On 13 March 2025, Syria’s President Ahmed Al-Sharaa signed a new Constitutional Declaration to govern the country’s transitional phase that has been set for five years. ARI executive director, Nadim Houry, interviewed Zaid Al-Ali, a leading expert on Constitution Building – with experience on constitutional processes in Iraq, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Yemen, and Mali – to get his views on the document and to place it within a broader context of recent constitutional exercises.

Nadim Houry: A new “Constitutional Declaration” has been adopted by the interim authorities in Syria. Can you explain what this means and why it’s important?

Zaid A-Ali: The term “constitutional declaration” can cause confusion. Many people hear the term and assume that it’s a specific category of legal act that has a special standing compared to laws or regulations. But when you think about it, you realize that the declaration is for all intents and purposes a presidential decree – except that it is a decree that exists outside the bounds of any specific legal framework. In fact, “constitutional declarations” are unique to the Arab region. To my knowledge, the term isn’t used anywhere else in the world. Normally, around the world, heads of state or governments can pass decrees, depending on whether they have been granted that power by the constitution and by law. And those same heads of state or governments can amend or replace those decrees however much they want. “Constitutional declarations” are just like decrees except that they do not depend on a pre-existing constitution or legislation – they are essentially a governmental or presidential decision that breaks the legal status quo by creating a new constitutional framework. You could say it’s a coup against a pre-existing legal framework. The justification for that type of act in countries like Syria is that the pre-existing legal framework was unjust and should be replaced and I would certainly not argue with that. But the key point here is that there is nothing stopping the head of state from amending the Constitutional Declaration as often as he likes.

Thus, the new Constitutional Declaration functions as an interim constitution except that it can easily be amended at any point, unlike a real constitution. In this case, the interim period is set to last five years and ends once a new constitution is adopted and elections are held. This is a relatively long period for an interim constitution, but it is not necessarily a bad thing. Rushing into a constitutional process – like Egypt and Libya did – hasn’t worked out well in the past. So, deferring that decision might be wise.

NH: Let’s start by talking about the process of writing this Constitutional Declaration. Who was responsible for drafting this text? What was the process adopted?

ZA: It was prepared by a small committee of seven Syrian members appointed by the interim President. They drafted very quickly – basically finalizing the text in around 2 weeks. They’re generally seen as professional and independent, though of course they couldn’t propose anything that the President would outright reject. Technically, they were supposed to be guided by the outcomes of the recent national dialogue conference – but those outcomes were so vague; they likely didn’t have much impact on the committee's actual deliberations. The draft was not subject to any formal process of public discussion or review. The draft was submitted to President Al-Sharaa who signed it on 13 March 2025.

NH: Can you tell us a bit about what the declaration covers and how it is organized?

ZA: It starts with a long preamble, which offers a historical narrative of Syria’s modern history, focusing heavily on the Baath party’s crimes. In fact, about two-thirds of the preamble focuses on past crimes. It’s reminiscent of Iraq’s 2005 constitution in that regard.

The preamble also outlines a few fundamental principles: the unity and integrity of Syria –both land and people; transitional justice and providing redress for the victims; building a state based on citizenship, freedom, dignity, the rule of law, and good governance. These are all positive, albeit somewhat generic. They’ll need real mechanisms behind them to mean anything. That said, the strong mention of transitional justice is noteworthy.

The rest includes 53 articles divided into four chapters outlining the system of governance during the transitional phase, highlighting rights and freedoms during that period, and specifically mentioning the creation of a commission for transitional justice.

System of Governance

NH: What are your general views about the Declaration’s system of governance?

ZA: The Constitutional Declaration adopts a very conservative and traditional approach to governance. Syria’s 1973 and 2012 constitutions both provided for a hyper-presidential system of government. The 2025 declaration essentially does the same but removes some authority from the President. For example, under the 2025 declaration, the President no longer has the power to dissolve parliament.

In my view, Syria’s current situation requires a totally different approach to governance. That approach should be something new and innovative, something creative, that tries to address the unique aspects of Syria’s situation. Taking a discredited system of government and merely tinkering with it a little to make it a little less presidential cannot be the right approach.

Syria’s situation is unique for a number of reasons, including the fact that half the population is displaced, the national territory is divided, and political parties have no real experience in negotiating and formulating policy. State institutions are in a terrible state – underfunded, with ancient working methods that are imbued with an absence of accountability. Traditional approaches to policy-making and oversight will simply not work in these circumstances. We know that from the experience of a number of countries. For example, in Iraq, the state bureaucracy before 2003 was ineffectual and was built to control the lives of ordinary people without offering much in return. Twenty-two years later, Iraq’s dysfunctional constitution has not been able to deliver any meaningful improvements – the system as it was in 2003 remains by and large the same today.

I don’t have any ready-made solutions for Syria. All that I am saying is that traditional models will not work, and that constitutional negotiators and drafters should push themselves much more to develop new models that will help address this situation. Here we can look at some comparative examples from other parts of the world, not to copy their models, but to seek inspiration from their commitment to progress and from their creativity.

So, for example, many countries are experimenting with citizen assemblies as a means to address the deficiencies of traditional parliamentary assemblies. That experience is still new, but it shows real promise on the condition that they enjoy political support. Other countries are designing new mechanisms to improve the performance of the judiciary. In Kenya, the 2010 Constitution tried to address corruption in the courts through a vetting process through which all of the country’s top judges were investigated, which led to significant improvements. In Brazil, the Supreme Court’s deliberations are all carried out publicly in an effort to increase transparency and democratic legitimacy. In many countries, members of the community must lead investigations when judges are accused of corruption, procedural failings, or conflict of interest.

Once again, I am not saying that Syria must adopt any one of these specific arrangements. All I am saying is that the Constitution should be bolder than simply limiting itself to basically the same constitutional arrangement as before but with slightly fewer presidential powers.

NH: The declaration explicitly guarantees the principle of separation of powers, but in practice, it gives a lot of power to the President and provides very little checks and balances. Many commentators are worried that Al-Sharaa can rule with little opposition for five years. What can you tell us about the powers of the President and any checks and balances possible?

ZA: The declaration allocates very significant powers to the interim President. He appoints a third of the parliament. He appoints the entirety of the constitutional court. He can declare an emergency virtually at will. And the text does not provide for elections or for any mechanism to hold the interim President accountable. Some commentators have defended the text by stating that it is less presidential than the 1973 and 2012 constitutions, which is true, but it is still far beyond what is normally acceptable in a modern constitution. The system as provided for is too dependent on the goodwill of a single individual, which makes it vulnerable to collapse.

NH: How is the parliament supposed to be formed under this declaration?

ZA: The President exerts significant control over parliament in two ways. The parliament’s composition will be selected by a 'high committee' – itself appointed by the President. In addition, the President appoints one-third of parliament “to ensure fair representation and competence.” That is not unique in comparative practice. Sudan’s 2019 constitutional charter also provided for an appointed parliament, but without clearly including how the parliament would be composed. All it said was that a coalition of actors (which had only been established months earlier) should determine the composition, which never happened.

In Syria, there is reason to think that an interim parliament will actually be composed. The declaration establishes a centralized process that will be under the interim President’s control, rather than leaving it to decentralized coalitions to determine the composition. In addition, so far, the interim authorities appear to be determined to make swift progress, and it is likely for now that they will want for the interim parliament to start its sessions relatively fast.

NH: What about checks and balances? Do courts have any power?

ZA: Theoretically, the courts could serve as a check on executive power. However, the text doesn’t clearly define the responsibilities or composition of key institutions. So, legislation will be needed to fill in those gaps, and that legislation will likely be passed by a parliament heavily influenced by the President.

Managing Syria’s Diversity

NH: The declaration maintains the name of the country as the “Syrian Arab Republic” and the Arabic language is the only official language. Following the deal between Ahmad Al-Sharaa and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), some observers expected a nod to the Kurdish community either through the inclusion of Kurdish as an official language, or dropping the word “Arab” in the official name. The text, on the other hand, mentions that “cultural diversity for the Syrian society in all its components, as well as cultural and linguistic rights for all Syrians” is guaranteed. What can you tell us about the protection of Syria’s diversity and the different communities during the transitional period?

ZA: What we know so far is that the interim authorities in Damascus absolutely reject the Iraqi and Lebanese model when it comes to diversity. Both of those countries apply an ethno-sectarian power-sharing model, which many people have said has contributed to stagnation, corruption, and undemocratic outcomes. In that sense, it makes sense that many Syrians would seek to avoid that model.

However, what they have been proposing instead, which is a state that promotes a single national identity, is not particularly convincing either. There are historic grievances between communities in Syria, which will not disappear on their own or just because we want to wish them away. Specific mechanisms and governance arrangements need to be established to foster national unity, to protect rights, and to reduce separatist tensions.

Once again, there isn’t a pre-existing model that I can point to that can fix all of Syria’s ills. Syria’s unique problems will require a unique approach. However, whatever approach is adopted in Syria will at the very least have to include a recognition of linguistic and religious plurality, such that Syrians who do not speak Arabic at home will not have their languages suppressed.

NH: The declaration refers to “Islamic jurisprudence” as the principal source of legislation whereas in Syria’s previous constitution “Islamic jurisprudence” was cited as “a major source of legislation.” How do you read this? And what is the difference between referencing Islamic jurisprudence as opposed to Sharia?

ZA: I know that these provisions get a lot of attention in the media, but ultimately, I think that they have more symbolic importance than practical impact. The reason why people give them so much importance is that they project very clearly who is in charge and the capacity of that group to impose specific values and beliefs on the rest of society.

However, in practice, what really matters is who is in control of policymaking. So, if Syria is controlled by political forces that are heavily inspired by Islam and religion, then policy and legislation will be Islamically inspired regardless of whether the constitution imposes it. Conversely, if someday in the future secular forces were to control policy-making, then they would not base their policies on Islam no matter what the constitution says. In the latter scenario, a constitutional reference to Islamic Sharia will only matter if someone were to challenge legislation before the courts on the basis that it is not in adherence with Sharia, in which case it is possible that the courts may strike down legislation. But even that is not likely to have a significant impact as the composition of the courts would likely also evolve as the country’s politics evolves (which is a worldwide phenomenon).

Human Rights and Transitional Justice

NH: The Declaration has a chapter dedicated to rights and freedoms. This is not that surprising given the record of the Assad regime. It explicitly forbids torture and enforced disappearance. Is that common in constitutional documents in other contexts? Any indication of enforcement mechanisms?

ZA: Many constitutions explicitly forbid torture, including the Egyptian, Tunisian, Moroccan, and Iraqi constitutions. Sadly, by themselves, those provisions do not guarantee that torture will not take place. In many of these countries, torture remains common, including the practice of extracting confessions through physical violence. In order to address torture, the executive and judicial branches will have to be committed to prosecuting individuals who carry out acts of torture.

NH: At the same time, some have criticized the wording around women’s rights as it emphasizes the “social status of women” preserving their dignity and role within the family and society, etc.

ZA: That type of wording is actually very common in Arab constitutions. It projects a very conservative view of society in which specific roles are imposed on women, without making any specific provisions on how men are supposed to behave. However, once again, these provisions do not have much impact in practice. They are mainly designed to project who is in charge, and the type of vision they have for society. In practice, if conservative groups are in charge of policy-making they will enact rules that will be conservative in nature regardless of whether the constitution says that the state has to protect the social status of women.

NH: The Declaration explicitly lays the ground for transitional justice by setting up a commission for transitional justice though it provides very few details. What have we learned about the role of constitutional texts in setting up transitional processes?

ZA: Since 2005, we have learned a number of issues relating to transitional justice, particularly in so far as it is implemented in Arab countries. First, in Arab countries, the concept of truth and reconciliation remains very controversial. For the most part, what we have seen in the past 20 years is either (a) high-level reconciliation initiatives that lead more to general amnesia, and in which the general population has virtually no say; and (b) collective punishment against large segments of society, including lustration processes and others. In very rare cases, such as in Tunisia, we have seen a transitional justice process that included public investigations on past crimes, but these efforts were ultimately ignored and discontinued mainly as a result of political resistance.

The lesson learned from these experiences is that a transitional justice process must have genuine political support to have a chance at achieving anything and surviving. What we also know is that strong institutional frameworks, including an independent judiciary and Supreme Court, are essential to protect independent processes such as transitional justice commissions.

The Future Constitution

NH: Does the declaration say anything about the process of drafting a final constitution? Who is responsible for drafting the final constitution?

ZA: Very little. All it states is that the interim period will last five years and end once a new constitution is adopted and elections are held. That is probably a good thing at this stage as it will allow for more time to discuss and exchange views on how the constitution should be drafted. What we are expecting at this stage is that the new parliament will take a few months to be formed, and that it will need another few weeks after that to organize its first meeting, to elect a leadership, and then to adopt its rules of procedure. All of that will allow some time to consider how the future constitution should be drafted.

Here again, I’m concerned that a very traditional approach will be adopted. In the Arab region, there have been two models so far: constitutions have either been drafted by appointed bodies (Morocco in 2011, Jordan in 2011), or by elected assemblies (Tunisia in 2011-2014, Libya in 2014-2017). Both of those formats are inadequate as they limit constitution-making to a single specific constituency (appointed ‘experts’, or political representatives), which always makes the constitution-making process poorer and the outcome uninspiring.

In order to achieve a different type of outcome, I would strongly prefer a different type of process altogether. In particular, I would strongly suggest a process that allows for different constituencies to be involved throughout the process. I would also strongly prefer a consensual approach to constitution-making so as to make sure that no single group can finalize the constitution without all other major groups agreeing. I know that this would make it more difficult to reach agreement, but in the end it is worth it. Throughout the region, we have seen majoritarian approaches lead to disaster. The last thing that we want in Syria is for the constitution to be adopted through a majority and for the rest of the country to reject the text, which would likely lead to violence.

NH: Overall, how would you assess this new Constitutional Declaration?

ZA: It’s not a disaster, but it’s not exactly visionary either. Apart from a few standout points – like the emphasis on transitional justice – it sticks to fairly traditional arrangements. You could argue it's a missed opportunity. On the other hand, Syria may benefit more from a sense of stability and incremental progress right now than from radical constitutional experiments. It's hard to say which approach is best.