Executive Summary
The clear opposition of Arab countries to the commitment to end fossil fuel use barred the mention of it in the final drafted text. For the Arab group, fossil fuels are associated with energy security, and they maintained a rigid stance throughout negotiations. The Arab region is highly diverse and includes not only petroleum states but also countries highly susceptible to conflicts and resource scarcity. This diversity in identity materialized in diverse positions. Oil-producing nations like Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) actively blocked the phaseout of fossil fuels, while the Levant advocated for reconstruction and infrastructure development funds. In the area of adaptation, at least eight Arab states submitted updated climate pledges, but little support has been provided for the region's vulnerable countries suffering from water scarcity and energy poverty. In mitigation, the Arab group opposed expanding the mitigation ambition and implementation work program’s mandate and emphasized that national climate pledges should remain voluntary. With respect to finance, the Arab group played a central role in pushing for enhanced climate finance obligations from developed countries by calling for a three-year work program implementing Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement.
In that context, the following report will provide a comprehensive look into the Arab group’s internal disparities. It will provide an outlook on the impact of such divisions on their reception to the COP30 outcomes in parallel to the formulation of their respective NDCs. Understandably, a divergent Arab region stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Arabian Sea holds divergent opinions, outlooks, and objectives, notably with respect to the achievement of the Paris Agreement.
Context and Importance
The outcomes of COP30 in a polarized world
Various parties convened for the 30th UN Climate Change Conference. COP30 was the first meeting after the first global stocktaking, amidst the loss of leadership due to the US’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and the launch of the NDCs. Negotiators have reflected that the lack of substantive engagement and political interest from developed countries in COP30 resulted in an unbalanced package of outcomes, including mitigation goals that lack technical depth and fail to establish rigorous new mandates.
Even within the fraught political landscape crystallized by global political polarization and the US’s withdrawal, the Arab group is considered one of the most internally heterogeneous yet strategically consequential coalitions. Being analytically one of the most underexamined negotiating coalitions in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change process, the Arab group requires rather urgent and rigorous scholarly attention. This paper is written in the aftermath of COP30 and ahead of COP31 in Turkey precisely because the conference crystallized, with unusual clarity, the tensions, contradictions, and strategic calculations that define Arab states’ engagement with the global climate regime. The Belém Political Package, the Global Mutirão decision, the launch of the Belém Mission, and the failure to secure binding language on fossil fuel phaseout create a set of outcomes with implications for Arab states that are neither uniform nor straightforward.
We are at a critical moment where three converging imperatives require an examination of the Arab group’s experience at COP30.
First, COP30 was characterized by deeply entrenched divisions between developed and developing countries, marked by the absence of the US from formal negotiations for the first time in history. In that context, many coalitions were reshaped, placing Arab countries in complex situations that require focused lenses to understand their dynamics.
Second, Arab countries’ efforts were instrumental in leading the opposition to strong language against fossil fuels, which ultimately led to a watered-down final text merely calling for an accelerated transition away from fossil fuels in a rather just and equitable manner. On the other hand, the Arab bloc focused its effort on adaptation finance. It is therefore important to capture the dual nature of the Arab group that resists certain outcomes and urgently endorses others with a deeper analysis.
Third, COP30 directly relates to the NDCs: 163 of 197 participant states have submitted their newest versions for review. Evaluating the relationship between the Belém Action Plan and the issued NDCs is instrumental for examining strategies for upcoming negotiations, notably at 2026’s COP31 in Antalya, Turkey.
Studies have expanded substantially in recent years in an attempt to understand the positions of different groups, notably those of emerging economies. However, most have failed to capture the complexities of diverse coalitions, notably those of the Arab group. This bloc of 22 member states includes major hydrocarbon producers such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Iraq; small island and coastal states with acute vulnerability profiles; conflict-affected nations such as Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Sudan, where climate and security crises are already intersecting; and lower-middle-income economies with limited adaptive capacity and high dependence on external finance. This geopolitical heterogeneity cannot be translated into a single narrative that could capture the Arab positions across different thematic areas of climate negotiations; attempting to do so would leave blind spots in understanding their deeply held positions and their impacts on each country’s policies.
In that context, this paper is guided by the following questions:
- How did internal political, economic, and structural differences within the Arab group shape its negotiating positions at COP30 across key thematic areas, and how were intra-bloc disagreements managed in practice?
- To what extent did the outcomes of COP30 respond to the differentiated needs and priorities of Arab states, especially those that are conflict-affected, climate vulnerable, or heavily dependent on hydrocarbon revenues?
- How did Arab states interpret the COP30 outcomes, and how did they shape their expectations after the conference?
- What does the Arab group’s experience at COP30 reveal about the broader structural challenges facing developing country coalitions in a polarized multilateral order, and what are the implications for the coalition’s strategic positioning heading into COP31?
Methodology
The following report is based on the analysis of the daily digest reports issued by the International Institute for Sustainable Development’s Earth Negotiations Bulletin, which provided independent, on-the-ground coverage of UN climate negotiations alongside a series of semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders involved in COP30. The daily digests offered systematic, neutral, detailed accounts of formal and informal negotiation processes – including plenary sessions, contact groups, and informal consultations – that captured the evolving positions, alliances, and disagreements among negotiating blocs and parties. The insights provided were complemented by interviews with negotiators (who wished to remain anonymous) and representatives of civil society organizations, think tanks, and international organizations, which provided interpretive insights into the dynamics within the Arab states and the informal decision-making processes that are not always visible in official records.
The new NDC commitments
From the start, the NDCs were not up to expectations: Some were submitted later than expected; many were insufficiently ambitious to reach the Paris Agreement’s goal of keeping the long-term surface temperature to 1.5°C above preindustrial levels; one-third of the signatories to the Paris Agreement failed entirely to submit their NDCs. When discussing NDC implementation, several parties identified the major obstacles as limited access to finance through the multilateral climate funds and a lack of local capacities.
Neeshad V. Shafi, expert in climate policy & finance, carbon markets and net zero strategies, reflected on the NDC launch in Gulf countries by emphasizing their already unrealistic and increasingly ambitious goals. For example, the NDCs proposed by Qatar, the UAE, and Oman show an increase in absolute emission reduction. When comparing the numbers across different metrics, the stagnant progress does not match their ambitions.
While ambitious NDCs are a step in establishing the intent to decrease emissions, they are not the silver bullet. Change must address mitigation, adaptation, just transition, and financing gaps.
A packed negotiations agenda resulted in the Global Mutirão decision, which left delegates at a crossroads on the future of fossil fuel phaseout across developing countries generally, and Arab countries specifically. The Global Mutirão is a package of decisions pertaining to Article 9.1, unilateral trade measures, a reaction to the latest NDCs, and the first biennial transparency reports that were issued to raise ambition and decrease the implementation gap. The emergence of the “big four” themes (finance, just transition, global stocktaking, and adaptation) as the primary negotiating bottlenecks for recent COP presidencies reflects various dynamics, including a failure to resolve long-standing gaps between goal-setting ambitions and implementation. While there is general acknowledgment of gaps, parties remain deeply divided on the necessary response. Dr. Wassim Dbouk, from the Southampton Marine and Maritime Institute at the University of Southampton, noted that discussions around the roadmap became one of the most politically sensitive aspects of the conference. Because the proposal was developed outside formal negotiation tracks, many delegations closely monitored whether and how it might appear in the presidency’s political text, and tensions surrounding the issue periodically spilled over into formal agenda negotiation. The Mutirão decision and its consultation space were intended to facilitate a highly ambitious consensus on a coherent package of outcomes that balanced mitigation goals with enhanced means of implementation. Unfortunately, the results are considered weak on both fronts due to significant and unaddressed disagreements and a presidency-led “shuttle diplomacy” approach, which many parties characterized as opaque, which failed to move beyond a lowest common denominator approach.
In that context, Arab eyebrows were raised over the unilateral measures to combat climate change that they saw as discriminatory and restrictive to international trade. One hard truth was flagrant during these meetings: Carbon budgets are rapidly depleting, and the paths for achieving the Paris Agreement are slimmer than ever. On the other hand, the Paris Agreement has been successful in bending the emissions curve, maybe even enough to still hope for a common will to effect change.
On the other hand, the Belém Mission – which includes 29 agenda items covering just transition, adaptation, finance, gender, and technology – aims at tripling adaptation finance by 2035, with developed countries committed to boosting finance for developing countries. This is a highly controversial decision, as such unilateral measures place significant stress on developing countries. Shafi stated that the Belém roadmap was great on paper, but realistically, it remains less likely to be achievable, especially given the US’s exit from the climate space.
Given their transitional nature, Arab countries are among the groups most concerned with this plan.
When assessing the capability to accurately abide by the Mutirão expectations and the Belém Action Plan, Ghiwa Nakat, the Greenpeace MENA Executive Director, emphasized the lack of precision associated with the agreement’s requirements. She stressed the vagueness in implementation associated with the Global Implementation Accelerator and the Belém Mission to 1.5: Both initiatives are voluntary, led outside the CMA (or the Conference of Parties serving as the meeting of the parties to the Paris Agreement), and do not constitute formal negotiating spaces. They remain unclear when addressing forests, fossil fuels, or sector-specific mitigation implementation.
These outcomes could represent a great opportunity for underscoring the role of non–fossil fuel states within the Arab group. They propose a significant shift for chronically underfinanced Arab states like Sudan, Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria. These countries face severe adaptation finance gaps while dealing with ongoing conflicts, collapsed infrastructure, and humanitarian crises. The Mutirão could provide these states with desperately needed resources for water security, agricultural resilience, and clean energy. However, the real test will be whether the mechanism can effectively reach these areas under conflict where traditional strategies have failed, and whether it addresses the political complexities that have historically excluded these states from urgent climate financing resources.
The Arab Region’s Positions Throughout COP30
One Region, Many Voices: The Arab Group’s Unified Call for Justice-Oriented Climate Policy
Throughout successive COP negotiations, the Arab group has maintained a complex and often contentious position shaped by the region’s dual identity as a major fossil fuel producer and a climate-vulnerable region. Historically, since the Paris Agreement, the Gulf states (such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait) leading this group have strongly resisted aggressive emissions reduction commitments, given the importance of oil and gas product revenues to their economies. Simultaneously, the region is highly vulnerable to climate change; it is subject to frequent events of extreme heat, water scarcity, desertification, and sea-level rise. This internal tension between the countries more aligned as oil producers and the more vulnerable countries (Syria, Sudan, and Lebanon), has fragmented the group’s stances at times. From COP7 and COP22 in Marrakech, COP18 in Doha, COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh, and COP28 in Dubai, the Arab group’s positions have evolved as the Gulf states increasingly promoted themselves as leaders in renewable energy and climate solutions, leading to a more impactful role in international negotiations.
Since the beginning of the COP30 meetings, the Arab group was clear on its objectives: Respect the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, focus on reducing emissions rather than sources, and enable a technology implementation program promoting emerging technologies such as carbon capture and storage that would allow ongoing investment in fossil fuels instead of a full transition to green and renewable technologies. ) Indeed, carbon capture and storage occupies a central but deeply problematic role in the Arab group’s mitigation narrative: It is accused of not being a reliable decarbonization technique but instead an alibi that prioritizes economic and sovereign interests over the environment.
When asked about the Arab group's position during previous COPs, Nakat emphasized that the Arab group has remained broadly consistent in terms of its demand for public finance for mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage. She stated that the Arab parties have centered their narrative around the historical responsibility of developed countries, and they oppose explicit fossil fuel phaseout language as their economies are highly reliant on hydrocarbons.
The position of the Arab group reflects a new dynamic among the different Arab states. Indeed, the list of attendees at the COP30 Arab group negotiations table was very different from previous years, forecasting new priorities. A new key player was Syria, with a bigger delegation following the 2025 regime change and its desire to become a key actor in international politics while seeking effective infrastructure reconstruction. Lebanon and Palestine have had a more consolidated and regular presence; they focus on the impacts of war and conflicts, not only climate change. Leading both the Arab group and the Like-minded Developing Countries (LMDCs), the GCC countries presented themselves as the protectors of the rights of countries that are less resourced and less reliant on fossil fuels. However, Shafi noticed that the former COP host, the UAE, reduced their delegation by 60%, as the decision to allocate the location of specific Blue Zone pavilions was highly politicized by the COP presidency. Indeed, the national and organizational pavilions within the Blue Zone serve not only as a space for exhibition but also as an arena for soft power and exercising influence, where governments and key actors showcase strategic partnerships. On the other hand, the UAE has been very active, most notably with climate finance and supporting capital for climate initiatives since COP28. North African countries such as Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco have remained neutral throughout negotiations, given the impact of their political situation on their respective stances. Dr. Dbouk has been attending COP meetings and UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) subsidiary bodies sessions since 2021. He expressed that COP30 felt more political than other meetings, reflecting not only geopolitical tensions and shifts in the global energy order occurring outside the negotiation rooms, but also the growing influence of legal developments following the 2025 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on states’ obligations with respect to climate change.
However, negotiators confirmed that internal differences between oil-producing and non–oil-producing countries have not impacted the Arab group’s bargaining power. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s coordination maintains a strong consensus rooted in the region’s clear overarching priorities: Energy access and sensitivities around energy transition away from fossil fuels; climate adaptation, particularly in the context of water scarcity and different warming scenarios; and climate finance and the legal obligation of developed countries to improve their provision of support. Because these core priorities have not yet been meaningfully addressed within the UNFCCC process, the group remains united. Individual member states’ nationally determined priorities are unlikely to disrupt unity and collective bargaining power until these fundamental regional concerns are resolved.
The Arab group maintained rigid stances throughout negotiations, stressing their refusal of unilateral measures, their desire to reinforce the Baku Roadmap, and their resistance to fossil fuel phaseout language, among other priorities. The debate on fossil fuel transition language was further intensified by a political initiative at COP30 in which a coalition of more than 80 parties pushed for the inclusion of language on a formal roadmap to phase out fossil fuels in the conference’s political outcome. Importantly, this initiative did not originate from a formal negotiating agenda item but was advanced through presidency-led consultations linked to the “Global Mutirão” decision.
Another topic where the Arab group showed consistency and strong stances is gender. Indeed, gender is among the other less publicly underscored yet highly discussed red lines for the Arab group. In that context, the negotiation team was stringent in its refusal to discuss reproductive health and women’s rights in addition to the language associated with the Gender Action Plan.
Shafi mentioned that the rigidity in the Arab group's stances stems from the terminology used in the texts, which might seem at times very activism oriented. These terms are intentionally framed to promote advocacy, mobilize action, and advance a discussion presuming the necessity of eliminating fossil fuels rather than remaining neutral and analyzing the needs of different countries to transition away from oil and gas at their own pace. Terms such as “phaseout” and “unabated fossil fuels” do not land in negotiation rooms without deliberate advocacy, civil society movements, and scientifically informed communities that aim to delegitimize further investment in oil and gas projects. Arab countries have a national identity and reputation rooted in hydrocarbon revenues. In that context, Saudi Arabia and its GCC partners fervently resisted the use of such terms in the final text and instead proposed terms that reflect their own circumstances and sovereign choices. It is important to acknowledge the nuance in intention as the Arab group’s textual rigidity is less a defense of oil and gas per se than a rejection of a negotiating language that conflates urgency with an emphasis on its universality. This goes hand in hand with the rejection of a single narrative and a single pathway to emissions reduction.
A major concern of the Arab group was the underlying understanding of the Paris Agreement, which does not mandate a 1.5°C pathway. Instead, the Paris Agreement invites its signatories to substantially reduce global greenhouse gas emissions and keep global temperatures below 2°C above preindustrial levels and pursue efforts to limit them to 1.5°C above preindustrial levels. Throughout negotiations, the Arab group was reluctant to increase ambition, repeatedly stressing procedural “fiduciary standards” for climate finance rather than higher standards for climate action itself.
This issue came to light on numerous occasions, notably in the context of the Sharm el-Sheikh mitigation ambition and implementation work program, which aims to urgently scale up global greenhouse gas emission reductions and accelerate the implementation of the Paris Agreement. The Arab group joined the LMDCs and the Russian Federation in opposing the Small Island States group, the Least Developed Countries group, the Environmental Integrity Group, and Japan when referencing an explicit 1.5°C goal. On the surface, the main argument provided by the Arab group was the unrealistic attachment to this benchmark that has already been exceeded. Momentum has been building in mitigation negotiations, where all parties were encouraged to set ambitions beyond their current capabilities instead of simply focusing on existing emissions. This trajectory led to a shortened timeframe for implementation means from developed countries, while others were pushed toward greater mitigation efforts.
A similar altercation was observed under the Just Transition Work Program (JTWP), where the LMDCs and Arab group proposed an alternative language based on the referencing of:
[an] inherent connection between pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to well below 2°C and pursuing efforts to limit it to 1.5°C, scaled-up adaptation action, and the fulfillment of developed countries’ means of implementation obligations to enable developing countries to respond to climate change in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication, and recognizes that such outcomes are pursued through nationally determined just transition pathways. )
Dr. Dbouk, negotiating under the JTWP, emphasized the lack of substantive progress since the SB62 meetings in Bonn. At COP30, parties agreed to develop a mechanism to enable equitable and inclusive just transitions, with further consideration of the operationalization deferred to COP31 – an outcome that, in Dr. Dbouk’s view, reflects the largely procedural character of recent JTWP discussions. Although parties and stakeholders have since engaged in consultations, dialogues, and submissions intended to inform the design of the proposed mechanism, Dr. Dbouk argues that these processes leave unresolved a broader structural challenge within the Paris Agreement and the wider UNFCCC framework. While principles such as equity and “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” are widely recognized, Dr. Dbouk argues that the JTWP discussions missed an opportunity to engage directly with how these principles should translate into differentiated obligations or operational criteria for national transition pathways. As a result, Dr. Dbouk argues that discussions under the JTWP have increasingly functioned as another arena in which parties and negotiating blocs advance their positions on mitigation ambition, adaptation priorities, and means of implementation, thereby limiting the JTWP’s ability to build convergence on operational outcomes. In this context, many developing countries, including the Arab group, emphasize that ensuring any future mechanism adequately reflects these principles and provides adequate and reliable means of implementation – including finance, technology transfer, and support for economic diversification – remains a central concern.
Adaptation
When discussing national adaptation plans, the Arab group noted the focus on mobilizing adaptation finance from developed to developing countries while opposing all sources of finance and private finance. At the core of adaptation, the Arab group emphasized the lack of language on unilateral trade measures. ) Nakat highlighted that the Arab group has been more vocal on these measures, framing them as an issue transcending technical trade concerns that threatens their sovereignty, competitiveness, and development.
The Arab group was extremely vocal in opposing the targeting of particular sectors, notably energy, and they openly rejected references to specific decarbonization approaches and long-term strategies during the presidency consultations. For example, Qatar urged the shifting of focus toward low-carbon development in the context of sustainable development. Nakat criticized the performance of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as too hardline when advocating for issues such as adaptation finance and the Paris Agreement’s global goal on adaptation (GGA). She cites one instance where the Arab group refused to engage in talks on an adaptation fund despite the Small Island States and the African group being ready to proceed with their talks, thus disrupting the Group of 77 (G77) and China’s position on adaptation.
Finance
With respect to finance, the Arab group continually called for an action plan based on Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement that would include common accounting methodologies for assessing the implementation of decisions and tripling climate finance outflows. Negotiators working on finance disclosed the near absence of the tripling of adaptation finance from the negotiations table but added that they occupied a great portion of the adaptation discussions. In that case, the finance and adaptation negotiators from the Arab bloc received much praise. From a finance aspect, it has been observed that this COP also served as the culmination of the 2025 joint efforts between the Arab group and LMDCs to create new spaces for discussing important issues, namely establishing a formal process addressing developed countries’ financial obligations under Article 9.1, alongside addressing the implications of unilateral trade measures in the UNFCCC space. Advocacy by the Arab group throughout 2025, building on India’s prior leadership and engagements with other proponents across the G77 and China, resulted somewhat successfully in the creation of a work program that would include Article 9.1.
Throughout discussions, the Arab group’s undisputable red line included the language involving a transition away from fossil fuels, claiming it was “against the spirit of the Paris Agreement.” The Arab group associates fossil fuel with energy security, a concept obsolete to developed countries. In that context, while on the surface one would think the Arab group must therefore reject the science in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reports, in reality, they instead repudiate the speed with which the transition away from fossil fuels is happening outside negotiation rooms. Their rejection nevertheless appears to be a categorical rejection, emphasizing that the matter is “off the table.”
The Arab group also opposed the nature of the technologies supported by developed countries, notably the EU and UK. Gulf economies are highly reliant on fossil fuels; thus, they are natural proponents of carbon capture and storage and clean hydrogen products – emphasis on clean, not green. Indeed, divisions within the Arab group highlight the high fossil fuel dependence within the region as well as the vulnerability and access to capital. As developing countries under the UNFCCC, high-income Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait rejected binding financial obligations, favoring voluntary South–South cooperation and private-sector mobilization instead. On the other hand, middle-income countries that import fossil fuels – such as Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, and Tunisia – supported concessional finance reforms by championing affordable finance and technology transfer. Finally, countries affected by conflict and characterized as highly vulnerable states, including Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Palestine, advocated for climate finance from a standpoint of equity and responsibility, prioritizing grants and adaptation finance instead of loans for loss and damage. These substantially different outlooks toward finance mean that the Arab group advocates externally for conformity in procedural language while struggling at times to propose a unified position on the New Collective Quantified Goal along with other workstreams.
This “COP of Truth,” as COP30 was called by Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, highlighted the growing divergence between developed and developing countries, particularly as some nations classified as part of the Global South possess high economic output. Under the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities,” certain countries felt pressured to lead decarbonization efforts despite their developing-country status. For example, Oman’s funding proposal under the Green Climate Fund faced rejection from developed countries due to its high GDP. The Arab group has strongly opposed this decision.
Arab states that are part of the greater G77 and China group have shown great solidarity with their Global South counterparts, notably by reinforcing demands to scale public finance, predictable support, and historical responsibility of developed countries. The bloc has consistently framed climate delivery as a justice issue and aligned itself with broader Global South coalitions in calling for more equitable access to finance, technology, and capacity-building. For example, finance has been the most visible expression of solidarity, with Arab negotiators strongly amplifying calls for delivery on mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage finance, and resisting attempts to expand the contributor base in ways that dilute developed country obligations. This framing has strengthened the Arab group’s positioning and alignment with the rest of the G77 and China group, especially given that their demands have a greater moral weight in negotiations.
Only 11 Arab states out of 22 have submitted an updated NDC, including Bahrain, Djibouti, Iraq, Morocco, Qatar, Yemen, the UAE, Tunisia, Jordan, Somalia, and Mauritania. This uneven response reflects a lack of trust in multilateralism and international cooperation under the Paris Agreement, stemming from a critical lack of predictable means of implementation; this discourages Arab countries from investing their limited capacities into revising their NDCs without a guarantee that international support will follow. International climate finance exhibits significant shortcomings, as the total amount of finance approved from multilateral climate funds between 2003 and 2021 reached only $1.6 billion for 153 projects. The finance has largely been concentrated in a small number of large mitigation projects and in the form of loans or concessional loans, despite urgent adaptation needs. The limited funding is also highly concentrated, with Morocco (48%) and Egypt (28%) receiving the majority, and Arab Least Developed Countries such as Djibouti and Yemen receiving none, indicating both a small quantity and unequal regional access.
Conclusion
The Arab group arrived at COP30 not as a monolithic bloc with a single agenda, but as a deeply stratified coalition managing three structurally distinct realities under the pressure of one collective identity. Rooted in their reliance on hydrocarbons, Gulf countries sought to preserve economic sovereignty and contain the prescriptive ambition of transition language, while more vulnerable states hoped to express their realities in a negotiation architecture that does not account for countries’ vulnerabilities. In Belém, the bloc secured the removal of binding fossil fuel language, contributed to the adoption of a just transition mechanism, and maintained apparent solidarity with the G77 on finance obligations. These stances reflected a rigorous negotiating discipline that its critics rarely acknowledge. However, it is important to recognize that coherence at the negotiating table is not the same as adequacy for all in the outcomes. Indeed, most vulnerable Arab states witnessed a widening gap between the bloc collectiveness and the urgency to address finance, adaptation support, and a just transition. This divergence remains wide and requires structural reform of both the coalition’s internal dynamics and the multilateral finance architecture.
The significance of the next phase is shaped considerably by the location of COP31: Antalya is set to host. Turkey is connected to the Arab states culturally, politically, and economically, but stands outside the Arab group coalition. As the COP president, Turkey will exercise significant influence over the agenda, the pace of negotiations, and the political framing of key decisions, including the critical follow-through on the Belém commitments on just transition, adaptation finance, and NDC ambition. Managing the relationship with the Turkish presidency while continuing to navigate the bloc’s internal contradictions will therefore be one of the defining diplomatic challenges for the Arab group in the year ahead, and one that will reveal whether the coalition’s Belém discipline was a floor to build upon or a ceiling that marks the limits of what internal heterogeneity will permit.
Key Recommendations
Institutional & Negotiation Capacity
- Enhance negotiation capacity across delegations within the Arab group beyond the current reliance on Saudi Arabia’s technical leadership, enabling a broader set of Arab states to actively shape outcomes and advance implementation-focused commitments.
- Build capacity within national governments by equipping relevant institutions with the technical expertise, data systems, and legal tools needed to participate effectively in international climate negotiations and follow-up processes.
- Establish structured platforms for intra-Arab knowledge exchange, coordination, and position alignment to strengthen collective negotiating stances across finance, mitigation, adaptation, and implementation.
Climate Finance Access & Reform
- Adopt short-term, action-oriented targets with concrete financial figures, clear timelines, and defined impacts across finance, mitigation, and adaptation, with leadership from GCC countries given their financial depth and institutional capacity.
- Strengthen domestic policy and regulatory and monitoring frameworks to translate NDC ambitions into enforceable implementation, particularly by targeting high-emissions sectors and improving measurement, reporting, and verification systems.
- Prioritize transparency by publicly reporting annual progress using verifiable data on platforms accessible to national stakeholders, investors, and international partners.
- Push for reforms of the international climate finance architecture to expand access to concessional instruments that do not exacerbate debt burdens, particularly for vulnerable and conflict-affected Arab states.
- Establish intra-Arab climate finance mechanisms through which wealthier GCC states channel development finance to Maghreb and Mashreq countries for dedicated mitigation and adaptation support, reducing reliance on uncertain international flows.
- Accelerate the development of national legislative frameworks and infrastructure to enable participation in international carbon markets and Article 6 mechanisms.
Regional Political Coordination
- Recognize and articulate the links between regional conflict, political instability, global economic shocks, and heightened climate vulnerability in Arab states, moving beyond narrow climate metrics.
- Treat regional political stability, peacebuilding, and conflict resolution as enabling conditions for effective climate action, investment mobilization, and long-term resilience.
- Maintain coordinated pressure on developed countries to deliver on binding climate finance, technology transfer, and capacity-building commitments in line with UNFCCC principles and equity considerations.
The views represented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Arab Reform Initiative, its staff, or its board.
