What Roadmap for Dealing with Syria’s Disappeared? A Conversation with Luis Fondebrider, One of the World’s Leading Forensic Anthropologists

سجن صيدنايا حيث قُتل آلاف السوريين تحت التعذيب.
Sednaya prison where thousands of Syrians were killed under torture. (c) Mohammad Bash - shutterstock

Luis Fondebrider is a leading Argentine forensic anthropologist. He is a former director of the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team and of the ICRC Forensic Unit. He worked in 60 countries investigating cases of human rights violations. He was a consultant for a number of international tribunals and UN investigative bodies, including the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and UNITAD in Iraq, as well as seven truth commissions around the world. Between 2018 and 2021, he was president of the Latin American Association of Forensic Anthropology.

Question: One of the most pressing and complicated challenges in Syria today is the need to respond to the demands of the families of the tens of thousands of missing and disappeared who want truth and justice. The scenes of joy after the opening of prisons in Syria were quickly followed by scenes of anguish as families could not locate their loved ones. You have worked in many countries on the issue of the disappeared. Are there lessons that Syria can learn from them?

Luis Fondebrider (LF): Absolutely. Countries like Argentina, Colombia, Guatemala, Peru, South Africa, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Iraq have all had to grapple with the legacy of the disappeared left behind by violent regimes. Each case has presented its own set of questions and challenges: How do you investigate past violence? Who should investigate? Where do you draw the line on accountability? What is the role of local authorities and that of international organizations?

The answers and approaches have varied from country to country, depending on local circumstances. So you cannot simply copy/paste models for Syria but you can definitely draw lessons from past experiences to avoid repeating mistakes.

Question: So what are some of the common mistakes to avoid in such investigations?

LF: The first major mistake is excluding the families of the disappeared from decision-making processes. Too often, they’re only viewed as providers of DNA samples or as mere participants in meetings, rather than key stakeholders with a voice in shaping the investigation. So it is essential for the families to play a central role from the beginning. In Syria, the families of the disappeared are well organized and have been demanding answers for years. They not only deserve but have also earned that seat at the decision-making table.

Another mistake is to sideline Syrian expertise and not build on Syria’s existing capacity. Syria has an existing medical and forensic system. It is not perfect, and it clearly needs support and training but it would be a mistake not to center the effort on building a local system.

Question: You mention the essential role of families and civil society organizations representing them. How can their involvement be ensured? And how to overcome divisions that we have seen amongst families in other contexts?

LF: Achieving consensus among these groups will be crucial. Family members must have a meaningful role in decisions, and clear criteria must be set for prioritizing cases. Without broad participation and agreement, the process risks losing legitimacy.

The families’ organizations don’t need to agree about everything but there are a few basic concepts that they can share and agree on. In Peru, when the local Truth Commissions started working in 2001, the families’ organizations created a platform for supporting the investigation on the disappeared, and the platform was very useful to reach consensus and move forward at key stages. Of course, there will always be different NGOs and groups, from families to lawyers, from specific cases to targeted groups, but a basic consensus is possible to reach.

Also, it is essential to better define what “participation” means for the families. A good, and almost solitary example, is Chile. In 2005, a major crisis erupted after a relative of a disappeared, who received the identified body of their loved one, decided to ask for a genetic analysis as she had doubts about the identification. The result indicated that there had been a misidentification and that triggered a national scandal. Former President Michele Bachelet decided to intervene and created an international forensic commission to oversee and review the whole case. I was part of that commission that lasted three years, and from the first meeting, the six main human rights organizations of the families were sitting at the same table as us to discuss and decide what to do. This was an example that strengthened family implication and in the process, the legitimacy of the process.

Question: What role should foreign organizations and governments play in this process?

LF: Foreign involvement must be handled with care. We’ve seen in cases like the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq that external interventions haven't always been beneficial. Very often foreign organizations have their own agendas and tend to undervalue local actors. I often heard international experts issue denigrating comments that local actors “don’t know” or that “they are biased”. However, experience shows that it is the locals who have to do the heavy lifting – especially because international experts often leave after international media and donors lose interest in a particular conflict.

So international efforts should really be focused on building local capacity, especially in forensic sciences. These efforts should include medium- and long-term strategies with the local counterparts that cover rebuilding infrastructure at the Medico-Legal Institutes in Syria, provide training in the country on the process of recovery and identification of human remains, create a Forensic Genetic laboratory, etc. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been doing this for years in Syria and should continue to play this important role.

The key lesson here is to ensure that foreign expertise supports local processes rather than take over decision-making.

There is also a risk of competition or duplication between foreign donors. Effort duplication, unfortunately, is very common in this situation and is not new. We saw it in the Balkans, Mexico, Colombia or Iraq. Governments pay for programs without consultation with others. Forensic teams from different Western countries are sent to assist without coordination among them. How to have a different approach? First, it is important to understand that nobody is the “best” but different efforts are needed and could be complementary. Then it will be important to establish a clear process for coordinating the different efforts.

Question: The UN has already established several investigative mechanisms in Syria. Can you elaborate on these and how they might interact with new local efforts?

LF: Over the last 13 years, the UN has created three mechanisms to investigate crimes in Syria:

  • The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria (2011).
  • The International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism for crimes committed since March 2011 (2016).
  • The Independent Institution on Missing Persons (2023).

While the third mechanism focuses on investigating disappearances, its coordination with the other two remains unclear. If the new Syrian authorities establish a local investigative body, they will need to clarify its mandate and how it will work alongside these UN mechanisms.

The UN has to demonstrate that it really has a medium/long-term strategy for Syria and that it is willing to listen to all the stakeholders living inside and outside the country. At the same time, Syria’s new authorities have to start a dialogue with these UN mechanisms, to coordinate with them and decide which Syrian institution will be their counterpart. This process will take some time. Just to give an example: experience shows us that any new mechanism, be it a Truth Commission or Institute on the Missing, takes at least one year to get minimally organized.  In Colombia, it took almost two years for the Search Unit to be operational. This time was needed to make sure that the institution that was set up was permanent and had autonomy and its own budget.

Question: When it comes to identifying bodies, what are some of the technical challenges involved?

LF: One misconception is that genetics alone can solve the problem. In large-scale cases involving thousands of victims like in Syria, relying solely on genetic matches can lead to false positives – instances where a match appears to exist, but it’s incorrect due to genetic variations. The process is far more complex than what TV shows portray. It requires a multidisciplinary approach involving medicine, dentistry, anthropology, imaging, and genetics. This is in line with guidelines from the ICRC and the UN’s “Minnesota Protocol” on investigating unlawful deaths. You need a multidisciplinary forensic team, with forensic pathologists, forensic anthropologists, forensic odontologists, and forensic images at least, plus a proper infrastructure, Standard Operating Procedures, etc. Also, you will need to create a local Genetic Forensic laboratory as it is not sustainable to simply rely on analyzing samples outside the country.

Another challenge is we often observe a rush to open graves before authorities are in a position to identify the bodies. While opening the graves provides photo opportunities for the media and a sense that something is being done, the remains found often end up stored for years. You need a clear search plan and you need to communicate transparently and consistently about your efforts – including the challenges encountered.

Question: Time is of the essence here. Families are understandably very anxious to have answers. At the same time, we know from past experiences that this process takes time. Based on your experience, what basic steps would you recommend Syria take to handle these disappearances? What can be a road map today?

LF: There are eight essential lessons we can draw from nearly 40 years of investigations into serious human rights violations.

  1. Establish a centralized mechanism with independence and a dedicated budget. This requires a serious dialogue among Syrians and a clear political decision. One of the best models that I have seen in recent years is the Colombian Search Unit, created in 2016 following the Peace Agreement between the Colombian Government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. Today it is composed of 540 persons and covers the whole country with 26 regional offices. It has a team of 96 forensic specialists, and their mandate is to find 110.000 missing persons.
  2. Ensure real participation of victims’ relatives and their representatives in decision-making from the start.
  3. Develop a National Search Plan, specifying objectives, strategy, and instrumentalization.
  4. Open regional offices to facilitate local engagement.
  5. Create a multidisciplinary forensic team combining Syrian specialists and international experts, ensuring proper training for Syrians. This will take some time but we have seen that Syria has an existing capacity to start working with. The training should not just be for the forensic experts, but also you need your entire judicial system – from lawyers to judges – to become more familiar with this.
  6. Launch a national information campaign to educate families and communities about the search process. This process should include going out into Syria’s different regions and reaching out to families.
  7. Protect burial sites and safeguard all conflict-related information. Notably preserving evidence from Syria’s notorious Mukhabarat and prisons is very important.
  8. Build forensic data banks that include more than just genetic data. This will make identifying the remains easier in the future.

Question: How long do you think this process will take?

LF: It’s important to understand that this won’t be a quick process. We’re talking about years, possibly even decades. It requires a long-term commitment from the state and from society. Genetic analysis alone won’t be enough to resolve these cases. A comprehensive, multidisciplinary approach is the only viable way forward. I realize that this is not what families want to hear. But it is very complicated, and it takes time. In Argentina, after 40 years, we are still looking for our disappeared. The situation is similar in Guatemala and Peru.

We can also discuss the process in Cyprus, where there were an estimated 2,000 disappeared. In 1981, both communities with UN coordination and ICRC support, created the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus (CMP). In 2006, the forensic program at the CMP was relaunched and they contracted the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team (EAAF) to train the local forensic specialists from both communities. It took three years to train the local team. Today, Cyprus’ CMP has a very strong forensic team with more than 50 members, their own anthropological lab (one of the biggest in the world), and they have already identified more than half of the disappeared on the island. Perhaps the CMP could be one of the training centers for forensic experts from Syria given their close geographical proximity and their recent experience.

Question: There is the issue of finding and identifying the disappeared. But there is also the issue of obtaining justice for the crime of disappearance. From your experience, how has forensic expertise helped with efforts for accountability?

LF: In Latin America, we say that societies with a history of violence must work on five concepts: Truth, Justice, Reparation, Memorialization, and Non-Repetition. To develop and implement this is a major task that involves the whole of society. It is a long-term process. Forensics is just a small part of this process, and the key lesson here is that to give back the remains of a disappeared has political, judicial, humanitarian, and psychological consequences. It is up to the Syrian society to decide what they want and how they will undertake this journey.

The views represented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Arab Reform Initiative, its staff, or its board.