conflict on the economic and social conditions. It aims to achieve this through an approach that takes into account the context and needs of the conflict. International interventions have followed three simultaneous lines of action:

  • Providing essential humanitarian needs and facilitating access to primary services.
  • Strengthening socio-economic resilience by improving livelihoods and recovery capacity.
  • Strengthening cohesion, protection, and adaptive responses to the expected impacts of climate change.

Emergency Cash Transfer Program: Objectives and Results

International donors began contributing to Social Welfare Fund (SWF) cash grants as early as 2011 through ad hoc and limited projects, such as the Emergency Crisis Recovery Project (P133811) (ECRP) (2014-2013) funded by DFID and the Emergency Social Protection Support Project (P151923) (2016-2014) funded by DFID and the US government. Since the start of the war in 2015, international interventions have increasingly adopted cash-assistance programs. According to the Financial Tracking System (FTS), Yemen’s humanitarian response includes the highest proportion of cash-based programs. While conditional cash transfer programs are more prevalent,9Josephine Hatton et al, Cash Transfer Programs in Difficult Contexts: A Case Study on Cash Transfer Programs and Risk in Yemen 2015-2018, Cash Learning Partnership. October 2018, available at https://www.albankaldawli.org/ar/news/feature/2018/01/18/social-protection-reforms-in-a-conflict-environment-a-success-story-from-iraq (Josephine Hatton et al., Cash Transfer Programs several unconditional cash transfer programs and initiatives have been implemented. For example, the Unconditional Cash Transfer (UCT) emergency program, the largest UNICEF-run program globally.

This program began in August 2017 as a part of the Yemen Emergency Crisis Response Project (YECRP). The program is the result of a coordinated effort with several donors. Among other donors, the program is funded by the World Bank, which also provides technical assistance, with contributions from the UK’s Department for International Development and the US Department of State through the Yemen Emergency Multi-Donor Trust Fund10World Bank, Third Additional Financing for the Yemen Emergency Crisis Response Project, available at https://is.gd/TgxLZt (World Bank, Third Additional Financing). United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Yemen Emergency Crisis Response Project, Fifth Additional Financing (P172662): Social Impact Assessment (SAI) for Component 3, August 2020, available at https://www.unicef.org/yemen/media/4651/file/Yemen%20ECRP_AF5_Social%20Impact%20Assessment_AR.pdf (United Nations Children's Fund, Emergency Response Project  UNICEF is financially and operationally responsible for the program, coordinating and negotiating with donors, funders, and contractors.11United Nations Children's Fund, Emergency Response Project. ,12World Bank, Strengthening Social Protection and COVID-19 Response Project in Yemen, November 2020, available at https://documents1.worldbank.org/Yemen-Social-Protection-Enhancement-and-COVID-19-Response-Project-P173582.pdf (World Bank, Strengthening Social Protection Project

The primary goal of the program is to resume the disbursement of cash transfers previously provided by the SWF to approximately 1.5 million cases/households (8-9 million people, 30-35% of the population) across Yemen.13United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Unconditional Cash Transfer Project, available at https://www.unicef.org/yemen/ar/ According to program documents, the transfers are intended to protect the target population from food insecurity and meet their basic needs.  It is estimated to cover about 22 % of the cost of the minimum food basket (for a family of five) set by WFP in January 2019, help them achieve relative stability in terms of income access and predictability, enable families to continue human development, facilitate basic consumption and cover the cost of essential services.  It is also intended to reduce extreme poverty (poverty line $1.90) by 3.6%, improve access to health services, contain diseases, manage chronic conditions, and mitigate the effects of climate change and other risks.14World Bank, Third Additional Financing. World Bank, Fourth Additional Financing for the Emergency Crisis Response Project, May 2019, available at https://www.albankaldawli.org/ar/news/factsheet/2019/05/14/yemen-emergency-crisis-response-project-fourth-additional-financing (World Bank, Fourth Additional Financing).

The program also aims to overcome political and institutional challenges by updating the social protection system's efficiency through a new information system and establishing mechanisms to address administrative issues.  Donors aim to transfer responsibility for the program to the SWF as soon as conditions allow,15Ministry of Planning, Social Protection in Yemen. making it a sustainable program. Because the system suffers from institutional weaknesses and inefficient administrative procedures and mechanisms, UNICEF has committed to work with the World Bank and the UNDP to build the Social Welfare Fund’s capacity.16World Bank, Strengthening Social Protection Project.

Results and Lessons Learned

The UCT program presents a complex narrative, indicating a mix of successes, failures, strengths, weaknesses, and challenges, and offers several lessons about the enabling factors and conditions for the success of unconditional cash assistance. Until March 2023, the program secured payments for 15 cycles, with around 1.43 million beneficiaries receiving their transfers each cycle.17World Bank, Second Additional Financing for the Strengthening Emergency Social Protection and COVID-19 Project, available at https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099416005012327060/pdf/IDU0402139ee0c070af460aa3e36998653.pdf (World Bank, Second Additional Financing). UNDP, Lessons Learned Report: Social Protection for Community Resilience Project (SPCRP) - Yemen, February 2021, available at https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/migration/ye/SPCRP-Lessons-Learned-Report---English.pdf Francisco V. Ayala, “Emergency cash transfers in Yemen (case study)”, Handbook on Social Protection Systems, August 2021, available at https://www.elgaronline.com/display/edcoll/9781839109102/9781839109102.00042.xml (Francisco V. Ayala, Emergency Cash Transfers However, the program suffered from funding gaps that disrupted payment cycles. For instance, in some years, only three out of four cycles were paid, and in one year, only one cycle was covered.

Program evaluations confirm that it helped beneficiaries meet their most pressing needs and that its transfers put families in a better position to cope with the crisis and recover from its negative effects.18Francisco V. Ayala, Emergency Cash Transfers. According to data published by an external contractor at the end of 2018, 99 % of beneficiaries received the correct amount of cash and spent most of it on food (8 %), medicine (5 %), services (rent, electricity, gas, fuel) (5 %), and buying clothes (2 %). 19World Bank, Additional Financing IV. However, there is a lack of outcome and impact assessment studies of the program, with the most recent project documents referring to a 2019 study.

In the institutional context, the program has achieved several achievements, including:

  1. Establishing a special program management unit (PMU), a scalable integrated management information system (MIS) containing a beneficiary database, special forms for dealing with the various project components, and a case registry.
  2. Implementing a process to verify the identity of the beneficiary list and confirm their eligibility.
  3. Amendments to the disbursement mechanism to ensure the delivery of cash transfers in high-risk war conditions.
  4. Establish a grievance redress mechanism (GRM).
  5. Developing additional services for the most vulnerable beneficiaries and those with special needs, such as home delivery.

The Social Welfare Fund gains experience by assisting in the program's activities, as its employees make up about 50% of the program's field staff.20Al-Thawra newspaper, “Executive Director of the Social Welfare Fund Amir al-Warith told Al-Thawra: The fund supported social protection programs and worked to alleviate the suffering of the poor in times of war and aggression,” July 15, 2021, available at https://althawrah.ye/archives/686017. Some are also hired as short-term consultants to support the program's field operations. The systems, mechanisms, and procedures developed, together with the experience gained and accumulated during the implementation of the program, are supposed to benefit the country's social protection network and contribute to developing its capacities and correcting its situation. However, in contrast to these achievements, the donors have not launched any plans to build the Fund's capacity and rehabilitate it, nor have they completed an assessment of its capacities and needs.21World Bank, Additional Financing for the Strengthening Social Protection in Emergencies and Coronavirus Pandemic Project, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/.pdf

Imbalances and Weaknesses

Despite its successes and the experience gained during implementation, the program suffers from many weaknesses and shortcomings related to its management. These are issues that can be overcome. However, the program also faces numerous challenges, most of which are beyond its control. The most significant of these are:

  1. The current beneficiary list does not reflect emerging need patterns, as it is outdated (going back to 2014) and excludes those affected by the war. The criteria and parameters for designing cash transfers (targeting, benefit calculation formula, frequency of payments, coverage, etc.) remain the same as those of the Social Welfare Fund and have not been updated.
  2. Changes in beneficiary status and eligibility are not tracked.
  3. Beneficiaries may be excluded for technical reasons, such as the inability to provide an acceptable ID.
  4. Lack of reliable social and economic information and data raises doubts about the program actually handling eligible cases correctly.
  5. Long delays in responding to issues that arise in the field, and processing and resolving complaints that can take up to three or four payment cycles.
  6. Weakness and irregularity in the process of monitoring, following up, and evaluation, focusing mainly on service quality assessment. There is insufficient attention to impact measurement, where project documents reflect only one impact assessment study conducted in 2018.
  7. Program activities are susceptible to corruption. Remittances, for example, are disbursed through group processes and may be delivered to non-beneficiaries or substitutes. Cashiers may submit receipts for deliveries that were not delivered. Disbursements are generally made without reasonably adequate oversight.
  8. Doubts about the eligibility of contracted entities for implementing or overseeing program operations and activities. Although the program's reliance on community networks (local figures, chiefs, elders) is necessary for protection, especially in conflict-prone areas, it risks indirectly engaging and supporting the patronage system. Despite generally strong relationships among the program's stakeholders, the Social Welfare Fund's does not reflect the same level of trust. The SWF feels marginalized by the partners, not fully informed about the program activities, and claims that its feedback and observations are intentionally ignored.22Interview with the head of the fund on July 16, 2023.
  9. The aid amount was estimated to be around 5000 Yemeni riyals on average per family per month. However, the actual value of cash transfers kept decreasing due to inflation, currency devaluation, and the disparities between official and unofficial prices.23Josephine Hatton et al., Cash Transfer Programs. Although the aid amount has been under review since at least 2018 to assess the need for adjustments to maintain its real value 24World Bank, Third Additional Financing. , progress was slow. It was only in the 11th payment cycle that the dollar value of the transfer amount was adopted, bringing the annual aid to $120. 25World Bank. Second Additional Financing. However, the value of the transfer remained vulnerable to global food price inflation.
  10. The cash transfers are modest and inadequate to meet basic needs, having minimal real impact on poverty. The transfer value has significantly decreased as a %age of the minimum food basket, dropping from 42% before the conflict to between 10-11% in 2022. 26Meraki Labs and Ruta Nimkar, Humanitarian Cash and Social Protection in Yemen, CaLP Network, January 2021, available at https://www.calpnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/CaLP-Yemen-Case-Study-WEB-1.pdf (Meraki Labs and Ruta Nikmar, Humanitarian Cash and Social Protection).
  11. The absence of significant referral programs and policies deny the prevents beneficiaries from accessing other services and programs projects or receiving complementary support services to enhance impact and compensate for the modest transfer value.27Josephine Hatton et al. Cash transfer programs. Although the Cash-Plus initiative was launched 28United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Cash-Plus support brings new hope, July 2020, available at https://is.gd/aBiaff it was implemented on a limited time and geographic scale.  Additionally, while the program introduced supplementary payments with the emergence of the coronavirus pandemic, this policy was quickly canceled due to funding constraints.
  12. Funding has been unstable. The program suffered from funding gaps resulting in irregular payment cycles. This is one of the main reasons for the inability to increase the amount of the subsidy. The risk of funding shortfalls or interruptions remains in an environment where international aid to Yemen is decreasing, making regular transfers unpredictable. Funding shortfalls have caused other programs under the same ERP to be discontinued. 29World Bank, Fourth Additional Financing.
  13. The previously mentioned challenges highlight another issue: poor coordination with other programs, actors, and stakeholders in the humanitarian and social protection field in Yemen.

Finally, in the context of global interest in understanding cash assistance programming, this experience strengthens the evidence base for the efficiency of this type of aid compared to others. This confirms the validity of several theoretical advantages: being more flexible, adaptable, and sensitive to the circumstances of beneficiaries; more controllable and traceable; less politicized and influenced by the political environment; and having lower operational costs and risks. The experience also provides effective lessons on enablers and success factors of cash assistance.

However, due to the absence of impact evaluation studies, this experience did not support or refute certain assumptions, judgments, and controversies surrounding this type of aid. These include the assumption that unconditional cash assistance contributes to reducing overall poverty. Additionally, while injecting funds stimulates local economies, reduces economic stagnation, and boosts the local production cycle by creating jobs and investments, this journey did not support or refute the arguments about the negative impact of this aid on prices and the availability of goods, the motivation and productivity of beneficiaries and skilled people, and unemployment rates increase in recipient communities.

Recommendations

  1. Enhancing Unconditional Cash Transfer (UCT) program efficiency through:
    1. Updating the beneficiary list to accommodate evolving needs since 2014 and address unjustified exclusions
    2. Developing targeting systems and inclusion/exclusion criteria to accurately reflect evolving needs and consider all factors affecting poverty, such as income, health status, education, housing, access to basic services, number and health of family members, housing, and other economic and social factors
    3. Implementing a system for periodic updates of the beneficiary database.
    4. Using better methods for beneficiary verification, such as biometric checks.
    5. Increasing the cash transfer amount to meet basic needs, potentially providing supplementary support through coordination with other programs.
    6. Developing indicators to measure the impact and track changes in the conditions of beneficiaries across various aspects, including poverty, health, and education.
    7. Conducting comprehensive studies to measure the program's broader impact on poverty, economic conditions, and markets.
    8. Addressing weaknesses in program management: Developing a strong oversight and accountability mechanism; enhancing transparency; activating the complaints system and ensuring rapid interaction and resolution; reviewing and developing contracting mechanisms to ensure that partners and service providers are selected according to the principle of competition and equal opportunity, and it is particularly important to open the door to competition for financial service providers.
    9. Adopting a more participatory approach with community structures and organizations and local governance, which will help increase the efficiency of aid distribution and absorption and improve spreading and minimize risks.
    10. Working towards securing sustainable funding until local financing can normalize, preventing potential funding gaps.
  2. Improving the efficiency of international programs and interventionsConsidering the appropriate recommendations in cluster (a), in order to enhance the integration of these interventions, maximize their results, and ensure that aid is directed to the most vulnerable groups, it is important to:
      1. Enhance coordination between cash interventions and programs, and assess integration into a comprehensive system.
      2. Strengthen coordination between the various programs and interventions directly targeting social protection and its institutions
      3. Develop coordination mechanisms between cash and humanitarian interventions.
      4. Standardize targeting criteria and ensure non-duplication of assistance, in addition to sharing experiences and acquired knowledge.
      5. Develop infrastructures for this necessary coordination.
      6. Promote community participation in program activities.
  3. Strengthening the social protection system
    1. Coordinate between different players and interventions in order to strengthen and develop the social protection system and maintain its capacities. This coordination is critical for managing the broader context of social protection and aligns with the international community's growing interest in linking humanitarian assistance to social protection. Although various international interventions are intended to work in this direction, they often operate in siloes, perpetuating system fragmentation and disrupting its institutions amid prolonged instability.
    2. Explore and develop ideas and approaches for rehabilitating social protection institutions, along with plans to ensure local and sustainable financing.
    3. Build institutional and human capacity within the social protection system, ensuring its independence from political interference.
    4. As the most important institution in the social protection system, the Social Welfare Fund’s involvement in the activities of relevant international programs remains important. Particularly, rehabilitating the Fund to play a central role after the normalization of the situation in the country should be a top priority. Maintaining the current situation (i.e., the continued exclusion and poor coordination) will lead to institutional and administrative inertia, harming the Fund, its expertise, staff experience, and their mental and psychological relationships with their work.
    5. Develop a national social protection strategy to address existing system gaps and laws, aiming for comprehensive coverage for the poor and needy, including health and unemployment insurance.
    6. Ensure strategy alignment with sustainable and diverse funding sources and mechanisms to secure sustainable and diversified funding for social security and insurance institutions and programs. Develop mechanisms to ensure that the social protection system and its institutions are not affected by political turmoil and developments. This includes the development of comprehensive contingency plans to address crises, ensuring that protection services continue to be provided to beneficiaries
    7. This strategy should also take into account the establishment of a supportive social sphere, for example by:
      1. Sensitizing local communities to the importance and benefits of social insurance and encouraging people to participate in it.
      2. Encouraging and supporting community-based social protection initiatives and encouraging civic organizations to provide social services.
      3. Encouraging the private sector to provide social services to local communities and support training and skills development programs for young people from poor and needy backgrounds. For example, tax incentives can be offered to companies that employ people from poor and disadvantaged groups
  4. Enhancing knowledge about social protection

There are significant knowledge gaps due to a  severe lack of comprehensive and in-depth studies that assess the feasibility and validity of these programs and their broader long-term impacts on poverty and local economies. These studies are needed to examine systemic changes and adverse effects of such international interventions.

  1. Conduct in-depth, comprehensive, and rigorous research and studies on social protection issues in the country, with a focus on cash interventions, especially the Emergency Cash Transfer Program (ECTP). Such studies are crucial for learning from experiences, improving our understanding of social protection issues in times and areas of conflict, and examining the complex dynamics surrounding and affecting them. This knowledge will help develop and adapt better plans, practices, and methodologies.
  2. In this context, research collaboration between international agencies and academic institutions is important. Such partnerships are vital to ensure better knowledge production. They can include priorities such as funding studies, establishing specialized research centers and/or developing specialized academic.
  3. Establish a database for cash assistance programming.
  4. Establish a comprehensive social protection information platform or information system that collects data on all programs, interventions, and beneficiaries.
  5. International agencies and their local partners should make available their documents and studies, including those related to the intervention and adaptation strategies they use.

References:

(In Arabic) World Bank, Third Additional Financing for the Yemen Emergency Crisis Response Project, available at https://is.gd/TgxLZt

(In Arabic) World Bank, Second Additional Financing for the Strengthening Emergency Social Protection and COVID-19 Response Project, available here

World Bank, Fourth Additional Financing for the Emergency Crisis Response Project, May 2019, available here

World Bank, Additional Financing for the Strengthening Social Protection in Emergencies and Coronavirus Pandemic Project, available here

World Bank, Strengthening Social Protection and COVID-19 Response Project in Yemen, November 2020, available here

World Food Program, Yemen, available here

Josephine Hatton et al, Cash Transfer Programs in Difficult Contexts: A case study on cash transfer programs and risk in Yemen 2015-2018, Cash Learning Partnership. October 2018, available here

Al-Thawra newspaper, “Executive Director of the Social Welfare Fund Amir Al-Warith to Al-Thawra: The Fund supported social protection programs and worked to alleviate the suffering of the poor in times of war and aggression,” July 15, 2021, available here

OCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan, Yemen: Humanitarian Program Planning Cycle 2023, available at https://is.gd/l28xLT

International Labor Organization (ILO), Social Protection Program in Yemen, available here

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Yemen Emergency Crisis Response Project, Fifth Additional Funding (P172662): Social Impact Assessment (SAI) for Component 3, August 2020, available here

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Unconditional Cash Transfer Project, available here

Yemen's Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Yemen's Status in International Reports and Indicators, Issue 52, September 2020, available at https://is.gd/iP9dfV

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Cash Plus support brings new hope, July 2020, available at https://is.gd/aBiaff

Francisco V. Ayala, “Emergency cash transfers in Yemen (case study)”, Handbook on Social Protection Systems, August 2021, available here

Global Network Against Food Crises, Global Report on Food Crises 2020, available here

Meraki Labs and Ruta Nimkar, Humanitarian Cash and Social Protection in Yemen, CaLP Network, January 2021, available here

Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, “Social Protection in Yemen: Resilience and Coping Approaches: National Social Protection Mechanisms: Status Quo...Programs & Activities", Socio-Economic Update, Issue 48, May 2020, available at https://is.gd/NMfDqK (Ministry of Planninng, Social Protection in Yemen).

The Arab Investment and Export Credit Guarantee Corporation, Yemen Country Profile: Economic Indicators, Foreign Direct Investment, International Trade, 2020, available here

UNDP, Lessons Learned Report: Social Protection for Community Resilience Project (SPCRP) - Yemen, February 2021, available here

World Bank, Yemen Country Profile, available here

Yemen's Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Yemen's Status in International Reports and Indicators, Issue 52, September 2020, available here

Endnotes

Endnotes
1 The Arab Investment and Export Credit Guarantee Corporation, Yemen Country Profile: Economic Indicators, Foreign Direct Investment, International Trade, 2020, available at https://www.dhaman.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Yemen-min.pdf.
2 World Bank, Yemen Country Profile, available at https://databank.worldbank.org/views/reports/country=YEM
3 World Food Program, Yemen, available at https://ar.wfp.org/countries/yemen-ar
4 International Labor Organization, Social Protection Program in Yemen, available at https://www.ilo.org/beirut/events/WCMS_246618/lang--ar/index.htm
5 Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, “Social Protection in Yemen: Resilience and Coping Approaches: National Social Protection Mechanisms: Status Quo...Programs & Activities", Socio-Economic Update, Issue 48, May 2020, available at https://is.gd/NMfDqK (Ministry of Planning, Social Protection in Yemen
6 Global Network Against Food Crises, Global Report on Food Crises 2020, available at https://www.fsinplatform.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/GRFC_2020_ONLINE_200420.pdf
7 OCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan, Yemen: Humanitarian Program Planning Cycle 2023, available at https://is.gd/l28xLT
8 Ministry of Planning, Social Protection in Yemen.
9 Josephine Hatton et al, Cash Transfer Programs in Difficult Contexts: A Case Study on Cash Transfer Programs and Risk in Yemen 2015-2018, Cash Learning Partnership. October 2018, available at https://www.albankaldawli.org/ar/news/feature/2018/01/18/social-protection-reforms-in-a-conflict-environment-a-success-story-from-iraq (Josephine Hatton et al., Cash Transfer Programs
10 World Bank, Third Additional Financing for the Yemen Emergency Crisis Response Project, available at https://is.gd/TgxLZt (World Bank, Third Additional Financing). United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Yemen Emergency Crisis Response Project, Fifth Additional Financing (P172662): Social Impact Assessment (SAI) for Component 3, August 2020, available at https://www.unicef.org/yemen/media/4651/file/Yemen%20ECRP_AF5_Social%20Impact%20Assessment_AR.pdf (United Nations Children's Fund, Emergency Response Project
11 United Nations Children's Fund, Emergency Response Project.
12 World Bank, Strengthening Social Protection and COVID-19 Response Project in Yemen, November 2020, available at https://documents1.worldbank.org/Yemen-Social-Protection-Enhancement-and-COVID-19-Response-Project-P173582.pdf (World Bank, Strengthening Social Protection Project
13 United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Unconditional Cash Transfer Project, available at https://www.unicef.org/yemen/ar/
14 World Bank, Third Additional Financing. World Bank, Fourth Additional Financing for the Emergency Crisis Response Project, May 2019, available at https://www.albankaldawli.org/ar/news/factsheet/2019/05/14/yemen-emergency-crisis-response-project-fourth-additional-financing (World Bank, Fourth Additional Financing).
15 Ministry of Planning, Social Protection in Yemen.
16 World Bank, Strengthening Social Protection Project.
17 World Bank, Second Additional Financing for the Strengthening Emergency Social Protection and COVID-19 Project, available at https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099416005012327060/pdf/IDU0402139ee0c070af460aa3e36998653.pdf (World Bank, Second Additional Financing). UNDP, Lessons Learned Report: Social Protection for Community Resilience Project (SPCRP) - Yemen, February 2021, available at https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/migration/ye/SPCRP-Lessons-Learned-Report---English.pdf Francisco V. Ayala, “Emergency cash transfers in Yemen (case study)”, Handbook on Social Protection Systems, August 2021, available at https://www.elgaronline.com/display/edcoll/9781839109102/9781839109102.00042.xml (Francisco V. Ayala, Emergency Cash Transfers
18 Francisco V. Ayala, Emergency Cash Transfers.
19 World Bank, Additional Financing IV.
20 Al-Thawra newspaper, “Executive Director of the Social Welfare Fund Amir al-Warith told Al-Thawra: The fund supported social protection programs and worked to alleviate the suffering of the poor in times of war and aggression,” July 15, 2021, available at https://althawrah.ye/archives/686017.
21 World Bank, Additional Financing for the Strengthening Social Protection in Emergencies and Coronavirus Pandemic Project, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/.pdf
22 Interview with the head of the fund on July 16, 2023.
23 Josephine Hatton et al., Cash Transfer Programs.
24 World Bank, Third Additional Financing.
25 World Bank. Second Additional Financing.
26 Meraki Labs and Ruta Nimkar, Humanitarian Cash and Social Protection in Yemen, CaLP Network, January 2021, available at https://www.calpnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/CaLP-Yemen-Case-Study-WEB-1.pdf (Meraki Labs and Ruta Nikmar, Humanitarian Cash and Social Protection).
27 Josephine Hatton et al. Cash transfer programs.
28 United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Cash-Plus support brings new hope, July 2020, available at https://is.gd/aBiaff
29 World Bank, Fourth Additional Financing.

The views represented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Arab Reform Initiative, its staff, or its board.