Freedom, justice, and dignity in movement: Mobility regimes in the Grand Tunis

Mobility is one of the many areas where Tunisians are still waiting to achieve their revolutionary demands for justice, freedom, and dignity. This paper focuses on the modes of transportation in Grand Tunis to understand the persistence of unjust mobility regimes. It finds that decades of state policies favoring private car ownership coupled with structural and management problems in public transportation have affected the underprivileged communities the most. Therefore, treating the question of movement as social justice issue is key to envisioning viable long-term solutions.

Hundreds of Tunisian taxi drivers block a tramway road to protest the new fuel price hikes in the capital city of Tunis, Tunisia on April 15, 2019. ©AA/Yassine Gaidi

Introduction

For Monia1Fieldnotes, the name has been anonymized. , spending a third of her monthly salary on commuting from her home in the western suburbs of the city to her work in downtown Tunis with a taxi is now a usual process. She feels obliged to spend this amount because doing the same commute with public transport requires multiple changes and waits that can take up to two hours and cause her to constantly be late to work. Many Tunisians like her struggle on daily basis for their basic commutes and try to come up with different alternative solutions. Under these conditions movement becomes not so much an act of freedom as Article 24 of the Tunisian constitution stipulates, but a necessity requiring massive sacrifices. Mobility is one of the many areas in which Tunisians are still waiting to achieve their revolutionary demands for justice, freedom, and dignity.

The justice angle has been used extensively in the recent literature to study how movement is possible or impossible for different segments of society. Through the term “mobility justice”, Mimi Sheller offers a very comprehensive framework to study all sorts of mobility or immobility in an integrated manner. According to her, “Mobility regimes... govern who and what can move (or stay put), when, where, how, and under what conditions”.2Mimi Sheller, “Theorising Mobility Justice,” Tempo Social 30, no. 2 (July 28, 2018): 17–34, p. 19 https://doi.org/10.11606/0103-2070.ts.2018.142763. This means paying attention to not only how humans travel (or not) from one place to another but also to the movement (or lack thereof) of objects, ideas, discourses, and all ways of communication. In the public policy realm, transportation appears as a key area of practice where suggested policies can be deeply anchored in different philosophical approaches to justice.3Rafael H. M. Pereira, Tim Schwanen, and David Banister, “Distributive Justice and Equity in Transportation,” Transport Reviews 37, no. 2 (March 4, 2017): 170–91, https://doi.org/10.1080/01441647.2016.1257660. For instance, while a Rawlsian understanding asks for reshaping unequal access to transport in a way that benefits the worst-off in the society, utilitarian scholars try to see justice in transport as a way of maximizing the total utility of the maximum number of citizens.4Ersilia Verlinghieri and Tim Schwanen, “Transport and Mobility Justice: Evolving Discussions,” Journal of Transport Geography 87 (July 2020): 102798, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2020.102798.

So, how do the mobility regimes in Tunisia function today and how do they respond to the revolutionary demands for justice, freedom, and dignity? To answer this question, this paper focuses on the modes of transportation in the agglomerative area of the capital, the Greater Tunis (known as Grand Tunis or Tounes al-Kobra). This region is comprised of four governorates: Tunis, Manouba, Ben Arous, and Ariana. It constitutes the largest agglomeration in the country with 48 delegations and a population of more than 2.8 million. As the administrative and commercial center of the country, its governorates are among the most developed in the country5Amina Magouri et al., “Déséquilibres régionaux et inégalités sociales en Tunisie: Axes et actions prioritaires” (Tunis: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2018), 35, https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/tunesien/14418.pdf. , visible also in their better infrastructure and possibilities of mobility. Grand Tunis is home to the largest airport, 45% of the vehicle fleet6Amor Belhedi, “Le système urbain tunisien. Analyse hiérarchique démo-fonctionnelle sur la base de la loi Rang-taille,” Cybergeo, February 9, 2004, https://doi.org/10.4000/cybergeo.3877. and the only tramway network in Tunisia. It is also one of the most connected urban centers with railways. Yet, inequalities persist within Grand Tunis. For instance, the peri-urban governorate of Manouba has a lower regional development rate of than the other governorates.7Magouri et al., “Déséquilibres régionaux et inégalités sociales en Tunisie: Axes et actions prioritaires,” 35. Inequalities are also visible in the large variance of the poverty rate across the delegations8Dorra Dhraief et al., “Carte de La Pauvreté En Tunisie” (Tunis: Institut National des Statistiques Tunisie, September 2020), http://www.ins.tn/sites/default/files/publication/pdf/Carte%20de%20la%20pauvret%C3%A9%20en%20Tunisie_final_0.pdf. . Although Grand Tunis appears as a privileged region in terms of development, this privilege very much relativizesd when internal discrepancies are considered. In other words, even an urban-scale analysis of the Grand Tunis can clearly show us the severity of injustices revolving around the mobility regimes.

 

Freedom of movement at what cost?

9Author’s calculations based on the data from “Structure Des Dépenses Des Ménages Selon Les Fonctions de Consommation,” Institut National de la Statistique, March 24, 2021, http://www.ins.tn/statistiques/104.

Transportation constitutes a major concern for millions of Tunisians and its associated costs have grown significantly in the last decades. As of 2015, an average household spent 360 dinars per year on transport accounting for 9.3% of all household expenses, a rise from the 1990 level of 7.7% (55 dinars) (Figure 1). The rising cost of transport can be partially explained by the increasing reliance on individual transport. While in 1977, public transport used to account for 68% of transportation in the Greater Tunis, this number gradually fell to 28% in 2011 (Figure 2) with individual transport constituting approximately two thirds of all transportation in large urban areas (Tunis, Sfax, and Sousse)10Younes Boujelbene and Ahmed Derbel, “The Performance Analysis of Public Transport Operators in Tunisia Using AHP Method,” Procedia Computer Science 73 (2015): 498–508, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procs.2015.12.039. . This shift seems to be the result of state policies that privileged private car ownership at the expense of public transportation for the last decades. In the 2010-16 period, 0.52% of the public budget (492.5 million TND) was spent in total on public transportation against 1.07% (1021.6 million TND) for the individual forms of transport (Figure 3). A symbol of state’s support for individual car ownership is the Ben Ali era “voiture populaire” (folk car) tax deductions, still in place for the middle-class and working-class people wishing to purchase low-cost cars.

 

11Katharina Kilian-Yasin et al., “Social Acceptance of Alternative Mobility Systems in Tunis,” Transportation Research Procedia 19 (2016): 135–46, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trpro.2016.12.074.; “République Tunisienne. Livre Blanc Relatif Au Secteur Des Transports et de La Logistique” (The World Bank, May 18, 2016).

 

12Author’s calculations based on public spending data from Imen Nouira, “Mobilité Dans Le Grand Tunis : Les Solutions Au Calvaire,” Business News, November 18, 2019, https://www.businessnews.com.tn/mobilite-dans-le-grand-tunis--les-solutions-au-calvaire,519,92901,3. And total public spending data from The World Bank. 2018. "General government  final consumption expenditure (current LCU) - Tunisia" URL: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.CON.GOVT.CN?locations=TN&name_desc=true

 

However, the overreliance on private vehicles comes with great costs and leads to the consolidation of unjust mobility regimes. With high inflation rates and devaluation of the dinar, car prices have risen by around 63% from 2003 to 2015 according to spokesperson of the Tunisian Union of Car Dealers.13Imen Nouira, “Le prix d’un véhicule a augmenté de 63% en 12 ans,” Business News, October 11, 2015, https://www.businessnews.com.tn/tunisie-le-prix-dun-vehicule-a-augmente-de-63-en-12-ans,520,59506,3. Taxes represent a significant portion of the sales price for an automobile in Tunisia, around 40% according to the same source. Apart from the financial costs, government applies a quota system limiting the number of cars imported into the country, despite continuous calls from large car importers to liberalize the market.14“Les concessionnaires automobiles plaident pour la libéralisation du secteur,” TN 24, June 21, 2019, https://tn24.tn/ar/article/tunisie-les-concessionnaires-automobiles-plaident-pour-la-liberalisation-du-secteur-151308. It is also important to the note that the boosts in car sales typically benefit a dozen of car concessionaires which controlled 90% of the market in 2019 (with the leading four concessionaires making up 46.6% of the market)15Lilia Kamoun Turki, Hamza Ben Taarit, and Imen Yahia, “Revue de Recherches” (Tunis: Tunisie Valeurs - Département Études et Recherches, November 2020), https://www.tunisievaleurs.com/documents/tval-revue-etudes-et-recherches-nov-2020.pdf. and most of these concessionaires are owned by family-based major economic groups16Mohamed Afif Jaidi and Sharaf al-Din al-Yacoubi, “Vested Interests and Economic Rent: Tunisia’s Car Market,” Legal Agenda, April 7, 2022, https://english.legal-agenda.com/vested-interests-and-economic-rent-tunisias-car-market/. .

Environment and urban livelihoods constitute other domains where significant costs are incurred by the rise in private car utilization. Transport represents 12% of all CO2 emissions in Tunisia17Célia Corneil, “Roulons Vers l’écomobilité !” (Chabaka - Réseau tunisien des acteur.rice.s de l’économie sociale et solidaire, February 2020), https://www.labess.tn/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Roulons-vers-lecomobilite-.pdf. and 32% of the final national energy consumption18“Guide Pour Un Transport Durable En Tunisie” (Tunis: Observatoire Tunisien de l’Environnement et du Dévoloppement Durable, October 2014), http://www.environnement.gov.tn/images/fichiers/Rapports/Guide_Transport_Durable.pdf. . According to a study, 3% of all deaths are caused directly by the emissions from road traffic.19“Guide Pour Un Transport Durable En Tunisie,” 23. Furthermore, the increasing number of cars means more and more congested roads particularly around the urban centers like Tunis and more accidents as Tunisia ranks second in the North Africa with regards to number of mortal accidents per capita.20Mathieu Martin, “‘Tounes Tetnafes 2017’ (Tunis Respire 2017) : Première Journée sans Voiture à Tunis,” CODATU, June 2, 2017, https://www.codatu.org/actualites/tounes-tetnafes-2017-tunis-respire-2017-premiere-journee-sans-voiture-a-tunis/. According to public authorities, the costs associated with traffic congestions, road accidents, and greenhouse gas emission or pollution make up 2%, 1.5%, and 2 to 10% of the GDP respectively.21Ministère du Transport de la Tunisie, Forum de La Mobilité Urbaine - منتدى التنقلات الحضرية (Tunis, 2022), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cNI7-Nr8mdU.

Despite their negative effects on multiple fronts, Tunisians continue to rely on cars. Figure 4 shows that despite a post-revolutionary fall, yearly first registration numbers fluctuated since the Revolution, possibly due to the increases22Mathieu Galtier, “Automobile : fin des quotas en Tunisie dès 2016 ?,” Jeune Afrique, October 2, 2015, https://www.jeuneafrique.com/269171/economie/automobile-fin-des-quotas-en-tunisie-des-2016/. and decreases23“Automobile: Quotas, impots et taxes,” WMC Hors-Série: Le marché de l’automobile, June 30, 2019. in the import quotas. Yet, the total number of vehicles in circulation in Tunisia has risen significantly and is estimated to be around 2.3 million24Kamel Ferchichi, “Vignette auto 2022 : Une taxe qui fâche !,” La Presse de Tunisie, January 8, 2022, https://lapresse.tn/120059/vignette-auto-2022-une-taxe-qui-fache/. today. What is more, the number of vehicles per 1000 inhabitants has increased by 36% in the 2010-2018 period, reaching 191 (Figure 5). A number still considerably higher than other Maghreb countries like Algeria25Nassim B., “Algérie : Voici le nombre de véhicules en circulation (Parc automobile),” Dzair Daily, January 22, 2020, https://www.dzairdaily.com/algerie-nombre-voitures-circulation-parc-automobile-algerien-2020/. (153) or Morocco26“Plus de 4 millions de véhicules circulent officiellement au Maroc,” Médias 24, April 11, 2019, sec. ECONOMIE, https://medias24.com/2019/04/11/plus-de-4-millions-de-vehicules-circulent-officiellement-au-maroc/. (111). At the same time, only 27% of the households own a car in Tunisia, indicating that this mode of transportation remains available solely to the better-off.27Célia Corneil, “Roulons Vers l’écomobilité !” (Chabaka - Réseau tunisien des acteur.rice.s de l’économie sociale et solidaire, February 2020), https://www.labess.tn/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Roulons-vers-lecomobilite-.pdf. In other words, car ownership represents an unjust mobility regime whereby the mobility of the relatively better off comes at high economic costs to the owners but also significant long-term costs to the future and life quality of all the population. As such, a policy that aims at boosting private car ownership is likely to benefit a dozen of car concessionaires and moderately expand the share of car owning households while incurring higher costs to the whole population.

 

28This information has been gathered from multiple yearly reports published by the Technical Agency for Land Transport (Agence Technique des Transports Terrestres) of the Ministry of Transport available here: https://www.attt.com.tn/page.php?code_menu=149

29Author’s calculations based on the vehicle numbers data from “Parc automobile tunisien,” WMC Hors-Série: Le marché de l’automobile, June 30, 2019. And population data from The World Bank. 2020. "Population, total - Tunisia " URL: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=TN

The Quest for Justice and Dignity in Public Transportation

Arguably, a main reason behind the over-reliance on individual transport is the failures of the public transportation system around the country, including the Greater Tunis. There are several providers of public transportation in the Greater Tunis. The state-owned transportation company Transtu accounts for 80% of all the urban public transport.30Younes Boujelbene and Ahmed Derbel, “The Performance Analysis of Public Transport Operators in Tunisia Using AHP Method,” Procedia Computer Science 73 (2015): 498–508, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procs.2015.12.039. It runs the six-line tramway system (referred to as metro by the locals), the northern suburban train line named the TGM, and 232 lines of city buses.31“Réseaux,” Transtu, accessed April 26, 2022, https://www.transtu.tn/fr/entreprise/0002-reseaux.html. Furthermore, the Tunisian National Railways Company (SNCFT) runs a second suburban train line linking the southern suburbs to the Tunis city center. In addition to the Transtu buses, four private bus companies TUS, TUT, STC, and TCV are also smaller providers of public transportation in the Greater Tunis area.32Thierry Desclos et al., “République Tunisienne. Note de Stratégie Sectorielle Relative Au Secteur Des Transports Urbains” (The World Bank, February 12, 2019), https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/pt/843581568612862142/pdf/Tunisie-Note-de-Strategie-Sectorielle-Relative-au-Secteur-des-Transports-Urbains.pdf. Lastly, non-regulated forms of transportation have been growing exponentially as the number of registered “collective taxis”33Known as Taxi jami3 or taxi collectif in Tunisia, this is a mode of transportation also visible in other MENA cities like Cairo or Istanbul. The small vans carrying 8 passengers leave the departure point when all the seats are filled and use a fixed itinerary. They can stop at any point along the road to drop or pick up passengers. and individual taxis rose from 65 and 10 814 in 2006 to 1026 and 16 307 in 2017, respectively (Figures 6.1 and 6.2).

34Data for 2006 from Rafaa Mraihi, “Transport des voyageurs par taxis collectifs et louages en Tunisie : un modèle réussi à la ville de Sousse,” in Le transport artisanal dans les villes méditerranéennes, ed. Xavier Godard, Actes INRETS (Aix en Provence: Institut National de Recherche sur les Transports et leur Sécurité INRETS, 2008), 85. Data for 2017 from Souhir Bouzid Ben Tahar, “L’essor des taxis collectifs dans le Grand Tunis, une réponse aux besoins de mobilité des périurbains. Étude de cas d’El Mornaguia,” Revue Internationale d’Urbanisme RIURBA 9 (2020), http://www.riurba.review/Revue/lessor-des-taxis-collectifs-95/.

 

The urban public transportation suffers from multiple issues affecting the mobility of thousands of Tunisians. The first set of problems is structural. Since its design and construction, the transport system allows for certain types of mobility for specific groups of people while blocking others. Operational since 1872, Tunis-Goulette-Marsa (TGM) suburban train line, Tunisia’s first railroad, serves as a historical example revealing the purpose of the mobility regimes. Since its planning by the Beylik regime, obtaining the rights for its construction and exploitation caused a competition among European colonial interests in the country.35Laurent Debernardi, “Le premier chemin de fer tunisien, le T. G. M. (1870-1898),” Revue française d’histoire d’outre-mer 50, no. 179 (1963): 197–226, https://doi.org/10.3406/outre.1963.1374. Furthermore, since its conception, the line did not link the historical residential neighborhoods of Tunisia with each other but the Beys’ favourite retreat place, La Marsa and the European consulates along the line to the Goulette district, home to mostly non-Muslim European immigrants and a port connecting Tunis to Europe.

Tunis has grown rapidly over the last 50 years with new suburbs being built around the city. Yet, public transportation projects seem to have failed to keep up with this rapid growth. Until this day, the railroad networks in Tunis continue to link upper-class neighborhoods to the city center while very few of the lower-class neighborhoods benefit from this public service. Figure 7.1 shows the number of railway stations for any of the rail-based public transport services in the Grand Tunis (TGM, 6 Tramway lines, and the SNCFT suburban train) alongside the poverty rate for all the 48 delegations in Grand Tunis. The accumulation of the railway systems in the richer districts is remarkable. In the poorest tertile, there are only three railway stops in two delegations. While upper-middle-class and upper-class neighborhoods are marked by a high level of accessibility to the railway network. Some upper-middle-class residential areas like El Menzah, Ariana Ville, or Soukra are also also badly serviced by the railway networks. In these areas, residents often rely on private cars to commute, an option hardly available for most Tunisians. Hence, 70% of the public transport users in Grand Tunis rely on public buses for their daily movements36Haythem Maddouri, “Le Transport Public Urbain : Les Villes, Moteurs de La Croissance Économique Exemple : Région Du Grand Tunis,” Policy Brief (Houloul, December 10, 2020), https://houloul.org/fr/2020/12/10/le-transport-public-urbain-les-villes-moteurs-de-la-croissance-economique-exemple-region-du-grand-tunis/. but access to and travel by bus is not always easy.

 

Figure 7.1: Railway stations and poverty rate by delegation

Governorate Delegation Number of Railway Stations Poverty Rate
Poorest Tertile MANOUBA TEBOURBA 0 15.2%
MANOUBA BATTANE 0 14.5%
ARIANA KALAAT EL ANDALOUS 0 12.5%
ARIANA ETTADHAMEN 2 12.4%
MANOUBA BORJ EL AMRI 0 12.1%
MANOUBA JEDAIDA 0 11.9%
TUNIS SEJOUMI 0 11.5%
BEN AROUS MORNAG 0 11.2%
MANOUBA DAOUAR HICHER 0 10.8%
TUNIS JEBEL JLOUD 1 9.5%
TUNIS SIDI HASSINE 0 9.4%
ARIANA SIDI THABET 0 9.1%
ARIANA MNIHLA 0 8.8%
MANOUBA OUED ELLIL 0 8.2%
MANOUBA MORNAGUIA 0 7.8%
BEN AROUS FOUCHANA 0 7.3%
Middle Tertile BEN AROUS MHAMDIA 0 7.1%
ARIANA RAOUED 0 6.9%
TUNIS LA MEDINA 0 6.6%
BEN AROUS HAMMAMLIF 3 6.4%
TUNIS EL OMRANE 6 6.3%
TUNIS EL HARAIRIA 0 6.1%
TUNIS KABBARIA 10 5.3%
BEN AROUS NOUVELLE MEDINA 0 5.2%
BEN AROUS BEN AROUS 2 5.0%
BEN AROUS HAMMAM ECHATT 4 5.0%
ARIANA SOUKRA 0 4.8%
TUNIS BAB SOUIKA 4 4.5%
BEN AROUS RADES 3 4.3%
TUNIS SIDI EL BECHIR 3 4.2%
BEN AROUS BOUMHEL BASSATINE 0 4.1%
TUNIS EZZOUHOUR 0 4.0%
Richest Tertile TUNIS EL OUERDIA 2 3.9%
MANOUBA MANOUBA 10 3.8%
BEN AROUS MEGRINE 2 3.6%
TUNIS EL OMRANE SUPERIEUR 6 3.5%
BEN AROUS EL MOUROUJ 6 3.2%
TUNIS EL KRAM 2 3.0%
BEN AROUS EZZAHRA 2 2.6%
TUNIS EL MARSA 2 2.2%
TUNIS ETTAHRIR 8 2.0%
TUNIS BARDO 1 1.8%
TUNIS CARTHAGE 8 1.6%
TUNIS BAB BHAR 9 1.6%
TUNIS CITE EL KHADRA 4 1.4%
ARIANA ARIANA VILLE 2 1.3%
TUNIS LA GOULETTE 5 1.1%
TUNIS EL MENZAH 1 0.2%

Figure 7.2: Railway statistics by poverty rate tertile

Poverty Rate Average Number of Railway Stations Total Number of Railway Stations
Poorest tertile

(16 delegations)

7.3-15.2% 0.1875 3
Middle tertile

(16 delegations)

4.0%-7.1% 2.1875 35
Richest tertile

(16 delegations)

0.2%-3.9% 4.375 70

37Number of stations per delegation counted by the author. Stations that are at the administrative border between two delegations have been counted for both. It is important note that while some stations are clearly within the borders of one delegation, they are also walking distance from a second one. These have only been counted for the delegation they are located at. While these statistics give a first glimpse of unequal distribution of the railway stations, the author believes that a more complete and complex study based on the number of stations available at walking distance for different neighborhoods and social groups is needed. Statistics for poverty rate have been retrieved from Dorra Dhraief et al., “Carte de La Pauvreté En Tunisie” (Tunis: Institut National des Statistiques Tunisie, September 2020), http://www.ins.tn/sites/default/files/publication/pdf/Carte%20de%20la%20pauvret%C3%A9%20en%20Tunisie_final_0.pdf.

 

Public transport in Grand Tunis also suffers from management problems. At the end of 2018, Transtu was in a debt of over 800 million TND, notably due to the rise in personnel costs with a wave of hires after the Revolution.38Mohamed Khalil Jelassi, “Entreprises publiques - Restructuration de la Transtu : Avant qu’il ne soit trop tard !,” La Presse de Tunisie, November 18, 2019, https://lapresse.tn/35677/entreprises-publiques-restructuration-de-la-transtu-avant-quil-ne-soit-trop-tard/. Yet, its offer counted as km has diminished to around 23% in the 2010-18 period.39Imen Nouira, “Mobilité Dans Le Grand Tunis : Les Solutions Au Calvaire,” Business News, November 18, 2019, https://www.businessnews.com.tn/mobilite-dans-le-grand-tunis--les-solutions-au-calvaire,519,92901,3. Management problems are also visible in the inefficiency and insufficiency of the existing transport. With regards to the tramway network, it is easy to notice that most cars are old and slow while their arrival times are not indicated at the stations and the frequencies marked on the Transtu website are not always respected. A mobile application Wassalni showing the wait times and itineraries for the tram, TGM, and some bus lines has been recently developed but it currently holds a 2.2/5 score from the users on the application provider platform, Play Store, alongside many negative reviews pointing out its inaccuracy and technical problems.40“Wassalni,” Google Play, September 16, 2019, https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=tn.TransTu.SmartGateway&hl=fr&gl=US. The unreliability of the information means that passengers often cannot predict their wait times to ride the tram and can spend hours commuting. For instance, 34% of the surveyed students at the Manouba University affirm spending over three hours in commute per day despite a tram line serving their campus.41Khemaies Krimi, “Tunisie : L’absence d’une Politique de Mobilité Urbaine à l’origine de La Crise Du Transport,” Kapitalis, November 19, 2019, http://kapitalis.com/tunisie/2019/11/19/tunisie-labsence-dune-politique-de-mobilite-urbaine-a-lorigine-de-la-crise-du-transport/.

Similar observations can be made about city buses and the TGM. While the latter runs at a frequency of 15 minutes according to the official timetable42“Marche Horaire Hiver 2021-2022,” Transtu, 2021, https://www.transtu.tn/fr/0080-marche-horaire-hiver-2021-2022.html. , its slowness makes it a less attractive transport than the taxi collective, which also connects La Marsa district to downtown Tunis. The buses particularly suffer from infrequency; the time between two consecutive rides on the same line can take as long as three hours with one-hour wait times being quite usual.43“Marche Horaire Hiver 2021-2022.” According to a ticket salesman at one of the main bus stations in downtown Tunis, the wait times are due to a lack of capacity with only two vehicles assuring the commute for many lines.44Fieldnotes. In 2020, only 650 of the 1247 buses owned by the Transtu in Grand Tunis are operational, 33% down from the 966 operational buses in 2010 (Figure 8).  The scarcity of public buses exemplifies the degradation of public services due to bad management and lack of resources.

 

45Data for 2020 from Maddouri, “Le Transport Public Urbain.” Data for 2010 from Mohamed Khalil Jelassi, “Entreprises publiques - Restructuration de la Transtu : Avant qu’il ne soit trop tard !,” La Presse de Tunisie, November 18, 2019, https://lapresse.tn/35677/entreprises-publiques-restructuration-de-la-transtu-avant-quil-ne-soit-trop-tard/.

 

These structural and management issues characterizing the public transportation system have everlasting impacts on mobility injustice in Greater Tunis as they determine who can move and where. By the same token, the question of how the citizens move exposes the shortcomings of the post-revolutionary mobility regimes in Tunisia to offer dignity to Tunisians. Residents who live in newly built suburbs (be it upper or lower class) are more detached from the city than those living in historical and typically upper-class suburbs. Moving from one place to another becomes a bigger burden for people in the poorer suburbs as they are left with fewer options as well as riskier and harsher conditions when they need to commute. In one of these suburbs, Douar Hicher, there is no tramway or train station, and car ownership rate remains as low as 16% (national average being 27%) while the residents have access to only three public and one private bus lines.46Myriam Catusse and Olfa Lamloum, eds., Jeunes et violences institutionnelles. Enquête dix ans après la révolution tunisienne. (Arabesque, 2021), https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03083507. The degradation of regulated public transport seems to have led to an upsurge in unregulated forms of public transportation as the individual or collective taxi. Moreover, it is not uncommon for regular taxis to serve as collective taxis or even non-registered private vehicles to be used as such during rush hours.47Yousra Shikhaoui, “Asdiqa’ wa ma huma bi-asdiqa’... ’an ahkam al-naql fi Tunis,” ULTRA Tunis, January 10, 2019, https://ultratunisia.ultrasawt.com/%D8%A3%D8%B5%D8%AF%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7-%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%A8%D8%A3%D8%B5%D8%AF%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%A3%D8%AD%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B3/%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%8A/%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B9/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%B1. The residents of many recent suburbs like Douar Hicher48Catusse and Lamloum, Jeunes et violences institutionnelles. Enquête dix ans après la révolution tunisienne. or El Mornaguia49Bouzid Ben Tahar, “L’essor des taxis collectifs dans le Grand Tunis.” rely substantively on these unregulated forms of transportation despite their higher financial costs and dangerous nature.50Collective taxi typically costs about double the price of a bus ticket (0.5 TND) and their drivers are notorious for driving very fast and ignoring the traffic rules to make as many trips as possible during a day. On top of this, young residents of Douar Hicher explain how they face arbitrary police controls and interrogations on board the bus going downtown, a fact that discourages some from leaving the neighborhood for a year.51Catusse and Lamloum, Jeunes et violences institutionnelles. Enquête dix ans après la révolution tunisienne., 53.

Similarly, gender constitutes another determinant factor shaping the (in)justices of mobility in Grand Tunis. According to a 2012 study, only 4.5% of women in Tunisia have access to a private car (against 22.5% for men) which makes them rely on public transport more than men (36.1% against 22.4%).52Mathieu Martin, “Mobilité Urbaine et Genre En Tunisie : Quelle Place Pour La Femme Dans Le Transport En 2017 ?,” CODATU, November 27, 2017, https://www.codatu.org/actualites/mobilite-urbaine-et-genre-en-tunisie-quelle-place-pour-la-femme-dans-le-transport-en-2017/. Yet, using public transportation is not an easy task; 22.4% of women declare having been subject to a form of violence on board a mode of public transport in the last four years.53Mathieu Martin, “‘Tounes Tetnafes 2017’ (Tunis Respire 2017) : Première Journée sans Voiture à Tunis,” CODATU, June 2, 2017, https://www.codatu.org/actualites/tounes-tetnafes-2017-tunis-respire-2017-premiere-journee-sans-voiture-a-tunis/. The attacks on women’s freedom and dignity in movement do not stop there, the male domination of the public spaces, particularly in low-income neighborhoods54Paula Holmes-Eber, Daughters of Tunis: Women, Family, and Networks in a Muslim City, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2018), https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429501111. expose women to other types of dangers, including street harassment55Aliya Jessa, “Staring Down Street Harassment: Women’s Perspectives of Street Harassment in Tunisia,” Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection, no. 2668 (2017), https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection/2668. . Public transport in Grand Tunis lacks any security mechanisms to protect women and the newly launched “SafeNess” mobile application to help women remains virtually unknown and unused.56Gina Porter et al., “Improving Young Women’s Access to Safe Mobility in a Low-Income Area of Tunis: Challenges and Opportunities Pre- and Post-Covid,” Transportation Research Procedia 60 (2022): 266–73, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trpro.2021.12.035.

Public (in)Action and the Future of Mobility in Tunisia

The perennialization of unequal mobilities presents a key challenge to social justice in Tunisia. There seems to be growing awareness from public officials of the necessity to address the mobility issue and most notably to reform the transport sector in the country. A forum held in May 2022 to present the National Urban Mobility Policy (PNMU) and exchange with the stakeholders indicates that the public authorities are aware of the unviability of current urban mobility regimes and the lack of a coherent transport and mobility strategy so far.57Ministère du Transport de la Tunisie, Forum de La Mobilité Urbaine - منتدى التنقلات الحضرية (Tunis, 2022), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cNI7-Nr8mdU. A key point highlighted in this policy is the unsustainability of a mobility model based on roads and individual car ownership as well as the will to adopt a multi-model approach particularly by investing more heavily in rail-based transport. Similarly, Tunisia’s National Transport Master Plan for 2040 foresees 67 billion TND ($23.3bn) worth of investments, 40% of which is planned to be spent on railways with 19 projects.58“Tunisia Invests in Transport Infrastructure to Ease Congestion and Strengthen Connectivity,” Oxford Business Group, September 17, 2019, https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/managing-transition-investment-infrastructure-aims-ease-congestion-and-improve-connectivity. The Ministry of Transportation’s 2015-2020 development plan also allocates the highest share of the needed funds, 30%, to rail.59“Transport Infrastructure Needs Massive Investment,” Economist Intelligence Unit, May 15, 2015, http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1483168132&Country=Tunisia&topic=Economy&subtopic=Forecast&subsubtopic=Policy+trends&u=1&pid=987817283&oid=987817283. These elements suggest that the main solution envisaged by public authorities to the question of mobility is a shift from overreliance on roads and private cars to rail-based public transportation.

Yet, these plans have not been well implemented into practice so far. As multiple intervening parties (both public and private) in the Urban Mobility Forum affirm, despite multiple attempts from the state to create long-term transport policies and restructuration plans, little has been achieved on the ground so far, and the public transportation systems continue to degrade. No clear progress has been made for the implementation of the Master Plan or the PNMU so far. A key project that symbolizes this mismatch between plans and practice in Greater Tunis is the 85km-long high-speed train network, Réseau Ferroviaire Rapide (RFR) incorporating five lines that link downtown Tunis to its multiple suburbs. Although the RFR company has been created in 2007 with the construction beginning in 2010 and the network was planned to be operational in 201360“Tunisie : Le RFR Sera Fonctionnel Dans 3 Ans,” Investir En Tunisie, September 2, 2010, https://www.turess.com/fr/investir/6823. , the project has still not been completed and there exists no clear opening date61Ministère du Transport de la Tunisie, Forum de La Mobilité Urbaine. . According to Haythem Maddouri, an engineer and journalist who has been following the topic closely, the delay is due to multiple reasons ranging from the political turbulence caused by the Revolution to the stealing of materials from the construction sites.62Author’s interview

As things stand today, Tunisians’ revolutionary call for justice, liberty, and dignity constitutes a point of failure with regard to mobility. Decades of over-reliance on individual cars and roads has led to a severe crisis in the public transportation in Grand Tunis. Today, the country finds itself in a situation where even the most privileged are unhappy as the costs associated with driving a car are rising. Furthermore, those who use private cars do it at a higher cost for the living conditions of the whole society. Yet, it is the underprivileged, be they the residents of poorer suburbs or women, who suffer the most from the unjust design of the mobility regimes.

Hence, solving the problem of mobility in Grand Tunis today requires addressing it as a matter of social justice. In this regard, the state’s recent shift in planning from a transportation model based on individual car ownership to more investment in railways is a valuable one. Another key move could be prioritizing urban planning and integrating it with urban mobility. Furthermore, taking into consideration historical injustices and the needs of the population should be crucial when creating long-term mobility policies. But more importantly, solving the crisis of mobility in Grand Tunis requires concrete action as the successive plans for the transportation sector in Tunisia have produced very little real change so far. This means combining a comprehensive and long-term action plan with quick wins that support freedom, justice, and dignity in mobility for the residents of Grand Tunis. These quick wins can include ensuring the punctuality of public transport, better communicating the waiting times, making bicycles an alternative mode of transportation, especially in the least connected areas, and working on security mechanisms that protect women in public transport.

Endnotes

Endnotes
1 Fieldnotes, the name has been anonymized.
2 Mimi Sheller, “Theorising Mobility Justice,” Tempo Social 30, no. 2 (July 28, 2018): 17–34, p. 19 https://doi.org/10.11606/0103-2070.ts.2018.142763.
3 Rafael H. M. Pereira, Tim Schwanen, and David Banister, “Distributive Justice and Equity in Transportation,” Transport Reviews 37, no. 2 (March 4, 2017): 170–91, https://doi.org/10.1080/01441647.2016.1257660.
4 Ersilia Verlinghieri and Tim Schwanen, “Transport and Mobility Justice: Evolving Discussions,” Journal of Transport Geography 87 (July 2020): 102798, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2020.102798.
5 Amina Magouri et al., “Déséquilibres régionaux et inégalités sociales en Tunisie: Axes et actions prioritaires” (Tunis: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2018), 35, https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/tunesien/14418.pdf.
6 Amor Belhedi, “Le système urbain tunisien. Analyse hiérarchique démo-fonctionnelle sur la base de la loi Rang-taille,” Cybergeo, February 9, 2004, https://doi.org/10.4000/cybergeo.3877.
7 Magouri et al., “Déséquilibres régionaux et inégalités sociales en Tunisie: Axes et actions prioritaires,” 35.
8 Dorra Dhraief et al., “Carte de La Pauvreté En Tunisie” (Tunis: Institut National des Statistiques Tunisie, September 2020), http://www.ins.tn/sites/default/files/publication/pdf/Carte%20de%20la%20pauvret%C3%A9%20en%20Tunisie_final_0.pdf.
9 Author’s calculations based on the data from “Structure Des Dépenses Des Ménages Selon Les Fonctions de Consommation,” Institut National de la Statistique, March 24, 2021, http://www.ins.tn/statistiques/104.
10 Younes Boujelbene and Ahmed Derbel, “The Performance Analysis of Public Transport Operators in Tunisia Using AHP Method,” Procedia Computer Science 73 (2015): 498–508, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procs.2015.12.039.
11 Katharina Kilian-Yasin et al., “Social Acceptance of Alternative Mobility Systems in Tunis,” Transportation Research Procedia 19 (2016): 135–46, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trpro.2016.12.074.; “République Tunisienne. Livre Blanc Relatif Au Secteur Des Transports et de La Logistique” (The World Bank, May 18, 2016).
12 Author’s calculations based on public spending data from Imen Nouira, “Mobilité Dans Le Grand Tunis : Les Solutions Au Calvaire,” Business News, November 18, 2019, https://www.businessnews.com.tn/mobilite-dans-le-grand-tunis--les-solutions-au-calvaire,519,92901,3. And total public spending data from The World Bank. 2018. "General government  final consumption expenditure (current LCU) - Tunisia" URL: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.CON.GOVT.CN?locations=TN&name_desc=true
13 Imen Nouira, “Le prix d’un véhicule a augmenté de 63% en 12 ans,” Business News, October 11, 2015, https://www.businessnews.com.tn/tunisie-le-prix-dun-vehicule-a-augmente-de-63-en-12-ans,520,59506,3.
14 “Les concessionnaires automobiles plaident pour la libéralisation du secteur,” TN 24, June 21, 2019, https://tn24.tn/ar/article/tunisie-les-concessionnaires-automobiles-plaident-pour-la-liberalisation-du-secteur-151308.
15 Lilia Kamoun Turki, Hamza Ben Taarit, and Imen Yahia, “Revue de Recherches” (Tunis: Tunisie Valeurs - Département Études et Recherches, November 2020), https://www.tunisievaleurs.com/documents/tval-revue-etudes-et-recherches-nov-2020.pdf.
16 Mohamed Afif Jaidi and Sharaf al-Din al-Yacoubi, “Vested Interests and Economic Rent: Tunisia’s Car Market,” Legal Agenda, April 7, 2022, https://english.legal-agenda.com/vested-interests-and-economic-rent-tunisias-car-market/.
17 Célia Corneil, “Roulons Vers l’écomobilité !” (Chabaka - Réseau tunisien des acteur.rice.s de l’économie sociale et solidaire, February 2020), https://www.labess.tn/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Roulons-vers-lecomobilite-.pdf.
18 “Guide Pour Un Transport Durable En Tunisie” (Tunis: Observatoire Tunisien de l’Environnement et du Dévoloppement Durable, October 2014), http://www.environnement.gov.tn/images/fichiers/Rapports/Guide_Transport_Durable.pdf.
19 “Guide Pour Un Transport Durable En Tunisie,” 23.
20 Mathieu Martin, “‘Tounes Tetnafes 2017’ (Tunis Respire 2017) : Première Journée sans Voiture à Tunis,” CODATU, June 2, 2017, https://www.codatu.org/actualites/tounes-tetnafes-2017-tunis-respire-2017-premiere-journee-sans-voiture-a-tunis/.
21 Ministère du Transport de la Tunisie, Forum de La Mobilité Urbaine - منتدى التنقلات الحضرية (Tunis, 2022), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cNI7-Nr8mdU.
22 Mathieu Galtier, “Automobile : fin des quotas en Tunisie dès 2016 ?,” Jeune Afrique, October 2, 2015, https://www.jeuneafrique.com/269171/economie/automobile-fin-des-quotas-en-tunisie-des-2016/.
23 “Automobile: Quotas, impots et taxes,” WMC Hors-Série: Le marché de l’automobile, June 30, 2019.
24 Kamel Ferchichi, “Vignette auto 2022 : Une taxe qui fâche !,” La Presse de Tunisie, January 8, 2022, https://lapresse.tn/120059/vignette-auto-2022-une-taxe-qui-fache/.
25 Nassim B., “Algérie : Voici le nombre de véhicules en circulation (Parc automobile),” Dzair Daily, January 22, 2020, https://www.dzairdaily.com/algerie-nombre-voitures-circulation-parc-automobile-algerien-2020/.
26 “Plus de 4 millions de véhicules circulent officiellement au Maroc,” Médias 24, April 11, 2019, sec. ECONOMIE, https://medias24.com/2019/04/11/plus-de-4-millions-de-vehicules-circulent-officiellement-au-maroc/.
27 Célia Corneil, “Roulons Vers l’écomobilité !” (Chabaka - Réseau tunisien des acteur.rice.s de l’économie sociale et solidaire, February 2020), https://www.labess.tn/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Roulons-vers-lecomobilite-.pdf.
28 This information has been gathered from multiple yearly reports published by the Technical Agency for Land Transport (Agence Technique des Transports Terrestres) of the Ministry of Transport available here: https://www.attt.com.tn/page.php?code_menu=149
29 Author’s calculations based on the vehicle numbers data from “Parc automobile tunisien,” WMC Hors-Série: Le marché de l’automobile, June 30, 2019. And population data from The World Bank. 2020. "Population, total - Tunisia " URL: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=TN
30 Younes Boujelbene and Ahmed Derbel, “The Performance Analysis of Public Transport Operators in Tunisia Using AHP Method,” Procedia Computer Science 73 (2015): 498–508, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procs.2015.12.039.
31 “Réseaux,” Transtu, accessed April 26, 2022, https://www.transtu.tn/fr/entreprise/0002-reseaux.html.
32 Thierry Desclos et al., “République Tunisienne. Note de Stratégie Sectorielle Relative Au Secteur Des Transports Urbains” (The World Bank, February 12, 2019), https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/pt/843581568612862142/pdf/Tunisie-Note-de-Strategie-Sectorielle-Relative-au-Secteur-des-Transports-Urbains.pdf.
33 Known as Taxi jami3 or taxi collectif in Tunisia, this is a mode of transportation also visible in other MENA cities like Cairo or Istanbul. The small vans carrying 8 passengers leave the departure point when all the seats are filled and use a fixed itinerary. They can stop at any point along the road to drop or pick up passengers.
34 Data for 2006 from Rafaa Mraihi, “Transport des voyageurs par taxis collectifs et louages en Tunisie : un modèle réussi à la ville de Sousse,” in Le transport artisanal dans les villes méditerranéennes, ed. Xavier Godard, Actes INRETS (Aix en Provence: Institut National de Recherche sur les Transports et leur Sécurité INRETS, 2008), 85. Data for 2017 from Souhir Bouzid Ben Tahar, “L’essor des taxis collectifs dans le Grand Tunis, une réponse aux besoins de mobilité des périurbains. Étude de cas d’El Mornaguia,” Revue Internationale d’Urbanisme RIURBA 9 (2020), http://www.riurba.review/Revue/lessor-des-taxis-collectifs-95/.
35 Laurent Debernardi, “Le premier chemin de fer tunisien, le T. G. M. (1870-1898),” Revue française d’histoire d’outre-mer 50, no. 179 (1963): 197–226, https://doi.org/10.3406/outre.1963.1374.
36 Haythem Maddouri, “Le Transport Public Urbain : Les Villes, Moteurs de La Croissance Économique Exemple : Région Du Grand Tunis,” Policy Brief (Houloul, December 10, 2020), https://houloul.org/fr/2020/12/10/le-transport-public-urbain-les-villes-moteurs-de-la-croissance-economique-exemple-region-du-grand-tunis/.
37 Number of stations per delegation counted by the author. Stations that are at the administrative border between two delegations have been counted for both. It is important note that while some stations are clearly within the borders of one delegation, they are also walking distance from a second one. These have only been counted for the delegation they are located at. While these statistics give a first glimpse of unequal distribution of the railway stations, the author believes that a more complete and complex study based on the number of stations available at walking distance for different neighborhoods and social groups is needed. Statistics for poverty rate have been retrieved from Dorra Dhraief et al., “Carte de La Pauvreté En Tunisie” (Tunis: Institut National des Statistiques Tunisie, September 2020), http://www.ins.tn/sites/default/files/publication/pdf/Carte%20de%20la%20pauvret%C3%A9%20en%20Tunisie_final_0.pdf.
38 Mohamed Khalil Jelassi, “Entreprises publiques - Restructuration de la Transtu : Avant qu’il ne soit trop tard !,” La Presse de Tunisie, November 18, 2019, https://lapresse.tn/35677/entreprises-publiques-restructuration-de-la-transtu-avant-quil-ne-soit-trop-tard/.
39 Imen Nouira, “Mobilité Dans Le Grand Tunis : Les Solutions Au Calvaire,” Business News, November 18, 2019, https://www.businessnews.com.tn/mobilite-dans-le-grand-tunis--les-solutions-au-calvaire,519,92901,3.
40 “Wassalni,” Google Play, September 16, 2019, https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=tn.TransTu.SmartGateway&hl=fr&gl=US.
41 Khemaies Krimi, “Tunisie : L’absence d’une Politique de Mobilité Urbaine à l’origine de La Crise Du Transport,” Kapitalis, November 19, 2019, http://kapitalis.com/tunisie/2019/11/19/tunisie-labsence-dune-politique-de-mobilite-urbaine-a-lorigine-de-la-crise-du-transport/.
42 “Marche Horaire Hiver 2021-2022,” Transtu, 2021, https://www.transtu.tn/fr/0080-marche-horaire-hiver-2021-2022.html.
43 “Marche Horaire Hiver 2021-2022.”
44 Fieldnotes.
45 Data for 2020 from Maddouri, “Le Transport Public Urbain.” Data for 2010 from Mohamed Khalil Jelassi, “Entreprises publiques - Restructuration de la Transtu : Avant qu’il ne soit trop tard !,” La Presse de Tunisie, November 18, 2019, https://lapresse.tn/35677/entreprises-publiques-restructuration-de-la-transtu-avant-quil-ne-soit-trop-tard/.
46 Myriam Catusse and Olfa Lamloum, eds., Jeunes et violences institutionnelles. Enquête dix ans après la révolution tunisienne. (Arabesque, 2021), https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03083507.
47 Yousra Shikhaoui, “Asdiqa’ wa ma huma bi-asdiqa’... ’an ahkam al-naql fi Tunis,” ULTRA Tunis, January 10, 2019, https://ultratunisia.ultrasawt.com/%D8%A3%D8%B5%D8%AF%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7-%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%A8%D8%A3%D8%B5%D8%AF%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%A3%D8%AD%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B3/%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%8A/%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B9/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%B1.
48 Catusse and Lamloum, Jeunes et violences institutionnelles. Enquête dix ans après la révolution tunisienne.
49 Bouzid Ben Tahar, “L’essor des taxis collectifs dans le Grand Tunis.”
50 Collective taxi typically costs about double the price of a bus ticket (0.5 TND) and their drivers are notorious for driving very fast and ignoring the traffic rules to make as many trips as possible during a day.
51 Catusse and Lamloum, Jeunes et violences institutionnelles. Enquête dix ans après la révolution tunisienne., 53.
52 Mathieu Martin, “Mobilité Urbaine et Genre En Tunisie : Quelle Place Pour La Femme Dans Le Transport En 2017 ?,” CODATU, November 27, 2017, https://www.codatu.org/actualites/mobilite-urbaine-et-genre-en-tunisie-quelle-place-pour-la-femme-dans-le-transport-en-2017/.
53 Mathieu Martin, “‘Tounes Tetnafes 2017’ (Tunis Respire 2017) : Première Journée sans Voiture à Tunis,” CODATU, June 2, 2017, https://www.codatu.org/actualites/tounes-tetnafes-2017-tunis-respire-2017-premiere-journee-sans-voiture-a-tunis/.
54 Paula Holmes-Eber, Daughters of Tunis: Women, Family, and Networks in a Muslim City, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2018), https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429501111.
55 Aliya Jessa, “Staring Down Street Harassment: Women’s Perspectives of Street Harassment in Tunisia,” Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection, no. 2668 (2017), https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection/2668.
56 Gina Porter et al., “Improving Young Women’s Access to Safe Mobility in a Low-Income Area of Tunis: Challenges and Opportunities Pre- and Post-Covid,” Transportation Research Procedia 60 (2022): 266–73, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trpro.2021.12.035.
57 Ministère du Transport de la Tunisie, Forum de La Mobilité Urbaine - منتدى التنقلات الحضرية (Tunis, 2022), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cNI7-Nr8mdU.
58 “Tunisia Invests in Transport Infrastructure to Ease Congestion and Strengthen Connectivity,” Oxford Business Group, September 17, 2019, https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/managing-transition-investment-infrastructure-aims-ease-congestion-and-improve-connectivity.
59 “Transport Infrastructure Needs Massive Investment,” Economist Intelligence Unit, May 15, 2015, http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1483168132&Country=Tunisia&topic=Economy&subtopic=Forecast&subsubtopic=Policy+trends&u=1&pid=987817283&oid=987817283.
60 “Tunisie : Le RFR Sera Fonctionnel Dans 3 Ans,” Investir En Tunisie, September 2, 2010, https://www.turess.com/fr/investir/6823.
61 Ministère du Transport de la Tunisie, Forum de La Mobilité Urbaine.
62 Author’s interview

The views represented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Arab Reform Initiative, its staff, or its board.