Executive Summary
The recent collapse of a school wall in Mezzouna, a town in Sidi Bouzid governorate of Tunisia, resulted in the tragic death of three students and injuries to others. This incident has exposed deep-rooted deficiencies within the country’s public education infrastructure and governance- deficiencies that are further reflected in systemic neglect, underfunding, and infrastructural decay, all of which have compromised student safety and undermined the quality of public education, especially in Tunisia’s interior regions. Addressing these challenges requires a comprehensive overhaul of infrastructure maintenance, increased investment, and decentralization of decision-making to restore public trust and ensure the safety and dignity of Tunisian students. This policy paper advocates for immediate action to prevent future tragedies and rebuild a resilient education system.
Introduction
On 14 April 2025, a crumbling wall at Mezzouna’s secondary school collapsed, claiming the lives of three students and injuring several others. This event has reignited public outrage and drawn attention to the ongoing struggles within the region. Located in Sidi Bouzid – the birthplace of the Arab Spring –Mezzouna’s tragedy shows how underdevelopment and deep-rooted marginalization continue to afflict areas that once inspired calls for progressive social and political reform across the Arab world. This incident serves as a stark reminder of the systemic neglect that threatens the safety and future of Tunisian youth. It emphasizes the urgent need for comprehensive reforms – focused on infrastructure, accountability, and equitable investment – to prevent future tragedies. As Tunisia confronts this painful moment, the path forward must prioritize the safety, dignity, and rights of all its students. Drawing on field observations and key informant interviews with education specialists, youth, and civil society activists, this policy paper unpacks the root causes of the deterioration of Tunisia’s public education, analyzes the government’s response to the Mezzouna incident, and provides practical recommendations for comprehensive reform.
Unpacking the Root Causes Behind the Decline of Tunisia’s Public Education
Since gaining independence in 1956, Tunisia has treated education as a strategic sector, recognizing its transformative role in promoting literacy and developing a qualified workforce to lead state-building efforts in the post-colonial era. For many low- and middle-income Tunisians, education has been their primary vehicle for social mobility. However, despite its historic importance, Tunisian public education today faces numerous challenges that hinder its ability to fulfill this strategic role. Understanding these challenges requires a closer examination of the underlying factors contributing to the sector’s declining capacity to provide quality education and protection to students.
Aging Infrastructure and Bureaucracy
Many school buildings suffer from deteriorating walls and outdated construction due to inadequate maintenance and insufficient public spending, which pose serious safety risks to students and staff. A diachronic analysis of the budget allocation over the past years reveals a sustained contraction in Tunisia’s education spending as a share of government expenditure, declining from 24.85% to 18.11% between 2010 and 2023 – a decrease of 27.12%. This contraction has been driven by severe macroeconomic pressures, including a soaring public debt that reached approximately 80% of GDP in 2024, up from around 39% in 2010. This high debt burden has forced the government to allocate a growing share of its already limited fiscal resources to debt servicing, amounting to 15.9% of budgetary expenditure in the first quarter of 2025, which further constrained available funds. Compounding this, public sector wages consume around 53.2% of the state budget, significantly limiting fiscal space for adequate education spending. This reduced budget share limits funding for essential repairs and the construction of new classrooms, exacerbating overcrowding and accelerating the physical degradation of school facilities, which directly impairs student learning conditions and contributes to widening regional disparities in educational access.
The collapse of a dilapidated wall at the secondary school in Mezzouna brutally illustrates the consequences of insufficient funding and neglected infrastructure. Local reports indicate that other parts of the school in Mezzouna, including dormitories and classrooms, are at risk of collapse due to aging materials and construction flaws dating back to the 1980s, with little to no action from regional authorities despite repeated warnings. This pattern of neglect is common across Tunisia. Based on field observations and discussions with local residents and civil society activists between November 2023 and June 2024 across Tunisia’s inland regions, it appeared that dozens of primary and secondary public schools barely have two operational classrooms, with the remaining spaces deemed unsafe. Looting of school furniture is frequent, further compounding the challenges. The absence of fences and security guards has also left school grounds vulnerable, with cases of stray dogs entering premises and occasionally attacking teachers and students. Given these unfavorable conditions, many local residents reported that they sometimes did not send their children to these schools, especially girls, and those who can afford it have enrolled their children in private institutions. These observations are consistent with findings from a recent study by the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights (FTDES), which revealed that many schools in Kairouan, Kasserine, and Sidi Bouzid lack basic facilities, including potable water, canteens, sanitation, and adequate hygiene. This persistent neglect of infrastructure not only contributed to absenteeism and poor academic performance but also endangered students’ lives- Mezzouna students are a case in point.
Bureaucracy also accounts for this incident. Since 2022, teachers and school officials repeatedly alerted the Sidi Bouzid Regional Directorate of Education about the dangerously deteriorating wall that eventually collapsed in April 2025. Yet, these urgent warnings were met with frustrating silence –symptomatic of an aging bureaucracy more focused on inertia than action – allowing a preventable incident rooted in years of neglect and administrative paralysis to take the lives of three young Tunisians. To unpack Tunisia’s bureaucratic inertia, it is essential to consider the historical and political continuities spanning the pre-2011, post-2011, and post-2021 periods. Before 2011, bureaucracy was characterized by rigid, centralized control inherited from colonial administration and solidified under Ben Ali’s authoritarian regime, which prioritized control and procedural compliance over responsiveness and innovation. The 2011 revolution opened a window for reform, emphasizing transparency and citizen participation; however, the post-revolutionary period revealed persistent structural weaknesses – political instability, fragmented institutions, and resistance within the bureaucracy – that limited meaningful transformation. Despite reform efforts, the bureaucracy remained focused on procedural legitimacy and risk aversion, perpetuating inertia rather than proactive governance. In the post-2021 era, recentralization tendencies under President Kais Saied and frequent administrative reshuffling further undermined decentralization efforts and long-term policy continuity, reinforcing a culture of short-termism and bureaucratic caution. This operational approach has led government officials and institutions to prioritize immediate, day-to-day management and risk avoidance over long-term planning and decisive action. Across these periods, Tunisia’s bureaucracy has struggled to evolve from a system centered on control and preservation of the status quo into one capable of dynamic, action-oriented governance, constraining the country’s broader socio-political and economic development.
Stalling Education Reform
The decline of Tunisia’s public education is partly due to the stalled reform process since 2011, largely caused by ongoing politicization. A retrospective analysis of the frequent political shifts in Tunisia is particularly effective here. Since 2011, successive governments have struggled to implement coherent and long-term reforms. Key ministerial positions have often been subject to political appointments and reshuffling, leading to inconsistent policies and abrupt changes in direction. For instance, from 2011 till today, Tunisia has had 10 ministers of education with a tenure period varying between one and three years at best. This frequent turnover reflects the high degree of political instability that affected education reform. In other words, reform efforts in Tunisia’s education sector have taken place during a highly sensitive period marked by inter-elite settlements following the 2011 revolution. The transitional phase was marked by intense political negotiations among various factions, including influential labor unions, the Islamist Ennahda party, secularists, and other political groups, all navigating a delicate balance between secular and religious influences in governance and policymaking. Such dynamics created a complex environment where education reform was not only a technical challenge but also a political battleground, with competing elites seeking to assert their visions and control over the sector.
While the 2011 revolution opened up new spaces for freedom of expression and debate within academic and educational circles, it also introduced a period of intense political contestation over the direction of the education sector. Various actors have each claimed greater legitimacy in setting priorities and leading the education reform process, which has made progress slow and challenging. On the one hand, the UGTT-associated teacher unions, namely the Syndicat général de l'enseignement de base and the Syndicat général de l'enseignement secondaire, have been at the forefront of teacher strikes in Tunisia. Over the past decade, these strikes have been fueled by urgent demands for higher salaries, better working conditions, participation in decision making, the formalization of contract and substitute teachers, and sweeping education reforms. Educators have employed a wide array of tactics, ranging from one-day and open-ended strikes to sit-ins, rotational strikes, withholding student grades in what is known as a “silent strike,” and large-scale rallies that have drawn tens of thousands of participants. Although these strikes have garnered strong participation, they have often been met with slow or inadequate government responses, resulting in actions that fall short of resolving the underlying issues.
On the other hand, the Ministry of Education has taken a firm and often confrontational stance in negotiations with teacher unions amid ongoing strikes, increasingly since 2022. This situation has been part of a broader standoff between the government and unions, with the latter accusing the ministry of repression, refusing dialogue, and imposing austerity measures, while the government insists on controlling public-sector hiring and maintaining social expenditures without ballooning wage bills. For illustration, in response to repeated union demands for contract regularization and salary increases, the ministry imposed salary cuts, withholding one month’s pay from over 17,000 primary school teachers. Additionally, around 350 school headmasters were dismissed for allegedly supporting or organizing strikes, signaling a zero-tolerance policy toward union-led activism. This escalation followed a breakdown in dialogue, with the ministry taking unilateral measures and backing out of previous agreements, leading to widespread protests, sit-ins, and strikes that disrupted academic programs. Beyond these measures, the ministry has leveled specific accusations against the teachers’ unions. For example, the ministry strongly criticized the practice of withholding student grades during strikes, describing it as ”a crime against the Tunisian people” and saying that the unions are holding students “hostage” to pressure the government. The dynamics of this standoff were succinctly echoed by a civic education teacher who argued:
Education, as Tunisians’ vehicle for social mobility, is malfunctioning because of short-sighted political calculations and agendas. The lack of consensus among teachers’ unions and the Ministry of Education on how post-2011 education should be conceived derailed or delayed the reform process.
Similar observations on the standoff between the teachers’ unions and the Ministry of Education have been made by a retired school inspector who recalled:
During meetings between the teachers' union and the Ministry of Education, discussions turned into a zero-sum game, often stalling over competing issues such as pedagogical reform, financial compensation, school management, and decision-making. This divergence in priorities has made achieving concrete outcomes or lasting agreements difficult.
Within this politically volatile context, the public education system has struggled to address its core challenges, resulting in the erosion of public trust in the sector’s ability to deliver quality outcomes. Further evidence of this trend can be found in the 2024 Arab Barometer survey data, which shows that satisfaction with education was low, at only 30%. This low rate signals a widespread perception of systemic shortcomings within educational institutions. Comparative analysis with the 2022 survey data further substantiates this trend, as a significant portion of respondents articulated specific priorities for reform: 25% identified improved teacher training as a critical need, 23% advocated for the reconstruction of school infrastructure, and 17% emphasized the integration of technology and the modernization of curricula. These findings collectively highlight a strong public consensus on the urgent need for comprehensive reform, reflecting widespread dissatisfaction with the current state of the public education system.
The most recent effort to advance public education reform began with the launch of a National Consultation on Education Reform in September 2023, followed by the plan to establish the Higher Council for Education and Teaching, representing significant steps toward tackling Tunisia’s longstanding educational challenges. Over 580,000 people took part in the consultation, with an impressive 65% of participants being youth under the age of 20. The strong participation of young people highlights their deep interest in shaping the future of Tunisia’s education system and ensures that their perspectives are central to the reform process. The consultation focused on key themes such as educational quality and equity, school dropout, violence in schools, the inclusion of marginalized groups, curriculum modernization, teacher support, and regional disparities in access to education. However, the absence of transparent dissemination of the national consultation’s findings has contributed to limited public clarity regarding the outcomes and future direction of education reform in Tunisia. This lack of communication is further complicated by the fact that the results were only formally presented to the president in February 2024 by the then Minister of Education, Mohamed Boughdiri, without being shared more broadly. This top-down approach to information flow, where key findings are confined within political circles rather than being communicated to educators, stakeholders, and citizens, significantly limits opportunities for public scrutiny, debate, and feedback – key components of democratic policymaking and reform. As a result, the process risks being perceived as opaque and disconnected from the very public it aims to serve. Without clear communication and transparency, people may remain uncertain about the changes being considered or planned, which can ultimately weaken trust in the reform efforts and hinder their success.
Moreover, after nearly two years, the overall process remains largely in the consultation and planning phase, with no major concrete policy changes implemented. This delay reflects the procedural complexities inherent in Tunisian bureaucracy, where formal requirements and administrative red tape contribute to extended timelines. A key reason for this delay is the incomplete establishment of critical institutional mechanisms, most notably the Higher Council of Education. This Council is mandated to spearhead the reform efforts and coordinate among various stakeholders; however, its full operationalization remains unfinished, impeding the initiation of concrete reforms. Another challenge lies in how this Council will effectively integrate and utilize the wealth of information generated by previous initiatives, like the 2016 White Paper on Education Reform. This initiative has already produced extensive quantitative data and qualitative insights that are critical for shaping Tunisia’s education policies. Without careful integration and coordination, there is a risk of overlapping efforts and fragmented data management, which could undermine the coherence and efficiency of ongoing reforms. Political approval from the Assembly of the Representatives of the People has not yet been secured, introducing an additional layer of delay to the implementation of the consultation’s objectives. Although this national initiative demonstrates political will and a commitment to participatory reform, its effectiveness will remain limited until tangible improvements are realized within Tunisia’s education system.
Finally, Tunisia’s declining birth rate presents a critical challenge for the education sector and the Higher Council of Education, which must adapt its strategies and policies to effectively respond to this demographic shift. According to the latest demographic data, the birth rate experienced a marked decline in 2023 (13.75 births per 1,000 people, a 2.66% drop from 2022), followed by a rebound in 2024 (14.98, up 8.96%), and a projected decline again in 2025 (14.58, down 2.65%). The proportion of children under the age of 5 has decreased, dropping from 19% in 1966 to 5.9% in 2024, thereby reflecting the drastic decline in the fertility rate in Tunisia. A similar trend is also observed among children aged 5 to 14, whose share decreased from 28% in 1966 to 17% in 2024.
As the school-age population shrinks, there is a tendency for education budgets to stagnate or even decrease, leading to a shortage of capital investment that hampers the sector’s ability to upgrade infrastructure, adopt new technologies, and implement necessary reforms. This underinvestment slows the pace of curriculum modernization and teacher training, which are critical for aligning the education system with contemporary economic and social needs. These challenges further exacerbate the persistent mismatch between graduates’ skills and labor market demands. At the same time, as the Tunisian population ages – projected to see the share of those over 60 rise from 5.6% in 1966 to nearly 17% in 2024 – there may be an increasing pressure to relocate substantial public resources toward health services and social security funds, which are already experiencing shortages, further straining the state’s capacity to adequately finance and reform the education sector. These technical, political, and administrative challenges, compounded by demographic realities marked by an aging population and declining birth rates, will place significant pressure on the Higher Council of Education as it strives to fulfill its complex mandate.
Widening Disparities: Urban and Coastal Vs. Rural and Public Vs. Private Schools
Long-standing socio-economic and regional disparities between urban and rural areas continue to undermine both the quality and accessibility of education in Tunisia’s interior regions. Urban schools, especially those in coastal areas and Greater Tunis, benefit from ‘somewhat better’ infrastructure, better access to digital tools, and a higher concentration of qualified teachers. In contrast, rural schools in the interior regions face chronic underinvestment, with poor facilities, limited educational resources, and a shortage of trained educators. These disparities are reflected in student performance; for instance, in the 2023 and 2024 baccalaureate exams, Greater Tunis areas and coastal governorates like Sfax, Mahdia, and Sousse recorded success rates above 65%, while interior regions such as Kasserine, Gafsa, Sidi Bouzid, and Jendouba lagged far behind, with rates barely going beyond 30% in both years.
Disparities are also reflected in the dropout risk. Spatial analysis reveals that the risk of dropping out is concentrated in Tunisia’s inland regions, particularly the North-West and Central-West, where delegations such as Gar Dima recorded the highest dropout risk in the country. Based on field observations, particularly in the communities close or bordering Algeria or Libya, such as Jendouba, El Kef, Siliana, Sidi Bouzid, Kairouan, Kasserine, Gafsa, Mednine, and Tataouine, many of these school dropouts have turned to the local smuggling networks or decided to cross the Mediterranean sea in pursuit of “better life”. For instance, during a conversation with a school dropout from El Kef, not yet 18 years old, he stated: “A few months ago, the coastal guards turned me back when I tried to cross the sea toward Italy. But I’m trying again”. These observations show that in border regions, socio-economic hardships and the lack of viable educational and economic prospects directly channel school dropouts into smuggling or migration as perceived pathways to a better life.
The 2024 census in Tunisia also revealed deeply concerning literacy disparities, highlighting sharp regional and gender divides. In interior governorates such as Jendouba, Kairouan, Sidi Bouzid, Kasserine, and Siliana, illiteracy rates surpass 25%, with women bearing the brunt, often experiencing nearly double the illiteracy rate of men within these regions. For instance, in Jendouba, 36,5% of women are illiterate, nearly double the 20% illiteracy rate among men. This stark difference reflects systemic barriers that disproportionately limit women's access to education, likely rooted in deeper socio-cultural factors such as traditional gender roles and economic constraints that hinder female educational attainment. These factors affect rural women and reinforce their concentration in low-wage, informal agricultural work, where they make up about 70% of the workforce. This early withdrawal from education not only limits their personal development but also perpetuates cycles of poverty and gender inequality in rural communities. This point is best captured by a civil society activist:
Socio-economic disparity and a pervasive sense of deprivation among youth-especially in regions with a long history of underdevelopment, limited educational resources, and scarce job opportunities- have generated a perverse cycle of vulnerability, school dropout, violence, addiction, and migration.
Another emerging trend is the widening gap between public and private schools. The latter, both in rural and urban areas, significantly lag behind their private counterparts in terms of infrastructure and the quality of educational services provided. Private schools, particularly international ones such as American, French, British, or Canadian institutions, not only deliver higher academic standards but also offer safe transportation, well-being support, and a range of tailored extracurricular activities, including networking events, well-equipped IT clubs, and entrepreneurship programs. This disparity between private and public education infrastructure was also underscored on 15 April 2025- just a day after the tragic event in Mezzouna- when a student in Hassi El Ferid, a town in Kasserine governorate, died and several others were injured after falling from a light truck used for school transportation. Such incidents highlight the unsafe and inadequate transport options many public school students in the interior regions must rely on, in sharp contrast to the regulated and safer transportation services typically provided by private schools. These structural inequalities not only undermine the right to quality education for all Tunisian youth but also reinforce broader patterns of social and economic exclusion, hindering national development and deepening regional divides.
The decline of public education quality has prompted many middle-class families—where financially possible—to enroll their children in these private institutions in hopes of securing better educational and developmental outcomes. In fact, there has been an upward trend in private primary school enrollment in Tunisia. In 2015, 4.3% of primary school students were in private schools, rising to 5.3% in 2016, and reaching 9.1% by 2023, indicating a significant and ongoing shift from public to private education. The deliberate choice of private schools by middle-class parents is not only a way to overcome the challenges and limitations of public education but also a long-term investment aimed at equipping their children with skills and credentials that enhance their prospects in a globalized world. This ongoing shift underscores how education choices are deeply intertwined with migration aspirations and the desire to navigate and benefit from transnational opportunities, securing social mobility and economic security.
Assessing Government Response to the Mezzouna Tragedy
The government's response to the Mezzouna tragedy has so far been reactive and marked by a lack of accountability. The swift arrest of the Mezzouna school director appears less an act of justice and more a convenient attempt to find a scapegoat. Although he was detained on suspicion of negligence in managing and maintaining the school’s infrastructure, the broader context points to systemic issues well beyond his control. This arrest seems intended to divert attention from deeper, structural failures and to deflect government responsibility. His subsequent release further highlights that he was unfairly targeted and his case was used to shield higher officials from accountability. This exemplifies classic scapegoating: managing public outrage without addressing the root causes.
The government’s reactive approach is also evident in the handling of social unrest related to education decline and broader socio-economic grievances. In Mezzouna and other marginalized regions, hundreds of people demonstrated on the first day, setting tires ablaze and blocking roads. Protests persisted into the following days with marches, meetings, and calls against government neglect and the scapegoating of the school director. Demonstrations also spread to the capital, Tunis, where students protested in solidarity. However, instead of fostering meaningful dialogue or implementing policy changes, these calls for accountability and justice have been met with police violence, including the use of tear gas to disperse demonstrators, arrests, raids, communication blackouts, and assaults on journalists.
The government’s response ostensibly shifted following President Saied’s visit on 18 April 2025. While security forces temporarily withdrew from confrontational roles and participated in community-led cleaning campaigns, these actions risk being little more than symbolic gestures rather than genuine attempts to address the root causes of the grievances. The purported collaboration between security forces and citizens appears largely superficial, casting significant doubt on whether this temporary easing of repression will lead to any meaningful or enduring reforms. Additionally, Saied’s promises to address citizens’ demands and restore dignity to the town have yet to be matched by concrete policy measures or meaningful accountability. Without sustained commitment to structural change, these gestures may serve primarily to defuse immediate tensions without resolving the deeper issues fueling public anger and mistrust.
Overall, the government's responses reflect a broader crisis of governance, where officials are rarely held responsible for failures or abuses, and crisis management is characterized by ad hoc, superficial measures rather than strategic planning and accountability. For example, in response to mounting concerns over unsafe school buildings, the government ordered the swift reinforcement or demolition of crumbling infrastructure nationwide, yet these measures have often been carried out hastily, without clear plans for building back better or ensuring students’ continued access to safe learning environments. Such actions raise serious questions about crisis preparedness and the government’s capacity for sustainable reform, as they do not address the root causes of educational decline and often leave affected communities in limbo. When citizens witness reactive measures that prioritize immediate fixes over sustainable solutions, it fosters a sense of neglect and abandonment, signaling that the government is more focused on short-term appearances than long-term welfare. This sense of uncertainty can affect how communities view the effectiveness and reliability of public institutions, particularly in a context where there have always been challenges related to governance and service delivery. Consequently, communities affected by these abrupt actions are left with skepticism, eroding their confidence in public institutions and weakening the social contract between the state and its citizens. This erosion of trust can have far-reaching consequences, including reduced public cooperation with future reforms, increased social unrest, and a general sense of disenfranchisement.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The tragic death of students in Mezzouna and Hassi El Ferid, along with the high dropout risks and illiteracy rates in many inland regions, reflect the systemic failure of public education to deliver quality outcomes and to fulfill its fundamental role as a vehicle of social mobility. At the core of these tragedies are long-standing issues, including an aging infrastructure dating back to the 1980s, a lack of responsiveness and accountability among officials, divergent political visions for education reform, and persistent regional disparities in development. Moreover, while demolishing crumbling walls in many towns is an important preemptive measure, it remains insufficient, as citizens are seeking more sustainable infrastructure and long-term development that can ensure the safety and security of students. This policy paper suggests the following practical recommendations to address the shortcomings of Tunisian public education:
- Urgent Infrastructure Audit and Maintenance Program: Launch a nationwide audit of all school infrastructure to identify urgent safety risks, followed by immediate repairs and a scheduled maintenance program. This should include clear, streamlined procedures for reporting and addressing hazards, and reducing bureaucratic delays that currently hinder timely interventions.
- Streamline Administrative Procedures and Decentralize Decision-Making: Current maintenance and repair processes are hampered by excessive bureaucracy and unclear responsibilities, leading to dangerous delays. Simplify and decentralize administrative procedures, granting more autonomy and budgetary control to school directors for routine repairs and urgent interventions. Clear guidelines and accountability mechanisms must accompany decentralization to prevent mismanagement and ensure timely action.
- Whole-of-System Approach: Inclusive Governance and Stakeholder Engagement: Adopt a whole-of-system reform strategy that actively involves parents, civil society organizations, and the private sector as responsible partners. This collaborative approach fosters shared responsibility, leverages community resources, and ensures reforms are contextually relevant and broadly supported.
- Transition Public Education Reform from Consultation to Concrete Action: Establish a clear roadmap to transition Tunisia’s education reform program, launched in 2023, beyond the consultation phase by setting defined milestones, assigning responsibilities for implementation, and instituting regular public progress updates. This structured approach will transform consultation outcomes into concrete actions, driving timely and meaningful improvements in public education.
The views represented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Arab Reform Initiative, its staff, or its board.
