The discussion will be held in both Arabic and English, with interpretation available on Zoom only.

You can register to attend by following this link. You will receive a Zoom confirmation email should your registration be successful. Alternatively, you can watch the event live here on our Facebook page.

Since September, a new wave of youth protests has swept across Morocco, marked by a high degree of localization of mobilization efforts across the country and relying on new digital platforms such as Discord for horizontal coordination. Triggered by the death of multiple women in childbirth in Agadir, the protesters, calling themselves Gen Z 212, have taken to the streets to contest the lack of basic healthcare and education in the country. And as with previous waves of youth protest across the region, the social and economic grievances that drove initial mobilization have transformed into concrete political demands, and namely the dismissal of the government. Yet, as opposed to the previous round of youth-led protest in 2011, the M20F movement, the current wave in Morocco is not unfolding as part of a regional dynamic; instead, it is taking place within a larger global dynamic of Gen Z protests occurring simultaneously around the world.

In Nepal, protests that began in early September 2025 after the government banned 26 social media platforms quickly evolved into a broader revolt against corruption and nepotism, ultimately forcing the lifting of the ban and the resignation of the Prime Minister. In Bangladesh, the July 2024 “Monsoon Uprising” started with student opposition to an unfair quota system but soon expanded into a nationwide call for democratic reform, culminating in a political crisis that exposed deep divisions over governance. Meanwhile, in Serbia, youth discontent over corruption, collapsing infrastructure, and democratic backsliding has sparked sustained protests over the past year that, while still ongoing, have drawn international attention and pressure for reform. Similar examples can also be found in Madagascar, Peru, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia, to name but a few. While diverse in context, and geographical localization, these movements share a sense of generational rupture and expose the widening gap between citizens’ expectations and political systems that appear unable or unwilling to reform. On the surface, they echo earlier waves of youth activism — notably the 2011 Arab uprisings and the 2019–2020 global uprisings — in their leaderless organization, reliance on digital networks, and rejection of corruption and inequality. Yet, there are emerging features that warrant closer scrutiny. Are these movements more confrontational and disruptive, or simply more visible due to digital amplification of the last decade? Are we witnessing the crystallization of a new political consciousness shaped by digital nativism, a post-pandemic precarity, and disillusionment with narratives of democracy, or all of the above?

This webinar aims to unpack what distinguishes this new wave of mobilization as a whole as well as what unites and/or differentiates each movement across national contexts. It asks whether we can meaningfully speak of a transnational Gen Z mode of protest — one defined not by ideology, but by shared repertoires of frustration, creativity, and moral claim-making. Is there really an identifiable Gen Z political consciousness across contexts, or are we projecting generational coherence onto diverse, localized grievances?

The webinar will also aim to address specific questions, including: 

• How does Gen Z’s digital fluency and the rise of sophisticated state surveillance technologies co-produce new forms of mobilization and repression, and what is the relationship between the two?
• To what extent do these protests demonstrate intergenerational learning from earlier waves, or are they reinventing protest logics for a new era?
• Do these mobilizations carry alternative visions of pluralism and inclusion and represent the renewal of democratic life — or its exhaustion?
• Bangladesh’s recent youth inclusion in transitional governance presents a potential model — but does it amount to genuine participation or symbolic co-optation? Can this model be adapted in other contexts such as Morocco or Nepal?