William Shakespeare’s Much Ado About Nothing encapsulates EU-GCC relations in 2024. The play is a romantic comedy featuring a budding interest between a couple whose union was initially derailed by spoilers who laid obstacles that were eventually overcome. The value of communicating is the play’s main takeaway – a basic ingredient for an enduring relationship.

Overcoming misconceptions and miscommunication has been – and will continue to be – key to advancing and transforming EU-GCC relations. The relationship has improved in recent years after decades of mutual suspicions and diversions, especially after the EU released its Gulf strategy in May 2022 and appointed a Gulf special representative in May 2023.

This new dynamic elicited a period of “hyper communication” in 2024 with an unparalleled number of meetings between the two blocs: a regional security dialogue in Riyadh (January), a security cooperation forum in Luxembourg (April), an economic dialogue in Doha (September), the first EU-GCC Summit in Brussels (October), and a business forum in Doha (November). That is on top of busy bilateral meetings, diplomatic flurry, and key inductions like the European Chamber of Commerce in Riyadh (May).

Building on this momentum, 2025 should be the year of action. Absent the achievement of major milestones in 2025, the vibe surrounding the reinvigorated EU-GCC relationship risks losing steam. This is not a call to discard the value of regular communication and high-level meetings, but an invitation to pair them with more measurable, bold actions. Some of these actions are already underway but have not received the proper messaging and attention. Other actions are missing or struggling to make way.

I survey these two types of actions in the political, economic, and “integrated security” domains, and suggest a path forward for a meaningful, action-driven EU-GCC partnership in 2025 that can deliver tangible results for both blocs.

Policy Meets People: Meaningful Collaboration on the Two-State Solution

The EU took a major step in 2024 to strengthen its ties with the GCC and wider Arab-Islamic region by aligning with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Norway in co-launching the Global Alliance for the Implementation of the Two State Solution (2SS). By recognizing the Palestinian right to self-determination and ultimately a state, the EU is making strategic amends for the double standards that marred the actions of some of its members during the onslaught on Gaza and the West Bank after October 7. Its policy kills two birds with one stone, wisely positioning itself with both official and popular narratives in the Gulf over the centrality of Palestine.

The attempt to revive the moribund 2SS amid the death and destruction in the occupied Palestinian territories is not easy. However, the alliance provides an innovative outside-in approach that aims to eventually meet the long-awaited negotiations that should take place between the Palestinians and Israelis. Not only is the alliance globalizing the initiative and applying pressure by keeping the issue on the table with regular meetings since its launch last September, it also asks each participating state for ways to support the actualization of the 2SS. Doing that will reinforce the viability of the 2SS and help bring the missing yet crucial states to the alliance’s table, the United States and Israel. The meetings that have taken place thus far in Riyadh (October 2024), Brussels (November 2024), Oslo (January 2025), and Cairo (February 2025) will continue, peaking with Saudi Arabia and France co-chairing a conference in June 2025 at the United Nations.

This is a major political feat that often goes unrecognized in policy and media circles as a successful example of EU-GCC collaboration. The globalized character of the initiative may have understated the important role that the EU, Saudi Arabia, and Norway played in co-launching this initiative in September 2024 on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly meeting. The EU-GCC Summit a month later missed highlighting this meaningful cooperation in the final communique, making a weak reference to the 2SS alliance in a pithy bullet point at the end of a long list of demands regarding Palestine instead of framing the whole section through the alliance. The EU and GCC ought to center this important milestone, even if it has not changed matters on the ground yet. This is the type of action that benefits the relationship: one that touches the masses and discards political comprehensiveness and alignment on a wide array of issues for a focused approach.

Handling political files requires a more robust approach whereby the two regions pair up to deliver workable solutions in sensitive hotspots that matter to them without waiting for cues from the leadership of other powers, namely the United States. The 2SS global alliance is one such example and so are the various GCC member states’ successful mediation efforts between the Russians and Ukrainians. A similar approach is needed for Iran, Lebanon, Sudan, and Syria. A recent European decision on sanctions relief for Syria, for instance, is commendable and the result of EU-GCC understandings. Further collaboration in Yemen is equally important. Aspides, the EU defense mission in the Red Sea, intends to protect shipping and freedom of navigation; however, cooperating with the GCC in its turf over resolving the causes of the Yemen conflict (internal strife) instead of its symptoms (naval attacks) will serve the GCC and EU better. Such a working partnership on a few focused political files will strengthen and breathe new life into the EU-GCC partnership.

“It’s the Economy, …!”: A Recognized Potential That Could Grow Further

President Bill Clinton’s catchy 1992 campaign slogan hits the EU-GCC partnership home. The EU is the GCC’s second trading partner after China at Euro 170 billion in traded goods in 2023. Investment volumes are meaningful too. At USD 178 billion, Gulf investments amounted to 38% of foreign investments in Europe in 2022. Europe reciprocates with an almost similar percentage (41%) when it comes to its investments in the GCC at USD 234 billion.

Geographically close, the two blocs can increase their interdependency in ways inaccessible to other regions. One notable example is Qatari LNG filling in the void left by Russian gas. Another potential is using the GCC as an interconnecting hub or a trade passage that ties European markets to Asia, as the logic of the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) blueprint suggests.

Yet, the EU and GCC have been punching below their institutional weight in terms of realizing the full potential of economic ties. The EU has seldom viewed economic considerations on their own, often interlacing them with regulatory and human rights conditions. A recent European suggestion that Qatari gas can be fined under due diligence laws related to “forced labor and environmental damage” threatens Qatari reprisal and hampers stronger economic ties, for instance. Furthermore, the inability to conclude a free trade agreement (FTA) after decades of discussions and pauses speaks to one of the main challenges confronting the relationship, notably the potential bureaucratic inertia emanating from managing a 27-member (EU) and 6-member (GCC) blocs.

Bilateral trade between key European and GCC states is ongoing and growing. However, sealing a holistic trade agreement elevates the relationship to the next level. An internal debate seems to be brewing between a multilateral approach and a bilateral one. There are hints of that debate in the October 2024 summit communique:

We will aim to take forward our discussions at regional level with a view to reach a regional GCC-EU Free Trade Agreement, including an investment chapter. In light of the cooperation arrangements signed between EU and GCC countries, we will continue to explore tailor-made agreements supporting trade and investments. (Clause I.A (3))

“Tailor-made agreements” may refer to the UAE’s push to advance a bilateral free trade agreement with the EU in light of the paralysis in the EU-GCC FTA process. If that is the case, the EU needs to be upfront about its choices. Will it forego an entity-wide agreement for a bilateral one or set the stage for an EU-GCC FTA by starting with the UAE? This is an internal question for both the GCC and EU. The two sides are better served if they lay their options in the open to ponder the benefits and drawbacks of the bilateral versus multilateral approach. Neither the EU nor the GCC should be in a position to interfere in the workings of the member states of the other entity or else risk the appearance of damaging internal EU or GCC cohesion. Bilateral ties are the bedrock of state relations. Balancing them with bloc-to-bloc relations is crucial.

A frank discussion over the trade file and the preferred modus operandi is in order. If certain countries are readier than others to enter into an FTA and this can lead to the fuller inclusion of the other member states into a larger FTA framework, that can be one way forward.

Promoting Integrated Security

Like the political and economic files, the EU should not seek comprehensiveness and competition with other global powers in the GCC over the security domain either. Instead, the two blocs should focus on a new security paradigm that incubates and integrates centers of excellence and niche offerings. Again, the geographic proximity is an advantage that the two blocs enjoy, distinguishing the EU from the US and China. Waterways are key connectors, and that is where maritime security comes to the forefront. Supporting joint missions and concentrated capacity building will enable a different type of partnership. The Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP) in the Northwestern Indian Ocean since 2022 needs to include cooperation with several neighboring GCC states, as has been the case with Oman. Another idea is to streamline the various EU naval missions in the region while connecting them to the GCC states like the signing of the coordination and cooperation protocol between EUNAVFOR Operation ATALANTA and the Omani navy in June 2024.

A second layer of this security paradigm is alternative energy. Both regions are keen on diversifying away from traditional energy sources. Announcing an EU-GCC partnership over Green Transition in April 2024 speaks to this ambition. So is the UAE’s plan to invest USD 50 billion in France’s artificial intelligence (AI), making it the largest AI data center in Europe. Bringing capital and innovation together can augment EU-GCC products and investment streams that safely incubate a post-oil era.

Finally, people are the third leg of the integrated security dynamic. Investing in the capacities and increased interaction between the peoples of the two blocs through mutual visa waivers, twinning cities, and sustained educational exchanges will go a long way toward enabling organic connections that in turn reinforce the official lines, regardless of the administrations in place.

EU-GCC Risks

Taking the EU-GCC relationship to the next level in 2025 is possible, with an action-oriented year premised on political focus, trade, and an integrated security paradigm. However, such promise is not without perils. Three main risks and spoilers need to be taken into account:

(1) Vague discourse: Avoid vague, future-oriented language without bound commitments and specific actions. Coming to agreement over summit communiques and joint declarations requires hard work and compromises. But that has also led at times to watered-down texts in ways that make them devoid of impact. A case in point is some of the language of the October 2024 twelve-page summit communique. Aside from the summit not declaring a specific breakthrough other than the important optics of having the leadership of both sides on the table, the language is worrisome: “The EU remains committed to discussions… exploring further options… studying… reviewing…pursuing…open to.” A repeat of this type of discourse in future communiques will drain the trust and hype surrounding the rising partnership. Targeting lesser issues in measurable, time-bound, actionable resolutions will assuage this risk.

(2) Mind the gap of bureaucratic inertia: The EU and the GCC are large bureaucracies with built-in mechanisms and institutional memories that can be hard to navigate at times. Both entities need to be mindful of internal dynamics that could unintentionally derail or dissuade progress. A clear position on the use of a multilateral versus a bilateral approach is urgently needed. A healthy mix of both has naturally been the default mode in the relationship, and that will continue. Agreeing on what issues remain at the region-wide level will limit risks of fragmentation and frustration.

Another potential bureaucratic tension emanates from within the EU. The European External Action Service (EEAS) named a special envoy for the Mediterranean (who previously served as ambassador in three Gulf capitals) in December 2023 just seven months after naming an envoy for the Gulf. In February 2025, the European Commission (EC) announced a new Directorate-General for the Middle East, North Africa, and the Gulf (DG MENA) with yet another post: the Commissioner for the Mediterranean. The current configuration means that the EEAS bifurcates between the Gulf and the Mediterranean via two envoys while the EC combines the two under the newly established DG. The newly created directorate speaks to the EU’s commitment to the Middle East, but it could lead to confusion and duplicate efforts if the lines of operation and activities are not delineated upfront both between and within the EEAS’s different envoys and the EC’s newly created DG MENA and then communicated to the Gulf partners.

(3) Cart before the horse? When the two blocs signed a Cooperation Agreement in 1988, the then-nascent GCC was particularly looking forward to strengthening its ties with the EU. A few decades later, the tides have changed. The GCC member states are stronger. The EU is now keen on closer ties with the GCC. The EU has to reflect on this reality and amend its posture accordingly. The EU is no longer the economic powerhouse it once was. While it matched the US economy in 2008, the US economy was 50% larger than the EU in 2023. The September 2024 Draghi Report addresses some of these concerns and offers ways to strengthen the EU. The GCC is not unaware of these developments and can help the EU actualize its objectives.

Different global powers have their eyes fixated on the GCC. Why should the EU be the GCC’s priority if the EU does not offer a compelling case? Such spirit ought to drive the thinking of EU officials when planning the next set of actions for 2025 and beyond in concert with their GCC counterparts.

EU-GCC relations hold much promise. Action, focus, and empathy will bring the best of both partners. The successful completion of complex tasks in Shakespeare’s All’s Well that Ends Well can provide inspiration for the EU-GCC partnership in 2025.