Alawite Disparities in Relation to the State and the Fallout of 6 March

تباينات العلاقة مع الدولة في البيئات العلويّة وأثرها في أحداث السادس من آذار/مارس
Protesters holding pictures of fallen Syrian Ministry of Defense forces and banners gather in Marjeh Square to show their support for the Syrian Ministry of Defense and to protest the clashes in the coastal areas of western Syria on March 9, 2025, in Damascus, Syria. (c) Hassan Bilal - Anadolu

Introduction

The bloody attacks of 6 March 2025 on the Syrian Alawite coastal population struck at the heart of Alawite’s challenging relationship with the nascent state. The coastal regions’ reactions varied from calls by the Assad regime’s remnants to control these areas to incitement to killing General Security personnel, all in an attempt to impose a new reality on the region. These events exposed a wide range of disaparities that had previously been under state control.

To try to understand the latent reasoning behind these disparities, this study begins by analyzing residents’ reactions to the calls by the remnants of the Assad regime to take up arms, their behavior during these operations, and their reactions to the victims of the Ministry of Defense, General Security, remnants of the regime as well as civilians. The study relies on an analytical field approach that explores the depth of Alawite contexts across the regions of the Syrian coast, examining the differences in attitudes and their causes, focusing in particular on how the popuplatoin n the area responded to the calls of the Assad regime’s remnants during the events of 6 March.

The study is divided into five parts. The first focuses on political representation in Alawite environments before 6 March; the second covers government policies over the same period; the third divides the Alawite regions into two parts in terms of their reactions to the plans of the regime’s remnants; the fourth analyzes the events of 6 March and their impact on the political positions of Alawites. The fifth section presents the analytical findings behind these disparities. The study aims to help draw a roadmap for the stabilization of the Syrian coast, to understand the discourse of the Alawite political positions, and analyze the domestic political situation emerging in Syria.

This paper relies on analytical interviews with survivors from areas where fighting erupted, as well as areas that are experiencing relative calm.

I: Political Representation Within Alawites Before 6 March

After the fall of the Assad regime, two types of political organizations emerged among Alawites, although they remained within rudimentary organizational frameworks in terms of their capacity for political action and influence. The first is represented by religious organizations, known as "Alawite councils", which used the name of the "Supreme Alawite Islamic Council" in multiple statements issued by different parties and personalities but did not necessarily conform to a single organizational entity. The second type is represented by civil society organizations and political parties, involving Alawite activists who direct their political and social discourse to Alawite populations.

A. The Alawite Councils

The Assad regime has worked to dismantle Alawite religious authorities since Hafez Assad came to power, leaving the Assad family as the sole authority for the community. He besieged the existing authorities and prevented the emergence of new ones, limited the authority of Alawite clerics locally, and expanded the authority of Baathists and military personnel in the regime.

After the fall of Assad, Bassel al-Khatib, a Kalazi,1The Kalazi sect is divided into two main sects: Kalazi and Haidari. Kalazi followers are geographically distributed in the areas of Jableh, Qardaha, Tartus, and some villages in rural Homs and Hama, while Haidari followers are distributed across Alawite villages in the Haffa region and up to the Salanfah district, east of Latakia. The Alawite villages north of Latakia, such as Besnada, Demserkho, Bahluliya, and the villages around Kassab, are considered mostly Haidari. There are major differences between the two sects, the exact truth of which is unknown, and researchers have differing narratives. There are many Haidaris who say that Kalazis historically have held the highest positions in Syria, while Haidaris remained in second place and were forbidden to assume civil or military leadership positions. announced the first Alawi council.2The Kalazi sect is divided into two main sects: Kalazi and Haidari. Kalazi followers are geographically distributed in the areas of Jableh, Qardaha, Tartus, and some villages in rural Homs and Hama, while Haidari followers are distributed across Alawite villages in the Haffa region and up to the Salanfah district, east of Latakia. The Alawite villages north of Latakia, such as Besnada, Demserkho, Bahluliya, and the villages around Kassab, are considered mostly Haidari. There are major differences between the two sects, the exact truth of which is unknown, and researchers have differing narratives. There are many Haidaris who say that Kalazis historically have held the highest positions in Syria, while Haidaris remained in second place and were forbidden to assume civil or military leadership positions. Al-Khatib is known for his ties with officials and influential people in the former regime, but many questions arise about the weight of his representation, especially since, in all his Facebook statements, he did not mention active figures, clerics, or members of the alleged council itself. Nonetheless, his rhetoric resonated with some Alawite circles as he criticized government employee layoffs and demanded the release of Alawite detainees, including military personnel arrested during the fall of the regime. Some of his statements carried a threatening tone toward the new administration, and on more than one occasion, he demanded a general amnesty for everything that had happened before 8 December 2024.3Basil al-Khatib stands with a few people in Tartus, with the same threatening tone and demands a general amnesty for the former regime, 21 February 2025, available at: https://www.facebook.com/Basell.alkhateb/videos/1816414215846396 However, in later statements, he retracted these demands, and his threatening tone disappeared after reports that he was detained for days by the General Security.

Saleh Mansour, another Alawite figure, also appeared to give similar statements4Ara Abu Rafi, "Video... Who is Sheikh Saleh Mansour?" viewed April 7, 2025, Al-Mashhad, 15 January 2025, available at https://almashhad.com/article/773112298002792-News/128863530920072 to those of Basil al-Khatib and announced the creation of another Alawite council. He tried to highlight his role and influence, mediating to resolve tensions after an armed group affiliated with the remnants of the regime kidnapped a General Security patrol in the town of Ain al-Sharqiya in the Jableh countryside on 14 January 2025.5Saleh Mansour makes a statement explaining the agreement he made with General Security to free the hostages, date of publication: 14 January 2025, available at: https://www.facebook.com/Mazaralqataria/videos/1259679271790344

Sheikh Ghazal Ghazal, who belongs to the Haidari sect of the Alawites, also released a statement announcing the formation of the Alawite Islamic Council6Sheikh Ghazal Ghazal in a statement on the page of the so-called Alawite Supreme Islamic Council, date of publication: 24 February 2025, available at: https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=3637821943029528&extid=CL-UNK-UNK-UNK-AN_GK0T-GK1C&ref=sharing — he did not agree to be the head of the council as announced by Basil al-Khatib, nor did he mention any relationship with Saleh Mansour, despite their closeness. The tone of Ghazal’s statement was less strident than Mansour and al-Khatib. It is worth noting the Haidaris did not participate in the 6 March attacks, and their areas did not witness hostile incidents or violations.

The suburb of Demserkho, located about two kilometers from Latakia city, was a relative exception, as it is one of the most prominent areas with a Haidari majority that was subjected to an attempted intervention. Factions affiliated with the Ministry of Defense attempted to enter and comb the area, but the General Security quickly intervened, preventing any clashes or violations from happening.

B. Civil and Non-Governmental Organizations

Civil and non-governmental organizations are considered the most important and closest popular incubators for Alawites, be it in terms of peaceful discourse or calls to stop the bloodshed and defend the new state-building project. These organizations gain their importance from their close connection to and emanation from Alawite populations. They are divided into three groups:

  • Civil society organizations that emerged after the fall:7Samer Abbas, "Political Prospects in the Syrian Coast after the Fall of the Regime (Baniyas as a Model)," Harmon Center for Contemporary Studies, date of publication 22 February 2025, available at: https://www.harmoon.org/researches/%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3/ These are organizations created by political activists, opponents of the former regime, and groups of young people working in the civil sector. They do not represent Alawites as such nor do they have sub-national agendas. Their members are sectarian, characterized by regionalism since they span areas of specific cities and sometimes towns. They do not have a civil organization status, despite their members’ insistence on naming them so. Most of them are concerned with general Syrian affairs and publish political statements without specializing in specific fields. Their importance lies in their financial independence and the democratic potential within them, which is hindered by the lack of awareness of democratic and political practice and the absence of democratic mechanisms and tools. They tend to be participatory civil political organizations that may evolve more explicit, democratic mechanisms.
  • Religious and civil society actors attempting to organize themselves: This type of organizational political initiative emerged in Alawite villages and towns and is still in the process of establishing an Alawite organization. It is now based on local religious authorities who enjoy popular support in their villages, towns, and communities. These initiatives contributed to stopping many of the seditious plans the remnants of the regime tried to ignite, such as in the northern countryside of Qadmous. They failed in other areas, such as the southern Qadmous countryside, where Assad regime Republican Guard officers controlled decision-making in the village of Hamam Wasel8The researcher belongs to the same area and the people of the area confirmed this story, as the mukhtar handed over about a thousand rifles. A post on the village's Facebook page after the meeting with the General Security, date of publication: 17 March 2025 Link: https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=122119788896656455&set=a.122103902612656455 during the period leading up to the 6 March events.
  • Influential businessmen in Alawite circles: Many businessmen from Alawite backgrounds have a large community presence, especially those who provide material and in-kind assistance to people in their areas. The new administration established links and contacts with many of them, which helped quell many of the security disturbances after 6 March. This was particularly the case of businessman Nizar Asaad, who provides material assistance to nearly 2,000 university students in the Dreikish area, and – according to eyewitness accounts from the area, prevented 150 armed men from ambushing General Security Forces heading to Dreikish on 8 March after they had been driven out by the remnants of the regime.9Al-Mundhir A., 57 years old, witness interview on 14 March 2025, near the city of al-Dreikish. The new administration has also good relations with other businessmen, such as Mehran Khondeh, owner of the largest passenger transportation company in Syria, al-Qadmous.

II: Government Policies in Alawite Areas Before 6 March

The legacy of Bashar al-Assad’s regime was heavy on the new administration, especially with regard to entrenched corruption and the deterioration of the population’s living conditions. The new administration made hasty and often improvised decisions to start implementing its economic and security policies. This led to a state of popular outrage among Alawites, primarily for reasons related to the Alawite environment and the shape of reforms initiated by the new administration. The Alawites are more closely associated with the government and in much higher proportions than other segments of Syrian society. This is due to the former regime’s policies of impoverishing Alawite areas and drying up their sources of income, thereby pushing them toward volunteering for the army and Intelligence services. From the first hours of the fall of the regime, tens of thousands of military personnel serving in Assad’s army were laid off, public transportation fares nearly tripled due to the liberalization of fuel prices, and within three months, thousands of government employees were laid off during administrative reforms. In the absence of salary increases for the remaining employees, a wide range of extremely poor citizens emerged in Alawite areas, mostly demobilized military personnel returning from major cities, such as Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo, who had lost the housing provided by the Assad regime. This was accompanied by a large proliferation of weapons in Alawite areas after many Alawites stole and looted the regime’s military bases following its fall.10Samer Abbas, “Tartus After the Fall of the Regime: Initial Impressions", Arab Reform Initiative, 16 January 2025, available at https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/tartus-after-the-fall-of-the-regime-initial-impressions/ The number of missing weapons is estimated at tens of thousands, including medium and light weapons, in addition to leaving social media spaces open to the Assad discourse promoters, who unleashed betrayal, hatred, and intimidation campaigns among the people along the coast. Most Alawite youth were offered work with the remnants of the regime but felt anxious about the future and at the same time were filled with hope that spread in Alawite circles regarding international intervention and placing the coast under international protection, at a time when the new administration worked to remove all traces of Alawite elements from leadership and sensitive positions. The new administration replaced leading Alawite figures with Islamist elements, who directed hardline sectarian speeches at those who remained in the government sector. These factors led to the emergence of a state of despair and frustration among a large segment of Alawites, in conjunction with the proliferation of weapons and the neglect of the file of Assad’s senior military officers, who were left in Alawite areas without any investigation.

III: Alawite Reactions to Plans of the Regime Remnants

Alawite regions were divided into two main parts in their reactions to the 6 March events.

A. Regions Divided Between Defending the State and Carrying Out Other Projects

Nearly nine areas witnessed clashes on 6 March between regime remnants and Syrian government forces:11SNHR, "803 extrajudicial killings between 6 and 10 March 2025," accessed 20 March 2025, available at: https://snhr.org/arabic/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2025/03/R250305A-2.pdf; Jusoor Center for Studies and Research, "Theater of military operations against the remnants in the Syrian coast," by: Obada al-Abdullah, Mahmoud Ebo, available at: https://www.jusoor.co/ar/details/مسرح-العمليات-العسكرية-ضد-الفلول-في-الساحل-السوري Harison, Baniyas, Jableh, Qardaha, al-Datour area and its surroundings in the city of Latakia, Sattamo district, Salanfah triangle, al-Daliyah, and Beit Ana. Some of these areas were out of government control for a few hours, others for more than 24 hours. Remnant rebels worked to fan the flames of events in these areas with some success, cutting off supply routes, isolating them, and deploying personnel in their surroundings. Clashes and guerrilla warfare then took place in Qardaha, Baniyas, and Jableh, where battles continued for more than two days. In Qardaha, faction members set up ambushes, targeted government forces, and assaulted and terrorized the population. Afterward, government forces entered some of these areas and towns to conduct manhunt operations; these were followed by arbitrary, random, and vengeful executions, with horrific massacres against civilian populations being reported. We met and spoke to people from these areas about the reasons they responded to faction leaders in higher numbers than in other areas, and the inability of the rest of the population to stop these factions.

- Baniyas Area: The events of 6 March in the city of Baniyas were one of the bloodiest and most complex episodes in the relationship between the city’s constituents and the emerging Syrian state, especially in Alawite-majority neighborhoods, such as al-Qouz and Al-Qusour. These events represented the culmination of security and social tensions that have been building up since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.

Al-Qouz neighborhood is in direct contact with predominantly Sunni neighborhoods.12Annonymous witness interview on 17 March 2025, in the city of Baniyas. After the fall of the regime, residents of the neighborhood received threats from Sunnis who accused them of participating in and being responsible for the 2 May 2013 al-Bayda massacre committed by the regime and involving Alawite militias led by Ali al-Kayyali. More than 250 civilians were killed;13Syrian Network for Human Rights, "No One Left: Field Executions by Syrian Forces in al-Bayda and Baniyas," 13 September 2013, available at: https://www.hrw.org/ar/report/2013/09/13/256470; Mohammed al-Qasim, "Shocking details of Syria's al-Bayda massacre," Al Jazeera.net, date of publication 23 February 2014, available at: https://www.aljazeera.net/news/2014/2/23/تفاصيل-مروعة-عن-مجزرة-البيضا-بسوريا killings, looting, and thefts also took place in Ras al-Nabaa over the same period.

The day before the 6 March attack, Al-Qouz was emptied of its inhabitants by the regime’s remnants through intimidation, with some of its residents remaining as snipers and machine gun bearers.14A witness from Ras al-Nabaa neighborhood, 67, who has been active for more than twenty years in the field of human rights, was interviewed on 17 March 2025. According to a witness:

We felt fear from the first moments of the fall of the regime, and some residents fled from that moment under the weight of threats. We received threats from former security personnel, officers, and their collaborators (meaning the remnants) to kill us if we did not respond to their request to evacuate on 5 March. Residents feared both elements of the regime’s remnants and nearby Sunni militants.

- Al-Qusour, a predominantly Alawite neighborhood in Baniyas, also witnessed abnormal movement on 6 March 2025, with many of its residents fleeing to nearby villages.

On 6 March, the operation to take control of Al-Qusour and al-Qouz took place, and ambushes were set up for the General Security personnel. The hospital was besieged, the security responsible for protecting it was liquidated, and some of its units were taken out of service. Civilians who were trying to rescue injured General Security personnel were targeted at the Cultural Center at the gateway to the Al-Qusour neighborhood. On the second day, after the arrival of the factions and the attack on the Al-Qusour neighborhood in particular, the battle stopped, and combing the streets began, where 186 civilians were killed, according to the Syrian Network for Human Rights.

According to witnesses in Al-Qusour, most residents were surprised by the 6 March events, despite complaints about government restructuring and the subsequent dismissal of a large number of employees, as well as poverty and a lack of income for army and security forces employees, who make up a large percentage of the city’s population.15The witnesses were interviewed on 17 and 18 March 2025, in Baniyas, and their testimonies were interrupted by others. Tensions were high in villages with large numbers of officers in the army and security forces, such as Deir al-Bashal and Barmaya, where there was a sharp tone of hostility toward the new administration. One of the witnesses added:

We started hearing the sounds of clashes, and residents stayed indoors. On Friday morning [March 7], the factions’ systematic killings, looting, and burning began. They continued their raids for about 12 hours, killing everyone they saw in the street, taking large numbers of people from their homes, and killing them in cold blood, with the bodies remaining lying there for more than two days. Rural Qadmous

Hammam Wasil is a town south of the Baniyas district. According to a town resident:

Most of the young men in the village were volunteers in either the Military Security or the Republican Guard, and there were high-ranking officers in the village. As soon as the regime fell, all of them returned to the village with their weapons. In addition, a number of them robbed several military posts during the first days of the fall of the regime, and we felt like we were living in a military battalion. Before the 6 March events, former soldiers participated in secret meetings with the officers, and I confirmed that they were receiving salaries from these officers, but we did not know where the money was coming from. The number of these armed men reached about 1,500. They began controlling the town and its surroundings since the end of February, under the pretext of protecting the area from thieves. They besieged the city of Qadmous more than once and were absorbed by the new administration’s local authorities in Syria, except on 6 March, when their activity was concentrated in and around the city of Baniyas. After the factions entered the city, they returned to the village and barricaded themselves there, and clashed with government forces, which resulted in the death of about 10 people and the destruction of homes and property in the village. The situation ended with the intervention from notables and wanted individuals surrendered to government forces, and a large number of weapons were handed over to the authorities.[15]

B. Areas Strongly in Favor of Defending the New State-Building Project

These areas were not absent from the plans of the regime’s remnants; there were preparations to target government forces present in them, as in other areas along the Syrian coast. However, residents thwarted these plans on the Syrian coast, but other areas fell out of state control, such as Dreikish, Sheikh Badr, and Qadmous. In areas such as Dreikish, Sheikh Badr, Beit Yashut, Qatilbiyah, Tartus City, and others along the coast that did not witness hostilities, residents protected government personnel. We conducted in-depth interviews with activists from these areas and will provide extensive accounts of their testimonies:16The researcher collected many testimonies from these areas since the beginning of the events. He lives in rural Tartus (Al-Naqib) and travels frequently to his hometown of Qadmous between 6 March 2025, and the time of writing this report.

  • Qadmous: On 6 March, a General Security vehicle was targeted at one of the city’s entrances. Government forces left soon after. The sheikhs and notables of the area contacted the General Security Forces, securing their entry. Residents also collected weapons and handed them over to the General Security Forces. The city and its countryside witnessed many community initiatives to create trust: some village sheikhs invited General Security Forces and government representatives for Ramadan Iftar meals.
  • Sheikh Badr: On 6 March, remnants of the regime besieged the police station and captured General Security personnel. Residents rose to resist, expelling them and rescuing the personnel. They also prevented uncontrolled armed demonstrations in the town. When calm was restored on March 8, residents held a welcoming banquet for the General Security.
  • Al-Naqib, Southern Tartus countryside: On 6 March, remnants of the regime tried to raid a General Security outpost in the town, but local youth guarded the personnel and expelled the remnants.

These three areas did not witness any killings, destruction, or theft, nor did the army enter them, and life returned to normal on the morning of 9 March. The city of Tartus did not witness any violent demonstrations or instances of killing and executions. The remnants of the regime tried to turn a demonstration on the evening of 6 March into a violent, armed incident but were met with strong rejection and condemnation by the people. Those who called for taking up arms remained a small minority and, fearing for their life, they put down their weapons and returned to their homes.

As news of massacres traveled fast after 6 March, Alawite regions experienced fear and terror in coastal cities, villages, and towns. Most rural residents spent two or more nights in the wilderness to escape the factions, known for their violence, killing, looting, and burning that accompany their entry into any area.

IV: The Alawites’ Attitude Toward the New Administration After 6 March

In addition to the military operations and violations, which amounted in many cases to massacres against civilians, the 6 March events witnessed campaigns of intimidation and terror on the population, some manifestations of which are still present today at checkpoints set up by government forces, and in cases of interrogations and raids on homes in search of wanted persons, including the retention of army checkpoints on many coastal roads. The state of intimidation has also involved the regime’s remnants and all those who support their discourse, in terms of exaggerating events and threatening Alawites themselves with further massacres, to undermine the new administration’s general political will to draw an integrated picture of the state. The rhetoric of the factions and some Alawite councils – especially the trio of al-Khatib, Mansour, and Ghazal – is determined to make it look like Sunni jihadists attacked Alawites, and to perpetuate the idea that the massacres will continue and even increase, pushing the population to keep their weapons and mobilizing them to fight the state’s security forces. While a good percentage of Alawites are aware of the remnants’ rhetoric, their fears of repeated deadly scenarios or the continued presence of “militant factions” along the coast, and their subsequent violations and inappropriate ways of dealing with civilians, remain strong. Therefore, fear is the main driver behind the Alawites’ political stance. It is based on uncalculated reactions to events and does not require collective reflection on the implications of any political positions they may take. Moreover, the absence of actual Alawite political representation on the ground and the weakness of the current representative structures, or those that have been put in place recently, contribute significantly to the general fragmentation of the Alawite civil society work. Therefore, demands such as international protection or partition are well received by Alawites, who hope to regain a sense of security they had lost since the 6 March events.

These demands, which are not based on any political discourse among Alawites, serve as a social justification for those who want to exploit the recent events and seize opportunities to gather Alawite support and draw attention to themselves – perhaps to play a political role, or an attempt to sabotage the state-building project, as Ghazal did in his statement a month after the events.

The project of state-building and sustainable security is an aspiration for Alawites, but they find this aspiration constantly under threat by the actions of many members of the new administration. The issue of everyday security cannot be overlooked, nor can the aspirations for better living, which Alawites see as possible if the new administration can rebuild trust and strengthen the state’s security presence along the coast. This is radically different from the current military presence that seems intimidating to the majority of them.

V: Conclusions

Politically, most of the declared Alawite councils are made up of figures who were close to the former regime and were strongly motivated to influence events quickly and directly, due to their rapid rise and clear anti-administration rhetoric. Most Alawites resented the councils’ calls for foreign intervention and general amnesty during the periods following the fall of Assad. Alawite demands were focused on living conditions and the arbitrary layoffs from military and government positions. We are talking about figures such as Ghazal, Mansour, and al-Khatib, whose statements carried a threatening tone to the current administration in Syria, as well as most Alawite religious and civil society actors. To a large extent, these figures succeeded in conveying a state of fear of the new administration, especially since civil and community councils were still in the process of getting organized and had not yet succeeded in announcing an Alawite council.

But the trio of al-Khatib, Mansour, and Ghazal was, intentionally or not, representing the remnants’ political discourse when addressing the Alawites as a party targeted by the Sunnis. Al-Khatib, for example, used the phrase “You have your religion and we have ours” after each demand. Ghazal Ghazal’s speech at the Al-Khalifa Mosque reinforced the idea that Sunnis target Alawites and their children are at risk of being slaughtered. Mansour also addressed a crowd of mourners in his hometown and demanded international protection for Alawites from Sunni militants. The remnants made a bet on the Alawites’ response to using this rhetoric in exchange for the remnants’ conviction that Alawite religious, civic, and community representatives are weak and poorly organized. This is contingent on how good the new administration’s policies toward Alawites are as this will reinforce their state-building rhetoric. Alawite notables have a key role to play as they are closely linked to their environments in terms of the origin of their political power, while the remnants are often linked to projects and goals that serve those involved, criminals, senior army and Intelligence officers, as well as possibly regional states.

Militarily: From the fall of the Assad regime on 8 December 2024 to 6 March 2025, the remnants of the regime worked to organize its ranks in various areas along the Syrian coast, where its rhetoric was public in Alawite environments, in addition to the freedom of movement enjoyed by its members, which the new administration in Syria was unable to limit, or even confiscate large numbers of weapons they looted from military facilities. For three months, the remnants had managed to secure contact with a group from every village, town, and coastal city, and to ensure that they could mobilize on 6 March to take control of all areas of the Syrian coast and impose a new reality on the new administration and the international community. This plan partially succeeded in certain areas but collided with Alawite reactions in other areas. The rapid intervention of the new administration and its mobilization of thousands of fighters, directing them toward the coast also contributed to undermining the remnants’ plan to take control of any area for more than twelve hours. In the city of Baniyas and the Al-Qusour neighborhood, in particular, the fiercest battles were fought on the night of 6 March between remnants and government forces. On the morning of 7 March, the factions reverted to their previous status of small pockets far from city centers and sleeper cells. The new administration remains determined to end this file by continuing its military operations along the Syrian coast, despite continuing violations and lack of discipline of many of its members. The pace of military actions and accompanying violations decreased with government forces' control of these areas and the Alawite surrendering of weapons and wanted individuals in many villages.

From the above-mentioned factors, we can identify three that significantly contributed to the differences in attitudes toward recent events and the lack of involvement with the remnants of the regime, including:

  • The population’s reliance on non-military sources of income as a disincentive, such as independent sources of income and civilian government jobs. The integration of the majority of the population in these areas into civilian life and government jobs has contributed to greater respect for laws — as was the case in the city of Tartus and its rural areas close to the city center. Despite multiple dismissals from civilian jobs, the general sense is that these areas still want to work peacefully with the state.
  • Sunni-Alawite sectarian friction as a catalyst: The Assad regime, both father and son, played on these binaries, incentivizing hate speech on both sides and threatening both. It has sought to deliver threatening messages to Alawites since the events of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1980s. The Syrian revolution, which began in 2011, awakened this rhetoric, and the regime mobilized Alawites from these areas, launching them into violent campaigns against the demonstrators, and later involving them in sectarian killings and massacres, as happened in al-Bayda in Baniyas. After the fall of the regime, the remnants of the regime worked to threaten these Sunni environments and emphasized the Sunnis were preparing mass massacres.
  • In impoverished rural areas with relatively large numbers of military personnel, the regime’s reliance on Alawite security and military tribal affiliations led to differences in people’s reactions. The affiliations to the Matawla and Kalbiyyin clans were a motivating factor, in that most of the military personnel were close to the Assad regime17Alimar Lazqani (Samer Abbas), "A preliminary approach to the relationship between Alawites and Assad's authority," Jisr newspaper, viewed on 7 April 2025, available at: https://www.jesrpress.com/journalism/مقاربة-أولية-لعلاقة-العلويين-وسلطة-الأسد and involved in the massacres carried – mainly the Republican Guard, the Fourth Division, and Military Intelligence. The example of the town of Hamam Wasel in the southern countryside of Qadmous is indicative of this, as most of its military personnel were involved in these sectors. While in the northern countryside of Qadmous, we find most of the personnel work in regular army units where the percentage of Intelligence, Republican Guard, and Fourth Division officers are comparatively lower than in Hammam Wasel, which witnessed widespread clashes that implicated many of its residents in remnant projects. The northern countryside of Qadmous did not witness any security disturbances, unlike the southern countryside.

Conclusion

The unrest created by the factions appears to have been coordinated. They relied on this newly generated grievance among Alawites in parallel with historically related Sunni oppression. It also emphasized the promise of the return of power to Alawite hands, especially along Syrian coastal regions. However, other factors were more influential, such as the sudden army and security forces unemployment levels, and the eagerness of most of those involved to return to arms and accumulate money. Many of them found the salaries offered by the remnants of the regime attractive and were tempted by their appalling living conditions. This is despite the new administration’s neglect of the remnants file, from a security point of view, as well as ignoring the general mood in the Alawites. This makes the Alawites one of the most affected in terms of livelihood. The new administration also left Assad’s senior officers working in the Intelligence and security sectors, the Republican Guard, and the Fourth Division unchecked – individuals who are likely to be brought to trials and the confiscation of the wealth they looted from the Syrian people over decades. They were, and still are, the main driving force behind the remnants.

All these factors would have undoubtedly led to a full-scale civil war. However, many Alawites are in favor of a national state project and refuse to take up arms, realizing the extent of the criminality of the Assad regime and its followers, and hope to build a safe and stable homeland. These are the main factors behind the failure of the remnants’ plans. The Alawite’s wide-ranging reactions to the remnants project contributed to their failure and mainly furthered the new administration’s ability to deal with the pockets that got out of control. This reaction carries great danger that could lead to chaos at the Alawites’ expense.18SNHR, "803 extrajudicial killings between March 6 and 10, 2025," accessed 20 March 2025, available at: https://snhr.org/arabic/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2025/03/R250305A-2.pdf Undisciplined elements and factions in the new regime — some of them jihadists with criminal records — have rushed to carry out mass and field executions in Alawite areas. It must ensure this does not happen again and the perpetrators are held accountable.

The importance of the investigation committee19Ibid. p. 2. announced by the head of the transitional period, Mr. Ahmad al-Sharaa, comes in outlining the face of a new Syria, where no crime goes unpunished, in addition to controlling the army, neutralizing jihadist elements, and disbanding undisciplined factions. The recent coastal events also highlighted the need to proceed with transitional justice, to form a civilian government representing the full spectrum of Syrian people, to stop sectarian fighting and insecurity, and to dampen the political motives for rebellion in these environments by integrating all segments of Syrian society into the security and military forces, enhancing communication with segments of society, and building healthy relations between society and the state.

There is no doubt that there are many objective factors that push Alawite environments in directions outside the framework of state-building, but they remain weaker than other countervailing factors, making Alawites an integral actor in the new Syrian state. However, Alawites inherited weak political organization from the previous regime, which further complicates matters as a result of the deep social and political fragmentation and a lack of trust between Alawites themselves and any future government. These issues are likely to worsen in the future unless the Alawites see rational state policies that reflect positively on their living conditions and security. As for political representation and the obstacles they pose for both the authorities and society, the roadmap is still unclear and requires intensive efforts from social and political elites, the new administration, and civil society, in preparation for peaceful and democratic political contests that promote development and belonging. This long road has a parallel path: limiting weapons to the state and restricting state violence. These two paths interact and overlap to produce a national political equation for the Alawites, who – if the new administration succeeds in safely establishing a new state, and silences international criticism of “persecuting minorities” – will become a national lever and an important support for the Syrian state in its civil and modernist project.

Endnotes

Endnotes
1 The Kalazi sect is divided into two main sects: Kalazi and Haidari. Kalazi followers are geographically distributed in the areas of Jableh, Qardaha, Tartus, and some villages in rural Homs and Hama, while Haidari followers are distributed across Alawite villages in the Haffa region and up to the Salanfah district, east of Latakia. The Alawite villages north of Latakia, such as Besnada, Demserkho, Bahluliya, and the villages around Kassab, are considered mostly Haidari. There are major differences between the two sects, the exact truth of which is unknown, and researchers have differing narratives. There are many Haidaris who say that Kalazis historically have held the highest positions in Syria, while Haidaris remained in second place and were forbidden to assume civil or military leadership positions.
2 The Kalazi sect is divided into two main sects: Kalazi and Haidari. Kalazi followers are geographically distributed in the areas of Jableh, Qardaha, Tartus, and some villages in rural Homs and Hama, while Haidari followers are distributed across Alawite villages in the Haffa region and up to the Salanfah district, east of Latakia. The Alawite villages north of Latakia, such as Besnada, Demserkho, Bahluliya, and the villages around Kassab, are considered mostly Haidari. There are major differences between the two sects, the exact truth of which is unknown, and researchers have differing narratives. There are many Haidaris who say that Kalazis historically have held the highest positions in Syria, while Haidaris remained in second place and were forbidden to assume civil or military leadership positions.
3 Basil al-Khatib stands with a few people in Tartus, with the same threatening tone and demands a general amnesty for the former regime, 21 February 2025, available at: https://www.facebook.com/Basell.alkhateb/videos/1816414215846396
4 Ara Abu Rafi, "Video... Who is Sheikh Saleh Mansour?" viewed April 7, 2025, Al-Mashhad, 15 January 2025, available at https://almashhad.com/article/773112298002792-News/128863530920072
5 Saleh Mansour makes a statement explaining the agreement he made with General Security to free the hostages, date of publication: 14 January 2025, available at: https://www.facebook.com/Mazaralqataria/videos/1259679271790344
6 Sheikh Ghazal Ghazal in a statement on the page of the so-called Alawite Supreme Islamic Council, date of publication: 24 February 2025, available at: https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=3637821943029528&extid=CL-UNK-UNK-UNK-AN_GK0T-GK1C&ref=sharing
7 Samer Abbas, "Political Prospects in the Syrian Coast after the Fall of the Regime (Baniyas as a Model)," Harmon Center for Contemporary Studies, date of publication 22 February 2025, available at: https://www.harmoon.org/researches/%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3/
8 The researcher belongs to the same area and the people of the area confirmed this story, as the mukhtar handed over about a thousand rifles. A post on the village's Facebook page after the meeting with the General Security, date of publication: 17 March 2025 Link: https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=122119788896656455&set=a.122103902612656455
9 Al-Mundhir A., 57 years old, witness interview on 14 March 2025, near the city of al-Dreikish.
10 Samer Abbas, “Tartus After the Fall of the Regime: Initial Impressions", Arab Reform Initiative, 16 January 2025, available at https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/tartus-after-the-fall-of-the-regime-initial-impressions/
11 SNHR, "803 extrajudicial killings between 6 and 10 March 2025," accessed 20 March 2025, available at: https://snhr.org/arabic/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2025/03/R250305A-2.pdf; Jusoor Center for Studies and Research, "Theater of military operations against the remnants in the Syrian coast," by: Obada al-Abdullah, Mahmoud Ebo, available at: https://www.jusoor.co/ar/details/مسرح-العمليات-العسكرية-ضد-الفلول-في-الساحل-السوري
12 Annonymous witness interview on 17 March 2025, in the city of Baniyas.
13 Syrian Network for Human Rights, "No One Left: Field Executions by Syrian Forces in al-Bayda and Baniyas," 13 September 2013, available at: https://www.hrw.org/ar/report/2013/09/13/256470; Mohammed al-Qasim, "Shocking details of Syria's al-Bayda massacre," Al Jazeera.net, date of publication 23 February 2014, available at: https://www.aljazeera.net/news/2014/2/23/تفاصيل-مروعة-عن-مجزرة-البيضا-بسوريا
14 A witness from Ras al-Nabaa neighborhood, 67, who has been active for more than twenty years in the field of human rights, was interviewed on 17 March 2025.
15 The witnesses were interviewed on 17 and 18 March 2025, in Baniyas, and their testimonies were interrupted by others.
16 The researcher collected many testimonies from these areas since the beginning of the events. He lives in rural Tartus (Al-Naqib) and travels frequently to his hometown of Qadmous between 6 March 2025, and the time of writing this report.
17 Alimar Lazqani (Samer Abbas), "A preliminary approach to the relationship between Alawites and Assad's authority," Jisr newspaper, viewed on 7 April 2025, available at: https://www.jesrpress.com/journalism/مقاربة-أولية-لعلاقة-العلويين-وسلطة-الأسد
18 SNHR, "803 extrajudicial killings between March 6 and 10, 2025," accessed 20 March 2025, available at: https://snhr.org/arabic/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2025/03/R250305A-2.pdf
19 Ibid. p. 2.

The views represented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Arab Reform Initiative, its staff, or its board.