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Democratic Transitions and the Latin American Military

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One of the main challenges to democratic state building processes in Latin America has been the enforcement of civilian control over the military. The introduction of a reform agenda for the armed services has been particularly critical for democratic forces in transitional periods. This process was delayed by the everlasting military reluctance to civilian democratic control and by the traditional disregard of military issues by democratizing coalitions.

Several studies[1] have been trying to establish the main reasons why it has been so difficult to reach "civilian supremacy"[2] and why military services are so reluctant to democratic government control, railing against key institutional reforms. The accumulated evidence shows that this reaction is the product of a singular combination of peculiar institutional traits and developments that differentiate military institutions from other state and civilian organizations, coupled with idiosyncratic national cultural and political conditions.

In this paper I will present and analyze the key elements that have been facilitating or preventing democratically oriented institutional changes inside the military in Latin America. The reception of a democratic reform agenda inside the barracks, advocated by a decisive civilian leadership, has been conditioned by the nature of the military institutions, their type of relationship with the rest of society, their level of autonomy, the existence or lack of a solid political and substantive leadership, and the changing set of their international influences. I will conclude with five action-oriented recommendations derived from this experience.

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[1] A revision and analysis of the existing bibliography in: Claudio Fuentes Saavedra , *La transición de los militares*. LOM, Santiago, 2006.

[2] Felipe Agüero, *Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy. Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective.* The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1995, p. 11. A full analysis of "civilian supremacy" in chapter 2, "Asserting Civilian Supremacy in Postauthoritarian Regimes".

I. Democratic transition and the Military

In Latin America, military reforms have not been the automatic and mechanical byproduct of national democratization processes. Different types of political democratization occurred in the region. Foundational, transitional and democratizing reforms have been different stages in this process and "elements of all three are typically present in each case"[3]. Therefore, democratization processes are varied, complex and open-ended. They were necessary, but not sufficient, conditions to re-accommodate military institutions into the new democratic state built after democratic transitions.

From their own hierarchical and one-dimensional structure the military used to interact with a myriad of government and state agents and agencies, each one with different agendas. Military interaction with the external environment resulted in a set of heterogeneous, uneven and asymmetrical functional and working relationships. As a consequence, military institutions use to interact and receive from their "significant others"-the diverse civilian political agents-contradictory expectations, demands and regulations.

In this situation, institutional interactions between the military, the state and society became a highly complex matrix with formal linkages between the military and institutions such as the judiciary and congress, and informal interactions with broader social processes and organizations. Even when military services were actually influenced in their institutional development by this diverse set of actors, they were able to absorb all these pressures and redefine them according to their own institutional values.

In this institutional context the key factor in successfully closing the gap between the military and democracy has been a solid and substantive civilian leadership able to translate the democratic agenda to the barracks. And this translation has not been a mere language issue, but the effective implementation of a democratization agenda suitable to respond, on the one hand, to social demands for the political neutralization of these institutions and, on the other, to act in response to the main military institutional development demands.

Military's development demands have been dependent on the type of institutional trends dominating the services. At the same time, the urgency of new democratic governments to introduce important institutional changes in the areas of procurement and budget, education, justice (including human rights), and visions of their international power projection[4] usually clashes with the military's cultural and political organizational inertias.

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[3] Cfr. Manuel Antonio Garretón, et. al., *Latin America in the 21st Century. Toward a New Sociopolitical Matrix*. North-South Center Press, Miami, 2003, p. 49.

Accordingly, democratic reform agendas have been conditioned by the nature of these institutions' separation from civil society, the existing national "collective consciousness" regarding these institutions and the type of their insertion in the state.

2.Conservative and Modernizing Trends

Military institutions, in general and particularly in Latin America, have been insulated or "total institutions". That is, organizations where all individuals' parts of life are subordinated to and dependent upon their authorities, a social microcosm dictated by hegemony and clear hierarchies[5] that usually resent civilian intromission in their internal affairs perceived as alien influences[6].

In this secluded environment, institutional self-images have been frequently justified and organized around transcendental values that transformed the military into an untouchable vehicle and expression of a "national soul", deeply rooted in national history and traditions. In this context its members perceived the military profession as a "transcendental call", the highest service to the motherland.

This institutional self-image has been eroded in the last decades by modernizing tendencies percolated from society, which are closing the gap with civilian institutions. In this new stage, military institutions are more differentiated internally, with a higher division of labor, more skills specialization, with a family life better integrated into civilian circles, and individuals more motivated by self-interest than by transcendental values[7].

The armed forces as institutional complexes are pushed by structural needs to permanently modernize their services. This is especially true considering the high speed in which new technological innovations for the military came out in the last decades. The acquisition of new technologies requires adaptation of old institutional structures and processes to absorb these innovations and to make them functional for an effective military power projection. This "technology thirst" has led to military institutions being better prepared for civilian control and for a democratizing agenda. They are more easily able to synchronize internal institutional changes with those observed in the rest of the state and society. This technological urge uses to vary according to the nature of the individual services, i.e. the air force and the navy leading the process, the army lagging behind.

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[4] The importance of these dimensions in: Felipe Agüero, "The New 'Double Challenge': Simultaneously Crafting Democratic Control and Efficacy Concerning Military, Police and Intelligence", Paper presented at the Third General Assembly of the Club de Madrid, November 12-13, 2004.

[5] Erving Goffman, *Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates*. New York, Doubleday, 1961.

[6] An interesting description of military institutions' characteristic in: Harold Laswell, "The Garrison State", *The American Journal of Sociology*, 46(4), p. 455-468; 1941.

[7] Charles Moskos, Jr., "From Institutions to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization." *Armed Forces & Society*, October 1977.

3. The Military in History

Military institutions are part of society and systemic changes - such as those observed in their government's foreign policy and local political developments - affect military institutions. Similarly, the evolution of national social and cultural institutions has also had significant impact on the armed forces. This societal environment, or national "collective consciousness", expresses the kind of socio-cultural relationship the armed institutions used to establish with civil society and larger social groups[8]. At the same time the main social role performed by the military determines the way that society perceives and relates to the military. This long-term relationship has created what can be called a "collective consciousness" of the military. This has been observed in some Latin American cases where the military played institutional roles and functions different from national defense ones that are commonly accepted by society at large.

This has been the cases of failed states, such as Haiti before the United Nations Mission for Stabilization (MINUSTAH), Somoza's Nicaragua and Balaguer's Dominican Republic, where pre-modern political traditions confined military institutions to being praetorian forces at the services of warlords or caudillos.

Another situation can be observed in those countries where, due to state fragility, the military's institutional strength and its nationwide presence, they replace state functions and roles. Providing common goods and services they actually play the role of a *state by default,* such as in the case of contemporary Cuba, Nicaragua after the end of the civil war, Ecuador during its recurring crises and last years of Fujimori's Peru. Chavez' Venezuela could be evolving in the same direction.

In other countries where the democratic state was unable to project all its power over key institutions, military services emerged as a *counter force,* as an institutional opposition to the formal democratic state, such as in the case of Chile during the 1990-1998 period when Pinochet was still the commander-in-chief of the army and the heads of the Navy and Air Force had been appointed or promoted by him. This situation was supported, at least, by 20% of the population[9]. The other case could be that of Uruguay during Sanguinetti's term (1985-1990).

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[8] I am following the definition of "civil society" as the dense network of intermediate groups and voluntary associations independent from the state.

The political role of the military has been the most common one in Latin America until the 1980s. Military institutions in countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, Peru and Central America permanently played the role of substituting political parties, eroding in the medium- and long-term their professional capacities. In all these cases military institutions expanded their professional roles from national defense to internal order controlling the state and policing their respective societies for long periods. Usually this politicization and policialization of the military occurred under recurrent local crises of hegemony where the armed forces played a "bonapartist arbitrage" role. Paradoxically, this role expansion jeopardized the long-term social stability as it prevented the development of civilian institutions.

Some military institutions in Latin America used to evolve as inward-oriented corporations expanding their roles into civilian realms like the economic and productive sectors. The paradigmatic case is Ecuador. The 1979 Constitution allowed the military to participate in economic development integrating industrial corporations' boards and creating new firms. It is said that this was a condition for their withdrawal from government[10]. They run corporations dedicated to produce ammunition, clothe and shoes for military use, but also an airline (TAME), firms exporting shrimps and bananas and producing cement and car parts, financial institutions (Banco General Rumiñahui), supermarkets and customs. Due to inefficiency and corruption these industries are currently bankrupt. According to the Ecuadorian Ministry of Defense, they had to terminate 19 firms, merging others with the Holding Dine and Andec (among the 500 top firms in Ecuador). Five other firms offered their stock on sale and 28 firms are in a restructuring process[11]. As a result of these non-professional activities "the armed forces like the National Police are highly delegitimized and receive a poor citizen support and confidence due to corruption, smuggling and drug trafficking, fraud, and sales services to oil companies"[12]. To a different extent and proportion this role expansion into economic and productive activities can also be seen in Peru, Colombia (hotels), Chile and Brazil (military industries) and Central America. In these cases state-owned, but militarily-managed firms usually receive subsidies hiding their inefficiencies and generating conflicts with the private sector.

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[9] Cfr. Augusto Varas, Claudio Fuentes y Felipe Agüero, *Instituciones cautivas. Opinión Pública y Legitimidad Social de las Fuerzas Armadas*. Editorial Catalonia, Santiago, 2008.

[10] Cfr. Anita Isaac, *Military Rule in Ecuador, 1972-92*. University of Pittsburg Press, Pittsburg, 1993, p. 140.

[11] http://www.midena.gov.ec/content/view/441/207/lang,es/

[12] http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fuerzas_Armadas_del_Ecuador

Few cases show a combination of professionalization and politicization of the military. Chile was an example. Historically, from the late 19th century on, when the Chilean military army was trained by a Prussian mission, military services were mainly focused on cultivating its functional role as a national defense institution usually under civilian political control. Even during military dictatorship (1973-1990) the armed forces played a supporting role of the military government. They did not run the government as the Argentinean or Peruvian juntas did. Only during a brief period, from 1973 to 1976, the Navy was in charge of Education and Foreign Relations; the Air Force of Labor and; and the Army of political ministries. For the rest of dictatorship, probably due to permanent military tensions at its borders, the Chilean military was forced to play its professional role[13]. This was independent from its support to massive human rights violations by specialized repressive agencies such the DINA and CNI. This professional role was part of the national "collective consciousness" that considered military institutions as crucial to national development. Actually, less than a year after democratic transition the professional role of the military was supported by 80% of the Chilean public opinion[14]. The internal evolution of the military from 2003 up until now and its ambition to be an integral part of the nation made a new and different type of relationship with society possible[15].

Professionalization, politicization and insulation have been the predominant modes military institutions experience in different moments of their institutional development. According to these dominant traits, interactions with the rest of the state and society will be more or less contentious and will condition military reforms. Therefore, in each case a different set of political alliances and skills were required to overpower the military. The key element to all has been the mobilization of democratizing forces around a military reform agenda lead by a genuine civilian leadership able to see a change process within the military through.

4. Accommodation to Democracy

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[13] On the role of the military during military dictatorship in Chile, see: Augusto Varas, *Los militares en el poder, 1973-1986.* Pehuén, Santiago, 1987.

[14] See: Augusto Varas, Claudio Fuentes y Felipe Agüero, *Instituciones cautivas. Opinión Pública y Legitimidad Social de las Fuerzas Armadas*. Op.Cit.

[15] In this respect, see: Claudio Fuentes Saavedra, *La transición de los militares.* Op. Cit.

The likelihood of success of democratizing the military has also been dependent on how they exit their governmental functions and how they accommodate to the new situation after military dictatorships[16].

In Latin America it is possible to identify three main types of withdrawals from government and accommodation to the new democratic situation according to the level of control the military exercised during the transition period:

4.1. ***Autarkic autonomy***.

This has been the cases of Brazil (1985-1994), Uruguay (1985-2004) and Chile (1989-2000), where democratic transitions have been long term processes due to a gradual opening of the political system and a final political overpowering of the military.

In all these cases the military kept a high degree of control over institutional processes and changes; no deep constitutional changes were introduced; military budgets did not dramatically decrease; no main changes in military justice were introduced; and their international relations were not dramatically affected.

During these periods neither the de-politicization of the military was completed, nor was the full civilian leadership on defense and security enforced. Accordingly, the professionalization process of the military was delayed.

4.**2** ***Corporative Accommodation***

Examples for current cases of corporative accommodation include Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru. As a product of intra-elite disagreements and conflicts, military institutions have been partially affected by democratization processes in these countries, but the military has still been able to protect its prerogatives and institutional realms. It keeps relative control over its own institutional changes.

Under these conditions the military remain highly politicized and military reforms are paralyzed or only partially introduced. In some countries, like Ecuador, they engage in independent economic activities expanding their economic roles (as mentioned above) or in other countries, like Peru (2001-2006), they have been able to limit the effects of the investigation and punishment of human rights violation cases. Currently, vice-admiral (retired) Luis Giampetri, an open critic of human rights organizations, is the First Vice-President of the Republic. As a consequence their professionalization process has been delayed.

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[16] An analysis of diverse post-transition outcomes in: Felipe Agüero, “Towards Civilian Supremacy in South America”, in: Larry Diamond, Marc E. Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien, *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies. Themes and Perspectives.* The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1997. See also: Comisión Andina de Juristas, *El control democrático de la defensa en la región andina. Escenarios para una integración civil-militar.* Comisión Andina de Juristas, Lima, 2004.

4.2. *Political Demobilization*

Argentina is the case where there has been a solid civilian political control of the military thanks to constitutional changes, judgment of massive human rights violations and key symbolic gestures from the presidency.

The effect of the Malvina's defeat made a substantial change in military doctrine in both the political and professional field possible since the military could not keep the entire control over its institutional change processes. The consequential democratization process in 1983 and the trial of military personnel due to massive human rights violations (from the 1980s until now) opened the way in 1998 for the comprehensive *Law 24.948 for the Restructuring of the Armed Forces.* This law implied a deep transformation of the Argentina military integrating them into United Nations Peacekeeping Operations; considering Mercosur as a security area; introducing administrative downsizing; making interservice operations and jointness possible; modifying military education; introducing civilian personnel in the Defense Ministry; regulating purchase of equipment; and modernizing the services thanks to the abolition of the draft and the establishment of a fully professional army. The same law included the establishment of a parliamentary committee responsible for the follow-up of these reforms and monitoring its implementation every three months. The economic and political crisis from 1999 to 2002 made the full implementation of this law difficult. However the fact of its approval and its acceptance by the military proves the civilian political control over the services. In 2007 an addendum to the new doctrine was adopted, integrating the defense of fresh water sources as one of the military's main missions.

Uruguay has been a similar case in recent years during the President Tabaré Vásquez government (2004-2009), who changed the autarkic autonomy of the military thanks to a new interpretation of the amnesty law of 1986 (*Ley de la Caducidad de la Pretensión Punitiva del Estado*). This opened the way for investigating massive violation of human rights, for introducing a law on compensation to former military fired during military governments (Ley 17.949, January 8, 2006) and a law giving full power to the president for appointments and nominations of high-ranking officers (Ley 17.920, November 22, 2005).

All these changes made important adjustments in military education and doctrines and tight control over military budget possible and opened the way for participating in international peace keeping missions.

As mentioned before, these accomplishments have been possible thanks to a solid civilian leadership. This leadership has succeeded in translating democratic demands from society into effective reforms of the armed forces, particularly in the human rights field.

5. **Democracy and Political Leadership**

The type of integration of the military into a democratic state has been dependent on effective civilian political control**.** This kind of control refers to the capacity of civilian governments to keep military institutions performing the expected roles as defined by political leaders. As Agüero states, "civilian democratizing elites pursue control over the military and the military resists this pursuit, civilian supremacy will be asserted only as a result of overpowering military resistance"[17].

In cases where this role redefinition has been successful and the capacity of the political leader effectively overpowered military resistance, the civilian political leadership concentrated on the professionalization of the military, meaning the de-politicization of their chain of command and the re-orientation of their mandate from internal order to national defense only. Argentina during President Néstor Kirchner's term and Chile during President Ricardo Lagos' term have been able to conduct these reforms successfully.

In the Argentinean case, "Barely three days into his term, [President Kirchner] forced the resignation of at least half of the military high command by naming loyal but low-ranking generals to head the armed forces"[18]. From 2003 on Kirchner deepened political control over the military through, among other measures, important symbolic acts such as the inauguration of human rights memorials in former torture centers and the elimination of pictures of members of military juntas in all barracks. New and reopened cases of human rights violations have also proved useful for the political demobilization of the military. However, reforms concerning military justice are still outstanding.

The Chilean experience is different from the Argentinean one. At the beginning of its term, President Lagos of Chile affirmed his political control over the military without any constitutional or legal change. Just two months after inauguration, President Lagos publicly and strongly admonished the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces and the director general of the police for a lunch meeting in a restaurant signaling their open disapproval of the President's policies on human rights investigation and of the Pinochet trial after his return from London.

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[17] Felipe Agüero, *Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy. Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective.* Op. Cit.

[18] *Washingtonpost.com*, June 5, 2003

After this unexpected and solid reaffirmation of the presidential authority over the military, no other episode of this kind was reproduced whatsoever[19].

It is only fifteen years after democratic transition, in 2005, that the first important constitutional change regarding presidential political control over the military was introduced into the 1980 Constitution. Thereby, the President regained the capacity to remove the commander-in-chief of military services and of the police, with the limitation to inform the Senate on this decision. The National Security Council was transformed in an advisory board only allowed to come together at the request of the President, which effectively eliminated its former prerogatives.

Not even military governments necessarily had the political capacity as the Chilean president to give a clear signal to the military to return to the barracks. For instance the general Velasco Alvarado, who was head of the army and military junta, did not succeed in keeping the military under control, contrary to his successor, general Morales Bermudez. In sum, the political decision and capacity to overpower military resistance to civilian control played a crucial role in re-inserting military institutions into democratized states and societies.

6 Substantive Civilian Leadership

As important as political leadership, strong civilian leadership also helps to explain successful transition to democratic control over military institutions. Traditionally military services in the region were left without substantive civilian leadership with regard to their main institutional processes, which made them readily available to other's political strategies or isolated from the rest of the state and society.

One of the sources of the everlasting legitimacy deficit of civilian rule over the military in this region has been the weak civilian leadership, especially with regard to substantial institutional and professional issues. This kind of leadership has no substitute for civilian legitimation inside the barracks. Alfred Stepan's testimony in the late 1980s sheds light over this issue: "I asked a former Brazilian General Staff colonel why he thought the civilians had made no progress toward controlling the military since the transition. He said, 'The military have a project and the will. The civilians have neither'"[20]. The importance of substantive institutional leadership is overtly recognized by the military: "Trust derives primarily from a perception of leader competence in essential tasks”[21]. And this competence is expressed in factors such as: vision of what is being attempted; the strategy to achieve it; operations, or the specific tasks to be accomplished; and tactics employed to get things done[22]. The political vision needs to be provided by civilian leadership; strategy and tactics would then have to be jointly discussed and decided upon, under civilian leadership.

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[19] The existence of this policy was paved by previous democratic governments. See: Rodrigo Atria, "Estado, militares y democracia: la afirmación de la supremacía civil en Chile", *Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad*, enero-marzo, 2000.

[20] Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics. Brazil and the Southern Cone*. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1988, p. 127.

There are few examples in Latin America of successful substantive civilian leadership of military institutions. One could be the Brazilian case where, as a result of a long process of institutional changes, a new Ministry of Defense was inaugurated in 1999 and the Brazilian president’s vision for the military was clearly articulated[23]. This vision was updated in August 2006 with the Presidential Decree 5.484.

The other one could be the case of Argentina and the1998 *Law for the Restructuring of the Armed Forces*, as mentioned above, and Colombia under the Uribe administration (2002-2010). The later, supported by Plan Colombia, has been able to improve the level of professionalization of the military to fight guerrillas by keeping political control over military services[24]. President Santos has been continuing this path.

7 International Insertion

The insertion of Latin American military institutions into the international and regional security landscape has been an important factor that helps to understand military reactions towards institutional reforms.

Latin American military services have been confronted with two contradictory types of insertions. One is the multilateral option offered by the UN and the European Union and, the other, is their insertion into US hemispheric security policy. Reactions of governments and military forces in the region toward these alternatives have been linked to their positioning in national and regional contexts.

The US-Latin American relations are characterized by the military aid toward the region[25]. Between 1997 and 2007, the United States gave Latin America and the Caribbean a total of $7.3 billion in military and police assistance. Economic assistance exceeds military aid by only about a third and four Western hemisphere countries are on the list of the world's top twelve US military and police aid recipients in 2005-2007. 75 percent of the military and police aid to the region was dedicated to two drug-war programs and Colombia has received by far the biggest share of U.S. security assistance. Between 1997 and 2007, Colombia's police and military received almost two out of every three dollars in such aid for the entire region - $4.9 billion out of $7.3 billion. The shift to an anti-terrorism mission occurred when the Secretary of Defense made countering terrorism the U.S. military's number-one priority. The Southern Command had to defend its resources and relevance within an internal Pentagon climate in which all non-terror missions were secondary. Before the House Armed Services Committee in 2003, general James Hill, then commander of the Southern Command, stated: "Narcoterrorism is most pervasive in Colombia, [...] Narcoterrorist groups are involved in kidnappings in Panama, Venezuela, Ecuador and Paraguay. They smuggle weapons and drugs in Brazil, Suriname, Guyana, Mexico, and Peru, are making inroads in Bolivia, and use the same routes and infrastructure for drugs, arms, illegal aliens and other illicit activities." Deployment of military bases in Curacao, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Paraguay has been part of these policies.

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[21] Lt. Gen. Walter F. Ulmer, Jr., “Introduction”, in: Lloyd J. Matthews & Dale E. Brown, *The Challenge of Military Leadership*. Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, Virginia, 1989, page xii.

[22] Don A. Starry, “Running Things”, in: Ibid., p. 10-11.

[23] See: Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira, *Democracia e Defesa Nacional*. Editora Manole, Sao Paulo, 2005.

[24] Cfr. Kimberly Stanton, *The Colombian Conflict: Regional Impact and Policy Responses*. A WOLA Conference Report, August 2005.

[25] All the following information as been gathered from: *Below the Radar. US Military Programs With Latin America, 1997-2007*, March 2007, joint publication from the Center for International Policy, the Latin America Working Group Education Fund, and the Washington Office on Latin America. www.ciponline.org/facts

However, some governments in the region have been limiting US engagement with Latin American militaries. Venezuela refused military assistance and ejected the US Military Group from its offices in the Defense Ministry's Fuerte Tiuna headquarters, even before the US government began banning aid to the Chavez government. Other governments have refused immunity agreements to reverse sanctions of the American Service-Members' Protection Act. Paraguay even revoked an agreement granting immunity to US personnel carrying out a series of bilateral exercises. Argentina and Uruguay have reportedly pledged to stop sending military trainees to the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, the successor to the US Army School of the Americas. Latin American countries are increasingly purchasing weapons from non-US sources and there was a generalized criticism and rejection of the treaty on the US-Colombian military bases.

In this context, military cooperation with the US confront Latin American armed forces with the risk of transforming their military roles into internal security forces, policing their societies, politicizing their cadres and facing new periods of de-professionalization. This is the case for the Colombian military that is helping the US military in Afghanistan with eradication programs, which failed in their own country. Military institutions in El

Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala also had difficulties avoiding this effect. The main consequences of US influences over the military have been the "securitization" of the regional agendas, defining key social, economic and political problems, including immigration and populism, as security threats.

Multilateralism and UN peace operations have offered an alternative for professionalization and modernization to the Latin American military, especially since 1999: "Global Peace Operations have grown exponentially since 1999. There are currently a greater number of larger, more robust peace operations underway around the world than ever before. Simultaneously, these operations are typically armed with more ambitious military, policing and political goals than pre-1999 missions. Rapid growth in the number of UN Peacekeeping missions as well as their size means that UN missions now involve more active duty troops globally than the foreign deployments of any country with the exception of the United States"[26].

These ideologically different options open different ways of professionalizing and modernizing Latin American military institutions. They also condition the likelihood to successfully introduce democratization reforms in the barracks.

8. Conclusions

The Latin American experience of enforcing a democratization agenda in military institutions shows that the success of such a transition depends on a variety of factors. These factors represent a mosaic of political, social and cultural variables that create enabling conditions or make the introduction of reforms into the armed forces by democratically elected civilian governments more difficult[27]. The following conclusions, drawn from the Latin American experience, can serve as strategic considerations to bear in mind when undertaking similar reforms in other countries.

1. A Democratizing Coalition

One of the key elements in making a democratic military transition possible is the convergence of all forces around a democratization agenda to overpower military resistance. These forces have to be integrated into a wider democratization alliance including independent international and local civil society organizations[28], political parties, private sector organizations, progressive government technocrats and officials, and international and regional multilateral organizations. This is the coalition that will provide socio-political support to the leading actors making it possible for them to introduce reforms in the barracks.

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[26] Center on International Cooperation (CIC), *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, 2006.*

[27] An interesting agenda in this regard, in: The Gorbachev Foundation of North America and FRIDE, *Conferencia sobre transición y consolidación democráticas. Madrid, Octubre, 2001.* Siddharth Mehta Ediciones, Madrid, 2002, p. 81-91.

[28] I underline "independent" since in some political context the development of civil society could be manipulated by central governments increasing the obstacles for reform instead of facilitating them. Cfr. Quitan Wiktorowicz, "Civil Society as Social Control.

The consensus and coherence of this democratization coalition is crucial. It will have to be an interlocutor as united and as rational as possible for the military institutions that are still powerful despite their missteps. The coalition will have to adapt the national democratization process to the military.

2. *Military Professionalization*

Confronted with large social groups, political organizations and anti-military coalitions, military rule usually ends with the armed forces in bad political, institutional and professional shape[29]. The key element to restore its institutional dignity is military professionalization. A significant consensus should be created around the importance of this institutional center of gravity. Rescuing their professional role in national defense, the democratization coalition should show the military the positive effects of political demobilization and the negative effects of non-professional roles and functions (internal security). The institutional redefinition of the military as a national asset will depend on this demobilization.

Refocusing the military around this professional role requires a clear statement to separate national defense from internal order and other non-professional activities, such as business. At the same time, the integration of military services into the new democratic state and society should prevent the temptation to permit new institutional role expansions in fields other than the professional one.

A civilian leadership on institutional and strategic doctrines is crucial for democratizing the military and synchronizing it with similar processes occurring in the larger society and the state.

3. Military Profession as Occupation

Concurrently with the professionalization, it is important to create an enabling environment for the enlargement of the occupational dimension of the military. This dimension makes a better integration of these institutions within society possible and reinforces the professional role in national defense. On the contrary, autarkic accommodation and unjustified institutional

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State Power in Jordan", *Comparative Politics,* October 2006.

[29] There is an extensive bibliography on this issue. A thoughtful analysis of these historical trends in: Alain Rouquié, *L'état militaire en Amérique Latine.* Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1982.

prerogatives create and deepen the gap vis-à-vis society.

Therefore, integration in society is a key element in re-legitimizing the military after transition. In the new democratic scenario, the armed forces will have to compete with civilian institutions for financial resources. Their level of legitimacy within society will partly determine the level of their annual budget allocation. At the same time, controlling and providing transparency to the military budget is a way of empowering society vis-à-vis the military.

The social demand for democratization has been based on values that crosscut different political alignments, an increasingly globalized phenomenon[30]. The elimination of institutional prerogatives, which introduction stemmed from military dictatorships, is an important part of this new civil-military relation. Punishment of human rights violations; the enforcement of international humanitarian right; reduction and elimination of military justice and military courts to handle actions in the civilian realm; introduction of key changes in military education; and the elimination of independent economic activities are all critical decisions to make the integration of military services in society possible. Curtailing military families' privileges in the areas of health and social security would also help to close the gap with civil society and the rest of public administration.

4. Political control and substantive leadership by democratic forces

One important conclusion from the Latin American experience has been the need to prevent a new cycle of civilian neglect on security and military issues. The democratization of the military can only be carried out effectively if there is a clear political and substantive control by the civilian power.

Political control implies the military's demobilization and the restoration of the full authority of civilians in power to appoint the high command in each of the forces. But this political control would be inefficient if it is not complemented with a substantive leadership for the professionalization of the military provided by the civilian authority. Accordingly, a substantive agenda responding to the institutional development demands of the military should be developed. At the same time, this agenda will be a crucial element in organizing the democratizing coalition.

The strict definition of the role of the military requires an agenda pointing out to specific professional demands such as modernization, jointness and interservice coordination, technological and scientific synergies with the civilian sector, and environment. Similarly, other organizational changes should be implemented that make civilian leadership over military development strategies possible.

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[30] On this type of mobilizations see: Alain Touraine, *Après la crise*. Editions du Seuil, Paris, 2010.

5. Independent International Accords

Finally, military institutional development does not occur in an international vacuum, it is also dependent and affected by foreign affairs and external actors. To lead a military professionalization process and to prevent its political mobilization by external forces it is crucial to scrutinize and modify previous international links and relationships. Democratic civilian authorities should supervise international military relations. The existence of independent, non-ideological and non-political alignments, and international alliances and cooperation is essential in keeping civilian control over these institutions. Supporting the professionalization process through their participation in peacekeeping operations and missions is one way to achieve both objectives.

A diversified and consistent system of international and regional security relations could also help in making these long-term efforts for full democratization of military organizational changes to conduct institutional activities within this new institutions a successful collective accomplishment.